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They might not be worried now, but Democrats made the same mistake earlier this year.

Permitting reform is dead in the 118th Congress.
It died earlier this week, although you could be forgiven for missing it. On Tuesday, bipartisan talks among lawmakers fell apart over a bid to rewrite parts of the National Environmental Policy Act. The changes — pushed for by Representative Bruce Westerman, chairman of the House Natural Resources Committee — would have made it harder for outside groups to sue to block energy projects under NEPA, a 1970 law that governs the country’s process for environmental decisionmaking.
When those talks died, they also killed a separate deal over permitting struck earlier this year between Senator Joe Manchin of West Virginia and Senator John Barrasso of Wyoming. That deal, as I detailed last week, would have loosened some federal rules around oil and gas drilling in exchange for a new, quasi-mandatory scheme to build huge amounts of long-distance transmission.
Rest in peace, I suppose. Even if lawmakers could not agree on NEPA changes, I think Republicans made a mistake by not moving forward with the Manchin-Barrasso deal. (I still believe that the standalone deal could have passed the Senate and the House if put to a vote.) At this point, I do not think we will see another shot at bipartisan permitting reform until at least late 2026, when the federal highway law will need fresh funding.
But it is difficult to get too upset about this failure because larger mistakes have since compounded the initial one. On Wednesday, Republican Speaker Mike Johnson’s bipartisan deal to fund the government — which is, after all, a much more fundamental task of governance than rewriting some federal permitting laws — fell apart, seemingly because Donald Trump and Elon Musk decided they didn’t like it. If I can indulge in the subjunctive for a moment: That breakdown might have likely killed any potential permitting deal, too. So even in a world where lawmakers somehow did strike a deal earlier this week, it might already be dead. (As I write this, the House GOP has reportedly reached a new deal to fund the government through March, which has weakened or removed provisions governing pharmacy benefit managers and limiting American investments in China.)
The facile reading of this situation is that Republicans now hold the advantage. The Trump administration will soon be able to implement some of the fossil fuel provisions in the Manchin-Barrasso deal through the administrative state. Trump will likely expand onshore and offshore drilling, will lease the government’s best acreage to oil and gas companies, and will approve as many liquified natural gas export terminals as possible. His administration will do so, however, without the enhanced legal protection that the deal would have provided — and while those protections are not a must-have, especially with a friendly Supreme Court, their absence will still allow environmental groups to try to run down the clock on some of Trump’s more ambitious initiatives.
Republicans believe that they will be able to get parts of permitting reform done in a partisan reconciliation bill next year. These efforts seem quite likely to run aground, at least as long as something like the current rules governing reconciliation bills hold. I have heard some crazy proposals on this topic — what if skipping a permitting fight somehow became a revenue-raiser for the federal government? — but even they do not touch the deep structure of NEPA in the way a bipartisan compromise could. As Westerman told Politico’s Josh Siegel: “We need 60 votes in the Senate to get real permitting reform … People are just going to have to come to an agreement on what permitting reform is.” In any case, Manchin and the Democrats already tried to reform the permitting system via a partisan reconciliation bill and found it essentially impossible.
Even if reconciliation fails, Republicans say, they will still be in a better negotiating position next year than this year because the party will control a few more Senate votes. But will they? The GOP will just have come off a difficult fight over tax reform. Twelve or 24 months from now, demands on the country’s electricity grid are likely to be higher than they are today, and the risk of blackouts will be higher than before. The lack of a robust transmission network will hinder the ability to build a massive new AI infrastructure, as some of Trump’s tech industry backers hope. But 12 or 24 months from now, too, Democrats — furious at Trump — are not going to be in a dealmaking mood, and Republicans have relatively few ways to bring them to the table.
In any case, savvy Republicans should have realized that it is important to get supply-side economic reforms done as early in a president’s four-year term as possible. Such changes take time to filter through the system and turn into real projects and real economic activity; passing the law as early as possible means that the president’s party can enjoy them and campaign on them.
All of it starts to seem more and more familiar. When Manchin and Barrasso unveiled their compromise earlier this year, Democrats didn’t act quickly on it. They felt confident that the window for a deal wouldn’t close — and they looked forward to a potential trifecta, when they would be able to get even more done (and reject some of Manchin’s fossil fuel-friendly compromises).
Democrats, I think, wound up regretting the cavalier attitude that they brought to permitting reform before Trump’s win. But now the GOP is acting the same way: It is rejecting compromises, believing that it will be able to strike a better deal on permitting issues during its forthcoming trifecta. That was a mistake when Democrats did it. I think it will be a mistake for Republicans, too.
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Rob and Jesse talk data center finance with the Center for Public Enterprise’s Advait Arun.
The boom in artificial intelligence has become entangled with the clean energy industry over the past 18 months. Tech companies are willing to pay a lot for electricity — especially reliable zero-carbon electricity — and utilities and energy companies have been scrambling to keep up.
But is that boom more like a bubble? And if so, what does that mean for the long-term viability of AI companies and data center developers, and for the long-term health of decarbonization?
On this week’s Shift Key, we’re talking to Advait Arun, a senior associate for capital markets at the Center for Public Enterprise, about his new report on the market dynamics at play in the data center buildout. What kind of bets are these AI companies making? How likely are they to pay off? And if they don’t, who stands to lose big? Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap, and Jesse Jenkins, a professor of energy systems engineering at Princeton University.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also add the show’s RSS feed to your podcast app to follow us directly.
Here is an excerpt from our conversation:
Robinson Meyer: Advait, you’ve done a — we’ve done a great job of kind of dancing around maybe the biggest question of the report — and I would say you do a very good job of playing coy about it in the report, where the report’s titled “Bubble or Nothing.” You actually don’t come out and say whether you think this is a bubble or not.
And of course, it’s kind of a weird bubble, too, because there hasn’t been a moment where these leaps in equity valuations for the hyperscalers has happened where people haven’t been like, Boy, it looks kind of bubbly. And if you remember back to the 20-teens too, people were worried about a tech bubble then, too. And it turned out that it wasn’t a tech bubble, it was just a rapidly growing and healthy part of the economy. And so what I wanted to ask you, Advait, was, number one, did you walk away from this and from your conversations with investors and creditors, policymakers, thinking it was a bubble? And number two, is this unusual that we have a bubble and we can’t stop talking about how bubbly it looks? Or is this a new type of bubble where there’s a bubble happening and we all know it’s a bubble?
Advait Arun: Ooh. I will not personally say whether or not I think this is a bubble. I do think, though, that the fact that so much of our attention is centralized around it, it testifies to a new way of the real media’s relationship with the economy — and not even the media just in general, but the fact that the federal government is interested in this being the next industry of the future. The fact that I think we haven’t had too much else to talk about in economic news due to the dominance of the hyperscalers and Mag Seven in the market, the fact that they’re the collateral for improvements in the energy system, and even some people are blaming them for the affordability crisis. I think it’s very easy to get into a headspace where we’re all paying rapt attention to the day-to-day stock movements of these companies. I don’t know what it was like, necessarily, to be following the news and the dot-com bubble, but I do certainly think that the amount that we’ve all been talking about it at the same time is very striking to me.
I think it’s important, as well, to recognize that bubbles have psychological motivations, more so than just pure economic motivations. Of course, from the perspective of a policymaker and someone who’s done credit analysis for stuff, I obviously look at these firms and look at their lack of revenue and think, This is dangerous. This could be getting over their skis. But a lot of companies have gone through this point and made it out. That’s not to say that these companies will or won’t, but the fact that so much of the market moves in response to the leading tech companies, there’s a degree of asset centrality and crowding, and extremely high relative values relative to historical values. It makes me think that there’s something to watch out for, anchored by the fact that a lot of the people leading this investment boom, whether it’s the federal government seeking to promote it or whether it’s the leaders of these companies, the CEOs envisioning some kind of vastly different future for the economy. There’s a psychology to it — I think Keynes would call it ‘animal spirits’ — that’s pushing this investment boom the way that it’s going.
Mentioned:
Advait’s report: Bubble or Nothing: Data Center Project Finance
Previously on Shift Key: A Skeptic’s Take on AI and Energy Growth
Jesse’s upshift; Rob’s downshift.
This episode of Shift Key is sponsored by …
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Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.
The transition to clean energy will be expensive today, even if it’ll be cheaper in the long run.
Democrats have embraced a new theory of how to win: run on affordability and cost-of-living concerns while hammering Donald Trump for failing to bring down inflation.
There’s only one problem: their own climate policies.
In state after state, governors and lawmakers are considering pulling back from their climate commitments — or have already reneged on them outright — out of a concern for the high costs that they could soon impose on voters. Democrats have justified the retreat by citing a new regime of sharper inflation, reduced federal support, and a need to deliver cheap energy of all kinds.
“We need to govern in reality,” New York Governor Kathy Hochul, for instance, said in a recent statement defending her approval of new natural gas infrastructure. “We are facing war against clean energy from Washington Republicans.”
Leaders in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and California have all sounded similar notes while making or considering changes to their own states’ policies.
“The trend toward a different approach to energy policy that puts costs and pragmatism first is very real,” Josh Freed, the senior vice president for climate and energy programs at Third Way, a center-left think tank, told me.
“Affordability is the entry ticket for any other policy goal that politicians have,” he continued. “It particularly makes sense on climate and clean energy because we’ve all been talking for years about the need to electrify. If electricity is expensive, then electrification is simply not going to happen.”
The challenge is an old one for climate policy. Climate change — fueled by fossil fuel pollution — will ultimately raise costs through heat waves, extreme weather impacts, and a depleted natural world. But voters don’t go to the polls for lower costs in 2075. They want a cheaper cost of living now.
Democrats have more tools in this fight than ever before, with wind, solar, and batteries often much cheaper than other forms of generation. But to fully realize those cost savings — and to decarbonize the grid faster than utilities or power markets would otherwise go — politicians must push for politically or financially costly policies that speed up the transition, sometimes putting long-term climate goals ahead of near-term affordability concerns.
“We’ve been talking about affordability as the entry point and not the end of the story. It’s important to meet consumers and voters and elected officials where they are,” Justin Balik, the vice president for state policy at Evergreen Action, a climate-focused think tank and advocacy group, told me.
“We can make the argument — because the data is on our side — that clean energy is still cheaper and is a big part of lowering costs.”
Part of what’s driving this shift among Democrats on climate policy is economics. The Trump administration’s war on clean energy has made it more difficult to build clean energy than some state-level policies once envisioned. Many emissions reduction targets passed during the late 2010s or early 2020s — like New York’s, which requires the state to reduce emissions 40% from 1990 levels by 2030 and 85% by 2050 — assumed much faster clean electricity buildouts than have happened in practice. The president’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act will end wind and solar tax credits next year, driving up project costs in some cases by 40% more than once projected.
The president’s war on wind power, in particular, has hit particularly hard in Northeastern states, where grid managers once counted on thousands of megawatts of new offshore wind farms to supply power in the afternoon and evenings while meeting the states’ climate goals. The Trump administration has succeeded in cancelling virtually all of the Northeast’s offshore wind projects outside New York.
But economics do not explain all of the shifts. Democrats seem to believe the president’s war on clean energy has created a fresh rhetorical opening for them: They can now cast themselves as champions of cheap energy in all forms. Some have even revived the old Obama-era “all of the above” slogan for this new era.
“We have an energy crisis. Electricity prices for homeowners and businesses have gone up over 20% in New Jersey. The only answer is all of the above,” Representative Frank Pallone, the ranking member of the House energy committee, told Politico in September.
Even politicians who once championed climate change have downplayed it in recent speeches. New York Mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani, who once described himself as a “proud ecosocialist,” barely mentioned climate change during his general election campaign for mayor.
Hochul’s recent moves illustrate the shift. Over the past year, she has delayed implementing New York’s cap-and-invest law, which seeks to reduce statewide carbon emissions 40% by 2030. She also paused the state’s ban on gas stoves and furnaces in new homes and low-rise buildings, which is due to go into effect next year. (A state court has ordered her to implement the cap-and-invest law by February.)
This month, Hochul approved two new natural gas pipelines as part of a rumored deal with the Trump administration to salvage New York’s wind farms. She defended the decision by appealing to — you guessed it — affordability.
“We have adopted an all-of-the-above approach that includes a continued commitment to renewables and nuclear power to ensure grid reliability and affordability,” she said in a statement.
New York’s neighbors have gone down similar paths. In Pennsylvania, Governor Josh Shapiro struck a budget compromise with Republican lawmakers that will remove the state from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, or RGGI, a compact of Northeastern states to cap carbon pollution from power plants and invest the resulting revenue.
Shapiro blamed Republicans, who he said have “used RGGI as an excuse to stall substantive conversations about energy,” but said he was focused on — yes, again— “cutting costs.”
“I’m going to be aggressive about pushing for policies that create more jobs in the energy sector, bring more clean energy onto the grid, and reduce the cost of energy for Pennsylvanians,” he said before signing the budget deal.
California has also reworked its own climate policy in response to cost-of-living concerns. Earlier this year, it passed an energy package that re-upped its cap-and-trade program while allowing new oil extraction in south-central Kern County. The legislation was partly driven by a fear that local refineries would shutter — and gas prices could soar — without more crude production.
Massachusetts could soon join the pullback. Earlier this month, the state’s House of Representatives fast-tracked a bill that included a provision nullifying a legal mandate to cut carbon emissions in half by 2030, as compared to 1990 levels.
While the bill preserved the state’s longer-term goal to cut emissions by 80% by 2050, it rendered the 2030 mandate “advisory in nature and unenforceable.”
“The number one goal is to save money and adjust to the reality with clean energy,” Representative Mark Cusack, co-chair of the energy and utilities committee and the bill’s sponsor, told the local Commonwealth Beacon. He said the Trump administration’s “assault” on clean energy made the pullback necessary. “We want to get there, but if we’re going to miss our mandates and it’s not the fault of ours, it’s incumbent on us not to get sued and not have the ratepayers be on the hook,” he said.
Cusack’s bill also included measures to transform the state’s Mass Save program — which helps households and businesses to switch to electrified heating and appliances — by dropping the program’s climate mandate and its ban on buying efficient natural gas appliances.
On Monday, lawmakers removed the mandate provision from the bill but preserved its other reforms. While the bill is no longer fast tracked, they could choose to revisit the legislation as soon as next year.
New Jersey may also revisit its own climate commitments. Governor-elect Mikie Sherrill swept to victory this month in part by promising to freeze state utility rates. She could do that in part by lifting or suspending certain “social benefit charges” now placed on state power bills.
In the long term, though, Sherrill will have to pursue other policies to lower rates. Researchers at Evergreen Action and the National Resources Defense Council have argued that changing the state’s electricity policies could lower carbon emissions while saving ratepayers more than $400 a year by 2030.
Balik described the proposal as a “three-legged stool” of immediate rate relief, medium-term clean energy deployment, and long-term utility business model reform. He also mourned that other states have not used revenue from their climate programs to pay for climate programs.
“There’s a danger of looking at cost concerns a little myopically,” he said. “Cap and invest [in New York] was paused for the stated reason that it’s not helpful with cost, but you could use cap-and-invest revenues to pay for things on the rate base now.”
Current conditions: Severe thunderstorms will bring winds of up to 85 miles per hour to parts of the Texarkana region • A cold front in Southeast Asia is stirring waves up to three meters high along the shores of Vietnam • Parts of Libya are roasting in temperatures as high as 95 degrees Fahrenheit.
David Richardson, the acting head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, resigned Monday after just six months on the job. Richardson had no experience in managing natural disasters, and Axios reported, he “faced sharp criticism for being unavailable” amid the extreme floods that left 130 dead in Central Texas in July. A month earlier, Richardson raised eyebrows when he held a meeting in which he told staff he was unaware the U.S. had a hurricane season. He was, however, a “loyalist” to Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem, CNN reported.
With hurricane season wrapping up this month, President Donald Trump was preparing to fire Richardson in the lead up to an overhaul of the agency, whose resources for carrying out disaster relief he wants to divvy up among the states. When FEMA staffers criticized the move in an open letter over the summer, the agency suspended 40 employees who signed with their names, as I wrote in the newsletter at the time.
The Environmental Protection Agency proposed stripping federal protections from millions of acres of wetlands and streams. The New York Times cast the stakes of the rollback as “potentially threatening sources of clean drinking water for millions of Americans” while delivering “a victory for a range of business interests that have lobbied to scale back the Clean Water Act of 1972, including farmers, home builders, real estate developers, oil drillers and petrochemical manufacturers.” At an event announcing the rulemaking, EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin recognized that the proposal “is going to be met with a lot of relief from farmers, ranchers, and other landowners and governments.” Under the Clean Water Act, companies and individuals need to obtain permits from the EPA before releasing pollutants into the nation’s waterways, and permits from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers before discharging any dredged or fill material such as sand, silt, or construction debris. Yet just eliminating the federal oversight doesn’t necessarily free developers and farmers of permitting challenges since that jurisdiction simply goes to the state.

Americans are spending greater lengths of time in the dark amid mounting power outages, according to a new survey by the data analytics giant J.D. Power. The report, released last month but highlighted Monday in Utility Dive, cited “increased frequency and severity of extreme weather events” as the cause. The average length of the longest blackout of the year increased in all regions since 2022, from 8.1 hours to 12.8 by the midpoint of 2025. Ratepayers in the South reported the longest outages, averaging 18.2 hours, followed by the West, at 12.4 hours. While the duration of outages is worsening, the number of Americans experiencing them isn’t, J.D. Power’s director of utilities intelligence, Mark Spalinger, told Utility Dive. The percentage of ratepayers experiencing “perfect power” without any interruptions is gradually rising, he said, but disasters like storms and fires “are becoming so much more extreme that it creates these longer outage events that utilities are now having to deal with.”
The problem is particularly bad in the summertime. As Heatmap’s Matthew Zeitlin explained back in June, “the demands on the grid are growing at the same time the resources powering it are changing. Between broad-based electrification, manufacturing additions, and especially data center construction, electricity load growth is forecast to grow several percent a year through at least the end of the decade. At the same time, aging plants reliant on oil, gas, and coal are being retired (although planned retirements are slowing down), while new resources, largely solar and batteries, are often stuck in long interconnection queues — and, when they do come online, offer unique challenges to grid operators when demand is high.”

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You win some, you lose some. Earlier this month, solar developer Pine Gate Renewables blamed the Trump administration’s policies in its bankruptcy filing. Now a major solar manufacturer is crediting its expansion plans to the president. Arizona-based First Solar said last week it plans to open a new panel factory in South Carolina. The $330 million factory will create 600 new jobs, E&E News reported, if it comes online in the second half of next year as planned. First Solar said the investment is the result of Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act. “The passage of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act and the Administration’s trade policies boosted demand for American energy technology, requiring a timely, agile response that allows us to meet the moment,” First Solar CEO Mark Widmar said in a statement. “We expect that this new facility will enable us to serve the U.S. market with technology that is compliant with the Act’s stringent provisions, within timelines that align with our customers’ objectives.”
If you want to review what actually goes into making a solar panel, it’s worth checking out Matthew’s explainer from the Climate 101 series.
French oil and gas giant TotalEnergies said Monday it would make a $6 billion investment into power plants across Europe, expanding what The Wall Street Journal called “a strategy that has set it apart from rivals focused on pumping more fossil fuels.” To start, the company agreed to buy 50% of a portfolio of assets owned by Energeticky a Prumyslovy Holding, the investment fund controlled by the Czech billionaire Daniel Kretinsky. While few question the rising value of power generation amid a surge in electricity demand from the data centers supporting artificial intelligence software, analysts and investors “question whether investment in power generation — particularly renewables — will be as lucrative as oil and gas.” Rivals Shell and BP, for example, recently axed their renewables businesses to double down on fossil fuels.
The world has successfully stored as much carbon dioxide as 81,044,946 gasoline-powered cars would emit in a year. The first-ever audit of all major carbon storage projects in the U.S., China, Brazil, Australia, and the Middle East found over 383 million tons of carbon dioxide stored since 1996. “The central message from our report is that CCS works, demonstrating a proven capability and accelerating momentum for geologic storage of CO2,” Samuel Krevor, a professor of subsurface carbon storage at Imperial College London’s Department of Earth Science and Engineering, said in a press release.