You’re out of free articles.
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
Sign In or Create an Account.
By continuing, you agree to the Terms of Service and acknowledge our Privacy Policy
Welcome to Heatmap
Thank you for registering with Heatmap. Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our lives, a force reshaping our economy, our politics, and our culture. We hope to be your trusted, friendly, and insightful guide to that transformation. Please enjoy your free articles. You can check your profile here .
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Subscribe to get unlimited Access
Hey, you are out of free articles but you are only a few clicks away from full access. Subscribe below and take advantage of our introductory offer.
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Create Your Account
Please Enter Your Password
Forgot your password?
Please enter the email address you use for your account so we can send you a link to reset your password:
What happens when you can’t run and you can’t hide?

You did everything right.
You had your go-bag ready and you knew your evacuation route. You monitored the wildfire as it moved closer and closer to your home, and you kept the volume turned up on your phone so you could heed a “LEAVE NOW” notice if one came. When it finally does, jolting you awake in the middle of the night, you realize that you can smell the smoke inside. When did the fire get so close?
The power is out, so you make your way downstairs using your phone’s flashlight. You have to Google how to manually open the garage door since the electronic clicker doesn’t work (oh, so that’s what the red cord is for). Your heart is thumping, but you’ve made it, you’re in your car; you even remembered to keep it filled to half a tank in preparation. You pull out of your driveway and onto the dirt road that leads out of your rural neighborhood. The night sky ahead of you is a weird neon orange.
You have to hit your brakes when you reach the intersection at the main road. It’s completely backed up with other evacuees, their red taillights stretching ahead through the thickening smoke as far as your eye can see. Some of your neighbors are pulling their boats on trailers; there is an RV up ahead. And you can see the fire burning down the side of the hill now — toward you, toward the gridlocked traffic that isn’t moving.
Harrowing Fort McMurray wildfire escapeyoutu.be
Leaving your home is only the beginning of a wildfire evacuation. But the next step — the drive to a safe location — is usually given no more attention in preparedness guides than the reminder to “follow the directions of emergency officials.” In the best-case scenarios, where communication is clear and early and residents are prepared, that might be enough. But when communication breaks down, or fires move fast and unpredictably, traffic can reach a dangerous standstill and familiar roads can transform into death traps.
In 2015, some 20 vehicles were overcome by a fire while stuck in a traffic jam on Interstate 15 between Los Angeles and Las Vegas; on the same interstate in Utah five years later, a backup nearly became deadly as a fire burned up to the road’s shoulder and panicked travelers abandoned their cars. Fire evacuations in New South Wales, Australia, in 2020 resulted in a 10-hour backup, and Canada’s Highway 3 had bumper-to-bumper traffic earlier this month because it was the only road out of imperiled Yellowknife. In 2020, some 200 people had to be evacuated by helicopter from California’s Sierra National Forest after a fire cut off their only exit route.
And when people die in wildfires, they are often found in their vehicles. In Portugal, 47 of the 64 people killed during a 2017 forest fire were in their cars, trying to escape. At least 10 people were found dead in or near their cars after the 2018 Camp fire, the deadliest blaze in California’s history. And in Lahaina, Hawaii, this month, in what the Los Angeles Times has called “surely … the deadliest traffic jam in U.S. history,” the lack of advanced warning combined with inexplicably blocked roads led an untold number of people to perish in their cars while trying to evacuate, including a 7-year-old boy who was fleeing with his family; a man who used his last moments attempting to shield a beloved golden retriever in his hatchback; and a couple who were reportedly found in each other’s arms.
In a best-case scenario, emergency managers are able to phase evacuations in such a way that the roads don’t get backed up and residents have plenty of time to make it to safety. But wildfire is anything but predictable, and officials who call for an evacuation too soon can risk skeptical residents deciding to take a “wait and see” approach, where they only get in their car once things start to look dicey. In one 2017 study, only a quarter of people in wildfire-prone neighborhoods actually left as soon as they received an evacuation notice (other studies have found higher levels of compliance). This is the worst nightmare from an emergency management standpoint, since “evacuating at the last minute is probably the most dangerous thing you can do,” Sarah McCaffrey, one of the 2017 study’s authors, told The New Yorker.
Further complicating matters is the fact that many wildfire-prone areas are isolated or rural regions with a limited number of egresses to work with. One 2019 investigation found that in California alone, 350,000 people live in areas “that have both the highest wildfire risk designation, and either the same number or fewer exit routes per person as Paradise” — the site of the 2018 Camp fire, where backups on roads prevented many from escaping.
Evacuation traffic also doesn’t behave like the rush hour traffic we’re more familiar with. It’s “a peak of a peak,” with the congestion caused by “the sheer amount of people trying to leave and load onto the roadway at the same time in the same direction,” Stephen Wong, a wildfire evacuation researcher and an assistant professor of transportation engineering at the University of Alberta, told me. Burnovers and hazards like downed powerlines or trees can further reduce exit options, funneling all evacuees onto the same low-capacity roads. Worse, once that congestion starts to form, “you actually reduce the number of vehicles being able to go through that section,” Wong added. “So you go from 2,000 vehicles per hour [per lane], and it drops to, like, 500 vehicles per hour.”
Get one great climate story in your inbox every day:
Households will also frequently evacuate with multiple cars — rather than leave a valuable asset behind to burn — and tow trailers, boats, and RVs. As a result, the average vehicle length increases by 3% during wildfire evacuations, one recent study that looked at the 2019 Kincade fire in California found — leading, of course, to even worse congestion. (Agonizingly, Wong’s research further uncovered that over half of evacuating households “had at least two or more spare seats available”). The Kincade study also discovered that drivers significantly slow down during wildfire evacuations — contrary to the common misconception of careening, panicked escapees — likely due to a combination of factors such as lowered visibility and more cautious driving.
Because “most [evacuation] research focuses on hurricanes and then tornadoes,” Salman Ahmad, a traffic engineer at the civil engineering firm Fleis & VandenBrink, told me, “traffic simulations — how traffic moves during a wildfire — are still lacking.” When emergency planners use computer models to calculate minimum evacuation times for their jurisdictions, for example, their assumptions can be deadly. “If you plan for an allocation considering normal traffic as a benchmark, you’re basically not making the right assumption because you need to put in that extra safety margin” to account for “the fact that people slow down,” Enrico Ronchi, a fire researcher at Lund University in Sweden and the author of the Kincade study, told me.
Wong agreed, stressing that the number of variables fire managers need to juggle is dizzying. “Evacuations are really complex events that involve human behavior, risk perceptions, communication, emergency management, operations, the transportation system itself, psychology, the built environment, and biophysical fire,” Wong said. “So we have a long way to go for evidence-based and sufficient planning that can actually operationalize and prepare communities for these types of events.”
And that’s the scary thing: A person or a community might do everything right and still be at grave risk because of all the unknowns. Evacuation alerts might not get sent or arrive too late; exit routes might become unexpectedly blocked; fires might leapfrog, via flying embers, to create new spot fires that cut off egresses. Paradise, California, famously had a phased evacuation plan in place and had even run community wildfire drills, but even the best-laid plans can unravel.
Tom Cova, a geography professor at the University of Utah who has been studying wildfire evacuations for 30 years, told me that “too many communities may be planning for the roads to be open, the wireless emergency alert systems to work, there not to be tons of kids at home that day — you can just go down the list of things that [could go] wrong and think, What’s the backup plan?” The uncomfortable truth is that we need plans B, C, and D for when evacuations fail. Because they will fail.
Take Lahaina, where a closed bypass road concentrated outbound traffic onto a single, jam-packed street. When people started to panic and abandon their cars, it ultimately further obstructed the road for everyone behind them. “It’s like a chain reaction, where each car is seeing the [people in the] car in front of them run,” Cova said. “And then you look behind you, you can’t back up. If you look to the sides, you’re stuck. And then you say, ‘We’re going into the ocean, too.’”
That improvisation ultimately saved some lives. But “it’s hard for emergency managers to order this kind of thing because what if people drowned?” Cova went on. “So you’re trading one risk for another risk.”
But the need for creative improvisation is also a conclusion that’s been reached by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the government agency tasked with issuing guidelines and regulations for engineers and emergency responders. In new guidance released last week, NIST used the Camp fire as its case study and found “evacuation is not a universal solution,” explaining there are times when “it may be better for residents to shelter in their community at a designated safety zone” rather than attempt to drive out of town.
This is a somewhat radical position for a U.S. agency since evacuations have long been the foundation of American wildfire preparations. But the thinking now appears to be turning toward asking “what shelters do we have?” if and when a worst-case scenario arises, as Cova further explained to me. “Temporary refuge areas, high schools, churches, large parking lots, large sports fields, golf courses, swimming pools — I wouldn’t recommend using any of these things, and I wouldn’t recommend people being told to use them,” he said, “but [people] have to know what to do when they can’t get out.”
In the case of Paradise, for example, NIST reports that there were 31 such “temporary refuge areas” that ultimately saved 1,200 lives during the fire, including 14 parking lots, seven roadways, six structures, and a handful of defensible natural areas, like a pre-established wildfire assembly area in a meadow that had already burned and ended up serving as a refuge for as many as 85 people. Once established, these concentrated refuge areas can be defended by firefighters, as was the case for 150 people who memorably hunkered down to wait out the blaze in a strip mall parking lot. It’s far from a best-case scenario, but that’s still 150 people who would’ve otherwise been stuck in potentially deadly traffic jams trying to get out of town.
Temporary refuges are unplanned areas of last resort, but establishing a larger safety zone network and preemptively hardening gathering places like schools and community centers could also potentially reduce exposure on roads by shortening the distance evacuees need to travel to get to lower-hazard areas. So-called WUI fire shelters — essentially, personal fire bunkers that NIST warns against because they aren’t standardized in the U.S. but are popular in Australia — could also be explored. “That’s the direction we’re heading in with wildfire communities,” Cova told me grimly, “because we don’t seem to be able to stop the development in these areas. That means we’re forcing people into a corner where shelter is their only backup plan.”
Maybe this is difficult for you to imagine: Your community is different; a wildfire couldn’t happen here. You’d evacuate as soon as you got the notice; there’s no way you’d get stuck. You’re a good driver; you could get out without help. But as Lahaina and other “unprecedented” fires show, it’s the limits of our lived experiences that we’re up against now.
“We should think about possible scenarios that we have not seen before in our communities,” Ronchi, the Swedish fire researcher, said. “I understand that it’s a bit of a challenge for everyone because often you have to invest money for something that you have not experienced directly. But we are [living] in scenarios now in which we cannot anchor ourselves on our past experiences only.”
Read more about wildfires:
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
Current conditions: A wave of summer heat is headed for the East Coast, with midweek temperatures surpassing 90 degrees Fahrenheit in Washington, D.C. • Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands are bracing for winds of up to 190 miles per hour as Super Typhoon Sinlaku bears down on the U.S. territories • At least 30 people have died in floods in Yemen, which just recorded its highest rainfall in five years.
The Trump administration is holding up some funding for grants at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, The Hill reported. On April 1, the University of Colorado put out a statement saying that a federal pause on funding had put scientists who collect data about the atmosphere “at risk for elimination” after the White House Office of Management and Budget had “not released these funds.” The university’s Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences said that roughly 30 days before running out of funds to pay scientists, “we were informed that NOAA has put a pause on all grant actions.”
As I told you back in December, the Trump administration is also working to dismantle the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Colorado, an institution credited with many of the biggest scientific breakthroughs in our understanding of weather and climate over the past 66 years since its founding. In a post on X at the time, Russell Vought, the director of the White House’s Office of Management and Budget, called the institute “one of the largest sources of climate alarmism in the country,” and said the administration would be “breaking up” its operations.
Secretary of Energy Chris Wright is scheduled to testify Wednesday morning before the House Committee on Appropriations to defend the White House’s latest budget request for his agency. He’s not the only chieftain of a federal agency with relevance to Heatmap readers who’s coming before Congress this week.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection plans to launch the first phase of what’s called the Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries tool in the agency’s automated commercial secure data portal to allow companies to request refunds of Trump administration tariffs the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unlawful earlier this year. Solar companies are among the thousands of American businesses that filed complaints with the U.S. Court of International Trade for refunds prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling. Those, according to Solar Power World, include American Wire Group, Canadian Solar, GameChange Solar, Fluke, Hellerman Tyton, Kinematics, JA Solar, Jinko Solar, Longi, Merlin Solar, Qcells, and Trina Solar.
Sign up to receive Heatmap AM in your inbox every morning:

Gas power plants are booming in the U.S. as demand surges, but the growth doesn’t yet mark a fundamental shift away from renewables, clean-energy analyst Michael Thomas wrote in a post on his Substack newsletter, Distilled. “If there were to be an unprecedented pivot to gas, you’d expect Texas to be ground zero for it,” he said. “The state has done everything it can to prop up fossil fuel power in recent years. It’s also one of the most permissive when it comes to environmental regulations and permitting.” Despite major growth in the past year, he wrote, gas made up just 10% of proposed new project capacity in Texas so far this year. The remaining 90% of capacity came from solar, wind, and battery projects. Last year alone, renewable and storage developers proposed 100 gigawatts of clean capacity — seven times more than gas developers proposed.
The developer behind a major Massachusetts offshore wind farm is suing its turbine manufacturer in a bid to keep the company from backing out of the project. By February, the Vineyard Wind project off Cape Cod had installed 60 of the project’s 62 turbines, as I reported at the time. Yet the parent company behind GE Renewables, the maker of the project’s turbines, said “it would be terminating its contracts for turbine services and maintenance at the end of April,” the Associated Press reported. GE Vernova, the parent company, says Vineyard Wind owes it $300 million already.
The war in Iran is taking a toll on Central African minerals. Miners in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are curbing output of copper and cobalt as the war cuts supplies of sulfuric acid needed for leaching minerals out of rock, Reuters reported. Mine managers are reducing cobalt production to conserve chemicals.
The deal represents one of the largest public-private partnerships in the history of the national labs.
I’ll admit, I thought I might be done covering fresh fusion startups for a while. In the U.S., at least, the number of new industry entrants has slowed, and most venture capital now flows towards more established players such as Commonwealth Fusion Systems and Helion. But in February, a startup called Inertia Enterprises made headlines with its $450 million Series A raise. It’s aiming to commercialize fusion using the physics pioneered at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the only place yet to achieve scientific breakeven — the point at which a fusion reaction produces more energy than it took to initiate it.
That achievement first came in 2022 at the lab’s National Ignition Facility in Berkeley, California. On Tuesday, Inertia announced that it’s deepening its partnership with Lawrence Livermore, creating one of the largest private sector-led partnerships in the history of the national lab system. This collaboration involves three separate agreements that allow Inertia to work directly with the lab’s employees on research and development, while also giving the startup access to nearly 200 Lawrence Livermore patents covering fusion technology.
The startup’s team isn’t merely a group of enthusiasts galvanized by the national lab’s fusion milestone. Alongside Twilio’s former CEO Jeff Lawson and fusion power plant designer Mike Dunne, Inertia’s other co-founders is Annie Kritcher, a senior employee at Lawrence Livermore who has led the physics design for NIF’s fusion energy experiments since 2019.
“We’re not starting from zero,” Kritcher told me, putting it mildly. “And that was really, really important to me when I decided to co-found this company.” Or as Lawson told me after the company’s fundraise in February, “the government put 60 years and $30 billion into NIF trying to get that thing to work.”
The technical approach pursued by Lawrence Livermore — and now by Inertia — is called inertial confinement fusion. In this system, high-powered lasers are directed at a millimeter-scale pellet of fusion fuel, typically a mixture of the hydrogen isotopes deuterium and tritium. The laser energy rapidly compresses and heats the pellet to extreme temperatures and pressures, driving the nuclei to fuse and releasing enormous amounts of energy. But NIF didn’t build its system for commercial purposes. Rather, its primary mission is to support the domestic nuclear weapons stockpile by recreating the extreme conditions inside a nuclear detonation, allowing scientists to study how U.S. weapons perform without conducting explosive tests.
To translate the lab’s research into a commercially viable device, Kritcher explained, Inertia must significantly increase the lasers’ efficiency and power output, targeting a system roughly 50 times more powerful than existing lasers of its class. The startup is also working to scale production of its fusion targets to drive down costs and enable mass manufacturing.
Inertia is not the only company attempting to commercialize this general approach, however. Back in 2021, as Lawrence Livermore moved closer to its breakeven moment, the future founders of the startup Xcimer Energy were taking note. Convinced that the fundamental physics of inertial confinement had been proven, they thought, “if we’re going to do this, we have to do it now,” Xcimer's CTO, Alexander Valys, told me a few years ago. He and his co-founder quit their day jobs, and Xcimer went on to raise a $100 million Series A round in 2024. Others joined in on the hype, too — the Fusion Industry Association reports 13 fusion companies that were founded or emerged from stealth between summer 2022 and summer 2023, a record for the sector.
Kritcher told me that none are adhering as closely to NIF’s successful design as Inertia. “There are fundamental technical differences between us and the other laser approaches,” she told me, explaining that while Xcimer and others are using broadly similar methodologies to produce a hot, dense plasma, the underlying physics behind their plan diverges significantly. Xcimer, for instance, is developing a novel laser architecture that hasn’t yet been demonstrated at scale, along with a different fuel capsule design than the one validated by NIF.
Kritcher will be allowed to continue her work at the lab thanks to what the company describes as a “first-of-its-kind agreement” enabled by the 2022 CHIPS and Science Act, which allows scientists at the national labs to participate in commercialization efforts with the goal of accelerating the transfer of knowledge to the private sector.
For the fusion engineer, it’s the ultimate dream come true. She first arrived at Lawrence Livermore as a summer intern in 2004, just before her senior year at the University of Michigan, and “fell in love with the lab and the NIF project,” which was still under construction at the time. She opted to attend the University of California, Berkeley for her masters and PhD in nuclear engineering so that she could continue her work there.
“I was starstruck by the possibility of fusion energy and [it having] such a big impact on humanity, and that really kept me going for a long time,” she told me. But after the NIF facility was finally completed in 2009, it failed to achieve ignition by its initial 2012 target.
By then, Kritcher was a postdoctoral fellow, and attention at NIF began to shift toward supporting the nation’s nuclear stockpile. Fusion energy was “always in the back of my mind, driving me day to day,” she said, “but you sort of forget about it, and you lose a little bit of that excitement and spark.” Under her guidance, NIF ultimately reached that watershed moment, which has since been replicated numerous times. And when it did, "it just reopened all those old inspirational feelings and motivations and excitement and it was like a 180 turning point where we all just go, oh, fusion energy is possible again with this approach.”
Many of the lab’s employees feel similarly, she said, and this close collaboration will allow some of the nation’s foremost experts in inertial confinement to work with the startup across a range of technical capabilities, including “the laser side, the target fabrication side, the simulations team side, the code development side, our physics design side,” Kritcher enumerated.
Inertia is looking to bring its first pilot plant online in the “2030s to 2040s,” she told me. By contrast, Commonwealth Fusion Systems — the most well-capitalized company in the sector — plans to connect its first plant to the grid early next decade, while Xcimer is targeting 2035. Kritcher is unfazed, though. While she acknowledges that other companies might complete their facilities sooner, she argues that Inertia still has an upper hand given that NIF effectively serves as the startup’s demonstration plant, something no other company has built.
Not to mention that all of the sector’s projected timelines remain highly speculative. There are serious technical and economic challenges that would-be fusion energy companies will have to overcome — Inertia not excepted — and the industry’s status 10 years down the line remains anyone’s guess. What’s crystal clear, however, is that a serious new contender has entered the race.
Big questions about naval strategy and the oil economy with Cornell University’s Nicolas Mulder.
After negotiations between the United States and Iran broke down Sunday without a deal, the United States Central Command said it would “begin implementing a blockade of all maritime traffic entering and exiting Iranian ports” Monday morning.
It’s hardly like traffic through the Strait of Hormuz had been unencumbered before that. The strait has been largely closed to through traffic since the beginning of March thanks to the threat of Iranian strikes on ships going in and out of the Persian Gulf. That has remained the case even after the ceasefire deal was supposed to have opened up the waterway last week. Only a few countries have been able to get their tankers out, mostly those with close trade relationships with Iran, including China.
President Trump has been seeking to reverse that state of play and open the strait to non-Iranian traffic (e.g. oil, liquified natural gas, and fertilizer coming in and out of the Gulf states), whether by badgering European allies to help clear the strait and by having U.S. Navy ships traverse the channel to clear mines and demonstrate it’s safe to navigate. He appears to have ultimately settled on blockading the blockaders.
The president said Monday on Truth Social that 34 ships had sailed through the strait on Sunday, a number that has not been confirmed by third party sources. In the run-up to the U.S. blockade, about 10 to 12 ships were sailing through the strait per day, according to marine data service Kpler and The New York Times.
So, is the blockade an escalation of U.S. pressure on Iran? A violation of the ceasefire? A “pacific blockade” designed to pressure Iran without resorting to direct strikes? And how would it work, anyway?
I spoke with Nicolas Mulder, an assistant professor of history at Cornell University and the author of The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War, to try and get some of my questions answered. This interview has been condensed and edited for clarity.
Let’s start from the beginning. What is a naval blockade? And how does it different from typical naval warfare?
A naval blockade is actually interesting because it is a form of warfare that has been quite regulated for quite a long time already under international law. A lot of our modern understanding of the laws of belligerence and neutrality actually comes from blockades because they impose an important stricture on international maritime traffic. As a result, they raise all sorts of questions about who wars are fought between, and what wars mean for the civilian economies of the countries involved, and what they mean for the relationship of the belligerent states and third countries.
For most of U.S. history, the U.S. was not the blockader, but the neutral wanting to bypass blockades. The reason that the United States concretely intervened in the First World War and began to really involve itself with the power politics of Eurasia in 1917 is because it insisted on its neutral rights to trade with Britain when Germany had declared an unrestricted submarine warfare campaign that was effectively a blockade of the British Isles.
Even before that, the Union used it against the Confederacy.
In the 18th century, all the big great power wars — the Seven Years War, the various succession wars, the Napoleonic Wars — all of those involved blockades.
What I find interesting is that we have this ceasefire. We have these negotiations, which are apparently still going on. But then we also have the blockade. You seem to be arguing that blockades are a part of warfare. So, is this implying that the U.S. Navy is still potentially going to be shooting at stuff, even if there’s a so-called ceasefire?
That’s the big uncertain aspect of the current situation. We are not back into the same war that we were in last week before the ceasefire took effect. The way I would interpret this is that it’s a kind of fudge. From the perception of the Trump administration, it needs to do something to not look weak, but at the same time wants to avoid the risks of a full resumption of kinetic warfare and a massive air campaign, which they had pursued for six weeks to very mixed and disappointing effects.
The one historical parallel that I think can help us make sense of what they may be attempting to do now is the practice in the 19th century of “pacific blockade.” There were several conflicts, beginning in the 1820s with the Greek War of Independence and then through a whole bunch of Latin American wars and Asian conflicts, where European great powers would blockade small countries — not to declare war on them, but to prevent any of their ships from entering or leaving to put serious pressure on them.
What they were doing in that situation was to use wartime levels of pressure without initiating the full war because they knew that the target states were basically too weak to retaliate and did not have the naval power to contest that blockade.
How can we see this operation in Iran as part of a continuum of using these strangulation-type strategies against much weaker opponents?
One way to interpret what they’re trying to do now is to apply that Venezuela-Cuba template to Iran, and to wager that if they play this carefully, they might be able to bring real economic pressure to bear without provoking Iran into as full-scale a retaliation as it was undertaking before.
But that Venezuela-Cuba template is difficult to implement in the case of Iran for two simple reasons. One is just that Iran has, of course, shown that it has quite a lot of military capacity to retaliate with drones and missiles, and also mines and small ships and submarines. It also has the ability to widen its own maritime disruption in the region, for example by working with the Houthis to really stem the flow of traffic through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.
What works in the Western Hemisphere, where the United States has a really unrivaled military dominance, may not be reproducible in this strategic theater.
What does the geography tell you about the ability to impose or contest a blockade like this?
They may be doing it with multiple rings, or multiple screens — a light initial screen, and then bigger barriers of ships a bit further away, so as to not risk most of their force too close to the Iranian coastline. We saw in the early phase of the war that some carrier strike groups began to operate over time further and further away from the Iranian coast, presumably to avoid the risk of being hit with missiles and drones.
In this case, one of the questions is, what kind of resources are needed to keep that going? The U.S. did run a blockade against Iraq for most of the 1990s that was in the Persian Gulf itself, which is very narrow. Iraq’s ports are a tiny sliver of land that ends in the Persian Gulf. So that was a very small stretch of coastline.
Iran should still be manageable, but it will require a wider screen, and potentially one that really crosses the entire Arabian Sea somewhere from the southern coast of Oman, diagonally, northeastwards to Pakistan, or at least the Pakistan-Iranian border, and potentially a bit further out. And if there is also interference in the Red Sea, then the U.S. Navy is going to have to route most of disabled forces all the way around Cape of Good Hope to move that whole force into the Indian Ocean.
I think that the Red Sea contingency is quite important to how this shapes up.
CENTCOM said yesterday that this blockade is on ships going in and out of Iranian ports. I wonder if this is unique historically — both a blockade of Iran and trying to impose freedom of navigation elsewhere?
It’s interesting, right? Because indeed, there is the commitment to freedom of navigation. But then it also has been suggested that the U.S. Navy will stop all ships that have paid any toll or transit fee to the [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps], and that paying that toll ipso facto would make their passage illegal. For that I don’t know any good historical precedent.
The other historical precedent is probably actually the Ottoman Empire and Russia and World War I. The Ottoman Empire was bottling up Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in the Black Sea by its control over the Turkish straits, which actually imposed a really serious, long run cost on the Russian economy. It’s one of the things that really fed us in the Russian Revolution. But at the same time, the Ottoman Empire was itself being blockaded by British and French forces in the Mediterranean.
Iran is blockading [Gulf Cooperation Council] states selectively — though of course, it is allowing through some shipments. But those shipments are then going to be intercepted, presumably by the Americans. So the de facto result of it is that no one is really going to be able to leave the Gulf. And that’s kind of where I see this game theoretically ending up.
So it seems like the result of this won’t be hugely different than what things were a few weeks ago, just with fewer Iranian ships getting out.
Also ships of those countries that negotiated transit with Iran.
If you looked at the news coming out of Asia and the diplomatic communiques of a large number of Asian states that brokered bilateral arrangements with Iran — so Pakistan, India; Bangladesh had done so; China, of course — but also countries that have otherwise fairly good links with the United States — the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam — all of them had essentially accepted that some payment to the IRGC was now the new cost of doing business. They were so desperately in need of energy supplies for the population that they decided to enter negotiations, even if, in principle, they would prefer freedom of navigation.
The likely diplomatic contestation or diplomatic issues coming out of this blockade are also going to be related to Asia, and that’s where I would focus our attention.