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European elites have been annoyed or worse by the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act. Its name is misleading; this is the largest American industrial policy since the New Deal — one that intends not only to drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but also to stand up a whole new industrial supply chain for green energy and manufacturing located in the U.S. and North America.
That project doesn’t sound great to many Europeans. French President Emmanuel Macron complained it was “super aggressive.” The French and German economic ministers traveled to Washington in February to lobby the Biden administration for exemptions from IRA rules (and actually got a receptive hearing). More recently Europe seems to have softened on the law; Bloomberg reports that elites are making their piece with EU businesses setting up shop in North America to be eligible for IRA subsidies. But this is still not ideal.
In the abstract, one can sympathize with European complaints over the U.S. flexing its still-unparalleled economic might to direct a greater share of cutting-edge economic production towards itself. But this isn’t merely a question of economics. As the recent IPCC report details, the world is still careening towards catastrophic global warming even given the fairly extensive climate policies most countries have enacted. Fighting that crisis trumps any possible complaint about economic unfairness.
But there’s a deeper problem here. The European Union taken together has economic heft not far off from the United States, with a population of 450 million and a price parity GDP of about $24 trillion. It absolutely has the capacity to enact an IRA-style industrial policy scheme — indeed, the continent has been crying out for one for over a decade. The IRA is a perfect opportunity to clear away the irrational and deeply harmful budget rules that have hamstrung the EU economy, return prosperity to the continent, and fight climate change to boot.
For the last 15 years most of the European Union, and especially the eurozone currency area, has been suffering a largely self-inflicted crisis of economic stagnation.
When the 2008 financial crisis hit, Europe barely avoided a galloping economic collapse, but it still faced a serious recession, particularly in the eurozone periphery of Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portugal. These countries were confronted with classic debt problems as revenues fell while spending on social benefits rose — a situation made worse because those nations did not control the European Central Bank and thus couldn’t rely on it to print money to prevent a self-perpetuating debt crisis. The EU eventually responded by essentially bailing out the banks that had lent to the ailing countries, but they disguised it as broader economic relief and then demanded punishing austerity measures in the rescued countries.
The austerity binge after 2010 pummeled the broader EU economy, and created a Great Depression-scale catastrophe in Greece and Spain. In the eurozone, unemployment had peaked and started to come down by mid 2010, but once the debt crisis and austerity poison took hold, it soared again to over 12 percent by 2012, where it remained for two years, and came down only with agonizing slowness. In Spain unemployment peaked at 26 percent, in Greece 28 percent.
Since 2009, eurozone growth has been dismal compared to America — which itself suffered a growth disaster during the 2010s, as I have previously argued. Yet the U.S. still managed inflation-adjusted growth per person of 19 percent between 2009 and 2021; the eurozone figure is 11 percent. In France the figure is just 8 percent; in Spain 1 percent, and in Greece negative 17 percent. Italy has not grown at all for more than 20 years. Adding insult to injury, all that austerity didn’t even help with Greece’s debt-to-GDP burden, because its economy shrank just as fast as the debt total.
This was a disaster for climate change and European energy security. European investment in renewable energy plummeted during the 2010s, from a high of about $30 billion in 2011 to just $10 billion in 2018. In sunny Spain and Italy investment virtually ceased during this period. Instead many European countries, particularly Germany, came to rely on cheap Russian natural gas for their core energy needs. That made them greatly vulnerable to Russia pressure when Vladimir Putin cut down gas supplies in an attempt to force Europe to stop supporting Ukraine’s effort to fight off Russian aggression.
To be fair, as I previously wrote here at Heatmap, Europe has been conducting a crash renewable investment program in response to Putin’s war that has been an amazing success, all things considered. But if it had spent the 2010s building out green energy, it would have been far less vulnerable to Russia coercion, its emissions would be much lower, European inflation today (driven by skyrocketing energy costs) would be considerably less, and Putin might even have thought twice about the invasion.
What is called for is a Europe-wide spending, borrowing, and investment policy to add to existing EU renewable subsidies. Rather than just decarbonization, the goal should be to restore full employment and production, and create a green energy and technology supply chain in Europe itself.
In other words, Europe needs its own Inflation Reduction Act. But still one hears austerity dogmatism from the highest European quarters. The EU is currently renegotiating its budget policies and German Finance Minister Christian Lindner recently published an article in the Financial Times arguing that “[s]ound public finances are a prerequisite for enabling economic growth in the EU,” and therefore the old strict rules about deficits and debt “must remain untouched.”
It would be hard to imagine a better disproof of this argument than the evidence cited above. The result of the old rules was the Greek crisis that threatened the structure of the EU itself. Europe’s lousy economic performance undoubtedly contributed to the decision of British voters to leave the EU in 2016. Yet Lindner has learned nothing.
The actual proposed reforms to the pact were released this week, and while they are a step in the right direction, they are mainly a loosening of the austerity straitjacket, not a removal of it — allowing countries more leeway as to how they will cut debt and deficits. That’s far short of what’s needed.
European commentators who aren’t austerity addicts often point to the political obstacles to doing Europe-wide industrial policy. But America has its own obstacles that are nearly as difficult to overcome. Thanks to our anachronistic Constitution, we had to get our climate bill past Joe Manchin, a literal coal baron. It’s frankly shocking that Democrats managed to pass anything with a zero-seat majority in the Senate, let alone the largest climate bill in history.
So for any Europeans who can see sense, the IRA should be seen as a golden opportunity. As noted above, the EU’s lunatic budget rules are most vulnerable in a crisis, and this can be such a crisis.
It may seem presumptuous for an American — coming from the land of suburban sprawl, four-ton SUVs that get eight miles to the gallon, and 3,000 square foot desert McMansions — to be lecturing Europe about what it needs to do about climate and economics. But I’m coming from a place of deep affection for the continent. I have been inspired by Europe’s welfare states, its city infrastructure, and even its tax authorities. America’s institutions in these areas are humiliating, pathetic failures by comparison.
That’s precisely why I want to see Europe strong, prosperous, and confident once more — so it can be the best version of itself, and provide an even better example for the rest of the world.
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The data center boom is everywhere you look in U.S. economic and emissions data.
This is an edition of Heatmap Daily, an evening review of the day’s news written by our executive editor. Sign up for it here.
It isn’t exactly a new thought, but I’ve been struck recently by how many trends in America’s economic and environmental data are fundamentally about the data center boom and the return of electricity demand:
First, the Energy Information Administration reported this week that U.S. emissions grew by more than 2% last year, driven by surging electricity demand and an increase in coal-fired generation. What caused that higher power demand? New factories and data centers — as well as record summertime cooling demand.
Second, many of the new factories driving that higher power demand are themselves producing goods that are … let’s say … data center-adjacent. There are the enormous new semiconductor fabs, of course. But Ford and General Motors have also set up new production lines (or repurposed old ones) to manufacture grid-scale batteries to meet power demand.
Third, take a look at the recent U.S. spending on private non-residential construction — in other words, everything American companies are building that is not houses, condos, or apartments.
The construction industry’s spent almost $60 billion on data centers over the past year, which is more than it spent on all other office buildings combined (and more than it spent building warehouses, too). Just a handful of categories — data centers, power plants, electricity infrastructure, and certain kinds of electronics manufacturing — now make up a third of all U.S. private non-residential construction investment. They’ve never made up such a large share of construction spending since data collection began in 2014.
As The New York Times recently noted, the American economy is unusually dependent on the American stock market right now — and the stock market is unusually dependent on artificial intelligence. This week, investors started to balk at the enormous spending hyperscalers are planning to keep building out the AI boom; Alphabet’s shares dropped 8% this week after it boosted its planned 2026 capital expenditure and signaled 2027 will be even bigger. If the data center boom started to slow down in earnest, then more than just that budget will change.
Speaking of which, my colleague Emily Pontecorvo wrote earlier this week about how many businesses are struggling to even estimate their carbon emissions from artificial intelligence. The carbon accounting startup Watershed recently unveiled a new formula to help companies get a sense of their AI-related emissions.
But even that formula is still limited by the amount of data hyperscalers publish — and they don’t publish that much. Google, for instance, is the only AI company that has (laudably) provided estimates of its emissions on a per-prompt basis. Yet no company has published its per-token emissions, or how emissions sync up with particular models or regions.
So Emily asked Google: Why aren’t you — or any other model provider — disclosing this kind of data yet?
The tech company didn’t get back to us until after we’d published Emily’s story. But its response was interesting enough that I wanted to quote some of it here.
The problem is “industry consensus,” Cooper Elsworth, a Google spokesperson, told us. “There is currently very little consensus on how to comprehensively and fairly measure the serving environmental impact of generative AI (such as text generation),” he wrote. “Without standardized, ‘apples-to-apples’ frameworks, it is difficult to compare different providers accurately.”
That’s partly because energy use — and emissions data — can vary from site to site and depend on “custom-built hardware, software compilers, and advanced inference techniques.” And he claimed Google doesn’t always have the measurement hardware in place to provide such specific estimates: “Providing precise, repeatable data requires highly advanced measurement infrastructure,” he said. “For example, software-based energy monitoring tools often suffer from sampling biases. For our study, we had to step away from top-down averages and directly measure actual energy at the physical power supply unit (PSU) level across our deployed fleet. Not all providers have the telemetry or data sets required to benchmark their operations at this level of granularity.”
Read Emily’s story to understand the other reasons why estimating — or even “guesstimating” — AI-related carbon emissions is so challenging.
A conversation with Emma Uridge of the Kansas Health Institute.
This week’s conversation is with Emma Uridge, analyst with the Kansas Health Institute. Uridge spent copious hours analyzing state and local laws on data center development to best understand how policymakers are responding to the potential environmental public health impacts of large AI infrastructure, including power and water. The report, which came out this week, also goes in depth into those health impacts. I reached out to her to discuss what she sees as must-watch territory for our readers on this emerging policy arena.
Our conversation was lightly edited for clarity.
What is actually being done on policy when it comes to data centers — beyond moratoria of course?
So first I’d like to just talk about the point of moratoria. It’s helpful to talk about how these policies emerge in the first place. One area where moratoria are helpful is when a data center is proposed but the county has no approach for how they’d like to potentially regulate them. That’s temporary, most of the time. It lets local governments conduct research on the various impacts and also negotiate community benefits, ones that can mitigate any potential negative impacts — like Lancaster Pennsylvania, which instituted a community benefit agreement that maximized the potential benefits of development while mitigating what large data centers can do. That agreement looked at capping municipal water use at 20,000 gallons per day and requiring 100% clean energy. It had financial penalties for non-compliance. The company also committed $20 million to their local economic development and clean energy fund. There are ways to negotiate with developers.
We also see amendments to existing zoning. Data center proposals are increasingly popping up in rural areas, many of which are unzoned, so there’s no way a county can negotiate unless there’s a moratorium in place.
Other policy solutions include different performance standards or requiring on-site renewable energy, like what Jefferson County, Missouri, looked at. Also setback requirements, mandatory noise buffers, ending by-right zoning.
Where are local governments getting ideas for regulating data centers?
A lot of the technical information comes from developers. That can in cases be seen as a biased source of information. I wouldn’t say there’s a dedicated group providing assistance to local governments when a project is proposed — which is a similar story to wind industry development, where we have only a handful of consultants who provide technical advice. It can be really helpful to get a multi-disciplinary approach to hearing information. It can be helpful to have the utility commission, public health folks, those in academia, as well as the developer.
As of right now, especially in rural areas, local governments have a hard task of balancing pushback while getting the most accurate, evidence-based, neutral information to make decisions. That balance can be contentious.
What is the federal government doing on data center policy? How is the Trump administration approaching it?
A few things there. In the early days, the drive was for AI expansion and to be competitive with foreign adversaries. Now due to the amount of public pushback in red and blue localities and a more cautious approach.
I’m not seeing a lot of actual policy movement at this time.
I know the EPA is looking at the chemicals used in cooling data centers because when that water is cycled through the system, some of it is discharged into the water system, so they’re looking at the Toxic Substances and Control Act for monitoring that.
How much of an impact does this minimal federal role have on industry behavior?
Y’know, this isn’t specific to data centers. This is true for all kinds of large-scale development: there’s a need to require some sort of federal monitoring and regulation.
That’s where I see an emerging role for public health. At the federal level, there could be policy movement towards requiring some sort of environmental monitoring at data centers to make sure they’re operating responsibility. Looking at specific water use relative to water availability and what happens when there’s a time of severe, persistent drought. With air quality too — we’ve seen areas where the grid isn’t as reliable so their diesel generators are kicking on more and affecting air quality for residents.
We’re just not seeing all of that right now. We need corporate disclosure.
What do you see as the most important public health impacts from data center development?
It varies by localities. The most discussed obviously is water usage. One thing I’d note about my conversations with folks enthusiastic around emerging tech is, there are still questions that need to be asked about the capacity of localities to support a data center. Like a small town in Kansas may only be using 40% of their water for their utility needs. If a data center came online, how much of that water goes to the data center?
One area underexplored within the public health discipline is energy poverty and energy security. The ability of a household to meet the needs of everything energy provides in our lives. It’s known we have an aging electric grid but we’re not talking enough about large-scale blackouts when the grid is not sufficient to support some of these new data centers.
Plus more of the week’s big development fights.
1. Laramie County, Wyoming — Meta is fighting the fine it received in the Cheyenne data center water pollution controversy, and the conflict between the tech giant and the city’s small board of public utilities is continuing to spill out into the public.
2. Niagara County, New York — This county just rejected a solar project’s highway work permits in a show of retaliation against the state’s Office of Renewable Energy Siting.
3. Barron County, Wisconsin — The anti-solar protest is the new campaign stop in deep red Wisconsin.
4. Chesapeake, Virginia — A large battery storage project on the Virginia coastline is on the rocks amidst rampant local opposition.
5. Lewis County, West Virginia — West Virginia is now a key battleground in the fight over transmission, as a line spanning all of West Virginia and Maryland — and cutting through Data Center Alley in Virginia — causes compounding consternation.