You’ve reached your free article limit
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
Sign In or Create an Account.
By continuing, you agree to the Terms of Service and acknowledge our Privacy Policy
Welcome to Heatmap
Thank you for registering with Heatmap. Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our lives, a force reshaping our economy, our politics, and our culture. We hope to be your trusted, friendly, and insightful guide to that transformation. Please enjoy your free articles. You can check your profile here .
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Subscribe to get unlimited Access
Hey, you are out of free articles but you are only a few clicks away from full access. Subscribe below and take advantage of our introductory offer.
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Create Your Account
Please Enter Your Password
Forgot your password?
Please enter the email address you use for your account so we can send you a link to reset your password:
The former Department of Energy chief commercialization officer talks about the public sector’s role in catalyzing new clean energy.

Vanessa Chan didn’t think she had the right temperament to work in government. After a 13-year stint as a partner at McKinsey, six years as a partner at the angel investment firm Robin Hood Ventures, and four years at the University of Pennsylvania, most recently as professor of practice in innovation and entrepreneurship, Chan considered herself to be an impatient, get-it-done type — anathema to the traditionally slow, procedurally complex work of governing.
But the Energy Act of 2020 had just formalized a new role within the Department of Energy ideally suited to her skills: Chief Commercialization Officer, which would also serve as the director of the Office of Technology Transitions. Who would fill these dual roles was to be the decision of then-incoming Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm, who found a kindred spirit in Chan. Under her leadership, Chan told me, “I found someone who’s less patient than me.”
In her four years at the DOE, the OTT’s annual budget — which she referred to as “literally a rounding error to most people” — grew from $12.6 million to $56.6 million. She leveraged it to its fullest extent, establishing a precedent for the potential of this small but mighty office. Chan spearheaded the “Pathways to Commercial Liftoff” reports that provide investors with a path to market for the most important decarbonization technologies, and announced over $41 million in funding for 50 clean energy projects across all of the nations 17 national labs through the Technology Commercialization Fund.
She also changed the way the DOE, national labs, venture capitalists, and startups alike talk about getting ready for primetime with the Adoption Readiness Level framework, which put a much-needed focus on factors such as economic viability, regulatory hurdles, and supply chain constraints in the same way that the established Technology Readiness Levels, pioneered by NASA, focus on the question of whether a technology actually works.
Now Chan is back at the University of Pennsylvania in a new, extremely apt role: the Inaugural Vice-Dean of Innovation and Entrepreneurship. She’s weaving lessons learned from her time in the public and private sectors into academia, where her goal is to help incorporate real-world skills into the education of engineers and PhD scholars to prime them for maximum impact upon graduation.
“It’s such a disservice if you invent something and it never sees the light of day,” she told me. “So we need to make sure that isn’t happening and we increase our odds of things making it to the market.”
Over two separate interviews, one before President Trump’s inauguration and one after, I asked Chan how her work with the DOE has helped climate technologies move from the lab to the market, the challenges that remain, and what to keep an eye on in the new administration. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
How did you get recruited for this job? Was government work even on your radar before?
No, this was never on my vision board. But the way in which this came about was in 2016, there was a workshop that was being led by DOE on a potential new foundation that was going to be focused on commercialization. And one of my former clients told the person running the workshop, if you’re talking about technology commercialization, you have to talk to Vanessa Chan. And when I was there, I just yapped off about all the issues that I see with commercialization and what the federal government should be doing about it. And I didn’t think anything of it.
And then fast forward to 2020, I get this cryptic email saying, “Hey, the Biden-Harris administration is interested in you.” I spent all the time during the interview [with the Biden-Harris team] going, “Here’s my thing about commercialization, but I don’t think you guys want me, because I’m someone who works really fast. I have no patience for bureaucracy. I like to disrupt. I don’t like the status quo.” And they’re like, that’s exactly what we want.
How did the DOE, and the OTT in particular, really undergo a shift in the Biden administration?
Historically, DOE has been very focused on research and development. And then when the [Bipartisan Infrastructure Law] and [Inflation Reduction Act] got passed, now there was half-a-trillion dollars going towards demonstration and deployment, and it became a lot more fun being the chief commercialization officer.
The mantra that we’ve had is that the clean energy transition — and quite frankly, commercialization — has to be private sector-led but government-enabled. Because in the end, it’s the private sector that’s actually commercializing. It’s not the government. DOD can buy stuff to bring things to market, but DOE, we’re an enabler. And unless the private sector has sustainable, viable economic models, nothing will ever be commercialized.
How does your work intersect with other DOE agencies that are focused on commercialization, like the Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations and the Loan Programs Office?
I worked very closely with all of them. In particular, one of the things that was really important to do was to get us on the same page of what it actually means to deploy technologies. So I quarterbacked an effort called the Pathways to Commercial Liftoff, which OCED, LPO, and any program office that was touching research, development, demonstration, and deployment was a part of.
If we use hydrogen hubs as an example, OCED was given $8 billion towards hydrogen. When we did the hydrogen liftoff report, what we found was a few things. One is that electrolyzer costs are super high, and so we have to be able to drive those downward to make the unit economics work. We have an issue where there is no midstream infrastructure. We also had a chicken-and-the egg, which is pretty classic: No one wants to buy hydrogen until the supply chain is stood up, [but] the supply chain doesn’t want to stand up until they know they actually have offtake agreements.
What we did with OCED was, we took $7 billion to invest in seven hydrogen hubs across the nation, and then we reserved $1 billion to create an offtake demand mechanism. And that’s the first time ever that the federal government has actually focused on a demand activation program.
Have these liftoff reports been well received on both sides of the aisle? Do you think they’ll continue to be referenced in the new administration?
We were very, very, very fact-driven. There’s no policy by design, because in the end it’s all about, what does it take for a technology to make sense, for it to be in the market? So it’s not Republican or Democratic, it’s just — what does the private sector have to do? I’m really hoping they’re not seen as partisan and really more a synthesis of what’s required for the private sector to actually scale technology.
What are some additional successes from your time at the DOE?
An example program is MAKE IT, which is Manufacturing of Advanced Key Energy Infrastructure Technologies, which was a program that we created with OCED in order to figure out ways in which we could try to help bolster manufacturing across the nation. We also have this program called EPIC, the Energy Program for Innovation Clusters, and we have funded over 80 incubators and accelerators across the nation, which are supporting startups.
We’ve created a voucher program for startups and smaller organizations — sometimes there’s very tactical things that they need help on, and they need a small dollar amount, like a couple-hundred-thousand-dollars to tackle that. We’re like, Oh, you need to do techno-economic analysis? We’re going to pair you with this organization here that can do it, and you don’t have to negotiate anything with them. We’re just going to send them the money, you’re given a voucher, and you just call them.
When I talk with venture capitalists, something that often comes up is the difficulty of getting startups through the so-called Valley of Death, the funding gap between a company’s initial rounds and its commercial scale-up. How do you think about the public sector’s role in helping companies through this stage?
First of all, this private sector-led, government-enabled idea around commercialization is really important. And the work we’ve done with Liftoff and how we’ve gotten money out the door has really worked, because for every dollar going out the door from DOE, we’ve seen $6 matching from the private sector. That in itself is showing that there’s a way for the public sector to nudge the private sector to act.
What I’ll tell you, though, is that I think there needs to be a wholesale reframe around how the private sector thinks about investments and the returns that they want on them. Right now, we are in the Squid Games, where everyone is first in line to be sixth or seventh, no one is first in line to be first, second, or third, because they know the person who is first, second, or third is going to lose money. So what we need to do is figure out, how do we have the ecosystem crowdsource the first 10 of a kind, so that we get to the tipping point where the unit economics are working? How do we get the private sector to promise to buy technologies when they’re not quite there? How do we in the public sector help on the back end?
What are other primary barriers to commercialization that you see?
Another big barrier is that the time clock for moving up the learning curve and moving down the cost curve is quite long in some of these hard-tech technologies. And so the challenge is, how do we convince CEOs to make investments in something which is not going to benefit them, but benefit a CEO two or three down the line? Humans just don’t work that way, right? They’re all about earnings per share and quarterly earning reports and so forth.
Now the challenge is, if we don’t do it, then countries like China are going to do it. This is what happened in solar: We invented the technology, but China was willing to take a loss in order to get up the learning curve and drive down the cost curve, and we need to figure out how to do the same.
Have you been in touch with anyone from the Trump administration? Do you know who your successor will be?
No idea. My team didn’t even know who I was until day one. But what I’ll tell you is that OTT has really strong bipartisan support because we’re commercializing technologies, which is creating jobs, and I think everyone understands the importance of this. Also for the [Foundation for Energy Security and Innovation] I was very deliberate with the other ex officio board members to make sure we had a bipartisan board. We have 13 board members that we appointed here at DOE, and I have representation from every single administration since George H.W. Bush, including two Trump appointees.
I really do hope that whoever sits in my seat will reach out, and I left a letter offering that, too. Hopefully they do give me a call because I really want to wish them every success in the work that they’re doing.
What’s it like to be back at the University of Pennsylvania, watching this new administration from a civilian perspective?
This was the best job ever, so I’m just sad in general to not be at the Department of Energy because I really enjoyed the work that we were doing there. A lot of the money from the BIL and IRA were used to catalyze many, many red states. I am hopeful that people in power recognize this and are going to do right by those counties. Because I think, in the end, what we’re trying to do is really help with American jobs and competitiveness.
Any thoughts on the executive order that’s frozen disbursement of funds from BIL and IRA?
I don’t know, because I always think it’s not right to be on the outside in, trying to figure out what different executive orders are trying to say or not say. We all have to wait to see how these get executed upon.
What do you think people should be keeping an eye on to gauge the impacts that these sweeping executive orders are having?
In my mind it’s really, is the private sector spooked? Are they going to continue to invest the money that’s needed for these manufacturing plants to continue and so forth? Because in the end, it’s the private sector that actually is driving American competitiveness — the federal government is a catalyst. And so I think what I’d be looking to is the private sector. Are they stopping the momentum that we helped to kickstart?
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
Fossil fuels are the real October surprise.
This is Heatmap Daily, an evening news digest written by our executive editor. Subscribe here.
At this point, the real October surprise may be the lack of one — because little seems set to change in the U.S. energy economy between now and the midterm elections on November 3.
Inflation certainly isn’t budging. Prices rose 3.7% over the past year, and 0.6% in September alone, according to today’s new government inflation report. That reading was hot — a tenth of a percent above what economists expected.
Surging gasoline and especially diesel fuel prices were to blame. Gasoline prices rose 9.1% last month, which pushed up prices above the economy: Transportation services, a category that includes airfare and Uber rides, increased by 0.6%, while food prices rose by 0.6%. (Read my colleague Matthew Zeitlin on how rising diesel costs can jack up food prices.) Staggeringly, fuel oil prices rose 15.3% — an eye-popping reading for a report where figures are usually in the tenth of a percent.
President Trump seems to be running out of time to repair the U.S. energy economy before Americans elect the last Congress of his presidency. His last-minute deal to free up 2.25 millions barrels of oil from Russia this month — with another 11 million or so to come afterward — seems unlikely to lower diesel prices, given that it represents only a few days of U.S. demand. (The deal has already succeeded in undermining Ukraine, however, and led six Republican senators to rebuke him this week.) Meanwhile, Election Day is in 20 days, and Americans are already voting in 20 states.
This is not how the Trump administration was supposed to play out — at least not according to its proponents. Trump in 2024 ran on taming the energy inflation that had plagued President Biden’s last two years in office. He vowed to “drill, baby, drill” and end Biden’s ambitious climate policies, which he called a “Green New Scam.” He even promised to do the bidding of oil company CEOs if they only steered $1 billion to his campaign.
This flagrant offer of quid pro quo may have mortified some in the industry, but it was coherent with the rest of Trump’s pitch: For more than a decade, he has essentially argued that only by surrendering to the fossil fuel industry, by giving oil and gas companies as much regulatory relief as they can stand, can voters finally escape high energy prices. Trump, of course, cemented this pitch in a typically over-the-top and ill-considered proposal, pledging to cut energy prices in half by 2026 or so. That was never going to happen, and its failure to happen has blown up for the president. But the underlying idea was consistent.
The Trump administration has spent the past two years executing this energy agenda. It repealed large swaths of the Inflation Reduction Act, ending incentives to build new solar and wind farms and terminating consumer-side subsidies for electric vehicles. It rolled back fines and rules restricting wasteful methane pollution. It has effectively eliminated fuel efficiency standards for cars and trucks. And it has declared an extralegal war on the wind industry.
And what has happened? Prices have gone up anyway. Gasoline and diesel are more expensive on an inflation-adjusted basis than they were on the day Trump took office. Now, you might argue that this surge is unrelated to the underlying policy, and that gasoline and diesel prices have surged because of the fallout from Trump’s war in Iran — not his domestic energy policy.
But the Iran crisis reveals the problem that Trump would have faced in any event: Oil prices are set on the global market, and neither the domestic oil industry nor the federal government possess the capacity to swing America’s production or consumption enough to affect those prices. Trump’s presidency, in other words, would always have been held hostage by the global energy markets — just as Biden’s was before him.
There is a deeper lesson here: The fossil fuel industry cannot guarantee low prices for consumers in the enduring way that Trump has promised — even if you give it all the regulatory relief that it demands. Nor can the oil, gasoline, and diesel markets deliver the deep energy security or economic stability that American policymakers want — or that voters desire. Trump’s war on Iran has continually been undermined by the American economy’s exposure to crude oil prices; the president is now compromising Ukraine’s defense in order to secure a dubiously small amount of crude. Fossil fuels remain America’s soft underbelly. Policymakers will keep getting poked until the country diversifies its energy system.
Even the smallest wave, tidal, and river-current projects are currently licensed as if they were 1,000-megawatt dams.
Tucked inside the Senate’s ambitious new permitting bill, the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act, is a major win for an energy technology that often flies under the radar: marine power. Small-scale wave, tidal, and river-current projects could help power everything from remote communities and military installations to ocean sensors and coastal desalination systems — at least in theory.
Drawing largely from the bipartisan FLOWS Act, introduced in the Senate last December but never brought to a floor vote, BAAJA aims to streamline the licensing pathway for so-called micro hydrokinetic projects, which harness moving water without dams or reservoirs and have a capacity of 5 megawatts or less. The bill would give the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission one year to act on commercial license applications for these projects, while exempting them from full review under the National Environmental Policy Act. It would also allow FERC to issue 10- to 20-year licenses, giving projects a pathway to long-term commercial operation, as opposed to relying on pilot licenses designed for temporary testing.
The bill wouldn’t eliminate environmental oversight altogether. Small-scale marine energy projects would still undergo basic environmental screenings as a part of FERC licensing, and would still require state and local permits, which can trigger their own environmental reviews. They’d also remain subject to the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act — though the bill would expedite reviews under both of those laws, too. On the whole, the reforms are intended to give developers and investors alike a quicker, more predictable timeline.
“Taking a 1-megawatt marine energy project and trying to license it like it’s a 1,000-megawatt conventional dam just wasn’t working. It was apples to oranges,” Matthew Allen, senior director of legislative affairs at the National Hydropower Association, told me. “Recognizing that it deserves its own process could be a tremendous market signal for the technology.”
After all, this tech certainly doesn’t look like large-scale hydropower, where colossal dams unleash thousands of tons of water per second that rush through electricity-generating turbines to the river below. Such gargantuan infrastructure projects typically require favorable geography — think big rivers running through steep, mountainous terrain, where a dam can create a sharp drop in elevation. And with most of the best sites in the U.S. already developed, the country is unlikely to build many new greenfield hydro projects anytime soon.
But less-developed marine energy technologies have barely scratched the surface of their potential. Some look like large buoys, bobbing with the ocean swells and converting that motion into electricity. Others use turbines anchored to the seafloor or riverbed, spinning as tides ebb and flow or river currents rush past. While these devices generate essentially zero power for the grid today, in theory the resource is enormous: The National Renewable Energy Laboratory estimates that wave, tidal, and river-current projects have the technical potential to generate a staggering 2,300 terawatt-hours of electricity annually — more than half of the country’s total electricity generation last year. Wave energy alone accounts for about 60% of that number.
Of course, technical potential is a long way from practical reality. Economic constraints, environmental regulations, competing water uses, and public acceptance could limit uptake of these technologies. NREL suggests that we would be lucky to eventually tap even 10% of marine energy’s potential. Meanwhile, most of the tech remains in the pilot or demonstration stage in the U.S. — which is exactly why expediting permitting for small-scale projects stands to have significant impact.
“Marine energy is so new and still so novel that a 5-megawatt device, it doesn’t even exist right now,” Jennifer Garson, former director of the Water Power Technologies Office during the Biden administration, told me. “So you’re still talking about a good amount of headroom for being able to deploy smaller-scale marine energy devices in rivers and nearshore.”
Early deployments have largely served remote or island communities. In the 70-person Alaska Native village of Igiugig, for example, Ocean Renewable Power Company installed two 35-kilowatt turbine systems on a local riverbed, designed to supply nearly half the village’s power and thus reduce reliance on expensive diesel generators. While the project’s pilot license expires in three years, the permitting bill could offer a pathway to continued power generation.
The lack of a commercial licensing pathway has already led to the demise of one promising project, National Hydropower Association senior program manager Kelly Rogers told me. Verdant Power’s tidal energy pilot in New York City’s East River — the first project of its type to receive a license in the U.S. — officially shuttered in 2021 when said pilot license expired. By then, its turbines had delivered over 312 megawatt-hours of total electricity to the grid, harnessing the tides as they flowed in and out of the saltwater channel.
Other companies in this space include wave energy startups Oscilla Power and CalWave, which make surface-floating and submerged wave energy converters, respectively, with the goal of selling to utility customers and remote communities alike. C-Power, another early-stage wave energy company, is focused on powering off-grid equipment like ocean sensors. And while all have received at least some venture backing, a significant portion of their funding comes from Department of Energy grants.
In 2022, all three received DOE funding to trial their tech at PacWave, an Oregon-based facility that’s the first grid-connected wave energy test site in the continental U.S. Backed by the DOE, the facility secured all its necessary state and federal approvals in advance so that companies working there could largely bypass the permitting process and get their tech straight into the water. But getting there, Garson told me, involved an arduous 15 years of negotiations among the DOE, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, and state and local authorities before the facility could open for testing this August.
The permitting bill can only do so much to accelerate a permitting process like this, Garson explained. Even with a faster FERC licensing process, all projects in federal waters — generally those more than 3 nautical miles from shore — will still need a separate lease from BOEM, a complex process that the bill’s new permitting pathway wouldn’t replace. “One of the complexities of anything that you do with water is you just have so many split jurisdictional challenges and questions,” she told me.
It’s also telling that as of yet, there are no wave energy devices in PacWave’s waters, as the Trump administration’s federal funding freeze has scrambled the plans of some of the marine energy developers who’d originally intended to test there. Oregon startup AquaHarmonics, for example, was on track to deploy its wave energy converter at PacWave but had to shut down last year after the Trump administration withheld its previously allocated grant money.
“A lot of the device deployments, particularly in the United States, have been contingent on or reliant on federal funding,” Garson told me. “You’re dealing with still such early-stage R&D that it really points to a necessity for the federal government to be in this space”
But while the federal budget for emerging marine energy technologies has generally grown year over year, Garson said relatively little of that money is actually reaching developers. When she was still at the DOE, for example, the Water Power Technologies Office launched a funding solicitation offering up to $112.5 million in total for wave energy companies to test their devices at sea, including at PacWave. But while the DOE was supposed to announce the winners last year, Garson said it has yet to do so — and it’s disbursed no funding, either.
“That’s a long time for a lot of these companies to sit and wait for any funding to even be available,” she told me. CalWave, at least, still plans to hook its system up at PacWave, as the startup’s CEO, Marcus Lehmann, told me the company is “now in the construction phase of installing the first grid-connected system” and that it plans to launch at PacWave sometime in 2027 or 2028.
He sees the permitting bill as “really critical” in helping early-stage projects “get online faster, and just to prove it out on a community level or a microgrid level” before scaling up to larger installations and device arrays that would likely exceed the 5-megawatt threshold.
“Regulatory certainty, particularly when you’re dealing with capital-tight startups — great. Anything that makes their lives easier, I am all for,” Garson told me, calling the existing permitting structure for marine energy “byzantine.” But she doesn’t think that if the bill passes we’ll suddenly see a slew of wave, tidal, and river-current projects coming online. “You’re still talking about relatively small outputs of power until we reach more [technological] maturity.”
But it could certainly be a first step toward recognizing the potential of water power technologies beyond conventional hydropower — and giving them a place in the broader clean energy conversation. “This is a meaningful amount of power to a lot of people. We just tend to get so lost in the gigawatt conversation,” Garson told me.
And while developers do measure these projects in kilowatts and megawatts for now, one day they too could help move the needle at the gigawatt level. As Garson put it, “If we can figure out how to unlock the ocean — power for everybody, everywhere.”
On methane emissions, renewables’ costs, and Poland’s atomic ambition
Current conditions: Hurricane Simon is lingering off Mexico’s coast as a new tropical depression that could form into a powerful storm begins gathering strength • Iceland has issued an orange-level warning — the notch just below the most severe — across the whole country ahead of an intense storm that could bring vicious winds and snow • The mountain areas surrounding Los Angeles are on red alert for wildfires throughout the rest of the week.
Over Labor Day weekend, I found myself on the upper deck of the ferry to Block Island, a rustic little vacation enclave between Rhode Island and New York’s Long Island, marveling at a seemingly endless horizon of spinning wind turbines. Revolution Wind, Orsted’s first big chunk of the Northeast’s offshore wind buildout, was, as its name implied, an act of defiance. The Trump administration had tried for months to kill the project, which was nearly finished when President Donald Trump returned to office last year. But the Danish energy giant won one battle after another in court, and ultimately brought the 704-megawatt turbine array online. Its completion, however, isn’t the end of the fight.
On Friday, the Department of Justice asked a federal court to rescind the Department of the Interior’s approval of a construction and operation plan for Revolution Wind. Citing a regulatory filing, Bloomberg broke news yesterday that the Interior Department wants to reconsider whether the permit complies with federal law. In response, my colleague Robinson Meyer asked last night whether Trump was “trying to blow up the permitting deal,” which includes a whole section on project certainty. (See my colleague Jael Holzman’s reporting on the bill for more.) White House energy advisor Jarrod Agen appeared to suggest the legal move was a negotiating tactic, calling on “the media” to “stop their attempts to blow up a GREAT deal for the American people.” In a post on X, he said, “This is an old lawsuit brought by the local community—who had serious concerns about this project—against the Biden Administration! The White House maintains support for PERMITTING REFORM! We look forward to the Senate voting on this historic legislation.” In a joint statement Senators Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island and Martin Heinrich of New Mexico, the chief Democratic negotiators of the permitting deal, said “the administration needs to start showing good faith progress on wind permits.”
Of the 1,583 executive orders presidents have issued since 1993, 22 explicitly mention coal. More than a third of those bore Trump’s signature. That’s according to a new analysis by the Financial Times, whose reporting found that lobbying by the coal industry has significantly increased in Trump’s second term. “When we would meet with the Biden administration they were like, ‘Let’s just keep that coal in the ground,’” Michelle Bloodworth, chief executive at trade association America’s Power, told the newspaper. “It’s been just amazing, unbelievable to have President Trump and the administration talk so publicly about the importance of coal.”
Meanwhile, there’s an optimistic climate case for fossil fuel that has driven the shift away from coal and reducing America’s emissions. The problem with natural gas has always been that, despite producing less carbon when burned, the drilling and transportation of the fuel leaks methane, a powerful greenhouse gas that stays in the atmosphere for less time but traps more heat throughout those decades. But methane emissions from the U.S. oil and gas sector are remaining steady despite surging production, according to new research by Johns Hopkins University. The study, published yesterday in the peer-reviewed journal Communications Earth & Environment, highlights a big reason: “Companies have built more infrastructure needed to better capture methane — a vital component of natural gas — and transport it for sale as a fuel, providing a financial incentive to limit the amount escaping into the atmosphere.” That’s a double-edged sword, the paper’s author said. “The good news is that emissions have not markedly increased, as many scientists feared would happen after an enormous increase in natural gas production in the decades following the hydraulic fracturing boom,” Scot Miller, an associate professor of environmental health and engineering at Johns Hopkins University who studies greenhouse gases, said in a statement. “The bad news is that oil and gas production is still a large percentage of U.S. methane emissions, and we do not find any evidence that a flurry of federal legislation had an impact on emissions.”

Wind and solar is cheap to build, and even cheaper to operate. But data suggests “there is no meaningful relationship between wind and solar deployment” and lower wholesale electricity prices, according to a new analysis from the consultancy BloombergNEF. “This is also the case when considering all renewable generation, and renewable-plus-nuclear power.” That’s because, in many markets, renewables bid at or below zero, and are thus tapped first. As a result, fossil fuels set the marginal price during the hours when they’re in demand as a dispatchable resource when the sun isn’t shining or the wind isn’t blowing. On average, fossil fuels such as gas or coal set the price in Europe roughly 58% of the time in 2021, despite a declining share of generation. In the United Kingdom, it was around 90% in the early 2020s, but has since shrunk to 60%. In PJM Interconnection, the second-largest U.S. grid system, natural gas set the marginal price 60% of hours last year. A big problem is the high rate at which renewable power plants are forced to reduce output below maximum levels to keep from overloading the grid. Across 27 markets worldwide, BNEF found that the average rate at which wind and solar are curtailed was 10.5% last year. “Indeed, more wind and solar deployment may increase other cost inputs for retail prices unless other fundraising mechanisms are used,” the report warned. “For example, renewables integration is a key driver of grid expansion and reinforcement, for which network charges in consumer bills have been a crucial source of funding in many markets.”
So, when will wind and solar actually start reducing bills? It depends on where you’re talking about. Over the next decade, Germany’s prices are set to fall by 20% below the 2025 average. Britain’s offshore wind and solar buildout are expected to reduce prices by 26% over that same period between now and 2035. Spain, on the other hand, is forecast to see steady power prices over the next few years followed by an increase as its nuclear plants come offline. In the U.S., prices in PJM and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas are set to soar “partly due to the phaseout of wind and solar tax credits” and “delays to new gas-fired capacity and transmission build.” The Texas grid in particular could see prices soar by 160% over 2025 levels by 2035. But the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, the nation’s largest grid spanning the Midwest, and New York’s statewide grid are poised for “a gradual decline from 2026 driven by steady renewable additions, lowering the need for thermal generation.”
Sign up to receive Heatmap AM in your inbox every morning:
The Department of Energy is pumping $581 million into upgrading the Tennessee Valley Authority’s grid system. The agency said Tuesday the funding would support 84 transmission and distribution projects across eight states in the federally owned utility’s territory, adding about 2.5 gigawatts of capacity. While $331 million will go to cost-share programs that require the TVA and local utilities to kick in funding, another $250 million will come as direct federal funding. “America’s electric grid cannot become a roadblock to economic growth,” Katie Jereza, the assistant energy secretary of the Office of Electricity, said in a statement.
When I visited the site where Poland plans to build its first nuclear power station with a trio of America’s flagship reactors, Westinghouse AP1000s, the area was little more than a cleared portion of a rural field on the Baltic Sea, where crews were conducting seismic tests. But as I told you last week, Poland cemented its plans by approving the purchase of long lead-time items. All along, the country had planned to build at least one more atomic power station. At first, the second plant was supposed to be financed with private capital and use South Korean technology. But those plans have largely fallen to the wayside in recent years.
Now the same state-owned firm behind the AP1000 facility has officially committed to building a second plant. The U.S., France, and Canada have all begun bidding to build the No. 2 facility, according to World Nuclear News.
Last month, I told you that the AI energy software provider Verse had tripled that amount of power capacity under its control. Now, I can reveal exclusively for this newsletter, the company is out with a new calculator that shows the potential impact of the data center buildout on Texas ratepayers. Without new power supply, data centers would add $624 per year to the average household’s bills, Verse’s calculations found. But requiring data centers to build their own power would reduce that increase to $35 per year. But data centers that respond to grid demand with flexibility, ramping down when supply when is lower, could actually reduce households' electricity bills by $223 per year. You can play with the calculator here for yourself.