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The former Department of Energy chief commercialization officer talks about the public sector’s role in catalyzing new clean energy.

Vanessa Chan didn’t think she had the right temperament to work in government. After a 13-year stint as a partner at McKinsey, six years as a partner at the angel investment firm Robin Hood Ventures, and four years at the University of Pennsylvania, most recently as professor of practice in innovation and entrepreneurship, Chan considered herself to be an impatient, get-it-done type — anathema to the traditionally slow, procedurally complex work of governing.
But the Energy Act of 2020 had just formalized a new role within the Department of Energy ideally suited to her skills: Chief Commercialization Officer, which would also serve as the director of the Office of Technology Transitions. Who would fill these dual roles was to be the decision of then-incoming Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm, who found a kindred spirit in Chan. Under her leadership, Chan told me, “I found someone who’s less patient than me.”
In her four years at the DOE, the OTT’s annual budget — which she referred to as “literally a rounding error to most people” — grew from $12.6 million to $56.6 million. She leveraged it to its fullest extent, establishing a precedent for the potential of this small but mighty office. Chan spearheaded the “Pathways to Commercial Liftoff” reports that provide investors with a path to market for the most important decarbonization technologies, and announced over $41 million in funding for 50 clean energy projects across all of the nations 17 national labs through the Technology Commercialization Fund.
She also changed the way the DOE, national labs, venture capitalists, and startups alike talk about getting ready for primetime with the Adoption Readiness Level framework, which put a much-needed focus on factors such as economic viability, regulatory hurdles, and supply chain constraints in the same way that the established Technology Readiness Levels, pioneered by NASA, focus on the question of whether a technology actually works.
Now Chan is back at the University of Pennsylvania in a new, extremely apt role: the Inaugural Vice-Dean of Innovation and Entrepreneurship. She’s weaving lessons learned from her time in the public and private sectors into academia, where her goal is to help incorporate real-world skills into the education of engineers and PhD scholars to prime them for maximum impact upon graduation.
“It’s such a disservice if you invent something and it never sees the light of day,” she told me. “So we need to make sure that isn’t happening and we increase our odds of things making it to the market.”
Over two separate interviews, one before President Trump’s inauguration and one after, I asked Chan how her work with the DOE has helped climate technologies move from the lab to the market, the challenges that remain, and what to keep an eye on in the new administration. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
How did you get recruited for this job? Was government work even on your radar before?
No, this was never on my vision board. But the way in which this came about was in 2016, there was a workshop that was being led by DOE on a potential new foundation that was going to be focused on commercialization. And one of my former clients told the person running the workshop, if you’re talking about technology commercialization, you have to talk to Vanessa Chan. And when I was there, I just yapped off about all the issues that I see with commercialization and what the federal government should be doing about it. And I didn’t think anything of it.
And then fast forward to 2020, I get this cryptic email saying, “Hey, the Biden-Harris administration is interested in you.” I spent all the time during the interview [with the Biden-Harris team] going, “Here’s my thing about commercialization, but I don’t think you guys want me, because I’m someone who works really fast. I have no patience for bureaucracy. I like to disrupt. I don’t like the status quo.” And they’re like, that’s exactly what we want.
How did the DOE, and the OTT in particular, really undergo a shift in the Biden administration?
Historically, DOE has been very focused on research and development. And then when the [Bipartisan Infrastructure Law] and [Inflation Reduction Act] got passed, now there was half-a-trillion dollars going towards demonstration and deployment, and it became a lot more fun being the chief commercialization officer.
The mantra that we’ve had is that the clean energy transition — and quite frankly, commercialization — has to be private sector-led but government-enabled. Because in the end, it’s the private sector that’s actually commercializing. It’s not the government. DOD can buy stuff to bring things to market, but DOE, we’re an enabler. And unless the private sector has sustainable, viable economic models, nothing will ever be commercialized.
How does your work intersect with other DOE agencies that are focused on commercialization, like the Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations and the Loan Programs Office?
I worked very closely with all of them. In particular, one of the things that was really important to do was to get us on the same page of what it actually means to deploy technologies. So I quarterbacked an effort called the Pathways to Commercial Liftoff, which OCED, LPO, and any program office that was touching research, development, demonstration, and deployment was a part of.
If we use hydrogen hubs as an example, OCED was given $8 billion towards hydrogen. When we did the hydrogen liftoff report, what we found was a few things. One is that electrolyzer costs are super high, and so we have to be able to drive those downward to make the unit economics work. We have an issue where there is no midstream infrastructure. We also had a chicken-and-the egg, which is pretty classic: No one wants to buy hydrogen until the supply chain is stood up, [but] the supply chain doesn’t want to stand up until they know they actually have offtake agreements.
What we did with OCED was, we took $7 billion to invest in seven hydrogen hubs across the nation, and then we reserved $1 billion to create an offtake demand mechanism. And that’s the first time ever that the federal government has actually focused on a demand activation program.
Have these liftoff reports been well received on both sides of the aisle? Do you think they’ll continue to be referenced in the new administration?
We were very, very, very fact-driven. There’s no policy by design, because in the end it’s all about, what does it take for a technology to make sense, for it to be in the market? So it’s not Republican or Democratic, it’s just — what does the private sector have to do? I’m really hoping they’re not seen as partisan and really more a synthesis of what’s required for the private sector to actually scale technology.
What are some additional successes from your time at the DOE?
An example program is MAKE IT, which is Manufacturing of Advanced Key Energy Infrastructure Technologies, which was a program that we created with OCED in order to figure out ways in which we could try to help bolster manufacturing across the nation. We also have this program called EPIC, the Energy Program for Innovation Clusters, and we have funded over 80 incubators and accelerators across the nation, which are supporting startups.
We’ve created a voucher program for startups and smaller organizations — sometimes there’s very tactical things that they need help on, and they need a small dollar amount, like a couple-hundred-thousand-dollars to tackle that. We’re like, Oh, you need to do techno-economic analysis? We’re going to pair you with this organization here that can do it, and you don’t have to negotiate anything with them. We’re just going to send them the money, you’re given a voucher, and you just call them.
When I talk with venture capitalists, something that often comes up is the difficulty of getting startups through the so-called Valley of Death, the funding gap between a company’s initial rounds and its commercial scale-up. How do you think about the public sector’s role in helping companies through this stage?
First of all, this private sector-led, government-enabled idea around commercialization is really important. And the work we’ve done with Liftoff and how we’ve gotten money out the door has really worked, because for every dollar going out the door from DOE, we’ve seen $6 matching from the private sector. That in itself is showing that there’s a way for the public sector to nudge the private sector to act.
What I’ll tell you, though, is that I think there needs to be a wholesale reframe around how the private sector thinks about investments and the returns that they want on them. Right now, we are in the Squid Games, where everyone is first in line to be sixth or seventh, no one is first in line to be first, second, or third, because they know the person who is first, second, or third is going to lose money. So what we need to do is figure out, how do we have the ecosystem crowdsource the first 10 of a kind, so that we get to the tipping point where the unit economics are working? How do we get the private sector to promise to buy technologies when they’re not quite there? How do we in the public sector help on the back end?
What are other primary barriers to commercialization that you see?
Another big barrier is that the time clock for moving up the learning curve and moving down the cost curve is quite long in some of these hard-tech technologies. And so the challenge is, how do we convince CEOs to make investments in something which is not going to benefit them, but benefit a CEO two or three down the line? Humans just don’t work that way, right? They’re all about earnings per share and quarterly earning reports and so forth.
Now the challenge is, if we don’t do it, then countries like China are going to do it. This is what happened in solar: We invented the technology, but China was willing to take a loss in order to get up the learning curve and drive down the cost curve, and we need to figure out how to do the same.
Have you been in touch with anyone from the Trump administration? Do you know who your successor will be?
No idea. My team didn’t even know who I was until day one. But what I’ll tell you is that OTT has really strong bipartisan support because we’re commercializing technologies, which is creating jobs, and I think everyone understands the importance of this. Also for the [Foundation for Energy Security and Innovation] I was very deliberate with the other ex officio board members to make sure we had a bipartisan board. We have 13 board members that we appointed here at DOE, and I have representation from every single administration since George H.W. Bush, including two Trump appointees.
I really do hope that whoever sits in my seat will reach out, and I left a letter offering that, too. Hopefully they do give me a call because I really want to wish them every success in the work that they’re doing.
What’s it like to be back at the University of Pennsylvania, watching this new administration from a civilian perspective?
This was the best job ever, so I’m just sad in general to not be at the Department of Energy because I really enjoyed the work that we were doing there. A lot of the money from the BIL and IRA were used to catalyze many, many red states. I am hopeful that people in power recognize this and are going to do right by those counties. Because I think, in the end, what we’re trying to do is really help with American jobs and competitiveness.
Any thoughts on the executive order that’s frozen disbursement of funds from BIL and IRA?
I don’t know, because I always think it’s not right to be on the outside in, trying to figure out what different executive orders are trying to say or not say. We all have to wait to see how these get executed upon.
What do you think people should be keeping an eye on to gauge the impacts that these sweeping executive orders are having?
In my mind it’s really, is the private sector spooked? Are they going to continue to invest the money that’s needed for these manufacturing plants to continue and so forth? Because in the end, it’s the private sector that actually is driving American competitiveness — the federal government is a catalyst. And so I think what I’d be looking to is the private sector. Are they stopping the momentum that we helped to kickstart?
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The group’s latest World Energy Outlook reflects the sharp swerve in U.S. policy over the past year.
The United States is different when it comes to energy and fossil fuels. While it’s no longer the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, no other country combines the United States’ production and consumptive capacity when it comes to oil — and, increasingly, natural gas. And no other country has made such a substantial recent policy U-turn in the past year, turning against renewables deployment at the same time as it is seeing electricity demand leap up thanks to data centers.
All of this is mirrored in the International Energy Agency’s 2025 World Energy Outlook, released Wednesday, which reflects a stark portrait of how America’s development of artificial intelligence and natural gas has made it distinct from its global peers. In combination, the effects of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act and the U.S.’s world-leading artificial intelligence development have meaningfully altered the group’s forecasts of global fossil fuel usage and emissions.
Much of the report compares two different scenarios for global energy usage and emissions — one looking at what governments are actually doing, and the other at what they say they want to do. The difference between the two is in the pace of the renewables buildout, and especially the pace at which fossil fuels’ place in the energy supply is wound down, if it is at all.
For example, the Current Policies Scenario (the stricter scenario) shows “demand for oil and natural gas continu[ing] to grow to 2050,” while the Stated Policies Scenario, or STEPS (the more optimistic one) shows oil use flattening “around 2030.” But in both cases, “gas demand continues growing into the 2030s, due mainly to changes in U.S. policies and lower gas prices.”

Even in the more optimistic outlook, natural gas use peaks later than it did in earlier forecasts. In 2035, the IEA projects, gas output will be 350 billion cubic meters greater than it projected last year, which is roughly equal to the annual gas production of Texas — and that’s in the optimistic scenario. “Three-quarters of this is for electricity generation, mainly in the United States, Japan and the Middle East, and reflects higher electricity demand and slower progress in adding renewables to the generation mix than projected,” the report says.
But the U.S. is not the whole story — the tide of renewable deployment continues apace. The clean energy analytics group Ember argues that the report’s “downgrades on clean growth in the U.S. are offset by rises in other countries,” especially as electric vehicles grow in popularity everywhere else. While the STEPS forecast shows a 30% drop in renewables capacity compared to last year’s projection in 2035 in the US (and a 60% drop in EVs on the road in 2035), “there are 20% more EVs projected in emerging markets outside China and the renewables forecast was also upgraded outside the U.S,” Ember said in a statement.
Ember attributes this to an “increasing focus on energy security,” with more countries following China in electrifying broader swathes of their economies in order to reduce their dependence on fossil fuel imports like natural gas, coal, and oil — including from the United States.
Similarly, Ember is sanguine about artificial intelligence throwing off projections for the wind-down of fossil fuels, which the IEA has and continues to portray generally as largely a U.S. phenomenon.
The IEA estimates that over 85% of global data center capacity growth will take place in the United States, China, and Europe, and that data centers will be responsible for only 6% to 10% of electricity demand growth in the EU and China through 2030. In the U.S., however, they’re responsible for about half of projected growth.
But it’s not just data centers that are causing the IEA to revise its figures. The IEA upped its forecast for electricity use in 2035 by 4% compared to last year, which amounts to some 1,700 terawatt-hours, a bit south of India’s annual electricity generation today. The group attributes this upward move in its forecast not just to “electricity demand to serve data centres” — which dominates discussion of energy use and climate change — but also to “higher demand for air conditioning in the Middle East and North Africa.”
While the economic benefits of artificial development are still necessarily speculative — with trillions of dollars of investment leading us potentially to a singularity of exponentially increasing technological development, machine-led human extinction, or somewhere in between — the benefits of air conditioning are far less so. With increased AC usage, even as temperature rises, heat-related mortality could fall.
And as the Global South heats and grows economically, its demand for and ability to procure air conditioning will grow, leading to higher energy usage and putting more pressure on the climate. The IEA figures square with another recent report from the climate and energy think tank Rhodium Group, which predicts a rise in emissions after 2060 due to economic development in the Global South.
In short, the energy consumption that feeds economic development all over the world is making the hottest parts of the world hotter while also enabling them to use more energy to cool their homes. At the same time, the richest parts of the world are increasing their electricity usage — and therefore their emissions — in order to develop a technology they hope will supercharge economic growth. The climate hangs in the balance.
After years of planning, the Tropical Forests Forever Facility has so far failed to take root.
In selecting a location for this year’s United Nations climate conference, host country Brazil chose symbolism over sense. Belém, the site of this year’s summit, is perched on the edge of the Amazon rainforest. The setting is meant to foreground the importance of nature in fighting climate change — despite the city’s desperately inadequate infrastructure for housing the tens of thousands of attendees the conference draws.
That mismatch of intention and resources has also played out in the meeting rooms of the gathering, known as COP30. The centerpiece of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s agenda was meant to be the Tropical Forests Forever Facility, an international finance scheme to raise at least $2 billion per year to fund forest conservation and restoration. After an inauspicious launch in which presumed supporters of the facility failed to put up any actual financing, however, it’s unclear whether the TFFF will have a chance to prove it can work.
Deforestation rates have hardly budged globally since 2021, despite more than 100 countries signing a pledge that year to halt and reverse deforestation and land degradation within the decade. The world lost more than 8 million hectares of forest to deforestation last year, causing the release of more than 4 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere — nearly as much as the entire U.S. energy sector.
First proposed by the Brazilian government in Dubai at COP28, the TFFF was devised to deliver a more consistent source of funding to countries in the global south for forest conservation that would not depend on foreign aid budgets or be vulnerable to the ups and downs of the carbon market.
The plan involves setting up a fund with money borrowed from wealthier countries and private investors at low interest rates and invested in publicly traded bonds from emerging markets and developing economies that command higher interest rates. After paying back investors, the revenue generated by the spread — roughly a 3% return, if all goes to plan — would be paid out in annual lump sums to developing countries that have managed to keep deforestation at bay. Participating countries would have the right to spend the proceeds as they choose, so long as the money goes to support forests. At least 20% of the funds would also have to be set aside for indigenous peoples.
Brazil lined up substantial support for the idea ahead of this year’s launch. Six potential investor countries — France, Germany, Norway, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States — as well as five potential beneficiaries — Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Indonesia, and Malaysia — joined a steering committee to help shape the development of the fund. The Brazilian government ultimately proposed a fundraising target of $25 billion from the sponsor countries, with the idea to attract about $100 billion from private investors, for a total of $125 billion to get the fund off the ground.
Once the fund started generating revenue, private investors would be paid out first, sponsor countries second, and forested countries last, with the $25 billion serving as insurance to the private investors should the emerging market bond issuers default on their payments. The fund itself would be managed by the World Bank, while a separate entity would govern payments made to forested countries.
While many in the international environmental community were enthusiastic about the plan — especially as a shift away from controversial carbon markets — some raised alarms.
Max Alexander Matthey, a German economics PhD student studying international finance, first saw a presentation on TFFF at COP29 and was baffled by its simplicity. “If it was that easy to make this 3% on borrowed money, why wouldn’t everyone else be doing it?” he recalled thinking at the time. After digging into the Brazilian government’s financial analysis and doing some of his own, Matthey came to believe that the fund’s proponents had underestimated the risk inherent to the investment strategy, as well as the cost of managing the $125 billion fund, he told me.
The whole reason these emerging market bonds command a higher interest rate, Matthey explained, is because they are riskier. If and when countries default on their debts, whether due to global financial shocks like pandemics or wars, or simple mismanagement, the “free money” available for forests will dry up. “These 3% are not up for grabs,” he told me. “They compensate for actual risk and defaults that will happen over time.”
The TFFF was designed to create an incentive for countries with tropical forests to invest in policies and programs to protect forests — to hire rangers to prevent illegal deforestation, to pay farmers not to raze their forests, to implement fire prevention strategies. “They have to heavily invest,” Matthey told me. “If we as the Global North say, Well, thanks for investing large shares of your budget into rainforest protection, but you won’t get any money from our side because financial markets turned the wrong way, that’s just not how you build trust.”
Matthey outlined his analysis in a Substack post in September with University of Calgary economist Aidan Hollis. They found that the JP Morgan EMBI index, which tracks emerging market sovereign bonds, has seen regular downturns of between 18 and 32 percentage points over the past two decades. In the case of the TFFF, a single 20-point loss would wipe out the $25 billion in sponsor debt “and halt rainforest flows, possibly before they even begin,” they wrote.
The energy research firm BloombergNEF seems to agree. In a report published last week outlining the state of international biodiversity finance ahead of COP30, BNEF forecast there would be “little progress” on the TFFF. “The 3% spread is not a money faucet, but a risk premium; studies on the TFFF appear not to have properly conducted risk analyses,” the report said, warning that in effect, the scheme would eat up development finance just to absorb private investor losses.
Just prior to that report’s release, confidence in the TFFF appeared to dip. Brazil’s finance minister lowered his fundraising ambition for the facility to $10 billion by 2026. A few days later, on the eve of the launch, Bloomberg News reported that the United Kingdom would not be contributing to the fund after the country’s treasury department warned it could not afford the investment, despite its significant involvement in the fund’s design.
Following the launch, Indonesia and Portugal each committed $1 billion, while Norway pledged $3 billion, although only if the fund successfully secures at least $10 billion. France also promised €500 million, or just over half a billion dollars, while Germany said it would contribute “significantly,” although it hasn’t said how much yet. All in all, countries committed just $5.5 billion above Brazil’s own initial $1 billion commitment — with at least $3 billion of that contingent on further fundraising.
Andrew Deutz, the managing director for global policy and partnerships at the World Wildlife Fund, which has also been heavily involved in developing the TFFF, assured me this was not the disappointment it appeared to be.
"I look at what just happened last week as validation that the model can work and that countries have confidence in it,” Deutz said. He pointed to the fact that 53 countries, including 19 potential investors, have endorsed the scheme. “A bunch of sponsor countries who haven’t been that engaged said, We like this idea, and I think that creates the opportunity and the momentum that we can get one or two more rounds of capitalization at least.” Deutz was bullish that Germany would come to the table with a pledge between $1 billion and $3 billion, and that the UK would “get guilted in” shortly. He expects to see additional pledges at the World Bank’s Spring Meetings next April, and a few more at the UN General Assembly next September.
As for criticisms of the fund’s investment strategy, he brushed them off, arguing that the risk was "quantifiable and manageable.” He has faith in the TFFF’s modeling showing that the fund’s managers will be able to earn high enough returns to pay back investors and still generate enough funds to pay tropical forest countries.
Charles Barber, the director of natural resources governance and policy at the World Resources Institute was more cautious on both fronts. “We’re glad it’s got as far as it has, but there’s a whole lot of questions that will need to be answered to really get it up,” he told me. Barber saw arguments both for and against the risky investment strategy, but he was skeptical that a starting point of $10 billion would be enough to attract sufficient private investment or give tropical forest countries enough of an incentive to participate.
Matthey has called the idea of a scaled-down TFFF a “worst-case scenario for everyone involved,” due to the high fixed costs of managing the fund, monitoring deforestation, administering the proceeds, etc. The potential payouts to forested countries would be so diminished as to amount to a “rounding error” rather than a true incentive, he wrote.
Deutz told me the TFFF’s architects always expected there to be a three- to four-year ramp-up period. If the fund gets one or two more rounds of capitalization, “we’ll see if it works — and then, assuming it works, you can keep adding to it,” he said. “This is something new and different, so it might take us a little while to prove it out and for people to get comfortable.”
Leading Light can’t move forward, a legal counsel wrote to state regulators.
Another offshore wind project on the East Coast is being quietly killed.
Legal counsel for the Leading Light Wind offshore project filed a letter on Nov. 7 to the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities informing the regulator it no longer sees any way to complete construction and wants to pull the plug.
“The Board is well aware that the offshore wind industry has experienced economic and regulatory conditions that have made the development of new offshore wind projects extremely difficult,” counsel Colleen Foley wrote in the letter, which was reviewed by Heatmap News. “Like many other industry participants, the Company has faced a series of obstacles in the development of the LLW Project including supply chain, equipment and vendor challenges as well as changing regulatory requirements, to name but a few of the issues the Company has confronted.”
Leading Light was going to be built about 35 miles off the coast of New Jersey. It was awarded a renewable energy certificate from the state in January 2024 and was expected to provide roughly 2.4 gigawatts of electricity to the grid, which would have made it one of the largest renewable energy projects in the country and enough, the developers said, to power a million homes.
That certificate, known as an OREC, came with state financial assistance but also required developers Invenergy and energyRe to meet specific project milestones. Yet in addition to facing supply chain issues both companies had been unable to pursue federal permitting because of the Trump administration’s policy on offshore wind. And for months, they had submitted extension after extension to filing a motion binding it legally to complete construction of the project.
But now Leading Light is dead for the foreseeable future. “The company regrets this decision but does not see a pathway forward for the LLW Project on this OREC award and looks forward to the future for possible solicitations,” Foley stated.
This means New Jersey’s offshore wind horizons are incredibly bleak, especially after Shell dumped its stake in the defunct Atlantic Shores offshore wind project last month. Almost all of New Jersey’s offshore wind contracts have now fallen apart, including those for the Ocean Wind, and there is little chance of Attentive Energy receiving federal permits under the current administration.
Only one project is now set to be operational off the New Jersey coast: Empire Wind. But it’s unclear if Empire will ever provide electrons to New Jersey itself since its only contract is with New York regulators. (It remains to be seen whether Empire’s developer, Equinor, will bid into New Jersey’s markets for the project’s second phase.)
It’s also important to consider the timing. On Nov. 4, New Jersey voters were swept up in a blue wave – but one that didn’t really hit many coastal areas, where a large majority of voters remained in the GOP camp. Republican gubernatorial candidate Jack Ciattarelli focused enormously on fighting offshore wind during his campaign, going so far as to sell anti-wind merch. So one can imagine a world where the coastline was part of a blue wave and an offshore wind developer wouldn’t immediately pull out of the state, but that’s not a world we live in.
When reached for comment on whether the project might still be built, Invenergy simply said, “Please refer to the filing.”
Editor’s note: This story has been updated to reflect comment from Invenergy and clarify Attentive Energy’s current status.
Emily Pontecorvo contributed to this article.