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Patrick Brown claims to have “left out the full truth” in order to get published. But his full story is much more perplexing.

Patrick Brown is a climate scientist at the Breakthrough Institute, a heterodox think tank based in California that advocates for using technology and economic growth to manage climate change. He holds a Ph.D. from Duke University in Earth and ocean science.
Last week, Brown and a team of co-authors published a paper in Nature that found climate change has made it more likely that California wildfires will experience a particularly dangerous kind of event: a moment of rapid, explosive growth. Thanks to climate change, these dangerous events are now 25% more likely to occur, the paper found.
On Tuesday, Brown published a lengthy Twitter thread about his wildfire paper, as well as an article in The Free Press, an online publication founded by the former New York Times columnist Bari Weiss. Now Brown told a different story about his research — a far more negative one. His new paper revealed fundamental problems with climate science, he said, because it looked at climate change alone and not at the role that other factors, such as vegetation change, arson, or forest management tactics, might play in driving wildfire growth.
“I knew not to try to quantify key aspects other than climate change in my research because it would dilute the story that prestigious journals like Nature and its rival, Science, want to tell,” he wrote. “I sacrificed contributing the most valuable knowledge for society in order for the research to be compatible with the confirmation bias of the editors and reviewers of the journals I was targeting.”
These incentives revealed that climate science is now more interested in serving as a “Cassandra” than revealing new information about the world — a tendency, he charged, that can “actually mislead the public.”
Brown’s argument attracted my attention, because I have written about how nuanced and complicated climate science can sometimes be. When President Joe Biden linked the Quebec wildfires to climate change, I expressed doubts about the connection. When Hurricane Ian made landfall in Florida last year, I wrote that hurricanes have a far more complicated relationship with global warming than many believe. And in 2019, I broke the news that a respected team of climate scientists had ruled out some of the worst-case scenarios for rapid sea-level rise this century. I am not, in other words, someone who sees climate change in every shadow.
On Wednesday, I called Brown to talk about his claims, the Nature publication process, and the state of climate science as a field. Our conversation follows below. But I left the interview unsure of why Brown had made such a fuss.
Brown argues that climate science suffers from a serious misallocation of incentives. He says that his paper should have looked at the influence of many factors — such as arson or forest management — in driving rapid wildfire growth. Yet it didn’t. Even though he says these factors can be “just as or more important” than climate change, he declined to study them because the professional incentives pointed against it. Doing so would have detracted from his paper’s “clean narrative” focused on climate catastrophism and made his paper less likely to “pass muster with Nature’s editors and reviewers.”
But after talking to him and reading his paper, a different story emerged. When Brown began his research, he did not actually know that, say, arson or forest management were as important as climate change in driving wildfire growth. What he did know is that it would be complicated — and labor-intensive — to pull out every factor that might influence a wildfire’s growth. So he chose to focus his first paper on what was likely to be the biggest signal: climate change.
During the peer-review process, Nature’s reviewers asked him why he made this choice. It would have been “very difficult” to study those other variables, such as forest management, he replied. “This is precisely why we chose to use a methodology that addresses the much cleaner but more narrow question of what the influence of warming alone is on the risk of extreme daily wildfire growth,” he wrote, adding that he hoped to look at other factors in future research.
Nature’s editors and reviewers accepted this argument in good faith. And Brown did, in fact, begin studying the role of those other factors on wildfires. He claims that newer, unpublished work shows that active forest management can negate some impacts of climate change on wildfire in California, although this finding has yet to be peer reviewed.
When the Nature paper came out last week, Brown was admirably upfront about its limitations. The paper itself cautions that its findings should be interpreted only “narrowly”; Brown stressed on Twitter and in interviews that even though climate change is making wildfires worse, near-term greenhouse-gas reductions will do little to cut that risk. And journalists listened to him. NPR and the Los Angeles Times devoted multiple paragraphs of their stories to that insight and to the importance of forest management.
So I’m left asking: What’s the problem here? Brown had a knotty research problem, and he chose to divvy it up into smaller parts and focus on the easiest part first. He triaged, in other words. When peer reviewers — whom he now claims accepted his paper due only to their “confirmation bias” — pushed back on his decision, he argued against them and said that he would look at other variables later. He kept that promise; he is studying those variables now. When his paper was published, he publicized its findings fairly and accurately. The media covered them with nuance. Where’s the scandal, again? What are we supposed to be mad about here?
Brown seems to have talked himself into the view that he did something wrong, but it’s not clear to me that he actually did. Shorn of his personal example, his Free Press article amounts to a series of gripes about other high-impact climate papers. He criticizes an article that calculated how carbon emissions could hit GDP, but his concerns, while reasonable enough, are hardly an indictment of the field. He complains that journal editors look for “eye-popping” statistics when reviewing papers, but this is hardly a vice unique to climate science. None of what he describes — least of all his own behavior — amounts to an effort to “distort research” or “mislead the public” that he has seemingly alleged.
His critique has found its audience anyway. Since we talked, Brown’s argument has been cited by Fox News, The New York Post, and The Telegraph. “Climate scientist admits editing paper to fit ‘preapproved narratives,’” reads a typical headline. (Brown denies distorting or lying about his results.) The editor-in-chief of Nature, meanwhile, has rebuked Brown and said that the journal is “carefully considering the implications of his stated actions.” During our conversation, Brown lamented that only articles warning of climate change’s dangers ever appear in the media. Now he is receiving a wholly different type of coverage.
Our conversation has been edited for concision and clarity.
I wonder if you could catch me up on what’s happened in the past few days and on the criticism, or the meta-criticism, of the paper that you just published.
If you look at my tweet thread or the press release on the paper, I went out of my way to emphasize the points that I end up critiquing the paper for. I emphasize that in our current phase of research, we’re finding that hazardous fuel reduction treatments might be able to completely overwhelm the impact of climate change on fire.
My argument is that I would very much defend the research overall, but I’m making this commentary on framing it for the journal. What I did when writing with paper, when my goal was to get it in Science or Nature, is very, very common. It’s pervasive. It’s just turning the dials in all these specific ways that end up skewing the public view of the overall situation that we’re in. As a climate researcher, if you want this high-end paper, if you want this paper that’s going to make a splash and help you in your career, your goal is to cut through everything else and use a bunch of sophisticated statistics to find the climate change signal in there.
There’s nothing explicitly wrong with this paper; it’s just what ends up getting communicated at the end of the day. So in this case, you hold everything constant, you only look at this temperature impact, so you’re controlling for other factors — like changes in human ignition patterns or changes in characteristics from fire suppression. Those caveats are mentioned in the paper, so I’m not saying that they’re hidden. But you focus exclusively on climate change and you ignore these other factors that might be important. There’s a firehose of papers like this, but they end up giving a totally overemphasized impression of the climate change impact.
Climate change is this nuanced thing, and it shows up in different ways in the world, and what we know about it is quite nuanced. I think that can absolutely get lost in the loudest parts of the discourse.
I struggle with it. People are coming from such different baselines, where I think some people are of the mindset that we don’t even know if the climate is changing, or we have no idea if humans are contributing to it or something like that. And, obviously, that is completely against what all of the empirical evidence and science shows. For those people, I’d love to convince them of the importance of climate change and the dominant role that humans play in it.
But then there’s this other group of people that I think is misled by social media or certain media outlets, that are under a very misinformed impression about how large changes in weather and impacts on people are at least historically or up to this point. That starts with the journal articles themselves, and I perceived there to be strong incentives to really just focus exclusively on the climate change impact and to play it up more than it deserves to be played out.
I want to talk about that by focusing on this paper. It seems there are these other factors that shape wildfires. You mentioned just now changing ignition patterns, changes in fire suppression, changes in vegetation. I think the way that you just described them is that they “might” be important. The way you described them yesterday is that they’re “just as or more important.”
My first question is: Do we know that? I can imagine that they might be important. But have you done the research to know they’re just as important?
So the paper in Nature was submitted in July 2022, and since I submitted this, I moved on to that question. And we don’t have a manuscript yet, but what we're seeing using the same methodology is that fuel loads just have an enormous impact on fire danger. It’s a struggle to figure out how to model mechanical thinning and prescribed burning, but the results indicate that doing that at least locally can totally overwhelm or negate the climate change impact.
That will be a new paper, but that’s not some new result. If you look at disciplinary journals — it’s not in PNAS or Nature for the most part — that is kind of a consensus, that the fuel component of this is very large. It’s not unreasonable at all to think that a hazardous fuel reduction could overwhelm the impact of climate change.
So, do we know that for sure? No, but that’s one of the points I’m making — researchers aren’t incentivized to write that paper as much as I think that they should be. That’s a paper that's like, We’re going to do the very best we can varying different scenarios of ignition, or how we think ignition patterns have changed historically, or varying different scenarios of fuel buildup based on suppression policies and climate change. And we’re going to do this in a super rigorous, fair way, and we could rank these things or just see the relative influence of those factors. That has a much lower return on investment from the perspective of a researcher. It’s way more work, it’s way harder, and whatever the results, it will be much more equivocal. It’s going to be this super long paper, and it’s going to get bogged down in review.
I want that to be the gold standard. But what I see becoming the gold standard are these papers that are mimicked off of Science and Nature. You have a limit of about 2,000 words and three figures, and it incentivizes you to make this case. You have all of this data that’s messy, and your goal is to find the story and to tell the story with beautiful figures. Inevitably, doing it that way, you have to relegate things that go against your story to the supplements and explain them away. That’s the way that scientific publishing works, at least for these letter-type papers in Science or Nature.
There are two threads here, but I want to stay focused on the smaller one first. I think the way you put it in your thread was that to focus on other factors would “muddy the waters of a clean story” or would decrease the odds that this gets approved by Nature’s editors or reviewers.
Yeah.
But at the time you submitted the study, did we have methods to pull out the vegetation signal? Or the ignition signal?
What I’m doing now is the same idea as trying to pull out the temperature signal. You’re using the variation in space and time to get at the incremental influence of fuels on fire danger. But historically you would’ve had to come up with an estimate of what suppression policies had done to those fuels.
Got it. But at the time you submitted the paper, the work hadn’t been done.
Right. And I would love to have it be the case where as a researcher you could afford essentially to submit a paper and then be like, actually this other [method] is better or something, and then take your paper back. But that is insane, but you would never do that as a researcher. You need publications, and you want to build off the previous one.
I’m asking because there’s a throughline in some of what you’ve written that basically alleges that this kind of science is simply not something that Nature and these high-level scientific institutions are looking for. You wrote, “I sacrificed contributing the most valuable knowledge for society in order for the research to be compatible with the confirmation bias of the editors and reviewers of the journals I was targeting.”
I’m struggling to square that with the fact that the Nature reviewers, who are the people you accused of confirmation bias, directly ask you for this analysis in the peer review. One of them flags that there’s “numerous factors that play a confounding role in wildfire growth that are not directly accounted for, including vegetation, fire management, and ignition.” And another cautions against publishing the study because of methodological problems.
And during peer review, you responded to them, “We agree that climatic variables other than temperature are important for projecting change” — then you name all the factors we’ve been talking about — but “accounting for changes in all of these variables and their potential interactions simultaneously is very difficult. This is precisely why we chose to use a methodology that addresses the much cleaner but more narrow question of what the influence of warming alone is on the risk of extreme daily wildfire growth.”
It seems there’s this motte and bailey here. I understand that a researcher has limited time and they’re going to invest in the most methodologically clear stories. But you’re saying that you “molded” your work to fit the confirmation bias of Nature reviewers. Yet the Nature reviewers actually asked you to do the thing that you’ve identified as the biggest question mark in the article — and when they asked for that, you said it was too difficult. So which is it?
So I think that, that’s very good that the reviewers brought that up. But like I said before, doing that is, then, it’s not a Nature paper. It’s too diluted in my opinion to be a Nature paper.
This is what I’m trying to highlight, I guess, from the inside as a researcher doing this type of research. Reviewers absolutely will ask for good sensitivity tests, and bringing in caveats, and all that stuff, but it is absolutely your goal as the researcher to navigate the reviews as best you can. The file even gets automatically labeled Rebuttal when you respond to the reviewers. It’s your goal to essentially get the paper over the finish line.
And you don’t just acquiesce to reviewers, because you’d never get anything published. You don’t just say, Oh you’re right, okay, we will go back and do that work for five years and submit elsewhere. The reality of the situation is you have to go forward with your publication and get it published. They can ask for legitimate things, and you can kind of hand wave it away, and I don’t think that would work if you were not focused on the climate-change signal alone. If you were only focused on the fuel effect, I don’t think it would even go to review. They would be like, They didn’t consider climate change. That’s the thing we care most about.
I think it’s good that they’re now publishing reviewer comments and retorts, but that is common, absolutely conventional practice. You do what you think you have to do, and you don’t do what you think would take too long or bog it down or end up with a paper not being published.
There’s two different stories there, though. I mean, you write: “To put it bluntly, climate science has become less about understanding the complexities of the world and more about serving as a kind of Cassandra” and that this “distorts a great deal of climate science research. It misinforms the public and it makes practical solutions more difficult to achieve.”
The argument you make in your article is that this is due to confirmation bias and the desire for splash. And the argument you’re making now, which is different, is that the methods on the climate signal are much better developed. That it’s a much clearer thing. It’s what everyone cares the most about, for understandable reasons, and if you’re a researcher, it’s the lowest-hanging fruit, so it’s the easiest and most pressing thing to focus on. But that’s very different from this being about confirmation bias or a tendency toward catastrophism — it’s about researchers trying to make the most of the limited time that they have.
Yeah, I don’t think that they’re that different. I think that the methods are less developed for these other causal factors because of this climate obsession. We know the most about the climate signal, again, because the data sets and the infrastructure are all designed around the climate signal.
So it’s very easy for me to get estimates of the temperature change since the pre-industrial era, and we have all these models, and it’s all at my fingertips. It’s easier, it is the low hanging fruit. But you can imagine a world where in the fire science community, there are resources and databases estimating historical ignitions or other data, like, “this is our year-by-year estimate of fuel loads from 1850 to the present.” Then, that would be the low-hanging fruit. You would have potentially a totally different feeling for what comes out the other end, or what is reported in the media, if those data sets existed.
But the other side of that story is right here, which is that the peer reviewers ask you for that other stuff, and you say it’s too hard. You said it’s “very difficult.” And the other thing you said is that, “Our study shows that large-growth days are predictable using our predictors despite having no other information.” My interpretation is that this leaps out of the data even if everything else is moot.
The predictors include fuel characteristics. There’s nothing in the paper that does long-term manipulation of those, like the temperature or other variables. The models do know certain fuel characteristics, but those have gotten much more sophisticated in the current version of the models.
But back in 2019 or 2020, when you started the wildfire paper, you actually didn’t know about the role of ignitions or vegetation or forest management in driving wildfire growth. You would assume, as I would assume, that these are important factors, but you didn’t know about them. You chose to focus on climate first.
Yeah.
And then you were told to go back and look at the other ones, which you eventually did — that’s what you’re doing now. But at the time, you were like, that’s very hard, so we’re doing this one first. So my question here is: Isn’t this just science working, then? Is that really so scandalous? You picked the highest salience trendline first and then, having found that, went to go study other things.
You could say that that’s science working, but I think that what would happen is that when we start to dilute the climate change story, it’s not a Nature paper anymore. It's not a high-profile paper.
I’m not throwing all of science or all of climate science under the bus. I’m saying, the incentives are aligned to get this exclusive billing in these highest-profile papers and that skews the overall public impression of how large the climate signal is. So yeah, we could go publish another paper, but that wouldn’t have nearly the splash or penetration into the public as this one would have.
I am not sure that's true. I’m also not sure that it seems like nobody has done this vegetation work that you're doing. And when you publish that, it seems like it will be a very important methods paper — and methods papers get cited in some ways more than the high-impact stuff.
I don’t see a story, really, or a narrative getting into The New York Times about how — or especially the Guardian, or someplace like that — about how something other than climate change could be the dominant driver. Maybe I’m wrong, but that doesn’t seem like it would be nearly as likely as focusing on the climate change thing exclusively.
Again, I’m not sure that’s true, but I think that gives away the game a little, because if you’re a researcher trying to publish work that will be highly salient to the public, of course you’ll focus on climate change — the public already cares a lot about climate change. And the public is fundamentally right to care. I even think this whole process has sold your own paper short: If climate change is contributing to these rapid wildfire growth events, that’s a very important finding! Even if it’s not fixable in the near term with emissions reductions. Of course the public cares about it.
There’s a lot in your criticism that suggests certain kinds of analysis are “discouraged” or that certain kinds of questions would not have made this a Nature paper. And I understand you’re just trying to get past the review stage, but the process that was set up to edit Nature did tell you this, and you argued against it. So it’s a little duplicitous to turn around to the public and say, Well, I was only arguing against them because of the incentives.
I realize you have to publish. But when the peer reviewers told you to look at these other factors, you were like, “Oh, it’s very difficult, and climate change is so important that it’s worth pulling out this signal anyway.” And now to the public, your meta-interpretation of your own paper is like, “I wish I had been able to focus on this other stuff.”
But we got it through. Reviewers and editors could say, “No, this is ridiculous, you can’t focus exclusively on the climate change signal.” And they could do that with everything — with yields, with deaths, with fires, with floods, with GDP.
But what I’m saying is that from reading Nature, from reading Nature Climate Change, from reading Nature Communications, from reading Science, from reading Science Advances, I know as a researcher that this is not going to stop my paper. This is what everyone does. So when someone says, look at other factors — which is always what you get in reviews — you just learn to say, that’s not in the scope of this paper, but we can do it potentially in future work. You come up with a reason why you’re not going to do it in this paper, because you need that paper published so you can go on to the next one.
I hear that, but it does feel dishonest to turn around and interpret the paper to the public in this way. You’re not saying, in either the Twitter thread or Free Press article, that “Frankly it was very hard to pull out all these other factors, so we didn’t do it in this paper, but you should know that other factors matter.” What you’re saying is that the entire publication set-up is geared toward producing articles finding a catastrophic climate impact.
I understand you felt you had to just get past the reviews, but you can’t tell a high-impact journal that what they want is too hard, then turn around and tell the public, “Simply put, the incentives didn’t let me do this!”
Yeah, I understand what you’re saying, but what I would say is that there was no pathway for the reviewer to say, “Consider these other factors,” and then for us to do that, and for it to become a Nature paper. There’s no off-ramp there where you say, “Okay, good idea, we’ll go do that.” Your response has to convince the reviewer that you don’t need to do that. That would be a potential way to reform things — if you were able to hold papers in limbo. As a researcher needing publications, and wanting as many high-profile publications as you can, you have to argue with the reviewers and do whatever’s necessary to then get it over the finish line. My larger point is that it’s still the biases of the editors and reviewers that allowed the hand-waving response to get through.
But if you thought that they had made such a valid point that it torpedoed the paper, you could have pulled the paper. You did have options.
Yeah. I could have pulled the paper.
But that’s my point. I’m trying to improve science. And I’m saying, from the inside, that you don’t pull your paper, that’s crazy. You would never do that. Your incentives as a researcher are not aligned with the best knowledge generation for the public. You can say, okay, a more pure scientist would have done that, and shame on me for not pulling the paper, but I don’t think that’s fair, because I think 99.99% of people in my position … this is our job. To argue with reviewers and get papers over the finish line. Especially when nothing is actually wrong. Nothing is explicitly wrong here.
You’ve said that this “wouldn’t make it a Nature paper.” But there was a commentary in Nature Climate Change just yesterday that argued against the assumption that the future will be worse than the present and said that we shouldn’t paint an increasingly dire version of the future.
These articles don’t always get covered in the press, but is this a problem with science, or is it just a problem with the press?
Well, I think that there’s definitely a press issue, and that's a whole separate issue. But yeah, I’m highlighting what I think is a basic foundational science portion of the issue. And there are feedbacks between the two. I think 10 years ago, or 15 years ago, I don’t think there was this alliance between certain celebrity scientists and certain journalists, like — “You journalists will be the PR for my study that just came out, and I’ll shape my study to be the most salient for writing about.” I think that’s a natural tendency for highly motivated and ambitious people.
This question of an “alliance” is an interesting one. Because there’s a very understandable story about the incentives you’re describing. I think it’s good to point out that climate change is where we have the most developed methods, it’s what the public cares about the most, so it’s what you write about first when you start to take a crack on this wildfire problem. And if there are negative consequences that follow from those incentives, that’s quite understandable. But when you talk about an “alliance,” it suggests that there’s this malevolent or highly self-interested conspiracy —
I don’t think that. Just as an example, though, you are being an excellent journalist right now. You are really questioning me, and shaking me down, and questioning all sorts of things that I said. But I did a bunch of interviews on the Nature paper and I got nothing like that. No one ever asked challenging questions. They do this kind of, You are the scientist, you are the arbiter of truth-type thing.
So I notice a difference here — when I am in this role of warning about climate change, I am treated very differently than when I’m in this role of challenging that. And maybe you always do this with all the climate stuff that you cover, but I think that the people on the climate beat should not just be these megaphones for researchers, they should challenge them.
When those reporters were asking you questions, were you going out of your way to say, “Oh, fire management is really important. Actually, how we manage this is really important.”
Yes, I was, actually.
And did it make it into the stories?
Well, the vast majority of the stories I was not interviewed for. There was an NPR story and an LA Times story, and I think my quotes got in there. So that’s good.
That’s good to hear. I’ll be honest that when I saw your Free Press article yesterday, I was pretty taken aback. And it’s because I was looking forward to calling you as an expert during a big wildfire event. But when I call a researcher about a paper, I need them to be honest with me and tell me their full views about it. But if someone says A to me and to my readers, and then they turn around a few days later and say, In fact, I really believe B — I was only saying A because of the incentives, it gives me pause. Because why should I trust you?
I totally understand what you’re saying. Part of this is certainly a confession of personal fault, but in my tweet thread and in the press release, I made sure to emphasize everything I thought was important. If we had wanted it to go viral, I could have emphasized a [high emissions scenario] and made the title that climate change radically alters wildfire growth. But the title was about using artificial intelligence. And in all the interviews I did, I emphasized what I think is the most scientifically interesting part of this, which is that if you put climate change on different wildfires, you get different responses because forests are nearer or closer to these aridity thresholds. I feel no regrets whatsoever about the publicity I did for the paper.
I want to ask you about a few of the ways that Twitter and Free Press readers have interpreted the criticisms you’re making. One reader says you “inflated numbers” in order to get the article published. Did you do that?
No. That sounds like something totally different from what I’m talking about. That sounds like you go into a spreadsheet and change the numbers or something. I’m talking about a much more subtle thing, about emphasis.
Got it. There was a Free Press commenter who walked away from your story and said that you “distorted the facts and lied in order to succeed.” Do you think that’s a fair read?
No — “lied in order to succeed”? No. There’s nothing out of the ordinary or unconventional about this paper. I’m saying the conventions lead to an incomplete picture overall.
Do you understand why people walked away from the criticism you were making with those ideas?
I suppose if you just understand that people are reading things pretty quickly and lightly, but I don't think if you go word by word through my piece, you would see that.
Your piece does allege that the public’s being misled by the incentives here.
I think the overall picture being painted emphasizes climate more than it deserves.
Were your co-authors aware that you were going to use the paper in the way that you did?
I gave some of them a verbal heads up, but they did not see the piece, so this is, 100%, I own it. They are not involved and should not be accused of anything. I wrote the paper, I did the entire analysis, and this is my thing in terms of the opinion piece as well.
Is this really about climate change, or is this really about something that we know happens in every scientific discipline, which is that the most novel, eyebrow-raising papers get into high-impact journals and get the most press coverage? We don’t read about the bulk of the experiments that happen at the Large Hadron Collider, either.
It’s hard for me to judge completely about other fields since I’m not in them, but I would say that the splashiest papers in a non-politicized field are the ones that would go against conventional wisdom or the state of perceived knowledge in the field. I would say it’s the opposite in climate science. It’s all about emphasizing the climate-change signal or the climate-change impact. A lot of climate researchers feel like it’s essentially their job to raise alarm about climate change and emphasize the emissions reduction component.
But climate change is inherently politicized, right?
Yeah.
And the history is that climate scientists are not who politicized it. The reason it’s an especially touchy field is because there was a 15-year effort to emphasize every single error bar, every quibble, every well-founded scientific statement of doubt, to convince the public to doubt the climate-change hypothesis.
I take your point. I don’t know if it’s fair to say — I mean, are you saying that they could be politicized? Because I think it’s still politicized in general. There’s all these values that are taken onboard [by scientists]. There are traditional environmentalist values that impacting Earth is inherently bad, and so we should look for and highlight these bad things. That’s not explicitly, necessarily a partisan, political thing, but it’s an ideology that’s running in the background. It’s different from an ideology that says warming is this much, but it could be overwhelmed or offset by this technology.
I’m not someone who sees the fossil-fuel industry in every failed climate policy. But just as a matter of historical fact, from 1990 to at least 2005, there was a well-funded, highly organized effort to publicize every point of scientific caution to sow doubt about climate change. And yes, climate science was associated with environmentalism through the 1970s and ’80s, but had there not been an organized effort to play up every morsel of doubt in the literature, climate science wouldn’t have been politicized in the same way.
I’m not a historian of that. I take your point.
You’re describing a set of incentives that push researchers to look at climate change first. But if you go to a climate science conference, it’s really different, and you do in fact see ideas in climate science get rolled back over time. Like, in the 2000s, we thought climate change played a much larger role in hurricanes than we do now.
I think that’s a really important point, but I don’t think that that is at all what the public thinks or that’s communicated to the public. I guess if that’s an empirical question, you could do the polling on it, but it seems like, now, to me, it seems like every extreme weather event is covered through the lens of climate change.
Look at Canada’s explosive wildfire year. On the one hand, it’s so out of line with historical norms, it’s hard to see how there isn’t a climate change signal there — on the other hand, it’s so out of line that it’s hard to say what’s going on. So what do we want the public to do here? Because I don’t think every member of the public will be an expert on exactly how climate change drives extreme weather. So is the American public, writ large, sufficiently concerned about climate risks as I understand them? Probably not. Is 5% of the public too concerned? Maybe, yeah. But I also don’t know what’s going to happen in the future.
I’d have to look at the polls. I remember seeing that 42% of young people have some form of climate anxiety every day, which I think is filtered through social media reframing all extreme weather through the lens of climate change, bringing in a very apocalyptic view that I think is incongruent with the data. You think 5% is too concerned? I don’t know. You’d also have to bring in policies, and costs of policies, and the net overall costs and benefits of energy systems and agricultural systems and everything, and that’s just a much more difficult thing to get right.
But the leading candidate for one of the two parties also says climate change isn’t real. So my question would be, are there malicious actors and institutions here? Or is this just an extremely hard, very difficult thing to get right?
I do not think that there are malicious actors and institutions. I think it’s much more just the cultural milieu of institutions. The problems that I’m highlighting, I think there’s just a groupthink that develops, and people not wanting to rock the boat too much, and everyone kind of being on board knowing that, Well, the good side is to raise alarm about climate change and to reduce emissions, and the bad side is to do anything that would be in the other direction of that. And I think that you can make an argument for that, but I think that that ends up distorting actual scientific output.
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Rob sits down with Jane Flegal, an expert on all things emissions policy, to dissect the new electricity price agenda.
As electricity affordability has risen in the public consciousness, so too has it gone up the priority list for climate groups — although many of their proposals are merely repackaged talking points from past political cycles. But are there risks of talking about affordability so much, and could it distract us from the real issues with the power system?
Rob is joined by Jane Flegal, a senior fellow at the Searchlight Institute and the States Forum. Flegal was the former senior director for industrial emissions at the White House Office of Domestic Climate Policy, and she has worked on climate policy at Stripe. She was recently executive director of the Blue Horizons Foundation.
Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Here is an excerpt from their conversation:
Robinson Meyer: What’s interesting is the scarcity model is driven by the fact that ultimately rate payers that is utility customers are where the buck stops, and so state regulators don’t want utilities to overbuild for a given moment because ultimately it is utility customers — it’s people who pay their power bills — who will bear the burden of a utility overbuilding. In some ways, the entire restructured electricity market system, the entire shift to electricity markets in the 90s and aughts, was because of this belief that utilities were overbuilding.
And what’s been funny is that, what, we started restructuring markets around the year 2000. For about five or six or seven years. Wall Street was willing to finance new electricity. I mean, I hear two stories here — basically it’s another place where I hear two stories, and I think where there’s a lot of disagreement about the path forward on electricity policy, in that I’ve heard a story that, basically, electricity restructuring starts in the late 90s you know year 2000, and for five years, Wall Street is willing to finance new power investment based entirely on price risk based entirely on the idea that market prices for electricity will go up. Then three things happen: The Great Recession, number one, wipes out investment, wipes out some future demand.
Number two, fracking. Power prices tumble, and a bunch of plays that people had invested in, including then advanced nuclear, are totally out of the money suddenly. Number three, we get electricity demand growth plateaus, right? So for 15 years, electricity demand plateaus. We don’t need to finance investments into the power grid anymore. This whole question of, can you do it on the back of price risk? goes away because electricity demand is basically flat, and different kinds of generation are competing over shares and gas is so cheap that it’s just whittling away.
Jane Flegal: But this is why that paradigm needs to change yet again. Like ,we need to pivot to like a growth model where, and I’m not, again —
Meyer: I think what’s interesting, though, is that Texas is the other counterexample here. Because Texas has had robust load growth for years, and a lot of investment in power production in Texas is financed off price risk, is financed off the assumption that prices will go up. Now, it’s also financed off the back of the fact that in Texas, there are a lot of rules and it’s a very clear structure around finding firm offtake for your powers. You can find a customer who’s going to buy 50% of your power, and that means that you feel confident in your investment. And then the other 50% of your generation capacity feeds into ERCOT. But in some ways, the transition that feels disruptive right now is not only a transition like market structure, but also like the assumptions of market participants about what electricity prices will be in the future.
Flegal: Yeah, and we may need some like backstop. I hear the concerns about the risks of laying early capital risks basically on rate payers in the frame of growth rather than scarcity. But I guess my argument is just there’s ways to deal with that. Like we could come up with creative ways to think about dealing with that. And I’m not seeing enough ideation in that space, which — I would like, again, a call for papers, I guess — that I would really like to get a better handle on.
The other thing that we haven’t talked about, but that I do think, you know, the States Forum, where I’m now a senior fellow, I wrote a piece for them on electricity affordability several months ago now. But one of the things that doesn’t get that much attention is just like getting BS off of bills, basically. So there’s like the rate question, but then there’s the like, what’s in a bill? And like, what, what should or should not be in a bill? And in truth, you know, we’ve got a lot of social programs basically that are being funded by the rate base and not the tax base. And I think there are just like open questions about this — whether it’s, you know, wildfire in California, which I think everyone recognizes is a big challenge, or it’s efficiency or electrification or renewable mandates in blue states. There are a bunch of these things and it’s sort of like there are so few things you can do in the very near term to constrain rate increases for the reasons we’ve discussed.
You can find a full transcript of the episode here.
Mentioned:
Cheap and Abundant Electricity Is Good, by Jane Flegal
From Heatmap: Will Virtual Power Plants Ever Really Be a Thing?
Previously on Shift Key: How California Broke Its Electricity Bills and How Texas Could Destroy Its Electricity Market
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Robinson Meyer:
[1:26] It is Friday, February 27th. I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News. Since Zohran Mamdani’s campaign in New York City last year, the watchword of progressive campaigns everywhere has been affordability. And now lots of climate groups are getting in on the act too and talking about affordability, inflation, particularly electricity affordability. And this question of, are power bills too expensive and what can be done to bring them down? And I get it. Listen, there were moments last year where electricity prices were increasing twice as fast as inflation, and that was before the tidal wave of new data centers came online. But is it a mistake to anchor climate politics, this big global issue, so tightly to these questions of domestic electricity affordability? Well, joining us today to talk about it is Jane Flagle. She’s done everything. She’s been everywhere, and she’s someone I always like to talk to about the wide world of climate and energy policy. In 2021 and 2022, she was Senior Director for Industrial Emissions at the White House Office of Domestic Climate Policy. She’s since then worked in climate policy at Stripe. She was recently executive director at the Blue Horizons Foundation, and she’s now a senior fellow at the Searchlight Institute and the States Forum. Jane and I have a big fun conversation on this show about two different philosophies of how to run the power grid, what we can learn from Texas and France, at least in the rest of the United States, and whether affordability is the wrong way to talk about climate politics. All that and more. It’s all coming up on Shift Key, a podcast about decarbonization and the shift away from fossil fuels.
Robinson Meyer:
[2:54] Jane, welcome to Shift Key.
Jane Flegal:
[2:56] Thanks so much for having me, Robinson. Great to be here again.
Robinson Meyer:
[2:59] Jane, you’re always someone who I like to talk to who’s thinking about different topics in climate advocacy. We always check in. Now we’re doing it for Shift Key. I’m going to just start off by asking, over the past six months, in some ways since the Mamdani campaign in New York, there has been this massive stampede of advocacy dollars, of progressive communications, of climate communications to talking about affordability. And that’s had some interesting secondhand byproducts. We can talk about how that happened. But do you think it’s a mistake to focus on electricity affordability as much as everyone is now focusing on electricity affordability?
Jane Flegal:
[3:37] Yeah, it’s a good question. I mean, in a way, it’s like it’s about time that the climate community focus more squarely on electricity affordability, not least because, all of our visions for decarbonization depend on rapid electrification of the entire economy, which means that every other sector of the economy then becomes a consumer of electricity. And quite obviously, that won’t happen if the prices of electricity are too high. So A, I think some people have been claiming to be advancing affordability in the climate domain for a long time, but now everyone’s doing affordability.
Robinson Meyer:
[4:17] Everything is an affordability policy.
Jane Flegal:
[4:19] Even if the policy is exactly the same as it was before, before the articulation of affordability as the rationale. And so because I do think that like it is an imperative for like a politically sustainable transition to an electrified economy, and not just an electrified economy, one where electricity is powering significant economic growth and new industries, leaving aside AI, right? This would be a huge challenge for our country.
Robinson Meyer:
[4:48] Right. At the same time, we’re talking about electricity affordability. There’s all this attention devoted to load growth and the fact that electricity demand is increasing. And that would have been happening now anyway, even if artificial intelligence remained a glimmer in Dario’s eye or Sam Altman’s eye, we would still be beginning to grapple with electricity demand growth again, because the reason we haven’t had growth since 2005 is because everyone was transferring from incandescent lights to compact fluorescent lights. Then we had a recession and then everyone transferred from compact fluorescents to LEDs. And now LEDs are, they’re probably in more than half of fixtures across the country. And so we kind of got all the juice we could out of that particular efficiency squeeze. And so we’d be seeing load growth anyway.
Jane Flegal:
[5:36] Totally. And if we are lucky, we will see electricity load growth, right? Both for our climate objectives and for like the functioning of our economy. Like load growth is good. Like it is good. Now, one can litigate the social value of particular industries or the behavior of particular industries, whatever. But as a matter of energy policy, That is just true. So for that reason, I’m sort of like, it is an imperative for all of us who care about climate to make sure that electricity is affordable so that we can electrify everything else. It is also critical that we have a lot of affordable electricity to electrify everything else. And I guess where I feel a little tied up in knots myself right now is like the conversation about what affordability looks like is highly focused, and narrowly focused, I would argue, on this like very short-term acute concern about meeting data center demand and like making more efficient use of the resources we already have to meet that demand. If we weren’t imagining a world with load growth at the scale we want to imagine that might be fine but like.
Jane Flegal:
[6:47] No amount of efficiency, of demand response, of getting more out of the grid.
Jane Flegal:
[6:52] We cannot like VPP our way to 2x-ing the grid in a decade and a half. You know what I mean? So like we are going to have to find a way to thread the needle here between cost constraining measures in the near term, including getting more of what we’ve already built, with the like actual very real imperative to build a lot more stuff very quickly.
Robinson Meyer:
[7:14] Let me go back and just gloss some of what you said, because you said initialisms that I think are familiar to you and me that I would imagine are familiar to many of our listeners, but perhaps not all of them. I believe the big one was VPPs, which are virtual power plants. A virtual power plant, as you could read on Heatmap, we’ll stick in the show notes, and my colleague Katie Brigham’s recent story, is a set of residential rooftop solar panels, residential batteries, residential HVAC systems, residential appliances, maybe EV charging, all strung together in a big software organized system that can respond to either demand fluctuations in the grid or price action in the grid to make sure that all those things are either sucking up power from the grid when it’s cheap or when clean energy is abundant or putting it back in the grid or at least reducing the amount of energy that homes are pulling from the grid during moments of peak stress. And I think what you’re implying is that
Robinson Meyer:
[8:16] We are watching a moment in the electricity sector where gigawatt scale facilities are beginning to come online, where we are going to need gigawatts of new demand to meet growth. And the playbook that is being deployed is one focused perhaps on making sure that we get the most out of all the generating assets, the power plants, the poles and wires, the transformers that are already out there to basically shave those moments of peak demand so that they don’t stress the existing system. And you’re saying, yeah, that’s important. But for the amount of growth that we’re seeing and for the amount of growth that we need to see, we actually need to be ready not just to shave those moments of peak demand, but to grow the grid at an infrastructural level and prepare for serious, serious load growth, which may be the tools that we’re using, such as and Trying to get homes in these virtual power plants, trying to get people to time their EV charging, either through incentives or through software, so that it doesn’t stress the grid at its most congested moments is like not enough to meet the challenge that we’re seeing.
Jane Flegal:
[9:29] Yeah, I think that that’s right. And that’s not to be dismissive of that set of interventions. I just think it is potentially necessary. Although, to be honest, I think there are real questions about the barriers to scale for some of these things. Like VPPs do not exist at the scale that we are imagining them to exist at in the same way that like small modular reactors don’t, right? Like these are all kind of imagined future states. And so like I just get anxiety about betting the climate on like one of those things.
Robinson Meyer:
[9:59] By the time we release this episode, we’ll put out this conversation I just had with Peter Freed, his former head of energy policy at Meta. And one thing he was saying is that all these data centers are basically not preparing to receive power from the grid until 2030. And so they’re all building giant on-site gas generation, basically with batteries to prepare just to be able to operate until they can get a grid hookup. Which number one suggests that a moratorium on data center grid connections would not be a very useful policy because that just means they’re going to burn 100 gas rather than whatever you can public policy your way into making the local grid but number two actually does to me, though, suggest that this set of tools that might be coming on online in 2030, maybe large scale VPPs, but also next generation nuclear, or at least a new fleet of current generation nuclear reactors.
Jane Flegal:
[10:55] Or geothermal.
Robinson Meyer:
[10:56] Or geothermal. Suddenly those tools become things we should be thinking about, because it sounds like 2030 is actually kind of when we will begin to need these tools since data centers
Jane Flegal:
[11:06] Have evidently decided. That really bums me out. That really bums me out. And like, it also goes to the affordability question, right? Like the notion that we wouldn’t take advantage of near-term demand and near-term demand that seems quite willing to pay for energy, that we can’t find some way to like leverage that to do the kind of supply side investments we need to have without having it all be on the backs of rate payers. It actually could be an opportunity, but instead it’s all viewed as downside risk. We could be not just expanding the denominator, but redistributing who actually is paying for this stuff outside of just the rate payers if we were creative here, instead of just being moratorium on great connections or whatever. That’s part of the problem that I’m frustrated by right now.
Jane Flegal:
[11:55] I just think we need much more creative thinking on this set of issues.
Robinson Meyer:
[11:59] So stipulated that this conversation is not so you can announce your big policy playbook of tools and policies that will actually solve these problems, but what kind of policies are you thinking about that would solve these problems and that you would contrast to the demand-shaving, efficiency-focused policies that are maybe already out there?
Jane Flegal:
[12:19] I am really trying to think about this more seriously right now, and people smarter than me should actually be in charge of figuring this out. But I think one thing is like a.
Robinson Meyer:
[12:29] Call for papers. This is a call for papers.
Jane Flegal:
[12:31] Someone please, someone please write these papers. I think one thing is like, We need to lower the cost of capital for grid scale projects, right? And so like, I think this question of how do you better use public financing, like you don’t necessarily have to go to like full throated public ownership of grid and grid assets, but like some kind of like, how do we better leverage the public to try to get whoever, utilities or developers or whatever, to use more cheap debt and less equity. To finance energy projects, I think is like a really underexplored set of ideas. And I would love to see more creative thinking on that set of issues, like whether it’s bonding or I don’t know, I think there’s like a bunch of things that you could do there. And then another thing is just like much more effective grid planning. And the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has this like order 1920.
Jane Flegal:
[13:31] Which is meant to force entities to not just plan for like the lowest possible load growth scenario in the next two years, but to plan over much longer time horizons and to plan for a range of scenarios, including like a high electrification scenario. I think improvements to grid planning, whether that FERC 1920 stuff can actually have teeth, whether it actually matters, I think is an open question, but it could be really powerful. And like tools in that category of grid planning for growth, not just grid planning for flat demand, which is what we’ve been doing for more than a decade, I think is really important. The other category of things is what a lot of people talk about, which is.
Jane Flegal:
[14:17] Citing and permitting challenges like we do actually genuinely have to do have to do permitting reform i continue to perhaps foolishly be bullish on federal permitting reform i think if you could get a federal deal that dealt with sort of what people are now calling permitting certainty you know the ability for the executive to like muck around and permits willy-nilly basically and something on transmission, like changes to the Federal Power Act that might help with this transmission planning and financing issue, and changes to NEPA and potentially the Clean Water Act. That, to me, would be very helpful.
Robinson Meyer:
[14:56] There’s something in there, too, that I want to just call out because I’ve been thinking about it as well, which is I think we made a mistake when we called the current House and Senate energy bill permitting reform and then grouped transmission under permitting reform, because permitting reform is primarily about things like the National Environmental Policy Act, about the kind of procedures you have to step through in order to build a kind of large-scale infrastructure project, who has the ability to approve those large-scale infrastructure projects. And for long-distance, large-scale transmission, there are key permitting barriers. However, there’s another part of the transmission package in front of the House and Senate, which is really not about permitting at all, and is usually called cost allocation. And I just want to emphasize that cost allocation is so important. Right now, if there are two utilities, even if they want to build a power line between their territories, they will have to figure out how to divide up the costs on a completely ad hoc basis, which is not how we fund other kinds of infrastructure.
Robinson Meyer:
[15:59] In a grid region. And what that means is that we actually don’t know the amount of transmission that would instantly finance itself in the country, were these rules to exist. Because with the lack of rules, nobody can go out and do a study on what transmission would be economical that we don’t have right now. Because we don’t know how the cost would be divided up. There’s no playbook on how that should work. And so I just want to emphasize that.
Jane Flegal:
[16:28] I think that’s totally right because the transmission section is really much more about like Federal Power Act reform than it is about NEPA, right? Then there’s like a separate set of issues around NEPA. And then like the last thing that I’ll mention on some of these like cost mitigation strategies is supply chain dynamics, which continue to be in a way that I always find surprising because I forget that we live in a physical world even after COVID. I’m like, oh, right, like, no one can get transformers. And like, I still am confused about whether anyone can or cannot get a gas turbine. And then certainly the tariffs and the foreign entity of concern requirements, there are all these ways in which we’re mucking around in like, the costs of our infrastructure for energy and other things like the tariffs are bad for energy infrastructure of all kinds, whether it’s oil and gas or clean energy. So I mean, those are all things that I think are worthy of further exploration for sure.
Robinson Meyer:
[19:04] I feel like there are two big schools of thought on utility matters right now. And I’ve been grouping them as ERCOT or EDF. So ERCOT is the Texas grid. It has an extremely competitive market-driven approach. Famously, its biggest market is this energy market. It allows prices to get extremely high in that market, thousands of dollars per megawatt, in order to make that market clear. It has an interesting structure where it has both a spot market for electricity on the moment-to-moment basis and also a robust set of rules governing two-party arrangements in ERCOT. It’s a very competition-based form of structuring a grid. Then you have EDF, which is a French utility that built a lot of nuclear power plants at the same time in the 1970s and 1980s and did so eventually very cheaply and now supplies extremely cheap and carbon-free electricity to the nation of France.
Robinson Meyer:
[20:11] I feel like people tend to go one or the other way when they are thinking about where the grid should go. There’s a set of ideas that say, actually, utilities should only control the distribution grid. And then you should be able to choose a retailer of electricity to sell you electricity, like you can choose a retailer of electricity in Texas. And some people say, no, no, no, actually, we want utilities to be big, to be full monopolies. We need to regulate them differently perhaps, but we want them to be able to embark on these big capital projects that where they outlay huge amounts of money on a forward going basis to make sure that a service area can meet its electricity demand for a decade or two decades to come, much like France did in the 1970s with its giant nuclear power plant buildout. And I would say there’s some evidence on the latter side in that the only There were a number of different offshore wind projects that were undertaken
Robinson Meyer:
[21:10] during the Biden administration. And the one that got to completion relatively early was this Dominion offshore wind project in Virginia, which is overseen not by a state entity, but by a monopoly utility, a regulated monopoly utility. Where do you come out on this debate?
Jane Flegal:
[21:27] Like any thoughtful policy analyst, I refuse to choose a side. I think there are lessons from both that are worth taking. Right. So I do sometimes wonder if I could rewind the clock. Do I really believe that restructuring was a good thing to do? I don’t actually know that I have an answer to that. For me, it feels quite complicated. There are for sure, and I’m sure this is true in the literature, efficiency gains associated with market competition on the generation side. But all of this has happened again in a time of flat demand growth, right? So like, fine, maybe that’s what you care most about when you’re not tripling the grid, right? You’re like, okay, cool. Like what’s most important is having the generators compete. One thing you give up is that you don’t have the same level of kind of like centralized planning and oversight that you have in a vertically integrated market with a public utility commission and a state setting policy objectives in overseeing these things. Now, Texas, I think there’s lots to be said about kind of the market logic there. But I think one of the things that I think is most important about the Texas model is the way that they’ve approached transmission.
Jane Flegal:
[22:43] So there are a couple of things about Texas. One, they have incredible natural resources. So they don’t have to mandate anything about renewables deployment in that state, right? And like, it’s just a very good latitudinal environment to build.
Robinson Meyer:
[22:59] And they have incredible natural resources, no matter what resource you count. So they have abundant oil and gas if you don’t care about carbon, and they have abundant wind and solar if you do care about carbon.
Jane Flegal:
[23:09] Exactly. And they have... Faster interconnection and siting than almost anywhere else, in part because they have streamlined their transmission siting process. And they did these, what is CREZ, competitive renewable energy zones.
Robinson Meyer:
[23:23] They basically centrally planned transmission.
Jane Flegal:
[23:26] Yeah, they like basically did the thing that I’m saying we should do at a national scale, which is like build it and they will come in terms of demand and customers and plan proactively.
Robinson Meyer:
[23:36] Back in the 2000s, Texas built out this giant transmission line out to West Texas, where at the time there was very little generation because it anticipated that people would eventually build wind turbines there. And then the cities in eastern Texas would benefit from cheap electricity from West Texas. What’s interesting, if you go back and read the press accounts of this decision, is that it was all about this gap in timing where people said it takes two to three years to build a wind farm, but it takes six to 10 years. Now it’s longer than that to build a transmission line. And so people will never build wind farms unless we start building a transmission line. So we should front run a transmission line and then people will invest in wind farms once they know that there’s going to be a transmission line between West Texas and East Texas. It’s an interesting case because it’s a, it is a centrally planned transmission line. And I think the Texas example speaks well of centrally planned transmission, but it’s done so with a kind of market failure logic to it where nobody’s going to invest in wind unless we build a transmission line first.
Jane Flegal:
[24:34] Which is fine. Like that’s fine. That’s fine as far as I’m concerned. Like that’s why I’m unwilling to pick one of your two paradigms. I’m kind of like some blend of these two things feels both like potentially politically plausible to me. And like you might be able to kind of navigate this such that you sort of get the best of both worlds. The other like crazy idea I’ve been toying with on this issue is like, In Texas, the thing that is supposed to make sure that you have reliability is that you have like scarcity pricing, basically, right? Like prices are supposed to go very high when you have a need for more supply and that’s supposed to bring more supply online. In other markets like PJM or whatever, you have capacity markets, which are a different way of trying to address this issue of getting like more supply online such that we have reliable systems. I think both of those are like not great like they’re both they’re both kind of like struggling in their own ways you saw with like winter storm uri in texas some of the frailties of their model and then obviously I genuinely don’t want to talk about PJM anymore but there’s what’s happening there if we really were to get away out of this like scarcity mindset on the energy supply side you could imagine a world where like I don’t know the federal government had a basically like.
Jane Flegal:
[25:51] Like strategic reliability reserve or something where like they were the government was actually like backstopping or financing this issue of like peak demand for reliability purposes.
Robinson Meyer:
[26:04] What’s interesting is the scarcity model is driven by the fact that ultimately rate payers that is utility customers are where the buck stops and so state regulators don’t want utilities to overbuild for a given moment, because ultimately it is utility customers. It’s people who pay their power bills who will bear the burden of a utility overbuilding. In some ways, the entire restructured electricity market system, the entire shift to electricity markets in the 90s and aughts was because of this belief that utilities were overbuilding. And what’s been funny is that, what, we started restructuring markets around the year 2000 for about five or six or seven years. Wall Street was willing to finance new electricity I mean I hear two stories here basically it’s another place where I hear two stories and I think where there’s a lot of disagreement about the path forward on electricity policy and that I’ve heard a story that basically electricity restructuring starts in the late 90s you know year 2000 and for five years Wall Street is willing to finance new power investment based entirely on price risk based entirely on the idea that market prices for electricity will go up. Then three things happen. The Great Recession, number one, wipes out investment,
Robinson Meyer:
[27:19] Wipes out some future demand. Number two, fracking. Power prices tumble, and a bunch of plays that people had invested in, including then advanced nuclear, are totally out of the money suddenly. Number three, we get electricity demand growth plateaus, right? So for 15 years, electricity demand plateaus. We don’t need to finance investments into the power grid anymore. This whole question of can you do it on the back of price risk goes away because it’s electricity demand is basically flat and different kinds of generation are competing over shares and gas is so cheap that it’s just whittling away.
Jane Flegal:
[27:56] But this is why that paradigm needs to change yet again. Like we need to pivot to like a growth model where, and I’m not, again.
Robinson Meyer:
[28:06] I think what’s interesting though, is that Texas is the other counterexample here because Texas has had robust load growth for years and a lot of investment in power production in Texas is financed off price risk, is financed off the assumption that prices will go up. Now, it’s also financed off the back of the fact that in Texas, there are a lot of rules and it’s a very clear structure around finding firm offtake for your powers. You can find a customer who’s going to buy 50% of your power. And that means that you feel confident in your investment. And then the other 50% of your generation capacity feeds into ERCOT. But in some ways, what the transit, the transition that feels disruptive right now is not only a transition like market structure, but also like the assumptions of market participants about what electricity prices will be in the future.
Jane Flegal:
[28:51] Yeah, and we may need some like backstop. I hear the concerns about the risks of laying early capital risks basically on rate payers in the frame of like growth rather than scarcity. But I guess my argument is just there’s ways to deal with that. Like we could come up with creative ways to think about dealing with that. And I’m not seeing enough ideation in that space, which I would like,
Jane Flegal:
[29:15] again, a call for papers, I guess. That I would really like to get a better handle on. The other thing that we haven’t talked about, but that I do think, you know, the States Forum, where I’m now a senior fellow, I wrote a piece for them on electricity affordability several months ago now. But one of the things that doesn’t get that much attention is just like getting BS off of bills, basically. So there’s like the rate question, but then there’s the like, what’s in a bill? And like, what, what should or should not be in a bill? And in truth.
Jane Flegal:
[29:49] You know, we’ve got a lot of social programs basically that are being funded by the rate base and not the tax base. And I think there are just like open questions about this, whether it’s, you know, wildfire in California, which I think everyone recognizes is a big challenge, or it’s efficiency or electrification or renewable mandates in blue states. There are a bunch of these things and it’s sort of like there are so few things you can do in the very near term to constrain rate increases for the reasons we’ve discussed. And also, by the way, just because we have an aging grit, like we just happen to be at like a year 60 in the investment cycle in the grid. And like we don’t really have a choice. Like we do have to invest in the grid, even if there wasn’t demand growth, you know.
Robinson Meyer:
[30:34] Warren Buffett says you can’t see who’s swimming naked till the tide goes out. And I feel like there’s a bit of an inverse problem that has happened here where a number of blue states paid for a lot of social programs off fees placed on the electricity bill. Some of those social programs, I think we could say are essential, like the retrofits that are happening in California. But in the Northeast, there’s a lot of other charges that appear on the bill that finance social programs that I think made sense in an era of declining electricity prices. And the issue now is that because electricity demand is going up and electricity prices are going up for reasons that don’t only have to do with data centers, for reasons that have to do with the natural gas got more expensive in 2022 after Russia invaded Ukraine and that pushed up prices particularly in new england which relies on more seaborne natural gas suddenly those charges which were not really noticeable and not really salient in a world where underlying electricity prices are falling suddenly become quite politically salient um last question do you think the path forward on these policies is to talk about climate. Or should Democrats, I don’t know whether it’s Democrats, I don’t know whether it’s think tanks, I don’t know whether it’s advocacy groups, should talk less about climate and indeed kind of sublimate their concern over climate into concern over things like, well, we need cheap electricity because that will ultimately help the cause of electrification.
Jane Flegal:
[32:00] Look, I think it is pretty obvious at this stage that climate does not have the cultural or political significance it had in 2020. That seems very obvious to me. I do not foresee that changing anytime in the immediate future. That doesn’t mean that no one should talk about climate change and we shouldn’t acknowledge the physics of the world in which we live. Fine. it’s pretty obvious to me that leading with climate is not going to be a winning strategy, my bigger concern is okay so then what do you lead with and how does what you lead with affect our ability to actually decarbonize and again that’s where it’s sort of like affordability is great if it actually is incentivizing the right things we need to incentivize not only to decarbonize, but I would argue to like power the economic growth of our country and deal with some of our biggest geopolitical anxieties right now. And like, that’s why I get so anxious about like, oh my God, if affordability becomes the only frame, what are we losing?
Jane Flegal:
[33:10] How do we find the right way to both like inject a consideration of affordability that is not so short term that we are like losing sight of the structural drivers of affordability in our economy, especially in the electricity sector. And, you know, another thing about the affordability piece is it’s sort of affordable to whom? So there’s lots of conversations about, for instance, rooftop solar in certain situations, being a cost effective strategy for an individual homeowner, right? That is not the same thing.
Robinson Meyer:
[33:45] It’s insane. It’s insane that we can talk about rooftop solar as an affordability strategy.
Jane Flegal:
[33:49] Yes, yes. And then I just think as a political matter, like, There’s a question for me of whether we’re overlearning the lessons of the end of the Biden administration where we very obviously did not take inflation seriously enough. But now it’s sort of like, are we becoming so inflation pilled that we’re not actually like substantively or politically leading with the most compelling strategies? If you actually looked at like the list of things that could potentially constrain electricity prices in the next two years, it’s not a particularly sexy or compelling agenda. In my view, it feels it’s giving it’s a little bit giving like Jimmy Carter put a sweater on. It’s a little bit or it’s at least an easy target for Republicans in that way. Right. It’s a little like efficiency, demand response. Don’t let utilities make money. And like all of these things may be good in their own right. So I’m not I’m not dismissing them as as tactics. But I think like having that be the kind of structure of the argument for Democrats on climate is like, I think we would make us very vulnerable.
Robinson Meyer:
[34:53] Anyway, Jane, we’re going to have you back on. Thank you so much for joining us on Shift Key.
Jane Flegal:
[34:57] Thanks, Robinson.
Robinson Meyer:
[35:01] If you enjoyed this episode of Shift Key, please leave us a review on your favorite podcast app. You can reach me as always at shiftkey at heatmap.news. This will do it for us this week. We’ll be back next week with a new episode of Shift Key. Until then, enjoy your weekend. Shift key, as always, is a production of Heatmap News. Our editors are Jillian Goodman and Nico Loricella. Multimedia editing and audio engineering is by Jacob Lambert and by Nick Woodbury. Our music is by Adam Kramelow. Thanks so much for listening. I’ll see you next week.
The proportion of voters who strongly oppose development grew by nearly 50%.
During his State of the Union address Tuesday night, President Donald Trump attempted to stanch the public’s bleeding support for building the data centers his administration says are necessary to beat China in the artificial intelligence race. With “many Americans” now “concerned that energy demand from AI data centers could unfairly drive up their electricity bills,” Trump said, he pledged to make major tech companies pay for new power plants to supply electricity to data centers.
New polling from energy intelligence platform Heatmap Pro shows just how dramatically and swiftly American voters are turning against data centers.
Earlier this month, the survey, conducted by Embold Research, reached out to 2,091 registered voters across the country, explaining that “data centers are facilities that house the servers that power the internet, apps, and artificial intelligence” and asking them, “Would you support or oppose a data center being built near where you live?” Just 28% said they would support or strongly support such a facility in their neighborhood, while 52% said they would oppose or strongly oppose it. That’s a net support of -24%.
When Heatmap Pro asked a national sample of voters the same question last fall, net support came out to +2%, with 44% in support and 42% opposed.
The steep drop highlights a phenomenon Heatmap’s Jael Holzman described last fall — that data centers are "swallowing American politics,” as she put it, uniting conservation-minded factions of the left with anti-renewables activists on the right in opposing a common enemy.
The results of this latest Heatmap Pro poll aren’t an outlier, either. Poll after poll shows surging public antipathy toward data centers as populists at both ends of the political spectrum stoke outrage over rising electricity prices and tech giants struggle to coalesce around a single explanation of their impacts on the grid.
“The hyperscalers have fumbled the comms game here,” Emmet Penney, an energy researcher and senior fellow at the right-leaning Foundation for American Innovation, told me.
A historian of the nuclear power sector, Penney sees parallels between the grassroots pushback to data centers and the 20th century movement to stymie construction of atomic power stations across the Western world. In both cases, opponents fixated on and popularized environmental criticisms that were ultimately deemed minor relative to the benefits of the technology — production of radioactive waste in the case of nuclear plants, and as seems increasingly clear, water usage in the case of data centers.
Likewise, opponents to nuclear power saw urgent efforts to build out the technology in the face of Cold War competition with the Soviet Union as more reason for skepticism about safety. Ditto the current rhetoric on China.
Penney said that both data centers and nuclear power stoke a “fear of bigness.”
“Data centers represent a loss of control over everyday life because artificial intelligence means change,” he said. “The same is true about nuclear,” which reached its peak of expansion right as electric appliances such as dishwashers and washing machines were revolutionizing domestic life in American households.
One of the more fascinating findings of the Heatmap Pro poll is a stark urban-rural divide within the Republican Party. Net support for data centers among GOP voters who live in suburbs or cities came out to -8%. Opposition among rural Republicans was twice as deep, at -20%. While rural Democrats and independents showed more skepticism of data centers than their urbanite fellow partisans, the gap was far smaller.
That could represent a challenge for the Trump administration.
“People in the city are used to a certain level of dynamism baked into their lives just by sheer population density,” Penney said. “If you’re in a rural place, any change stands out.”
Senator Bernie Sanders, the democratic socialist from Vermont, has championed legislation to place a temporary ban on new data centers. Such a move would not be without precedent; Ireland, transformed by tax-haven policies over the past two decades into a hub for Silicon Valley’s giants, only just ended its de facto three-year moratorium on hooking up data centers to the grid.
Senator Josh Hawley, the Missouri Republican firebrand, proposed his own bill that would force data centers off the grid by requiring the complexes to build their own power plants, much as Trump is now promoting.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, you have Republicans such as Mississippi Governor Tate Reeves, who on Tuesday compared halting construction of data centers to “civilizational suicide.”
“I am tempted to sit back and let other states fritter away the generational chance to build. To laugh at their short-sightedness,” he wrote in a post on X. “But the best path for all of us would be to see America dominate, because our foes are not like us. They don’t believe in order, except brutal order under their heels. They don’t believe in prosperity, except for that gained through fraud and plunder. They don’t think or act in a way I can respect as an American.”
Then you have the actual hyperscalers taking opposite tacks. Amazon Web Services, for example, is playing offense, promoting research that shows its data centers are not increasing electricity rates. Claude-maker Anthropic, meanwhile, issued a de facto mea culpa, pledging earlier this month to offset all its electricity use.
Amid that scattershot messaging, the critical rhetoric appears to be striking its targets. Whether Trump’s efforts to curb data centers’ impact on the grid or Reeves’ stirring call to patriotic sacrifice can reverse cratering support for the buildout remains to be seen. The clock is ticking. There are just 36 weeks until the midterm Election Day.