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Few aspects of Biden’s climate law have spurred more controversy than the “three pillars” — a set of rules proposed by the Treasury Department for how to claim a lucrative new tax credit for producing clean hydrogen. Now, it appears, the pillars may be poised to fall.
The Treasury has been under immense pressure from Congress, energy companies, and even leaders at the Department of Energy to relax the rules since before it even published the proposal in December. The pillars, criteria designed to prevent the program from subsidizing projects that increase U.S. greenhouse gas emissions rather than reduce them, are too expensive and complicated to comply with, detractors argue, and would sink the prospects for a domestic clean hydrogen industry.
But lately, the campaign to dismantle the pillars has gotten both more forceful and more threatening. There’s the politically challenging hurdle that leaders of another federally-funded hydrogen program — the regional clean hydrogen hubs — have spoken out against the rules, arguing they threaten investment in hub projects and therefore job creation and economic development around the country. Then there’s the recent Supreme Court decision to overturn the precedent known as Chevron deference, which weakened agencies’ ability to defend their own rules and thereby emboldens any aggrieved parties to sue the Treasury if it keeps the pillars in place. Last week, 13 Democratic Senators, 11 of whom hail from states involved in the hubs, sent a letter calling on Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen to dramatically revise the rules or risk having them challenged in court.
The consequences of losing the three pillars can only be guessed at using models, which are built on assumptions and can’t predict the future with certainty. But proponents say the stakes couldn’t be higher. In their view, the pillars don’t just prevent carbon emissions. They mitigate the risks of rising electricity costs for everyday Americans. And without them, one of the most generous energy credits the government offers could become incredibly easy to claim, ballooning the federal budget.
The clean hydrogen tax credit was created by the Inflation Reduction Act, and offers up to $3 per kilogram of hydrogen produced, with the top dollar amount reserved for fuel that is essentially zero-emissions. The hope was that this would be enough to bring down the cost of hydrogen made from electricity to parity with hydrogen made from natural gas. If made cleanly, hydrogen could help decarbonize other carbon-intensive industries, like steelmaking and shipping.
At first, excitement for the tax credit ran high and companies quickly began making plans for new factories. Announcements of new hydrogen production capacity more than tripled from 2 million tons per year in 2021 to 7.7 million by the end of the following year, with another 6 million announced in 2023, according to the energy consulting firm Wood Mackenzie.
Then, after the Treasury’s proposal dropped last December, everything stopped. Under the three pillars, hydrogen companies that get electricity from the grid, which is still largely powered by fossil fuels, would be required to buy clean energy credits with specific attributes in order to mitigate their emissions and render their hydrogen “clean.” The credits must come from power plants located in the same region as the hydrogen production — the first pillar — that were built no more than 3 years before the hydrogen plant — the second pillar — and be purchased for every hour the plant is operating — the third pillar.
The three provisions work together to ensure that new clean power plants are brought online to meet hydrogen’s energy demand. But finding clean energy credits with these features is not easy — there aren’t many systems in place to do this yet. The Treasury took more than a year to publish its initial proposal, and leading up to it, companies lobbied aggressively for a more lenient version. There was so much money on the line that some businesses flooded the public with ads in newspapers and on streaming and podcast services delivering a cryptic warning that “additionality” — the requirement to buy energy from new power plants — was threatening to “set America back.”
Until businesses have clarity on whether the three pillars will stay or go, the industry is on ice. Several previously announced projects have been delayed. Few companies have reached offtake agreements, even provisional ones, for their hydrogen. Almost none have received a final investment decision or started construction.
“They’re losing advantage over other parts of the world,” Hector Arreola, a principal analyst for hydrogen and emerging technologies at Wood Mackenzie, told me. Momentum to develop hydrogen projects has started to shift back to Europe, which has already finalized its own definition of what constitutes clean hydrogen, he said.
It’s hard to imagine a path forward for the Treasury to keep the three pillars intact. Last week’s letter outlined the current state of play in stark terms. “Without significant changes to the draft guidance,” it said, “one of the most powerful job creation and emission reduction tools in the IRA will likely be hamstrung by future court challenges, congressional opposition, and unfulfilled private sector investment.”
Indeed, at least one company, Constellation Energy, has already suggested it would draw on the loss of Chevron deference to sue the agency if it didn’t remove the second pillar — the requirement to buy clean energy credits from recently-built power plants. (Constellation owns a fleet of nuclear power plants and is developing hydrogen projects powered by them.) In comments to the Treasury, Constellation wrote that the requirements for purchasing clean electricity “have no basis” in the law.
“People can always sue today to challenge regulations,” Keith Martin, a renewable energy tax lawyer at the firm Norton Rose Fulbright, told me. “It’s just that the odds of success have increased.” The Supreme Court’s ruling undermines regulatory agencies’ authority to interpret federal statute.
Another hydrogen company that has been fighting the three pillars, Plug Power, has already claimed victory: It put out a press release last month declaring that it anticipates receiving the tax credit, despite the fact that the rules are still not final and its projects would likely not qualify under Treasury’s proposal. The CEO, Andy Marsh, told a hydrogen trade publication that he’s “certain” the rules will be loosened. (Plug Power didn’t respond to a request for clarification by publish time.)
In their letter, the 13 Democratic senators propose that hydrogen producers should be able to purchase clean energy from existing power plants that are already supplying the grid if they are located in a state that has a clean energy standard, or as long as the power plant doesn’t reallocate more than 10% of its power to hydrogen production. They recommend losing the hourly matching requirement altogether and replacing it with annual or monthly matching, depending on when plants start construction. The senators also suggest allowing projects built in areas with “insufficient clean energy sources,” meaning places with suboptimal sun, wind, water, or geothermal energy, to source their power from farther outside the region.
Beth Deane, the chief legal officer for Electric Hydrogen, a company that has historically supported the three pillars, told me in an interview she thought these proposals represented a good compromise. “Bottom-line, the effectiveness of green hydrogen as a decarbonization tool is being artificially held back,” she said later in an email. “We need to give up perfection on both sides of the three-pillar debate and find the ‘good enough’ solution that lets early mover projects move forward with less stringent requirements.”
But other proponents told me the letter carves out so many loopholes that the pillars would remain in name only. Rachel Fakhry, the policy director for emerging technologies at the Natural Resources Defense Council, told me the letter was “outrageous” and “a giveaway buffet.” Daniel Esposito, a manager in the electricity program at the think tank Energy Innovation, told me he can’t imagine any scenario where these exceptions don’t result in an emissions boost rather than a reduction.
That’s because the electrolyzers used to produce clean hydrogen consume a lot of power and are expected to cause fossil fuel plants — which are more flexible than renewables — to run more often and stay open longer than they otherwise would. Without a requirement to buy power from new clean sources and a prescription to match operations with clean energy throughout the day, there will be no demand signals to bring (often more expensive) clean resources onto the grid that can, for example, produce power at night when solar panels aren’t generating. Power system models from Energy Innovation, Princeton University researchers, the Rhodium Group, and the Electric Power Research Institute have all found that there could be significant emissions consequences if the three pillars were relaxed in ways suggested in the letter.
“This effectively unlocks more than 10 million metric tons of dirty electrolytic hydrogen,” Esposito said, based on some back-of-the-envelope estimates. That would cost something like $30 billion per year. Put another way, he said, every $300 paid out by this program could subsidize one ton of CO2 emissions. Put a third way, he added, it could set the U.S. back two to three percentage points on its commitment under the Paris Agreement to reduce emissions 50% to 52% by 2030 — and we’re already off track.
The authors of the letter say they’re “confident” these fears are overblown. They cite a competing analysis published last year by the consulting firm Energy and Environmental Economics and paid for by the trade group the American Council on Renewable Energy, which found that requiring companies to match their operations with clean energy on an hourly basis, rather than an annual basis, does not ensure lower greenhouse gas emissions. They also cite research by an energy modeling group at Carnegie Mellon and North Carolina State University, which found that the difference in cumulative emissions between scenarios with less stringent requirements and the full three pillars comes out to less than 1% by 2039.
Paulina Jaramillo, a professor of engineering and public policy at Carnegie Mellon who worked on that research, told me the three pillars add a level of regulatory complexity to hydrogen production that is not worth the cost in terms of the emissions savings. In general, she said, she saw no need for the rules, and that the Treasury should subsidize electrolytic hydrogen regardless of where the electricity comes from. “We need to deploy this infrastructure,” Jaramillo told me. “We need to deploy it now so it’s available later.”
The other camp of researchers disputed Jaramillo’s group’s findings, chalking them up to a series of differences in assumptions and approach. They also call the industry’s bluff on the claim that the three pillars are too hard and expensive to comply with. Esposito pointed out that a small group of hydrogen companies has already told the Treasury that if the rules were finalized as-is, they planned to build enough capacity to produce more than 6 million tons of hydrogen per year.
Fakhry argued that we are already seeing the risks of losing the three pillars play out in real time as power-hungry industries like bitcoin mining and artificial intelligence grow. Bitcoin mines have driven up emissions and energy costs around the country. Utilities in Pennsylvania are sounding the alarm that an Amazon data center seeking to divert power from an existing nuclear power plant could shift up to $140 million in costs to other electricity customers. As I wrote in Heatmap last year, this debate is not just about hydrogen — think of all the other energy-intensive industries that will have to electrify before we can reach net zero.
Plenty of stakeholders still believe that the Treasury can find a middle ground by making the three pillars more flexible. The American Clean Power Association, which represents a wide range of energy companies, has proposed loosening the hourly matching aspect for projects that start construction before 2028. Fakhry acknowledged the need for flexibility, but her recommendations are much more narrow than the senators’. For example, she would allow hydrogen producers to buy power from existing nuclear plants, but only if they are at risk of retirement and the purchase would help keep them open. Esposito said Energy Innovation would support power procurement from existing clean resources that are curtailed, meaning they produce power that currently goes unutilized.
Both Fakry and Esposito also downplayed the threat of lawsuits, arguing that Treasury did exactly what it was instructed to do by the law. The IRA specifically says that hydrogen emissions should be calculated per a section of the Clean Air Act that says any accounting should include “significant indirect emissions.” Treasury has interpreted this to include the induced emissions caused by a hydrogen plant, and received letters of support from the Environmental Protection Agency and Department of Energy backing this interpretation.
However, as Martin, the tax lawyer, told me, by overturning Chevron deference, the Supreme Court has just given “677 federal district court judges greater latitude to substitute their own judgment for subject matter experts at the federal agencies.”
Asked for comment on the Senators’ letter, a Treasury spokesperson told me the agency is still considering the many thousands of comments the agency received on the proposed rules. “The Biden Administration is committed to ensuring that progress continues and that the IRA’s investments continue to create good-paying jobs, lower energy costs, and strengthen energy security.”
Even if Yellen heeds the Senators’ advice, the department may not be able to avoid a lawsuit. “We will use every tool available to us — including the courts — to either defend a strong final rule or challenge an unlawful one that reflects the asks in the letter,” Fakhry told me.
There’s also a realpolitik argument here that the industry might want this all to be over more than it wants to kill the three pillars. “The number one thing people want is business certainty,” Esposito told me. “I don’t think people want this to drag on for another two years.”
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The president set an August deadline to deliver guidance for companies trying to qualifying for clean energy tax credits. Four months later — and two weeks before new rules are set to kick in — they’re still waiting.
The One Big Beautiful Bill Act included a morass of new rules for companies trying to claim clean energy tax credits. Some of the most restrictive go into effect January 1 — in other words, in about two weeks. And yet the Trump administration has yet to publish guidance clarifying what companies will need to do to comply, leaving them largely in the dark about how future projects will ultimately pencil out.
At a high level, the rules constrain supply chain options for clean energy developers and manufacturers. Any wind, solar, battery, geothermal, nuclear, or other type of clean generation project that starts construction in the new year — as well as any factory that produces parts for these industries in the new year — and wants to claim the tax credits will have to purge their products and facilities of components sourced from “foreign entities of concern.”
Foreign entities of concern, or FEOCs, are companies that are “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction” of foreign adversaries of the United States — namely China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
Companies are already subject to rules under the OBBBA that require them to prove that neither they themselves, nor their projects, are influenced or “effectively controlled” by FEOCs. These requirements, too, lack formal guidance from the Treasury, although tax credit experts told me it was somewhat easier to guess at how to comply with them.
Still, this is all a big new costly headache for developers. Before the OBBBA, the only tax credit that came with such constraints was the consumer subsidy for electric vehicles. Companies developing clean energy generation or manufacturing projects in the U.S. could acquire materials, seek out investment, or buy technology licenses from anyone they wanted and still get federal subsidies. Now obtaining the latter two from Chinese entities is effectively banned.
Come January 1, companies will still be able to source materials from China, but only to a degree. Say you’re a battery storage developer that’s trying to qualify for the 48e clean electricity investment tax credit. Starting next year you’ll have to not just ensure but also document that no more than 45% of the value of the material inputs to the project come from a Chinese owned or influenced company. The rules tighten over time, going down to 25% after 2029. (For other types of clean power generation, the starting threshold is 60%.)
All of that would be difficult enough. But the law itself didn’t specify how to calculate that percentage, leaving it up to the Treasury department to provide further instructions. A few days after signing the OBBBA in July, President Trump issued an executive order directing the Secretary of the Treasury to issue guidance for the FEOC restrictions within 45 days of the law’s enactment. That put the due date in mid-August, which came and went with no clarity for clean energy companies.
Storage developers aren’t sure whether they can base their calculations on the value of finished battery cells, for example, or if they’ll also need to consider the origins and values of subcomponents like anodes and cathodes, or even the critical minerals within those parts.
The Treasury Department did not respond to emailed questions about an updated timeline.
“The further upstream you go, the more difficult,” Mike Hall, the CEO of Anza Renewables, a supply chain data and analytics firm, told me. “That’s one of the fears that I’ve heard. You go upstream enough, then it just becomes impossible, at least in the short term.” China currently dominates the supply chain for batteries, controlling more than 95% of global production of key minerals like manganese and graphite and cell components like lithium-iron-phosphate cathodes and anodes.
In the interim, developers are allowed to follow instructions issued by the Biden administration for tallying up the amount of domestic content in a project and apply the same method to calculate the ratio of FEOC-produced materials. But that won’t work for everyone, David Burton, a partner at the law firm Norton Rose Fulbright, told me, since that earlier document only covers wind, solar, and battery generation projects. For companies deploying fuel cells, geothermal power, or renewable natural gas, for instance, “it’s really just, you know, a coin toss as to how the rules are going to work,” he said.
Beckett Woodworth, a manager of federal credits and incentives at the advisory firm Baker Tilly, told me that another point of confusion is whether tariffs must be included in the calculation. Incorporating the cost of tariffs would inflate the value of any products sourced from China, making it much more difficult to meet the prescribed threshold.
All this uncertainty — and the ultimate guidance itself — matters more for some project types than others. Few large-scale wind and solar developers, for instance, will have to contend with the FEOC material restrictions.
That’s because wind and solar farms face another deadline on July 4 of next year. If they start construction before that date, they will have four years to connect to the grid and still be eligible for the investment or production tax credits, known as ITC and PTC. If they start construction after that date, however, they’ll have to race to become operational before 2028 in order to remain eligible. While smaller projects like rooftop and community solar might be able to work within that timeline, it’s likely impossible for utility-scale projects.
“For large-scale projects, if you don’t get started by next July, you’re not going to hit the ITC deadline anyway,” Hall told me. That means most wind and solar developers only really have to worry about complying with the FEOC rules for the next six months.
Many wind and solar developers will already have their hands full come January 1, and may not even try to add more during that six-month period. Everyone I spoke to told me that companies have been racing to safe harbor as many projects as possible before the rules take effect in the new year. According to a safe harbor provision published by the Treasury in August, developers can claim they “started construction” this year as long as they completed “physical work of a significant nature” before January 1. That could include paving a road at a project site or simply placing an order for a major piece of equipment, like a transformer.
“The industry will have a backlog of safe harbored projects to work on,” Burton said. “It’s going to take a while to work through that backlog and actually have this be a problem.” He shared a research note with me from Roth Capital Partners, an investment bank, which forecast that utility-scale solar would continue to grow year-on-year in 2026 and 2027, largely due to the volume of safe-harbored projects. (This prediction was also based on the assertion that there was “potential for a relaxing of the Trump permitting chokehold,” a reference to the administration’s effective moratorium on solar projects requiring federal approvals.)
The picture is a little different for other types of generation and for clean energy manufacturing, because tax credits for those projects extend for several more years. In the energy research firm Wood Mackenzie’s latest U.S. Energy Storage Monitor report, it wrote that storage installations could drop by 10% in 2027 due to uncertainty over the pending FEOC regulations. “Projects that are not safe harbored in 2025 are at risk if additional FEOC-compliant supply does not materialize in the near-term,” the report says.
Hall said that ultimately, the FEOC rules would probably be a bigger issue for manufacturing projects than for power generation, since many U.S. solar and battery factories have some amount of Chinese ownership or licensing deals with Chinese companies. A number of U.S. solar manufacturers have already started to sell their Chinese ownership stakes, according to the trade magazine Solar Power World. And that’s without knowing exactly what the rules will compel them to do.
The biggest open question in all this is whether the Trump administration will use the FEOC guidance as another opportunity to shut down the clean energy industries it doesn’t like. It’s possible to write a version of the rules that make the tax credits impossible to claim, Burton told me, but he’s optimistic that won’t happen. The subsidies’ Republican defenders in Congress, including Senators Chuck Grassley and Susan Collins, would “have a fit,” he said. “So I don't think they're gonna be vindictive about it.”
On vulnerable batteries, Canada’s about face, and France’s double down
Current conditions: New York City is digging out from upward of six inches of snow • Storm Emilia is deluging Spain with as much as 10 inches of rain • South Africa and Southern Australia are both at high risk of wildfires.
Last month, I told you about China’s latest attempt at fusion diplomacy, uniting more than 10 countries including France and the United Kingdom in an alliance to work together on the holy grail energy source. Over the weekend, The New York Times published a sweeping feature on China’s domestic fusion efforts, highlighting just how much Beijing is outspending the West on making the technology long mocked as “the energy source of tomorrow that always will be” a reality today. China went from spending nothing on fusion energy in 2021 to making investments this year that outmatch the rest of the world’s efforts combined. Consider this point of comparison: The Chinese government and private investors poured $2.1 billion into a new state-owned fusion company just the summer. That investment alone, the Times noted, is two and half times the U.S. Department of Energy’s annual fusion budget.
Still, the race between the two countries is heating up. Cumulative investment in fusion energy soared 30% between June and September to $15 billion, up from a little over $11 billion, according to a report by the European Union’s F4E Fusion Observatory written up by NucNet. That fusion is, as Heatmap's Katie Brigham has written, “finally, possibly, almost” arriving at the same time that data centers to power artificial intelligence are driving up electricity demand is fortuitous. Or, it would be, if AI doesn’t end up proving to be inflated by hype. On Friday, Wall Street showed jitters over the possibility that the bubble may burst, sending shares of companies such as Oracle and Nvidia plunging. It begs the question Katie raised in another story in September: What if we get fusion, but we don’t need it?
The South Korean battery manufacturer SK On canceled its partnership to work on electric vehicles with the Ford Motor Company, throwing the fate of the two companies’ three factories in the American Southeast into jeopardy. The announcement, E&E News reported, also casts doubt over the $9.6 billion loan the Biden administration gave the joint venture, known as Blue Oval SK. The collaboration came as American automakers teamed up with Korean battery companies to hasten the establishment of an EV supply chain. General Motors inked a deal with LG Energy Solution and Ford with SK On. But as sales of EVs flatline — due in part to President Donald Trump axing the federal tax credit for purchases of new electric vehicles — the nascent supply networks are withering on the vine. Ford isn’t down for the count, however. In August, as I wrote in the newsletter at the time, the company unveiled what it billed as its “Model T moment” for EVs, a whole new assembly line structure meant to scale up and iron out production of battery-powered cars.

Prime Minister Mark Carney has scrapped Canada’s carbon tax, inked major oil and gas deals, and pumped the brakes on a scheme to boost electric vehicle sales. Now the leader of the Liberal Party is facing blowback from allies and sustainability-minded executives who say the reversals put Canada’s net-zero goals out of reach. The former environment minister, Steven Guilbeault, quit the cabinet in protest, as have two founding members of the federal government’s Net Zero Advisory Body. “From a climate-science standpoint, this risks undermining the urgency of emissions reduction,” Paul Polman, the former chief executive of home-goods giant Unilever and a campaigner for sustainable capitalism, told the Financial Times. “Betting heavily on unproven massive-scale CCS [carbon capture and storage] and a cleaner-oil narrative while accelerating production ... seems like a gamble with global emissions targets, and with the credibility of net zero by 2050. Gambling with firm science does not seem smart to me.”
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Utility-scale battery storage systems are facing increased risk of cyberattack from hackers working either for governments or criminal groups. That’s according to a white paper from the consultancies Brattle Group and Dragos. Battery deployments are expected to grow by as much as 45% in the next five years, raising the need for new protections against digital meddling. “Battery storage systems are being used across the grid to enable the deployment of variable demand sources such as solar and wind,” Phil Tonkin, field chief technology officer at Dragos, told Utility Dive’s sister publication Cybersecurity Dive. “This growing dependence makes them an attractive target.” Even relatively small-scale attacks can have devastating consequences. A single outage involving a 100-megawatt system for four hours in the U.S. would cost up to $1.2 million in revenue, the report found. A large-scale cyber attack that takes out 3,000 megawatts for a day would take a $39 million toll on the economy. Dragos is currently tracking as many as 18 groups that “are known to pose a threat to the electrical grid.”
Canada may be taking a U turn on climate policy, but France just updated its National Low-Carbon Strategy with an end date for using fossil fuels. The document “foresees the end of oil use between 2040 and 2045,” France24 reported, with natural gas phasing out by 2050. France is far ahead of most developed countries toward decarbonizing its power system since the nation has generated the majority of its electricity from nuclear reactors since the late 20th century. Under the plan, the French government expected electricity consumption to increase as heat pumps replace furnaces and electric vehicles swap in for diesel cars. Renewables are expected to cover the increase in electricity production.
Conspiracy theorists who think condensation trails from airplanes are some kind of population-control chemical may have their hands full with the paranoia fodder that geoengineering efforts represent. But actual scientists at Leipzig University have made a discovery about contrails’ effect on warming. The researchers found that “hidden” contrails within naturally forming cirrus clouds — previously not factored into assessments — contribute up to 10% of the warming all contrails cause. “We now know that not only the visible contrails we see in the sky but also those that form within clouds need to be taken into account when assessing the impact of aviation on the climate,” Torsten Seelig, the study's lead author, said in a statement.
The seminal global climate agreement changed the world, just not in the way we thought it would.
Ten years ago today, the world’s countries adopted the Paris Agreement, the first global treaty to combat climate change. For the first time ever, and after decades of failure, the world’s countries agreed to a single international climate treaty — one that applied to developed and developing countries alike.
Since then, international climate diplomacy has played out on what is, more or less, the Paris Agreement’s calendar. The quasi-quinquennial rhythm of countries setting goals, reviewing them, and then making new ones has held since 2015. A global pandemic has killed millions of people; Russia has invaded Ukraine; coups and revolutions have begun and ended — and the United States has joined and left and rejoined the treaty, then left again — yet its basic framework has remained.
Perhaps you can tell: I am not among those who believe that the treaty has been a failure, although it would be difficult — in this politically arid moment — to call it a complete success. Yet the ensuing decade has seen real progress in limiting global temperature rise. When negotiators gathered to finalize the agreement, it seemed likely that global average temperatures could rise by 4 degrees Celsius by 2100, as compared to their pre-industrial level. Today, a rise from 2.5 to 3 degrees Celsius seems more likely.
And for a document that is often described as non-binding, or even as hortatory, Paris has had a surprisingly material influence on global politics in the ensuing years. During the negotiations, the small-island states — the three dozen or so countries most affected by near-term sea-level rise — successfully got the final text to recognize a “stretch goal” of limiting warming to just 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels. They also tasked the United Nations’ advisory scientific body to prepare a special report on the virtues of avoiding 1.5 degrees of warming. When that report was released in 2018, it catalyzed a new wave of global climate action, spawning the European Green Deal — and eventually the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act.
Yet there is at least one way that Paris did not go as imagined.
Cast your mind back to Paris 10 years ago, right as diplomats filed in and began to applaud the final text’s completion. “This is a tremendous victory for all of our citizens — not for any one country or any one bloc, but for everybody here who has worked so hard to bring us across the finish line,” John Kerry, then the U.S. secretary of state, declared to his fellow diplomats.
It was a strange kind of victory. After decades in which western liberals had attempted to secure a globally binding climate treaty — an agreement that would limit each country’s greenhouse gas emissions — the world finally won a non-binding alternative. Under the Paris Agreement, each country would pledge to cut its emissions by as much as it could manage. Countries would then meet regularly to review these pledges, encourage each other to get more ambitious, and gradually ratchet the world into a lower-carbon future.
Kerry was reasonably direct about how such a mechanism would work: capital markets. “We are sending literally a critical message to the global marketplace,” he said. “Many of us here know that it won’t be governments that actually make the decision or find the product, the new technology, the saving grace of this challenge. It will be the genius of the American spirit.”
He was right, in a way: The Paris Agreement did send a signal to the global marketplace— and it did so in part because governments did shape policy and investment outcomes, not because they resisted doing so. But it did not reveal the genius of the American spirit, per se.
In the years running up to and following the Paris Agreement, China rolled out a series of important policies to boost its new energy sectors — a roadmap encouraging “new energy vehicle” sales in 2012, billions of consumer subsidies beginning in 2014, and a domestic content mandate for electric-vehicle batteries in 2015. These programs — along with canny decisions made by Chinese entrepreneurs and engineers, and no small amount of demand pull from companies and policies in the West — have transformed the world’s approach to decarbonization. They have begun to change even what decarbonization means — in the United States, in the western democracies, and around the world.
Ten years ago, Kerry could assume that any eventual solution to climate change would be geopolitically neutral, if not advantageous to the United States. But in 2025, to a degree that commentators still hesitate to describe, the climate story has become the China story. Across a range of sectors, how a country approaches its near-term decarbonization goals depends on how it understands and relates to the Chinese government and Chinese companies.
Consider the power sector, which generates just under a third of all greenhouse gas emissions globally. For many countries, the best way to cut carbon pollution — and to add more power generation to the grid — will be to build new utility-scale solar and battery projects. That will all but require working with Chinese firms, which dominate 80% of the solar supply chain. (They command up to 98% market share for some pieces of equipment, according to the International Energy Agency.)
It is much the same story in the grid-scale battery industry. China produces more than three-quarters of the world’s batteries, and it refines most of the minerals that go into those batteries. Its batteries are at least 20% cheaper than those made in Europe or North America. Most of the world’s top battery firms are Chinese — in part because they have more experience than anyone else; the country’s firms have manufactured 70% of all lithium-ion batteries ever produced. Nearly two dozen countries have bought at least $500 million in Chinese-made batteries this year, according to the think tank Ember.
What if a country wants to build wind turbines, not batteries? Even then, it will have to work to buy non-Chinese products. Although European and American firms have long led among turbine makers, six of the top 10 wind turbine manufacturers are now in mainland China, according to BloombergNEF. And for the first time since analysts’ rankings began in 2013, none of the world’s top three turbine makers are North American or European.
Transportation generates another 13% of global climate emissions. If a country wants to tackle that sector, then it will find itself (again) working with China — which made more than 70% of the world’s EVs in 2024. Thanks to the country’s sprawling battery and electronics-making ecosystem, its home-grown automakers — BYD, Geely, Xiaomi, and others — can produce more affordable, innovative, and desirable EVs at greater scale and at lower cost than automakers anywhere else. “The competitive reality is that the Chinese are the 700-pound gorilla in the EV industry,” Jim Farley, the CEO of Ford, said recently. As the scholar Ilaria Mazzocco put it in a recent report: “Chinese companies are ubiquitous in the value chain for EVs and battery components, meaning that for most countries, climate policy is now at least in part linked to policy toward China, and more specifically trade with China.”
That insight — that climate policy is now linked to policy toward China — will apply more and more, even when countries wish to tackle the remaining third of emissions that come from energy-related sources. Earlier this year, China approved a plan to build roughly 100 low-carbon industrial parks by 2030, where its firms will develop new ways to capture carbon, make steel, and refine chemicals without carbon pollution. (The Trump administration revoked funding for similar low-carbon projects in the U.S. earlier this year.) At the same time, China is building more conventional nuclear reactors than the rest of the world combined, and it may be pulling ahead of the United States in the race to develop commercial fusion.
This wasn’t inevitable. It happened because Chinese politicians, executives, and engineers decided to make it happen — choices owing as much to the government’s focus on energy security as to its concern for the global environmental commons. But it was also the result of American business leaders and politicians squandering this country’s leadership in climate technologies — and especially the result of choices made by Trump administration officials, who at nearly every opportunity have regarded batteries and electric vehicles as a technological sideshow to the more profitable oil and gas sector.
It was the Trump administration, after all, that licensed and then eventually gave U.S.-funded research on flow batteries to a Chinese company in 2017. It was the Trump administration that gutted fuel economy and clean car rules in 2018 and 2019, setting the American car industry back compared to its Chinese and European competitors. And it was the Trump administration and congressional Republicans that killed electric vehicle tax credits earlier this year, further choking off investment.
For progressives, this all might suggest a pleasant parable: China embraced the energy transition, and America didn’t, and now America is paying for it. Nowadays, commentators often invoke China’s clean energy dominance to inspire awe at its accomplishments. And how can you not, in truth, be impressed? China’s industrial miracle — its move to the frontier of global technological development — is the most important story of the past quarter century. The scale of the Chinese consumer market and the success of Chinese industrial policy (or, at least, its success so far) has wrenched world history in new directions. And Chinese companies have done humanity a great service by bringing down the cost of solar panels, batteries, and EVs on the supply side, even if they did so at first with demand-side assistance from policies in California or Europe.
But climate advocates in North America and Europe cannot be completely sanguine about what this development means globally. For environmentalists and other western liberals who have worked in decarbonization for decades, it will in particular require some rhetorical and political adjustment. We cannot pretend that we are playing by the 1990s’ rules, nor that environmental activism is but one part of a post-1970s progressive coalition, which is free to make demands and ignore inconvenient trade-offs. Basic questions of decarbonization policy now have patent geopolitical significance, which environmental groups attempt to side-step at their own peril.
Yet it isn’t only Americans or Europeans who must answer these questions. China’s dominance of decarbonization technology means that for the time being, every country on Earth must address this dynamic. When the scholar Mazzocco looked at how six countries around the world are approaching Chinese EVs, she found an uneven landscape, she told me on a recent podcast. Costa Rica, which has long embraced climate policy, has welcomed Chinese-made EVs; Brazil opened its doors to them but has now begun to close it.
Most major countries have some form of domestic automaking industry; no country will be able to sit back and passively allow Chinese exports to drive their local automakers out of business. At the same time, China’s manufacturing primacy is already making conventional export-driven growth less attractive for countries. And that will only be the beginning of the dilemmas to come. As long as going green requires buying and integrating Chinese technologies into critical infrastructure, environmental policymakers will be wagering decarbonization’s success on some of the world’s highest stakes geopolitical bets.
Environmentalists have long insisted climate change is a national security issue, but are we ready to think and act like it is? Do Western anxieties about a large and globalized war — either a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, a Russian invasion of the EU, or both — reflect a reasonable response to a real and growing menace, or an elite panic driven by our declining economic primacy? If China were to invade Taiwan, what would that mean for climate and energy policy — not only in the West, but around the world? Would American or European environmentalists even get a vote on that question — and if they do, how would they balance emissions reduction against other goals? If the unthinkable happens, we will all be called to account.
A decade ago, I remember watching the live stream of the world’s diplomats applauding their own success in Paris and realizing that I would be seeing that video in documentaries and news reels for the rest of my life. How will I see it then? I wondered. Would it strike me as the naivete of a simpler time, an era when liberal internationalism still seemed possible? Or would it really reflect a turning point, the moment when the world took the climate challenge seriously, pragmatically, and began to decarbonize in earnest? A decade later, I still don’t know. Perhaps the answer is both.