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Patrick Brown claims to have “left out the full truth” in order to get published. But his full story is much more perplexing.

Patrick Brown is a climate scientist at the Breakthrough Institute, a heterodox think tank based in California that advocates for using technology and economic growth to manage climate change. He holds a Ph.D. from Duke University in Earth and ocean science.
Last week, Brown and a team of co-authors published a paper in Nature that found climate change has made it more likely that California wildfires will experience a particularly dangerous kind of event: a moment of rapid, explosive growth. Thanks to climate change, these dangerous events are now 25% more likely to occur, the paper found.
On Tuesday, Brown published a lengthy Twitter thread about his wildfire paper, as well as an article in The Free Press, an online publication founded by the former New York Times columnist Bari Weiss. Now Brown told a different story about his research — a far more negative one. His new paper revealed fundamental problems with climate science, he said, because it looked at climate change alone and not at the role that other factors, such as vegetation change, arson, or forest management tactics, might play in driving wildfire growth.
“I knew not to try to quantify key aspects other than climate change in my research because it would dilute the story that prestigious journals like Nature and its rival, Science, want to tell,” he wrote. “I sacrificed contributing the most valuable knowledge for society in order for the research to be compatible with the confirmation bias of the editors and reviewers of the journals I was targeting.”
These incentives revealed that climate science is now more interested in serving as a “Cassandra” than revealing new information about the world — a tendency, he charged, that can “actually mislead the public.”
Brown’s argument attracted my attention, because I have written about how nuanced and complicated climate science can sometimes be. When President Joe Biden linked the Quebec wildfires to climate change, I expressed doubts about the connection. When Hurricane Ian made landfall in Florida last year, I wrote that hurricanes have a far more complicated relationship with global warming than many believe. And in 2019, I broke the news that a respected team of climate scientists had ruled out some of the worst-case scenarios for rapid sea-level rise this century. I am not, in other words, someone who sees climate change in every shadow.
On Wednesday, I called Brown to talk about his claims, the Nature publication process, and the state of climate science as a field. Our conversation follows below. But I left the interview unsure of why Brown had made such a fuss.
Brown argues that climate science suffers from a serious misallocation of incentives. He says that his paper should have looked at the influence of many factors — such as arson or forest management — in driving rapid wildfire growth. Yet it didn’t. Even though he says these factors can be “just as or more important” than climate change, he declined to study them because the professional incentives pointed against it. Doing so would have detracted from his paper’s “clean narrative” focused on climate catastrophism and made his paper less likely to “pass muster with Nature’s editors and reviewers.”
But after talking to him and reading his paper, a different story emerged. When Brown began his research, he did not actually know that, say, arson or forest management were as important as climate change in driving wildfire growth. What he did know is that it would be complicated — and labor-intensive — to pull out every factor that might influence a wildfire’s growth. So he chose to focus his first paper on what was likely to be the biggest signal: climate change.
During the peer-review process, Nature’s reviewers asked him why he made this choice. It would have been “very difficult” to study those other variables, such as forest management, he replied. “This is precisely why we chose to use a methodology that addresses the much cleaner but more narrow question of what the influence of warming alone is on the risk of extreme daily wildfire growth,” he wrote, adding that he hoped to look at other factors in future research.
Nature’s editors and reviewers accepted this argument in good faith. And Brown did, in fact, begin studying the role of those other factors on wildfires. He claims that newer, unpublished work shows that active forest management can negate some impacts of climate change on wildfire in California, although this finding has yet to be peer reviewed.
When the Nature paper came out last week, Brown was admirably upfront about its limitations. The paper itself cautions that its findings should be interpreted only “narrowly”; Brown stressed on Twitter and in interviews that even though climate change is making wildfires worse, near-term greenhouse-gas reductions will do little to cut that risk. And journalists listened to him. NPR and the Los Angeles Times devoted multiple paragraphs of their stories to that insight and to the importance of forest management.
So I’m left asking: What’s the problem here? Brown had a knotty research problem, and he chose to divvy it up into smaller parts and focus on the easiest part first. He triaged, in other words. When peer reviewers — whom he now claims accepted his paper due only to their “confirmation bias” — pushed back on his decision, he argued against them and said that he would look at other variables later. He kept that promise; he is studying those variables now. When his paper was published, he publicized its findings fairly and accurately. The media covered them with nuance. Where’s the scandal, again? What are we supposed to be mad about here?
Brown seems to have talked himself into the view that he did something wrong, but it’s not clear to me that he actually did. Shorn of his personal example, his Free Press article amounts to a series of gripes about other high-impact climate papers. He criticizes an article that calculated how carbon emissions could hit GDP, but his concerns, while reasonable enough, are hardly an indictment of the field. He complains that journal editors look for “eye-popping” statistics when reviewing papers, but this is hardly a vice unique to climate science. None of what he describes — least of all his own behavior — amounts to an effort to “distort research” or “mislead the public” that he has seemingly alleged.
His critique has found its audience anyway. Since we talked, Brown’s argument has been cited by Fox News, The New York Post, and The Telegraph. “Climate scientist admits editing paper to fit ‘preapproved narratives,’” reads a typical headline. (Brown denies distorting or lying about his results.) The editor-in-chief of Nature, meanwhile, has rebuked Brown and said that the journal is “carefully considering the implications of his stated actions.” During our conversation, Brown lamented that only articles warning of climate change’s dangers ever appear in the media. Now he is receiving a wholly different type of coverage.
Our conversation has been edited for concision and clarity.
I wonder if you could catch me up on what’s happened in the past few days and on the criticism, or the meta-criticism, of the paper that you just published.
If you look at my tweet thread or the press release on the paper, I went out of my way to emphasize the points that I end up critiquing the paper for. I emphasize that in our current phase of research, we’re finding that hazardous fuel reduction treatments might be able to completely overwhelm the impact of climate change on fire.
My argument is that I would very much defend the research overall, but I’m making this commentary on framing it for the journal. What I did when writing with paper, when my goal was to get it in Science or Nature, is very, very common. It’s pervasive. It’s just turning the dials in all these specific ways that end up skewing the public view of the overall situation that we’re in. As a climate researcher, if you want this high-end paper, if you want this paper that’s going to make a splash and help you in your career, your goal is to cut through everything else and use a bunch of sophisticated statistics to find the climate change signal in there.
There’s nothing explicitly wrong with this paper; it’s just what ends up getting communicated at the end of the day. So in this case, you hold everything constant, you only look at this temperature impact, so you’re controlling for other factors — like changes in human ignition patterns or changes in characteristics from fire suppression. Those caveats are mentioned in the paper, so I’m not saying that they’re hidden. But you focus exclusively on climate change and you ignore these other factors that might be important. There’s a firehose of papers like this, but they end up giving a totally overemphasized impression of the climate change impact.
Climate change is this nuanced thing, and it shows up in different ways in the world, and what we know about it is quite nuanced. I think that can absolutely get lost in the loudest parts of the discourse.
I struggle with it. People are coming from such different baselines, where I think some people are of the mindset that we don’t even know if the climate is changing, or we have no idea if humans are contributing to it or something like that. And, obviously, that is completely against what all of the empirical evidence and science shows. For those people, I’d love to convince them of the importance of climate change and the dominant role that humans play in it.
But then there’s this other group of people that I think is misled by social media or certain media outlets, that are under a very misinformed impression about how large changes in weather and impacts on people are at least historically or up to this point. That starts with the journal articles themselves, and I perceived there to be strong incentives to really just focus exclusively on the climate change impact and to play it up more than it deserves to be played out.
I want to talk about that by focusing on this paper. It seems there are these other factors that shape wildfires. You mentioned just now changing ignition patterns, changes in fire suppression, changes in vegetation. I think the way that you just described them is that they “might” be important. The way you described them yesterday is that they’re “just as or more important.”
My first question is: Do we know that? I can imagine that they might be important. But have you done the research to know they’re just as important?
So the paper in Nature was submitted in July 2022, and since I submitted this, I moved on to that question. And we don’t have a manuscript yet, but what we're seeing using the same methodology is that fuel loads just have an enormous impact on fire danger. It’s a struggle to figure out how to model mechanical thinning and prescribed burning, but the results indicate that doing that at least locally can totally overwhelm or negate the climate change impact.
That will be a new paper, but that’s not some new result. If you look at disciplinary journals — it’s not in PNAS or Nature for the most part — that is kind of a consensus, that the fuel component of this is very large. It’s not unreasonable at all to think that a hazardous fuel reduction could overwhelm the impact of climate change.
So, do we know that for sure? No, but that’s one of the points I’m making — researchers aren’t incentivized to write that paper as much as I think that they should be. That’s a paper that's like, We’re going to do the very best we can varying different scenarios of ignition, or how we think ignition patterns have changed historically, or varying different scenarios of fuel buildup based on suppression policies and climate change. And we’re going to do this in a super rigorous, fair way, and we could rank these things or just see the relative influence of those factors. That has a much lower return on investment from the perspective of a researcher. It’s way more work, it’s way harder, and whatever the results, it will be much more equivocal. It’s going to be this super long paper, and it’s going to get bogged down in review.
I want that to be the gold standard. But what I see becoming the gold standard are these papers that are mimicked off of Science and Nature. You have a limit of about 2,000 words and three figures, and it incentivizes you to make this case. You have all of this data that’s messy, and your goal is to find the story and to tell the story with beautiful figures. Inevitably, doing it that way, you have to relegate things that go against your story to the supplements and explain them away. That’s the way that scientific publishing works, at least for these letter-type papers in Science or Nature.
There are two threads here, but I want to stay focused on the smaller one first. I think the way you put it in your thread was that to focus on other factors would “muddy the waters of a clean story” or would decrease the odds that this gets approved by Nature’s editors or reviewers.
Yeah.
But at the time you submitted the study, did we have methods to pull out the vegetation signal? Or the ignition signal?
What I’m doing now is the same idea as trying to pull out the temperature signal. You’re using the variation in space and time to get at the incremental influence of fuels on fire danger. But historically you would’ve had to come up with an estimate of what suppression policies had done to those fuels.
Got it. But at the time you submitted the paper, the work hadn’t been done.
Right. And I would love to have it be the case where as a researcher you could afford essentially to submit a paper and then be like, actually this other [method] is better or something, and then take your paper back. But that is insane, but you would never do that as a researcher. You need publications, and you want to build off the previous one.
I’m asking because there’s a throughline in some of what you’ve written that basically alleges that this kind of science is simply not something that Nature and these high-level scientific institutions are looking for. You wrote, “I sacrificed contributing the most valuable knowledge for society in order for the research to be compatible with the confirmation bias of the editors and reviewers of the journals I was targeting.”
I’m struggling to square that with the fact that the Nature reviewers, who are the people you accused of confirmation bias, directly ask you for this analysis in the peer review. One of them flags that there’s “numerous factors that play a confounding role in wildfire growth that are not directly accounted for, including vegetation, fire management, and ignition.” And another cautions against publishing the study because of methodological problems.
And during peer review, you responded to them, “We agree that climatic variables other than temperature are important for projecting change” — then you name all the factors we’ve been talking about — but “accounting for changes in all of these variables and their potential interactions simultaneously is very difficult. This is precisely why we chose to use a methodology that addresses the much cleaner but more narrow question of what the influence of warming alone is on the risk of extreme daily wildfire growth.”
It seems there’s this motte and bailey here. I understand that a researcher has limited time and they’re going to invest in the most methodologically clear stories. But you’re saying that you “molded” your work to fit the confirmation bias of Nature reviewers. Yet the Nature reviewers actually asked you to do the thing that you’ve identified as the biggest question mark in the article — and when they asked for that, you said it was too difficult. So which is it?
So I think that, that’s very good that the reviewers brought that up. But like I said before, doing that is, then, it’s not a Nature paper. It’s too diluted in my opinion to be a Nature paper.
This is what I’m trying to highlight, I guess, from the inside as a researcher doing this type of research. Reviewers absolutely will ask for good sensitivity tests, and bringing in caveats, and all that stuff, but it is absolutely your goal as the researcher to navigate the reviews as best you can. The file even gets automatically labeled Rebuttal when you respond to the reviewers. It’s your goal to essentially get the paper over the finish line.
And you don’t just acquiesce to reviewers, because you’d never get anything published. You don’t just say, Oh you’re right, okay, we will go back and do that work for five years and submit elsewhere. The reality of the situation is you have to go forward with your publication and get it published. They can ask for legitimate things, and you can kind of hand wave it away, and I don’t think that would work if you were not focused on the climate-change signal alone. If you were only focused on the fuel effect, I don’t think it would even go to review. They would be like, They didn’t consider climate change. That’s the thing we care most about.
I think it’s good that they’re now publishing reviewer comments and retorts, but that is common, absolutely conventional practice. You do what you think you have to do, and you don’t do what you think would take too long or bog it down or end up with a paper not being published.
There’s two different stories there, though. I mean, you write: “To put it bluntly, climate science has become less about understanding the complexities of the world and more about serving as a kind of Cassandra” and that this “distorts a great deal of climate science research. It misinforms the public and it makes practical solutions more difficult to achieve.”
The argument you make in your article is that this is due to confirmation bias and the desire for splash. And the argument you’re making now, which is different, is that the methods on the climate signal are much better developed. That it’s a much clearer thing. It’s what everyone cares the most about, for understandable reasons, and if you’re a researcher, it’s the lowest-hanging fruit, so it’s the easiest and most pressing thing to focus on. But that’s very different from this being about confirmation bias or a tendency toward catastrophism — it’s about researchers trying to make the most of the limited time that they have.
Yeah, I don’t think that they’re that different. I think that the methods are less developed for these other causal factors because of this climate obsession. We know the most about the climate signal, again, because the data sets and the infrastructure are all designed around the climate signal.
So it’s very easy for me to get estimates of the temperature change since the pre-industrial era, and we have all these models, and it’s all at my fingertips. It’s easier, it is the low hanging fruit. But you can imagine a world where in the fire science community, there are resources and databases estimating historical ignitions or other data, like, “this is our year-by-year estimate of fuel loads from 1850 to the present.” Then, that would be the low-hanging fruit. You would have potentially a totally different feeling for what comes out the other end, or what is reported in the media, if those data sets existed.
But the other side of that story is right here, which is that the peer reviewers ask you for that other stuff, and you say it’s too hard. You said it’s “very difficult.” And the other thing you said is that, “Our study shows that large-growth days are predictable using our predictors despite having no other information.” My interpretation is that this leaps out of the data even if everything else is moot.
The predictors include fuel characteristics. There’s nothing in the paper that does long-term manipulation of those, like the temperature or other variables. The models do know certain fuel characteristics, but those have gotten much more sophisticated in the current version of the models.
But back in 2019 or 2020, when you started the wildfire paper, you actually didn’t know about the role of ignitions or vegetation or forest management in driving wildfire growth. You would assume, as I would assume, that these are important factors, but you didn’t know about them. You chose to focus on climate first.
Yeah.
And then you were told to go back and look at the other ones, which you eventually did — that’s what you’re doing now. But at the time, you were like, that’s very hard, so we’re doing this one first. So my question here is: Isn’t this just science working, then? Is that really so scandalous? You picked the highest salience trendline first and then, having found that, went to go study other things.
You could say that that’s science working, but I think that what would happen is that when we start to dilute the climate change story, it’s not a Nature paper anymore. It's not a high-profile paper.
I’m not throwing all of science or all of climate science under the bus. I’m saying, the incentives are aligned to get this exclusive billing in these highest-profile papers and that skews the overall public impression of how large the climate signal is. So yeah, we could go publish another paper, but that wouldn’t have nearly the splash or penetration into the public as this one would have.
I am not sure that's true. I’m also not sure that it seems like nobody has done this vegetation work that you're doing. And when you publish that, it seems like it will be a very important methods paper — and methods papers get cited in some ways more than the high-impact stuff.
I don’t see a story, really, or a narrative getting into The New York Times about how — or especially the Guardian, or someplace like that — about how something other than climate change could be the dominant driver. Maybe I’m wrong, but that doesn’t seem like it would be nearly as likely as focusing on the climate change thing exclusively.
Again, I’m not sure that’s true, but I think that gives away the game a little, because if you’re a researcher trying to publish work that will be highly salient to the public, of course you’ll focus on climate change — the public already cares a lot about climate change. And the public is fundamentally right to care. I even think this whole process has sold your own paper short: If climate change is contributing to these rapid wildfire growth events, that’s a very important finding! Even if it’s not fixable in the near term with emissions reductions. Of course the public cares about it.
There’s a lot in your criticism that suggests certain kinds of analysis are “discouraged” or that certain kinds of questions would not have made this a Nature paper. And I understand you’re just trying to get past the review stage, but the process that was set up to edit Nature did tell you this, and you argued against it. So it’s a little duplicitous to turn around to the public and say, Well, I was only arguing against them because of the incentives.
I realize you have to publish. But when the peer reviewers told you to look at these other factors, you were like, “Oh, it’s very difficult, and climate change is so important that it’s worth pulling out this signal anyway.” And now to the public, your meta-interpretation of your own paper is like, “I wish I had been able to focus on this other stuff.”
But we got it through. Reviewers and editors could say, “No, this is ridiculous, you can’t focus exclusively on the climate change signal.” And they could do that with everything — with yields, with deaths, with fires, with floods, with GDP.
But what I’m saying is that from reading Nature, from reading Nature Climate Change, from reading Nature Communications, from reading Science, from reading Science Advances, I know as a researcher that this is not going to stop my paper. This is what everyone does. So when someone says, look at other factors — which is always what you get in reviews — you just learn to say, that’s not in the scope of this paper, but we can do it potentially in future work. You come up with a reason why you’re not going to do it in this paper, because you need that paper published so you can go on to the next one.
I hear that, but it does feel dishonest to turn around and interpret the paper to the public in this way. You’re not saying, in either the Twitter thread or Free Press article, that “Frankly it was very hard to pull out all these other factors, so we didn’t do it in this paper, but you should know that other factors matter.” What you’re saying is that the entire publication set-up is geared toward producing articles finding a catastrophic climate impact.
I understand you felt you had to just get past the reviews, but you can’t tell a high-impact journal that what they want is too hard, then turn around and tell the public, “Simply put, the incentives didn’t let me do this!”
Yeah, I understand what you’re saying, but what I would say is that there was no pathway for the reviewer to say, “Consider these other factors,” and then for us to do that, and for it to become a Nature paper. There’s no off-ramp there where you say, “Okay, good idea, we’ll go do that.” Your response has to convince the reviewer that you don’t need to do that. That would be a potential way to reform things — if you were able to hold papers in limbo. As a researcher needing publications, and wanting as many high-profile publications as you can, you have to argue with the reviewers and do whatever’s necessary to then get it over the finish line. My larger point is that it’s still the biases of the editors and reviewers that allowed the hand-waving response to get through.
But if you thought that they had made such a valid point that it torpedoed the paper, you could have pulled the paper. You did have options.
Yeah. I could have pulled the paper.
But that’s my point. I’m trying to improve science. And I’m saying, from the inside, that you don’t pull your paper, that’s crazy. You would never do that. Your incentives as a researcher are not aligned with the best knowledge generation for the public. You can say, okay, a more pure scientist would have done that, and shame on me for not pulling the paper, but I don’t think that’s fair, because I think 99.99% of people in my position … this is our job. To argue with reviewers and get papers over the finish line. Especially when nothing is actually wrong. Nothing is explicitly wrong here.
You’ve said that this “wouldn’t make it a Nature paper.” But there was a commentary in Nature Climate Change just yesterday that argued against the assumption that the future will be worse than the present and said that we shouldn’t paint an increasingly dire version of the future.
These articles don’t always get covered in the press, but is this a problem with science, or is it just a problem with the press?
Well, I think that there’s definitely a press issue, and that's a whole separate issue. But yeah, I’m highlighting what I think is a basic foundational science portion of the issue. And there are feedbacks between the two. I think 10 years ago, or 15 years ago, I don’t think there was this alliance between certain celebrity scientists and certain journalists, like — “You journalists will be the PR for my study that just came out, and I’ll shape my study to be the most salient for writing about.” I think that’s a natural tendency for highly motivated and ambitious people.
This question of an “alliance” is an interesting one. Because there’s a very understandable story about the incentives you’re describing. I think it’s good to point out that climate change is where we have the most developed methods, it’s what the public cares about the most, so it’s what you write about first when you start to take a crack on this wildfire problem. And if there are negative consequences that follow from those incentives, that’s quite understandable. But when you talk about an “alliance,” it suggests that there’s this malevolent or highly self-interested conspiracy —
I don’t think that. Just as an example, though, you are being an excellent journalist right now. You are really questioning me, and shaking me down, and questioning all sorts of things that I said. But I did a bunch of interviews on the Nature paper and I got nothing like that. No one ever asked challenging questions. They do this kind of, You are the scientist, you are the arbiter of truth-type thing.
So I notice a difference here — when I am in this role of warning about climate change, I am treated very differently than when I’m in this role of challenging that. And maybe you always do this with all the climate stuff that you cover, but I think that the people on the climate beat should not just be these megaphones for researchers, they should challenge them.
When those reporters were asking you questions, were you going out of your way to say, “Oh, fire management is really important. Actually, how we manage this is really important.”
Yes, I was, actually.
And did it make it into the stories?
Well, the vast majority of the stories I was not interviewed for. There was an NPR story and an LA Times story, and I think my quotes got in there. So that’s good.
That’s good to hear. I’ll be honest that when I saw your Free Press article yesterday, I was pretty taken aback. And it’s because I was looking forward to calling you as an expert during a big wildfire event. But when I call a researcher about a paper, I need them to be honest with me and tell me their full views about it. But if someone says A to me and to my readers, and then they turn around a few days later and say, In fact, I really believe B — I was only saying A because of the incentives, it gives me pause. Because why should I trust you?
I totally understand what you’re saying. Part of this is certainly a confession of personal fault, but in my tweet thread and in the press release, I made sure to emphasize everything I thought was important. If we had wanted it to go viral, I could have emphasized a [high emissions scenario] and made the title that climate change radically alters wildfire growth. But the title was about using artificial intelligence. And in all the interviews I did, I emphasized what I think is the most scientifically interesting part of this, which is that if you put climate change on different wildfires, you get different responses because forests are nearer or closer to these aridity thresholds. I feel no regrets whatsoever about the publicity I did for the paper.
I want to ask you about a few of the ways that Twitter and Free Press readers have interpreted the criticisms you’re making. One reader says you “inflated numbers” in order to get the article published. Did you do that?
No. That sounds like something totally different from what I’m talking about. That sounds like you go into a spreadsheet and change the numbers or something. I’m talking about a much more subtle thing, about emphasis.
Got it. There was a Free Press commenter who walked away from your story and said that you “distorted the facts and lied in order to succeed.” Do you think that’s a fair read?
No — “lied in order to succeed”? No. There’s nothing out of the ordinary or unconventional about this paper. I’m saying the conventions lead to an incomplete picture overall.
Do you understand why people walked away from the criticism you were making with those ideas?
I suppose if you just understand that people are reading things pretty quickly and lightly, but I don't think if you go word by word through my piece, you would see that.
Your piece does allege that the public’s being misled by the incentives here.
I think the overall picture being painted emphasizes climate more than it deserves.
Were your co-authors aware that you were going to use the paper in the way that you did?
I gave some of them a verbal heads up, but they did not see the piece, so this is, 100%, I own it. They are not involved and should not be accused of anything. I wrote the paper, I did the entire analysis, and this is my thing in terms of the opinion piece as well.
Is this really about climate change, or is this really about something that we know happens in every scientific discipline, which is that the most novel, eyebrow-raising papers get into high-impact journals and get the most press coverage? We don’t read about the bulk of the experiments that happen at the Large Hadron Collider, either.
It’s hard for me to judge completely about other fields since I’m not in them, but I would say that the splashiest papers in a non-politicized field are the ones that would go against conventional wisdom or the state of perceived knowledge in the field. I would say it’s the opposite in climate science. It’s all about emphasizing the climate-change signal or the climate-change impact. A lot of climate researchers feel like it’s essentially their job to raise alarm about climate change and emphasize the emissions reduction component.
But climate change is inherently politicized, right?
Yeah.
And the history is that climate scientists are not who politicized it. The reason it’s an especially touchy field is because there was a 15-year effort to emphasize every single error bar, every quibble, every well-founded scientific statement of doubt, to convince the public to doubt the climate-change hypothesis.
I take your point. I don’t know if it’s fair to say — I mean, are you saying that they could be politicized? Because I think it’s still politicized in general. There’s all these values that are taken onboard [by scientists]. There are traditional environmentalist values that impacting Earth is inherently bad, and so we should look for and highlight these bad things. That’s not explicitly, necessarily a partisan, political thing, but it’s an ideology that’s running in the background. It’s different from an ideology that says warming is this much, but it could be overwhelmed or offset by this technology.
I’m not someone who sees the fossil-fuel industry in every failed climate policy. But just as a matter of historical fact, from 1990 to at least 2005, there was a well-funded, highly organized effort to publicize every point of scientific caution to sow doubt about climate change. And yes, climate science was associated with environmentalism through the 1970s and ’80s, but had there not been an organized effort to play up every morsel of doubt in the literature, climate science wouldn’t have been politicized in the same way.
I’m not a historian of that. I take your point.
You’re describing a set of incentives that push researchers to look at climate change first. But if you go to a climate science conference, it’s really different, and you do in fact see ideas in climate science get rolled back over time. Like, in the 2000s, we thought climate change played a much larger role in hurricanes than we do now.
I think that’s a really important point, but I don’t think that that is at all what the public thinks or that’s communicated to the public. I guess if that’s an empirical question, you could do the polling on it, but it seems like, now, to me, it seems like every extreme weather event is covered through the lens of climate change.
Look at Canada’s explosive wildfire year. On the one hand, it’s so out of line with historical norms, it’s hard to see how there isn’t a climate change signal there — on the other hand, it’s so out of line that it’s hard to say what’s going on. So what do we want the public to do here? Because I don’t think every member of the public will be an expert on exactly how climate change drives extreme weather. So is the American public, writ large, sufficiently concerned about climate risks as I understand them? Probably not. Is 5% of the public too concerned? Maybe, yeah. But I also don’t know what’s going to happen in the future.
I’d have to look at the polls. I remember seeing that 42% of young people have some form of climate anxiety every day, which I think is filtered through social media reframing all extreme weather through the lens of climate change, bringing in a very apocalyptic view that I think is incongruent with the data. You think 5% is too concerned? I don’t know. You’d also have to bring in policies, and costs of policies, and the net overall costs and benefits of energy systems and agricultural systems and everything, and that’s just a much more difficult thing to get right.
But the leading candidate for one of the two parties also says climate change isn’t real. So my question would be, are there malicious actors and institutions here? Or is this just an extremely hard, very difficult thing to get right?
I do not think that there are malicious actors and institutions. I think it’s much more just the cultural milieu of institutions. The problems that I’m highlighting, I think there’s just a groupthink that develops, and people not wanting to rock the boat too much, and everyone kind of being on board knowing that, Well, the good side is to raise alarm about climate change and to reduce emissions, and the bad side is to do anything that would be in the other direction of that. And I think that you can make an argument for that, but I think that that ends up distorting actual scientific output.
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Rob talks with Columbia’s Lily Bermel about where climate policy should go next.
Wait, is the climate policy landscape … in better shape than it looks?
Just over a year ago, President Trump passed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. It repealed many of the Biden administration’s most aggressive climate policies, including tax credits for solar and wind energy.
Although those policies are gone, the emissions cuts they achieved remain largely intact — at least in the power sector, according to a new study that we’re covering exclusively at Heatmap. Lily Bermel, the report’s author and a visiting fellow at the Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy, argues that at least where energy generation is concerned, the glass is more than “half full.”
On this episode of Shift Key, Lily joins Rob to discuss what we learned from Biden’s big climate law, why it likely never would have achieved its projected emissions declines (at least not without a tremendous transmission buildout), and how studying its legacy changed her mind about policy going forward.
Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
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Here is an excerpt from their conversation:
Robinson Meyer: Given that the IRA, in retrospect, in the power sector, kind of resolved any economic issue you would have making a project pencil out and revealed all these non-economic issues that actually constrain development, we are now looking at a political environment where we’re switching from mourning the IRA to saying, okay, what should happen next? And my colleague Emily Pontecorvo recently wrote a story about this question. But I think one of the big questions going forward, especially if Democrats take Congress at the end of this year is, well, should they fight to restore the tax credits? I can even see a world where restoring the tax credits becomes something people insist on to get permitting reform or something.
After writing this report, did you come to the conclusion that Democrats should restore the wind and solar tax credits? Is that the most urgent priority for climate policy?
Lily Bermel: In writing this report, I became quite confident that I don’t think it’s worth the bang for buck in restoring those wind and solar tax credits, and instead that the supply side constraints are the real issue that we need to focus on. I did this lag analysis where if you take a given year, say 2031, and you see that the IRA trajectory would have deployed like more than 300 gigawatts of solar, how many years later would the [OBBBA] scenario do that? There’s only a two and a half-year lag, or gap. And so in restoring the clean energy tax credits, you are only buying back two and a half years’ worth of deployment, which, at least for me, was a lot smaller than I had thought.
Meanwhile, both scenarios have a literal cap in them about how much they can build and how fast they can build it. So even if you buy back that little two and a half-year average annual lag, you’re going to run up to the exact same ceiling. So restoring the tax credits brings you closer to that ceiling, while permitting reform will completely lift the ceiling and be a rising tide that lifts all boats.
You can find a full transcript of the episode here.
Mentioned:
The “Glass Half Full” report
More from Rob on Lily’s findings
From Heatmap: The Wind and Solar Tax Credits Are About to Expire. Will They Come Back?
Heatmap’s cheat sheet on how the One Big Beautiful Bill Act changed America’s clean energy law
Previously on Shift Key: What Has All This Back-and-Forth Climate Legislating Bought Us?
Jesse Jenkins’ paper on transmission’s role in achieving the IRA’s goals
Brendan Duke’s policy affordability framework
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Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.
A just-released MIT paper argues that the energy transition is still largely following the trajectory laid out in the Inflation Reduction Act.
When President Joe Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act into law in 2022, climate observers — myself included — marked it as a landmark victory in the history of climate policy.
For the first time since global warming arose as a major issue more than three decades earlier, the United States had enacted a comprehensive policy to do something about it. America could boast a generous set of incentives meant to spur new solar farms, electric vehicle factories, and other zero-carbon industries nationwide. The law was projected to bring down U.S. emissions by at least 36% by the mid-2030s, compared to the all-time high they had reached in 2005.
Then Donald Trump declared that the law was in fact a “Green New Scam” and resolved to repeal it. Scarcely half a year into his second term, President Trump and Republicans in Congress terminated many of the climate law’s most important provisions in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, their tax cuts and spending package passed last summer.
Was the Biden law a false dawn? A new report, released on Monday by MIT’s Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research and entitled “Glass Half Full,” argues that its influence will live on — at least in the electricity system.
Most of the Biden policies’ expected climate benefits in the power sector — including the amount of renewables that will get built nationwide, and the projected declines in greenhouse gas emissions — are still likely to happen by 2035, even under the Trump administration’s policies, the report finds.
“The glass is substantially full,” Lily Bermel, the report’s author and a visiting fellow at the Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy, told me. “It’s not barely half full. It’s like three-quarters full.” Her study compared not only the effects of Biden and Trump’s tax and spending laws, but also the environmental rules that each administration fought for.
Roughly 74% of new clean energy capacity that would have gotten built under Biden’s policies by 2035 will still get built under Trump’s policies by that year, the report estimates. Those new renewables and zero-carbon power plants will generate about 71% of the electricity that would have been expected had Biden’s policies remained law.
About 67% of the decline in climate pollution that would have occurred over the next decade under Biden’s policies will still happen under Trump’s policies, the report estimates.
Coal- and gas-fired power plants are also likely to generate less electricity over time in both the Biden and Trump scenarios. But under Trump that story is not quite as rosy: The coal-powered fleet will retire more slowly than it would have had Biden’s laws stayed on the books, and the natural gas fleet will run more often than it would have needed to.
The report does not analyze what Trump’s climate and energy policies will do to emissions from every sector of the economy. It focuses only on the electricity system and omits, for instance, any discussion of transportation or heavy industry, even though Trump’s tax and spending law repealed incentives for electric vehicle buyers and hydrogen production.
But the power sector drove the largest share of emissions declines that were expected from the IRA, and other estimates of President Trump’s tax law have suggested that repealing the wind and solar incentives would do more harm to the climate than any other provision. In those studies, the law’s termination of the EV tax credits is often the No. 2 driver of higher emissions.
When Bermel began writing her paper, she wasn’t sure the results would be so optimistic. She compared two scenarios produced by a mathematical model prepared by Energy Innovation, a nonpartisan energy and climate policy think tank, which seeks to simulate the country’s energy system.
In the first scenario, the Biden administration’s climate law and other policies — such as Environmental Protection Agency rules restricting carbon emissions from coal and some natural gas power plants — remain on the books through 2035.
The second scenario looks more like the world we live in. In that run, the Trump administration passes the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, repealing the solar and wind tax credits but preserving incentives for other zero-carbon technologies, such as nuclear power plants and batteries. It also withdraws the EPA’s power plant rules and weakens other regulations on pollution.
The models do not simulate everything the White House has done to stymie renewables and climate policy. Simulations cannot capture, for instance, Trump’s bureaucratic and sometimes extralegal war on solar and wind power because the administration has changed tactics — and gotten blocked by courts — too often to model effectively, Bermel said.
But the models do try to estimate some of the real-world constraints that limit the construction of new clean power plants. In both scenarios, the country’s lack of new interregional transmission — and the long queues to connect new energy projects in many power markets — imposes a “speed limit” on new wind and solar construction, regardless of other incentives on the books.
Despite those constraints, the report finds that more than 80% of the utility-scale solar and battery storage that would have been built under the Biden scenario by 2035 will still be deployed under Trump’s policies.
Only one clean electricity technology stands to do much worse than it would have had the IRA remained on the books: onshore wind. The country will build less than half of the new onshore wind capacity that it would have built had the IRA remained on the books.
In the U.S., new onshore wind installation has declined every year since its peak in 2020. The lack of new large-scale power lines — and a deteriorating local permitting environment — has hampered wind energy’s expansion.
Ultimately, policymakers should prioritize easing construction of new transmission lines and other forms of energy infrastructure, Bermel asserts in the report. Amending the country’s permitting system — and raising the de facto speed limit on new clean energy construction — is likely far more important for lowering emissions than restoring the tax credits, she told me in a conversation for Heatmap’s Shift Key podcast.
“By solving one problem — by making clean energy a little bit cheaper and by incentivizing the demand of it — we therefore exposed how supply-side constrained we are and how awful and burdensome the permitting barrier process is,” she said.
Though there is broad agreement among researchers about the need for a smoother permitting process to allow more renewables development, Bermel’s direct comparison of counterfactuals is an unusually direct way of trying to answer policy questions. “In general, I think the findings are reasonably consistent with what we’d say, but this is a bit of a different way of looking at these questions than energy modelers typically take,” Ben King, an energy and climate analyst at the Rhodium Group, which also operates an energy system model, told me.
Energy analysts often try to examine a range of outcomes and assumptions in their models, such as by varying natural gas prices or electricity demand, he said. The new report does not do that, instead comparing the same baseline energy demand assumptions under the two differing policy regimes. That means the results are less likely to capture what will actually happen in the real world, but still “illustrate the economic competitiveness of these technologies no matter what,” King said — as well, for the moment, as the surging hunger for electricity from AI companies.
Noah Kaufman, a Columbia economist and senior research scholar, told me Bermel’s technical analysis made sense. But he differed sharply with her conclusion that the IRA’s most important benefits had been preserved, even in the power sector. The law’s most important benefits, he said, were never measured in gigatons alone.
“I don’t agree at all with the ‘glass half full’ framing of the situation,” he said. “To me, the importance of the Inflation Reduction Act wasn’t the tax credits or how many gigawatts of solar we will deploy. It was that, for the first time, the U.S. was able to go out to the world and say, ‘We have a strategy now.’”
“I don’t think we have 50% of that now, or 70% of that now,” he said. “I think we have basically none of that now.”
Repealing the IRA and the Biden administration’s other policies has returned the country to something closer to its pre-2021 status quo, he said, where the country is slowly reducing its emissions but not using the energy transition to generate new jobs or economic opportunities for fossil-fuel-dependent communities.
“If you’re not decarbonizing in a way that works for big parts of the country, then you’re not going to be able to sustain the strategy over long periods of time,” he said.
The MIT report does not try to examine whether clean energy manufacturing has declined under the Trump scenario, and concedes that “the Glass Half Full reading is limited to … the power sector, not the broader economic-transformation strategy a successful energy transition requires.” The One Big Beautiful Bill Act retained some of the Biden law’s manufacturing tax credits, including subsidies for solar panel and battery component production.
For at least one technology, Bermel believes the report is not optimistic enough.
The Trump tax law preserved tax credits for technologies such as enhanced geothermal and nuclear fusion — “clean firm” power plants that can produce electricity on a 24/7 basis, regardless of the wind or weather. These technologies will be essential to eventually replacing fossil fuel-burning power plants on the grid.
Yet the energy system models on which Bermel’s report depends hold that companies will build essentially no new sources of zero-carbon electricity by 2035. That’s partly because the policies to support those technologies still aren’t generous enough, because in some cases companies developing them are still building first-of-a-kind facilities.
“Tax credits are best for a technology that is mature enough to respond to price signals,” Bermel said. “They’re helpful, but ironically they’re more helpful for a later stage technology.”
Yet in this case, the real world is already diverging from the models. The artificial intelligence boom has driven hyperscalers to invest in clean firm technologies in ways the model does not predict. Even the models Bermel uses in her report, for instance, do not account for the more than 5 gigawatts of new nuclear power that is expected to come online due to new plant openings, canceled plant closures, and planned upgrades.
The models also don’t reflect the gigawatt of enhanced geothermal-produced electricity Google plans to buy from the energy developer Fervo by 2028. That deal could scale to 3 gigawatts in the 2030s.
Despite those additions, she argues that the next stage of federal climate policy should emphasize public investment that helps expand the power grid and commercialize the next generation of clean firm technologies. That could look like expanding the manufacturing tax credit to cover transformers and other grid equipment. It could also entail offering more direct financial support — either through cheap loans, federal guarantees, or even direct government procurement — to clean firm energy developers. Only through building the next generation of zero-carbon of power plants, she told me, will the country begin to retire its fossil fuel fleet in earnest.
This transcript has been automatically generated
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Robinson Meyer:
Hello, it is Monday, July 6, and a year has passed since Republicans in Congress and President Trump passed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. That pulchritudinous policy repealed many of the provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act, which is, of course, the big climate law passed in 2022 by President Biden and congressional Democrats. It also revealed, crucially, the tax credits for wind and solar energy and the consumer side tax credits for electric cars. I would say this is the biggest event in recent American climate political history. You know, for the first time in 40 years, the U.S. had passed a comprehensive climate law, and then it got repealed by Republicans very quickly. I think it’s driven part of the climate hushing trend, the so-called climate hushing trend, where even Democrats are reluctant to talk about climate change now. And I think it’s seen at least, I don’t know, among progressives, climate advocates, liberals, everyone who cares about the environment and climate change as a partial failure.
Robinson Meyer:
What today’s guest presumes is, what if it wasn’t? A new report out today argues that in the power sector, much of the IRA’s new clean energy construction and emissions reductions remain intact. Even in a world where the Trump administration has passed OB3, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, and repealed Environmental Protection Agency regulations restricting fossil fuel emissions, the glass remains more than half full. That’s what she says. The IRA really did, she says, helped pull ahead new clean energy construction that would not have happened otherwise. And that success has big implications for policy going forward, including whether Dems should restore the solar and wind tax credits next time, when and if they get a majority, or do something else to fight climate change. Well, joining me today is the author of that new report, Lily Bermel. She’s a visiting fellow at the Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy and a former climate policy advisor at the State Department. She was on John Kerry’s climate diplomacy team during the Biden administration. We talk about what she found in the new report, why she thinks the glass is more than half full, why the IRA might not have produced the benefits that we thought it would at the moment it was passed, and what she changed her mind about as she looked at the reality of climate policy’s landscape today. I’m Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap News, and it’s all coming up on Shift Key. Lily Bermel, welcome to Shift’s Key.
Lily Bermel:
Thanks, Rob. Excited to be here.
Robinson Meyer:
Okay, so let’s get right into it. You write in this report, which we have a story about on Heatmap.news today, I encourage everyone to read. You compare two scenarios in this report. One is the, let’s say, the world of the Biden administration, where the Inflation Reduction Act is law. And the other one is the world we live in, where the One Big Beautiful Bill Act passed, repealing swaths of the Inflation Reduction Act. And you write in this new report that the Oba scenario preserves 74% of new and clean energy capacity, 71% of new clean generation, and 67% of emissions reductions that we would have achieved had the IRA stayed on the books. And so my opening question for you is, why are you so sunny?
Lily Bermel:
Why am I so sunny? Well, great question. That is definitely a part of my personality, but I wanted to get some data to book it up to see if it was really real or not. I think last year, last summer, when the Republicans were doing their reconciliation process, really kind of taking that hatchet to the IRA, it was a distressing time and there were different narratives that emerged and were confusing and dueling even. The IRA was totally dismantled. The clean energy transition is doomed, but you also had that the clean energy itself is unstoppable because it’s the cheapest. And so a couple of things caught my attention. I actually remember Jigar Shah saying that if we had just skipped the IRA and gone straight to, I’ll say OB3, we would be shouting from the rooftops. It preserved the majority of the tax credits, which is where most of the IRA’s decarbonization benefits were coming from. And it was really just wind and solar that got the short end of the stick.
Robinson Meyer:
And electric vehicles.
Lily Bermel:
Totally. Yes. Thank you. In the power sector, specifically.
Robinson Meyer:
Yes. In the power sector, it’s all about wind and solar.
Lily Bermel:
Yes. Exactly. So this report is just on the power sector, the backbone of the energy transition. And it’s really wind and solar that get their tax credits removed in the coming decade. And then there was restrictions placed on the rest. And so in wanting to just myself kind of have a clearer understanding of what’s happening, my curiosity got the best of me. I reached out to the Energy Innovation Team and asked for some data. And they provided me with two scenarios. So the first is what you outlined, say the prior policy environment, which is the full IRA, and also those EPA regulations. So it’s the tax credits and the regulations.
Robinson Meyer:
What exactly is in these two scenarios? Because I think crucially, you’re not comparing worlds that never existed. You’re kind of comparing like the entire regulatory and legal framework created by the Biden administration versus the world we live in now.
Lily Bermel:
That’s exactly right. So the first scenario I call the IRA trajectory, but it’s more than the IRAs. The IRA plus the power plant regulations. And you can imagine that’s the like December 2024 world, that policy frozen in place. The second scenario is with the one big beautiful bill act, OB3, and then all of those regulations taken away. And so that would be maybe the July 2025 policy environment. Models are a camera of a moment in time with a trajectory or projection of what you think is going to happen going forward from that. And so importantly, the model does not include all of the coordinated executive branch actions that the Trump administration has done on wind and solar since then. And that’s really important because these numbers are model numbers really distinct from real world outcomes.
Robinson Meyer:
Your report is titled “Glass Half Full.” And I think the story in the power sector that you tell in this report is a much more upbeat one than maybe people were expecting after OB3 passed.
Lily Bermel:
Yep. So that basic question is what actually survived. And it technically has two different ways. It’s how much of the gain survives. So that’s your clean energy, your emissions reductions, and how much worse is that fossil outcome. And so we see that the glass is half full if you’re within 50% of the benefits preserved or more, or fossil is less than 50% worse. The top line is that more than half of those benefits of the prior policy environment survives across the board. It’s only onshore wind that dips below that 50% line. And so we have about three quarters of clean capacity will still get added over the coming decade, and about two thirds of emissions reductions will still occur as well. And then on the fossil side, the outcomes were less than 50% worse at threshold. We see fossil capacity is only 4% more in the OB3 scenario than the IRA trajectory, and it’s fossil generation that surges 19% more on average over the coming decade compared to the IRA trajectory. So it’s about the same fossil fleet, but doing more.
Robinson Meyer:
So if I’m thinking about these two worlds, and I want to get into the epistemological world of the models in a moment, something that I’m sure quickened all of our listeners’ pulses just to hear. I mean, in some ways, it’s not even as the glass half full or half empty. It’s that the glass is detectably more than half full. In kind of all these three big questions, we’re going to be adding most of the clean energy capacity, the new build, new wind and solar farms and batteries that we anticipated adding in IRA world under Trump world, held constant basically for executive interference that’s very hard to model and changing by the week, but which you can follow on a day-to-day basis at Heatmap.news. We’re going to preserve two-thirds, roughly, of the emissions reductions we expect to see under IRA world. And we’re going to not add that much new fossil. In fact, we’re just going to run the fossil fleet more than we would have under a world where we kept the IRA on the books and maybe built that kind of extra 25% of solar and wind and battery capacity. Is that a fair description?
Lily Bermel:
Yes. Yeah, you said that really well. One detail on that fossil fleet is that while the size of the fossil fleets between the scenarios are relatively similar, the composition is quite different. And so this is where it’s important to remember the scenarios include the impact of the regulations as well. So without these power plant regulations that encourage faster retirement of coal power plants, what we see is that coal still retires, but it retires more slowly today than it would have if the regulations were still on board. So therefore, the fossil fleet itself is just ever so slightly larger, but it’s more coal heavy and therefore more emissions heavy as well.
Robinson Meyer:
I mean, it’s interesting because this is a mechanism we talk about all the time back during the Biden administration that I think has a little bit been lost to time, which is that the IRA, correct me if this is a misunderstanding, but the Inflation Reduction Act, because it discounted the cost of clean and because it discounted various carbon capture technology, made it far easier for the EPA to impose strict air pollution standards on coal plants. And it was actually those standards that would have shifted the composition of the fossil fleet from a coal and gas fleet to a primarily gas fleet. And with the IRA off the books, and of course, with the standards off the books, too, it’s much harder now. We’re going to run these coal plants for much longer than we would have in Biden world. Is that right? Or am I missing something important?
Lily Bermel:
Yeah, I think that’s generally right, that the coal is stickier. It stays around for longer. It’s the gas that fires and runs way more and helps to fill in that clean shortfall. I think the Biden administration viewed the regulations as a nice complement to making clean cheaper. And that kind of allowed them to say, as we build more clean, we can generate less of fossil. But there is a really important distinction between building clean and replacing fossil capacity and the reliability services it adds to the grid. When you build clean energy, you can decarbonize in a shallow or in a deep way. To me, I think about shallow decarbonization as adding clean energy that meets new demand and that helps the economy grow and helps meet demand growth. It kind of offsets emissions that would have happened if that was met by fossil fuels instead. A deeper decarbonization is clean energy that is built that mitigates emissions that have already been happening from fossil plants that are already running. And so just because you’re building clean energy, you’re often doing the former and not the latter there.
Robinson Meyer:
It’s interesting. It’s such a good comparison between the two in the power sector. And I think it also helps to like maybe put it in the context of countries, right? What we see in China so far has generally been shallow decarbonization, where they build this enormous amount of clean energy. It’s extremely impressive. And historically it has allowed them to maybe not run their fossil plants as much as they wanted going forward and i think in like very recent quarters we have seen that clean energy begin to eat away at the existing fossil generation and that’s what a deeper decarbonization looks like that’s what it looks like when you’re not only building enough clean to meet new growth but actually building so much clean that you’re out competing the fossil that already exists
Lily Bermel:
Yeah, I think that’s spot on. And it’s Lauri Myllyvirta is one of my favorite China analysts who has found that like clean energy is what’s driving China’s economic growth. And that’s why their coal fleet is generally still there in the size that it is. I think the other distinction to make on shallow and deep is that different clean energy technologies kind of can do one or the other. And so the services and the gains that wind and solar and storage bring to the grid when you deploy them do not provide the same reliability services that gas, that coal, that nuclear or geothermal will give. And so as you are scaling variable renewable energy penetration on the grid, you actually sometimes need more gas capacity to meet its intermittency and to support it from happening. And so simply deploying wind and solar alone does not achieve you that deep decarbonization. You can’t wind and solar your way out of the fossil fleet. You need that set of clean firm technologies to replace it, to offset it, to eventually retire it. But that’s something far in the future.
Robinson Meyer:
And clean firm here is anything that can run 24-7, is relatively reliable, is independent on the weather or the sun, and is dispatchable too, right? You can basically, as a grid planner, say, hey, we need this power plant to go on and turn it on and it provides power. And it doesn’t need to be like a battery or something where it had to have saved up fuel.
Lily Bermel:
Yeah, I think about firm energy as that always-on, always-available energy generation. And then when it’s clean, it’s low emissions or no emissions. You know, traditional firm powers is that coal and gas. Interestingly, I don’t think of storage as firm power because that’s more about shifting when the energy is generated rather than it always being available. So therefore, it’s interesting to realize that it’s gas is what firms renewables less so than storage. Storage kind of supports a wider time span horizon with which wind and solar can generate energy. But it’s what’s on the books right now is coal and gas and later other clean technologies will be able to firm renewables as well.
Robinson Meyer:
This report only looks at the power sector. And so arguably, some of the worst damage of repealing the IRA happened in the transportation sector. We’re not talking about the transportation sector. But when you look at the power sector, I think we’ve spent a long time mourning the disappearance of the Inflation Reduction Act. And even if its repeal is going to be more for the transportation sector than the power sector, the idea that we’ve only lost, say, 25 percent of the emissions reductions that we expected, I think, will be surprising. So why didn’t repealing the IRA have a bigger effect on U.S. emissions?
Lily Bermel:
I think this comes down to the maturity of wind and solar, the power of market forces to drive the energy transition, and some functionalities about how the grid and deployment basically works. So to take those each in force, or in turn, we know that wind and solar are very mature, are cost competitive. Advocates in industry have been saying that for a while. And so I think removing the tax credits and seeing that still, on average, three quarters is getting built speaks to that and is a testament to their resiliency, their cost effectiveness, the benefits that they have, and the fact that they make up 95% of the interconnection queue. So that’s one reason. I think the other is that because of the safe harboring of the wind and solar tax credits, you do see a bit of near-term deployment locked in. And Rhodium Group actually has similar projections that mirror mine. In their taking stock report, they show that across their projections, their low, medium, and high emission scenarios, that the deployment that’s happening through 2030 is the same. And so I kind of like to think about the grid in terms of light years, how it operates, where what you see today reflects what was decided years ago. So therefore, the things that get deployed today, construction decisions, permitting decisions, were made many years ago, and that kind of flows through. So there’s a lot of momentum, I think, on clean energy’s side and a lot going forward in terms of cost competitiveness.
Robinson Meyer:
And so in that world, I guess, did passing the IRA matter to the grid’s decarbonization at all? Because I’m listening to what you’re saying, And what I’m hearing is, well, wind and solar are really mature. We were building up a lot of them. Did we basically build up a huge bolus of wind and solar projects that are now working their way through the system between, say, 2021 and 2024? And they were all safe harbored and they’re all going to get built or many of them are going to get built. And so in some ways, the IRA already gave its gift to the wind and solar industry and it didn’t need to extend these tax credits forward. And kind of it already essentially did because of how the safe harbor rules work. Or is it just that AI and load growth have driven up power prices so much that developers are going to go out and build wind and solar anyway? The IRA actually turned out to be a little extraneous to this story because it turned out that everyone was going to build wind and solar as much as they could because power prices are shooting through the roof in any deregulated market.
Lily Bermel:
Yeah, I think that’s a great question. And of course, the IRA was enacted before the huge energy boom that we’re seeing right now. And in some ways, the way you phrase that question makes me think about how, as the wind and solar tax credits are phasing down, you have demand growth surging, and that’s acting as the demand pull, kind of in some ways to replace the IRA tax credits. I mean, I think the IRA was hugely beneficial in that when I was working on the Clean Investment Monitor, we just saw investment come off the sidelines and explode through the roof in terms of the amount of projects being stood up and investment flowing through the economy. And that was very tangible and very real. The huge value add of the IRA, too, was that it put down a lot of public investment to down payment in innovating and commercializing the set of other technologies that we need to decarbonize. And so that’s in geothermal, that’s in nuclear restarts, that’s in carbon capture and a whole lot more. And so what’s interesting about this model is that because it comes with its own assumptions about costs and performance, the model itself actually does not pick up on these clean firm technologies deploying at all in the coming decade.
Robinson Meyer:
That’s something so striking here is that we put all this work in. I mean, during the One Big Beautiful Bill Act legislative process, I wrote an op-ed. I wrote tons of pieces for Heatmap, basically saying the Senate and Congress needs to keep these tax credits for clean firm technologies like geothermal and fusion and fission on the books because they really matter. And what your model shows is like that capacity never comes online like it does not come online in 2030 it doesn’t come online in 2035 it is simply not a major player in your model.
Lily Bermel:
That’s an interesting kind of embedded assumption in the energy innovations model where just the projects don’t seem to pencil out. And that’s where we get to really bifurcate between what a model says and what we’re seeing in the real world, because these are two really different things. And I’d argue that commercialization of these technologies is happening faster than we expected, ranging from the progress that we’re seeing on geothermal with Fervo’s IPO, a lot of offtake that they have, construction of a project, to what we’re seeing in nuclear, where two weeks ago, the Office of Energy Dominance Financing announced, I think, $17.5 billion, in loans to restart new nuclear plants. That’s multiple gigawatts that we did not expect at the time that this model was created that will now come online and help do the job. And then we also have the hyperscaler attention and willingness to pay to commercialize these technologies to invest in the grid and to build clean energy fast. That’s tangible. That’s a lot of capital. And that is doing a lot of work to create the environment that these technologies need to come to bear.
Robinson Meyer:
So one of the big findings in the report is that if you look across technologies, you look across different questions that you’re curious about. The clearest bad news is in onshore wind. It is only onshore wind that fails to build 50% of the capacity in a Trump world that it would have built in an IRA world. And I guess maybe there’s a certain argument for this because people would go, well, of course it does. The Trump administration doesn’t want to build any wind at all. They hate wind. For whatever reason, they’ve decided wind should lose the culture war. But wind actually was already struggling by the time we were halfway into the Biden administration. I mean, I think 2020 was the best year for wind construction ever, and it’s kind of been falling off since then. Why is onshore wind so harmed in the IRA repeal scenario or the OBBBA scenario in your model?
Lily Bermel:
Yes, I think you already indicated that it is a technology that just seems to struggle anyways. It has really long development timelines. It needs a lot of transmission to connect to the grid. It has … it’s just very capital intensive. It has high upfront costs, high project finance costs and whatnot. So that helps make it very credit sensitive. So when you remove the tax credits, it’s hurt by that. But it also has other problems that a tax credit won’t fix anyways.
Robinson Meyer:
In other words, it was already struggling. IRA was going to help it because those tax credits were actually meaningful to helping projects pencil out. But without the tax credits penciling out wind, it’s just not getting built.
Lily Bermel:
Yes. And this is onshore wind in particular. Offshore wind is interestingly like less credit sensitive because it’s more connected to state procurement mandates and has kind of other drivers pushing it forward.
Robinson Meyer:
That’s interesting. Does your model account for all the offshore wind skullduggery that’s happened?
Lily Bermel:
The model doesn’t take into account any of those executive branch actions, but the report itself includes kind of a deep discussion of how real world events will change the model’s outcomes. And it looks at three different time horizons. It looks at what the IRA expectations have come to pass. It looks at the near term, like will OB3 projections and outcomes bear? And on a more medium term, What does it look like as well?
Robinson Meyer:
Reading this report and seeing basically that repealing the IRA, at least in the power sector, and again, we’re talking about the power sector, doesn’t have this catastrophic effect on our emissions trajectory. It doesn’t have this catastrophic effect on how much wind and solar we build. Now, of course, I will miss the wind and solar that gets built. I’m sure developers will, the climate will. We’ll all mourn this 25% of emissions that we could have had that we didn’t have. Like reading this report, it doesn’t sound like we’ve lurched from beautiful, verdant, abundant, cheap electricity world into dark, evil, polluter world. It sounds like we’ve taken a wrong turn somewhere and it’ll take us some time to get back onto the right highway, but we’re not locked into an evil world now. And that suggests that the Inflation Reduction Act was maybe not as important as we thought it would be. And so my question to you is like, When the IRA passed, we talked about how it was going to reduce economy-wide emissions by like 40 to 48 percent by 2035. Would it have achieved the huge emissions reductions that we thought it was going to achieve when it passed?
Lily Bermel:
I don’t think it would have achieved the full amount that we would have expected in the power sector. Jesse Jenkins put out a really prescient report when the IRA was enacted that said 80% of the IRA’s emissions benefits hinged on could we build transmission faster. And guess what? We have not built it faster at all. We’ve built less and less of it and more slowly. And so John Bisling, who you had on your podcast recently, put out this really great report with a lot of other people, and they looked at all of the IRA modeling. And what they found was that later IRA models projected less and less benefits that would have come as people kind of realized like, oh, shoot, we have a lot of supply side constraints. And so I think your question is very sharp. Because the IRA would not have fully come to pass, that doesn’t mean that the IRA wasn’t good or wasn’t worth it. It’s that we have other problems. Basically, by solving one problem, by making clean energy a little bit cheaper and by incentivizing the demand of it, we therefore exposed how supply-side constrained we are and how awful and burdensome the permitting barrier process is.
Robinson Meyer:
In other words, because the IRA sort of solved any financial issue you would ever have building wind and solar, we discovered how bad the non-financial issues are or how many supply side constraints create financial issues for projects, regardless of whether the, you know, kind of facial economics are favorable or not.
Lily Bermel:
Yes, I think that’s right. And right, Heatmap does an excellent job of this on the local side, where you guys track on the local ordinance level, like how these restrictions and bans against wind and solar are completely proliferating. And so that makes me think that this issue is only getting worse because you have the federal level, you have all the national laws that really constrain build out. That adds cost. It makes it more expensive to build the longer it takes. That’s an issue. And at the local level, we have it building up as well.
Robinson Meyer:
Given that the IRA, in retrospect, in the power sector, kind of resolved any economic issue you would have making a project pencil out and revealed all these non-economic issues that actually constrain development. We are now looking at a political environment where we’re switching from mourning the IRA to saying, okay, what should happen next? And my colleague, Emily Ponacorvo, recently wrote a story about this question. But I think one of the big questions going forward, especially if Democrats take Congress at the end of this year is, well, should they fight to restore the tax credits? I can even see a world where restoring the tax credits becomes something people insist on to get permitting reform or something. After writing this report, did you come to the conclusion that Democrats should restore the wind and solar tax credits? Is that the most urgent priority for climate policy?
Lily Bermel:
In writing this report, I became quite confident that I don’t think it’s worth the bang for buck in restoring those wind and solar tax credits and instead that the supply side constraints are the real issue that we need to focus on. I did this lag analysis where if you take a given year, say 2031, and you see that the IRA trajectory would have deployed like more than 300 gigawatts of solar, how many years later would the OB3 scenario do that? There’s only a two and a half year lag or gap. And so in restoring the clean energy tax credits, you are only buying back two and a half years worth of deployment, which, at least for me, was a lot smaller than I had thought. Meanwhile, both scenarios have a literal cap in them about how much they can build and how fast they can build it. So even if you buy back that little two-and-a-half-year average annual lag, you’re going to run up to the exact same ceiling. So restoring the tax credits brings you closer to that ceiling, while permitting reform will completely lift the ceiling and be a rising tide that lifts all boats.
Robinson Meyer:
Can I ask, do we know that permitting reform will lift the ceiling? I mean, what you’ve done is create an ingenious modeling device that basically tries to account for real world constraints, which I appreciate because as we’ve been talking about, the awareness that we even need to do this in energy models, I think, was maybe not as there as it has been dawning on the community over the past five years. But do we know that if we pass permitting reform, I mean, we don’t even know what’s in the legislative package. So I guess let me ask you, like, what would need to be in a permitting reform package to raise the cap on what we can build in a meaningful way?
Lily Bermel:
Yeah, I think there’s a suite of laws that need reform to help speed the process of building. And so, of course, that’s the National Environmental Policy Act, Clean Water Act, Section 401, Federal Power Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, you know, rules to make it so that you don’t have like 10 years to litigate a case. And then the concept of permit certainty, which the Freedom Act on the Senate recently introduced to kind of protect against what the Trump administration is doing in revoking permits. So I can imagine a package coming together with components across the board from that. And we do a bills in Congress, both sides of the House or both sides of the chamber that have elements of all of that. So I think it is coming together. I do think there’s two ways that permitting reform does accelerate clean energy and help reduce emissions. The first would be raising that ceiling so that more can get added to the grid, so that the grid itself can grow, so that more transmission can get built. And the second is shortening the amount of time to build and to connect to the grid itself. And then because clean energy, it’s more permitting exposed, it needs more infrastructure from scratch. The queue itself is 95% clean, like it will net benefit clean.
Robinson Meyer:
You write in the report, the American energy transition now operates in a different macroeconomic and political environment than the one that shaped climate policy debates in the late 20 teens and early 2020s. I thought that was such an interesting claim. Can you speak a little bit more about that?
Lily Bermel:
Sure. I think I say the IRA was built and it was sold, and later it was attacked as a pure climate law. It was the product of a democratic trifecta. Interest rates were zero or near zero. Very low deficit anxiety. We were economically choosing to prioritize jobs over costs, and now all of that has changed. We’re living in a cost-of-living politics where affordability is the name of the game. We have huge demand growth that we were not really seeing at the time. Geopolitical competition over supply chains has sharpened and the fiscal space has really become quite exhausted. And then, of course, politically, right, we are now in a Republican trifecta and energy itself is ideologically the ire of both parties. And so I think with that big shift, that for me is one of the biggest telltale signs that you can’t just restore what happened before. That was built for a completely different moment. And to me, the glass half full result should point policymakers towards building beyond what we have.
Lily Bermel:
One other thing I’ll point out is that the wind and solar tax credits have been extended and extended for 30 to 40 years on a bipartisan basis. It was then a one-party vote that expanded the tax credit policy from focusing on wind and solar to supporting a lot of different technologies in the full suite of clean energy. It was then one party that affirmed to keep all of those, but that, explicitly tells us that the wind and solar tax credits are no longer bipartisan, that it will take a one party vote to bring them back and the next party, when given the opportunity, will remove them. And so to me, that’s another tell that it will come with great political capital and cost to try to extend them. And that urges the question if it’s worth the political capital to do that. Do we get the emissions reductions in the build out that we want? Is it worth that bang for buck? And so, right, like I’m not working for the CBO. I don’t know the exact fiscal costs. I’m not one of my friends on the Senate negotiating. And so I’ll leave the political strategy to them. But I trust them greatly. But I think it’s a really important question to ask if it’s worth it.
Robinson Meyer:
How much of all the assumptions here are just dependent on continued high electricity prices? Because I’m a little bit worried about a world where we assume the AI, you know, like, it’s funny in environmental policy land right now, let’s say, because on the one hand, you have a group of people who are convinced the AI is a bubble, or going to pop or not economically useful. And we’re not going to talk about that, but we’re going to just say that’s one point of view. And then we have another point of view that basically, when thinking about the future, assumes high power prices are going to remain the norm now, somewhat indefinitely. But in fact, we know the two things are linked. We know that power prices are high because hyperscalers are bidding up for every electron they can get. If power prices were to fall, would we still like to have winded solar tax credits on the books? Or are there certain insurance policies we should try to pass now that would insure us against a world where power prices fall because the last time power prices were high back in the aughts, we made a lot of bets on different technologies. And then a number of things happened, but fracking was one of them. And what wound up happening with fracking was it crashed power prices. And then it turned out to be okay because we got cheap Chinese solar. But a lot of technological bets didn’t wind up panning out because we anticipated a world of expensive power prices and instead we got cheap power prices. Thank you.
Lily Bermel:
My understanding is that the data is quite mixed on whether large loads are directly raising electricity prices or not. The Lawrence Berkeley National Lab has a really great study that they’ve updated over time that shows the impact of large loads on these prices. And in some areas, prices are tracking with inflation up until only super, super recently. So I think the data is mixed there. What your point implies, though, is that, as we discussed, AI is such a large demand and a demand pull for energy? Like, what if that goes away? What if it’s smaller than we expect? Like, are we screwed from that? I don’t think wind and solar tax credits are a necessary insurance against, like, oh, demand growth is less for several reasons. One is that the demand growth that we’re seeing now from AI is very sizable. It’s actually smaller than the demands that will come from electrification, from EVs, from building, from industry. That comes more next decade. So essentially, AI is front running this high energy demand growth scenario. And that’s good because it’s forcing us to think on our toes and react to this now. And whether or not the AI part of it comes to pass, electrification is definitely coming and it’s a larger amount. So I think while, yes, size of the bubble, all of that is like debated. And thank you, economists who are debating that. The demand growth is coming.
Lily Bermel:
And then third is that, again, I don’t think that the wind and solar tax credits are the number one needed thing here. I think, like, in terms of insurance costs, like, we are so much more screwed if we can’t build in this country and build faster. And so I think the argument there still points to permitting reform over the tax credits.
Robinson Meyer:
What did you change your mind about writing this report?
Lily Bermel:
One thing that I think this report really crystallized for me is the role that gas plays in our power system. We see that it’s what fills the clean energy gap because it’s able to generate more. And we see that even as we build more clean energy, when it’s wind and solar and storage, that does not offset the services that gas provides. And I think like anyone who’s focused on mitigating the power sector needs to keep top of mind. They’re like, you literally need a turbine spinning on the grid as like the on switch to keep it on and to keep it functioning. There are only so many technologies that can do that. Gas is the only cost competitive and available technology to do that right now. And that’s why if we want a clean alternative, it has to be nuclear, it has to be geothermal. And down the line, there’s other options as well. And so to me, that helps us realize that geothermal in particular should be the number one public and private investment priority in the coming decades for decarbonization. And I saw a stat recently that geothermal has only received like one tenth of the amount of public support that solar has received. And so even though we’re seeing some success on that side, like it’s not enough. There is so much more that we can do.
Lily Bermel:
I think something else that this report helped me clarify my thinking about was the value of building versus doing things kind of marginally on the side to make things better. There’s a whole set of actually like really cool, innovative technologies like grid enhancing technologies, reconductoring, virtual power plants, demand response. Like there’s a whole set of things now that’s essentially the equivalent of like finding a $20 bill on the street. Like these should be pursued immediately. But recognizing that in order to meet demand growth, which as we talk about is both from AI, but also electrification and heat pumps and EVs and manufacturing, decarbonizing industry, like doubling the size of our grid is table stakes. In fact, like we might need to triple it. And so while all of those energy things should be pursued with like full steam ahead, it’s probably marginal and just like buys a little bit of time for all of the building that we really need to do. And a through line, like a theme that I put in my report is that building actually, is what will help solve our problems on both sides, right? You have to simply build more renewables to close that clean energy gap. And you have to build a clean firm to be able to close the emissions gap. And so to me, that’s the through line here and the way that we’ll decarbonize our power sector.
Robinson Meyer:
Can you give us how you used to feel about gas versus how you feel now?
Lily Bermel:
Sure. I’ll admit that I was raised in kind of climate academia, where I was very excited to go work at the Paris Agreement. And like everything was all about climate change and net zero and 2050 and direct timelines like that. And I think as I’ve learned more practically about how the energy system works, right, you realize that like, oh, you like things take slower than you expect. And you actually have to like add a whole lot of energy, way more than you want. And there’s a lot of building that’s required. And then maybe in a while, we can get rid of some of that fossil. I’ll see you next time.
Robinson Meyer:
Let’s now preserve some of your climate respectability here, as we’ve praised gas and said we shouldn’t bring back the wind and solar tax credits. And if we aren’t using the money on the wind and solar tax credits, of course, we have constrained fiscal space. The budget deficit, unlike a decade and a half ago when people were concerned about it, now seems to be a real problem, certainly driving up mortgage rates. We could just not spend that money at all. Okay. But if we did want to spend some money on climate change and we didn’t just want to do permitting reform, like what do you think we should spend money to do? What should we do instead of wind and solar tax credits?
Lily Bermel:
Great question. And just to provide a little bit of context, Brendan Duke put out a great report last month that looked at, if Democrats are to undo just a portion of the Trump agenda, it will cost the size of Biden’s original Build Back Better proposal. And that is not Trump’s whole agenda. And that is before any additional Democrat spending priorities.
Robinson Meyer:
Is that like the tax cuts? Like basically, if you were to undo the tax cuts, it’s just extremely expensive.
Lily Bermel:
It’s not even the tax cuts. It is healthcare and the tariffs and one other piece. So it’s not the tax credits. So all to say is, not only has the level of debt gone through the roof, the amount of spending demands will be huge. And so we will have to be really picky about what we do.
Lily Bermel:
So your question is a great one. In the report, I think I propose a premise for thinking about it. The first should be, let’s not subsidize the deployment of mature technologies. And instead let’s focus on building out the grid and focus on commercializing the set of innovative technologies that need to come to scale. So there’s a lot of things you can do to build the grid. You can expand existing tax credits on the books, say the manufacturing one for transformers, advanced conductors, transmission equipment, other power electronics that will really help relieve bottlenecks and supply crunch that we’re facing on that side. Some people support a transmission investment tax credit. That makes sense to look into. And then those technologies that we need really to deploy in the 2030s to have ready. So long-duration energy storage, geothermal, nuclear, carbon capture, you know, fusion maybe one day will happen. And that can be done through procurement that the government does. And then, of course, federal loan authority. And the Department of Energy Dominance Financing obviously plays a huge role here. And so wanting to continue to support that is really key. And it’s been great to see that being done on a bipartisan basis so far.
Robinson Meyer:
Your report says so clearly, build, build, build, how we’re going to achieve decarbonization is developing, you know, this next generation of clean firm technologies, be it nuclear or geothermal or fusion. And only building out more transmission can unlock the degree of renewables that we would need to see in order to really begin shipping away at the huge amount of fossil that’s in the system. When you look at leaders in the environmental policy space, when you look at what organizations are telling their Instagram followers and the people who ostensibly look to them, do you feel like they are communicating the importance of building as much as they should be?
Lily Bermel:
Yeah, I think it’s becoming more of a priority. I think people are realizing how important it is. And again, that Jesse Jenkins report that says we’ll lose 80% of emissions reductions if you don’t build transmission more like that is quite eye opening. So I do hope that my report can be a nudge in that direction, explaining, you know, really at a detail level and a technology level, like why we need to build more and why building more is the answer.
Robinson Meyer:
So you feel like it’s getting better. But do you feel like it’s where it needs to be now?
Lily Bermel:
Probably not. There’s always room for improvement. That’s the counter to glass out full. I’ll say I’ll be optimistic, but there’s a lot more work to do for sure.
Robinson Meyer:
OK, very politic answer. One more question, which is after all that you’ve come to understand about the IRA and looking at these reports, looking at what it would have done, looking at what it didn’t do. I think when the law was first passed, a lot of us thought, wow, what a well-designed law. It’s going to stay on the books. And then after the Beautiful Bill Act passed, a lot of us thought, oh, my gosh, it wasn’t well designed at all. What a disaster. It didn’t survive in the House. It didn’t. There were this group of 14 House Republicans who were lined up to support it. But as soon as President Trump made it clear that he wanted to get rid of this law, they got rid of it.
Robinson Meyer:
Actually, this was a disaster. But looking at your report, I don’t know, I’m of two minds. On the one hand, I look at your report and I go, look at this, three quarters of the clean energy capacity we would have had, two thirds of the emissions reductions we would have seen. Seems like the IRA did a pretty good job. On the other hand, I go like, well, but I look to 2035 or I look to 2030 and those clean firm tax credits don’t seem to be doing a lot. Now, we know that in the real world, it seems like they actually have a better track record that we’re commercializing technology faster than the models think we will. But there’s a reading of events here where like the IRA spent a lot of money to accelerate trajectories that we would have hit within a year or two anyway. Was the IRA a well-designed law? Do you think it did what we thought it was going to do when we passed it? Or does doing this, you know, after analysis report on it make you think, actually, we should have done a lot of other stuff instead of the IRA during this moment?
Lily Bermel:
Yeah, I think about how our understanding of what our best foot forward is with policy changes over time. And after, what, 20 years of trying to tax carbon and make carbon more expensive, we were enlightened to instead make clean energy cheaper. And so that was like the moment that the IRA was riding on. It was novel. It was very cool to design an industrial strategy and policy around clean energy. And that’s where a lot of the IRA came from. Again, by kind of solving for that demand side of the equation, we realized, oh my gosh, the supply side morass is so massive that we are just running and hitting our head against the wall over and over again. Also, right, the rise in energy demand, like our own realization about it came after the IRA was passed. So I think now that we are in a different moment where we have more data to prove that how, mature wind and solar are and how cost competitive they are, and we have a better understanding that there’s a whole other suite of technologies that we need to commercialize and innovate and scale, that then our focus, I think, naturally continues to move on. So I don’t think anything about the IRA was a mistake or not worth doing, right? We learned a lot from it. It did spur a lot of investment. It accelerated things. And now we’re realizing, oh my gosh, like, look how cool it is that these technologies are mature. And now let’s go do that for the rest of the set of clean energy
Lily Bermel:
technologies that we need and that we want to decarbonize the power sector.
Robinson Meyer:
When you look at your the set of technologies that have matured now, one thing we often hear from Democrats, one thing we hear, I have to say, constantly heated map events from elected Democratic representatives is, well, clean is cheap and cheap is clean, right? Right. Clean is the cheapest it can be. Clean, clean. There’s a bit of dissonance, I have to say, in this message that clean is cheap and also that we need to restore the subsidies for the thing that is allegedly cheapest because it was truly cheapest. We wouldn’t need to subsidize it. Do you believe after writing this report that clean is always the cheapest option?
Lily Bermel:
Sure. And I think you are so spot on in saying that. I’ll flag that my report itself didn’t look at costs and was just looking at deployment levels. But it did encourage me to look exactly into that question because I wanted to think through what are the headwinds and the tailwinds that the clean energy sector is facing. So obviously, we’re getting a lot of tailwinds right now from the Trump administration directly, also from persistent high interest rates and other things like that.
Lily Bermel:
A tailwind that people cite over and over again is how cheap clean energy is. And in looking into it, again, to ground truth that, I realized that clean is cheap. It’s comparatively cheap when it’s freshly getting built. So new solar compared to new gas, the solar will be cheaper. But in the really narrow context, when that market or that region has enough reliability already, if it already has the transmission built, and if it has a relatively low amount of solar, so therefore the solar is like value add. And in other moments when those conditions are not met, clean is not necessarily like automatically cheaper. And when you compare new clean to existing fossil, clean doesn’t always win out there either. And so I think that’s really important to know and, of course, argues for doing things to make clean cheap. I think it still supports the fact that clean is very competitive, but I think we really need to dismantle the thinking that says clean is always cheapest because it’s simply not. The study in the data that’s most often cited, which is the Lazard’s levelized cost of energy, it doesn’t take into account the grid costs and the systems costs that it takes to connect renewables to the grid. And it compares apples to oranges and all of these things. So again, clean is relatively cheap. Clean is super competitive. It’s not 100% always the cheapest.
Lily Bermel:
That’s really important to know. And it’s also like, okay, that gas is cheap, too. And that gas is what’s being used, because we want whatever energy is cheapest. And when gas is cheap and getting added to the grid, that will lower the cost of electrification, like that still helps support our goals. That’s still, yeah, lowering the cost of electrification is useful for decarbonization, and gas helps firm solar and wind and storage.
Robinson Meyer:
It’s funny, the Lazard levelized cost of energy, it’s if we did a, you know, levelized cost of calories.
Lily Bermel:
That’s such a good analogy.
Robinson Meyer:
It would tell you basically that what you should be eating at all times is like oatmeal cooked in canola oil. Yeah. You know, and it’s be like, you know, oatmeal cooked in canola oil, man, nothing delivers cheap calories like that. You can go to Costco and walk away with tens, hundreds of thousands of calories for like 10 bucks, you know, tomorrow. But you actually can’t exclusively eat oatmeals cooked in canola oil. You need other nutrients. You need other parts of your diet. Totally.
Lily Bermel:
Yeah. It’s like, how soon would you die if that’s the only thing that you ate? Yeah, exactly. How soon would the grid fail if you just completely only relied on wind and solar and didn’t have firm capacity, which one day will be met with clean energy?
Robinson Meyer:
That’s great. Lily Bermel, thank you so much for joining us on Shift Key. This was great.
Lily Bermel:
Thanks, Rob. So happy to be here.
Robinson Meyer:
And that will do it for us on Shift Key today and on Shift Key this week. We’ll be back next week with a new episode of Shift Key. But if you miss us, remember, you can go to heatmap.news right now. Go to the newsletter button in the tab and subscribe to Heatmap Daily. It’s the new daily on weekdays newsletter that I write with my analysis and thoughts on the day’s biggest climate and energy news on the biggest news and kind of the new electric economy. Me. It’s like getting an email from me to you every evening. It’s fun. I’m enjoying doing it. And you should go sign up right now. Heatmap.news. Click newsletters. Subscribe. Of course, you should subscribe to all of our newsletters at Heatmap, including Heatmap AM written by my colleague, Alexander Kaufman. Until then, Shift Key is a production of Heatmap News. Our editors are Jillian Goodman and Nico Lauricella. Multimedia editing and audio engineering is by Jacob Lambert and by Nick Woodbury. Our music’s by Adam Kromelow. Thanks so much for listening. See you next week.