You’re out of free articles.
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
Sign In or Create an Account.
By continuing, you agree to the Terms of Service and acknowledge our Privacy Policy
Welcome to Heatmap
Thank you for registering with Heatmap. Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our lives, a force reshaping our economy, our politics, and our culture. We hope to be your trusted, friendly, and insightful guide to that transformation. Please enjoy your free articles. You can check your profile here .
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Subscribe to get unlimited Access
Hey, you are out of free articles but you are only a few clicks away from full access. Subscribe below and take advantage of our introductory offer.
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Create Your Account
Please Enter Your Password
Forgot your password?
Please enter the email address you use for your account so we can send you a link to reset your password:
What we learned about “energy dominance” on Day One.

Here we go: On Monday, Donald Trump was sworn in as the 47th president of the United States.
Surrounded by some of the country’s richest men, including Elon Musk, Mark Zuckerberg, and the oil magnate Harold Hamm, Trump rejected what he called a “radical and corrupt establishment” that has “extracted power and wealth from our citizens” while promising a new golden age for the United States.
At the center of that golden age, he said, was an almost totally unregulated fossil fuel economy. “Today I will also declare a national energy emergency,” he said. “We will drill, baby, drill.”
Over the next 12 hours, he signed a series of executive orders that relaxed protections across the oil and gas sector while imposing costly new restrictions on wind turbines, electric vehicles, and other forms of renewable energy. He demonstrated that his extreme vision for the American government — a new order where the executive reigns supreme and Congress does not control the power of the purse — will run straight through his climate and energy policy.
You could see in his actions, too, what could become fragility in his governing coalition — times and situations where he might too eagerly slap a cost on a friend because he believes they are a foe.
But all that remains in the future. For now, Trump is in charge.
Trump’s first day was about undermining climate policy in virtually any form that he could find. Soon after taking the oath, Trump began the process of pulling the United States out of the Paris Agreement on climate change. He announced a broad freeze on virtually all federal wind energy permits, throwing at least one large-scale onshore wind farm into chaos while smothering virtually all offshore wind energy projects, including several planned for the East Coast. He moved to weaken energy and water efficiency rules for lightbulbs, showerheads, washing machines, and dishwashers. He began the multi-year process of rewriting the Environmental Protection Agency’s rules on tailpipe pollution from cars and light trucks, which he has described as lifting the federal government’s “EV mandate.” And he promised to open up new tracts of federal land for oil and gas drilling, including in the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge.
But most important were a series of executive actions that Trump signed in the late evening, many under the bearing of a “national energy emergency.” In these orders, Trump told the Environmental Protection Agency to study whether carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are dangerous air pollutants. This question has been a matter of settled science for decades — and, more importantly, has not been under legal dispute since 2009. In the same set of orders, Trump lifted federal environmental and permitting rules, potentially setting up a move that could force blue states — particularly those in the Northeast and West Coast — to accept new oil and gas pipelines and refineries.
Finally, and most importantly, Trump asserted the right to freeze virtually all ongoing federal spending under the Inflation Reduction Act — and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law — for 90 days. Even after this time elapses, funding programs will have to be approved by the White House Office of Management and Budget. This move places at least tens of millions of dollars of federal contracts at risk, and it raises questions about the federal government’s ability to operate as a reliable counterparty. It is also of dubious Constitutionality because it appears to violate Congress’s sole authority over federal spending.
The stated goal of many of these policies is to bring down energy costs for American consumers. The president’s national energy emergency, for example, takes as its premise that the country is growing its energy supply too slowly. The United States, it suggests, is at imminent risk of running out of energy for new technology. (You might ask yourself why — if this is the case — Trump has also frozen all federal wind projects. But then you misunderstand Trump’s particular genius.)
Yet bringing down costs will be difficult. Energy costs — and particularly oil costs — are already low. Today, as Trump’s second term begins, gasoline stands at $3.13 a gallon, according to AAA. That’s about five cents above where it stood a year ago, and it’s within the inflation-adjusted range where gas prices hovered for much of Trump’s first term. (Oil prices crashed in 2020 because of the pandemic, but the industry — and the American public — would obviously prefer not to repeat that debacle.)
How much further could energy prices fall? Look at it this way: A barrel of oil in the U.S. costs $76 today, per the West Texas benchmark. (The international benchmark, called Brent, is a smidge higher at $79.) Last year, oil producers across much of the Permian Basin reported that they could break even only if oil stayed at or above about $66 a barrel. The rough rule of thumb is that for a $1 change in the per-barrel oil price, drivers will eventually see a roughly 2.5 cent change in prices at the pump. You can see how hard it will be to push oil prices down to record lows, at least with current levels of economic activity, interest rates, and demand volumes.
Which isn’t to say that it’s impossible. Trump will have advantages when dealing with the oil and gas industry that his immediate predecessor did not enjoy. Chief among these is that the industry’s leaders like him, want to see him succeed, and will be more willing to do favors for him — even if it means suffering thinner margins. These may help keep a lid on electricity prices, which are far more sensitive to natural gas and which really are set to surge as a new wave of factories, EVs, and data centers comes online.
Maybe! We’ll see. When you look closer, what stands out about Trump’s policies is how few of them are designed to lower energy prices. Instead, they aim to do virtually the opposite: shore up oil and gas demand. According to The Wall Street Journal, ensuring demand for oil and gas products — and not deregulating drilling further — is what the industry has asked Trump to do. That makes sense. The United States is, at the moment, producing more oil and gas than any country in world history. The fossil fuel industry’s problem isn’t getting gas out of the ground, but finding people to sell it to. By suspending fuel economy and energy efficiency rules, Trump can force Americans to use more energy — and spend more on oil and gas — to do the same amount of useful work.
In other places, what stands out about Trump’s policies is their incoherence — and how few of his constituencies they will satisfy. Late on Monday, Trump suggested that he might impose 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico as soon as February 1. Such an action would quickly harm key segments of the American energy industry. Canada exports about $124 billion of crude oil to the United States every year — much of it a heavy, sludgy petroleum from the Albertan oil sands. That sludge is piped across North America, then fed into U.S. refineries, where it helps produce a large portion of America’s fuel supply. (Alberta’s heavy, sulfurous sludge is particularly well-suited to mixing with the light, sweet crude produced by American frackers.) Should Trump impose those tariffs, in other words, he would gambol into a self-imposed energy crisis.
Tariffs are not the only place where Trump could undermine his own policies. One of his executive orders on Monday aimed to establish America as “the leading producer and processor of non-fuel minerals, including rare earth minerals”; three clauses later, it announced an end to the federal government’s so-called “EV mandate.”
But by kneecapping demand for electric vehicles, Trump will hurt the critical minerals industry more than any anti-growth hippie could fathom. For the past few years, corporate America and Wall Street have invested billions of dollars in lithium and rare-earths mining and processing facilities across the country. These projects, which are largely in Republican districts, only make financial sense in a world where the United States produces a large and growing number of electric vehicles: EVs make up the lion’s share of future demand for lithium, rare earth elements, and other geostrategically sensitive rocks, and any mines or refining facilities will only pencil out in a world where EVs purchase their output. If Trump kills the non-Tesla part of the EV industry, then he will also mortally harm those projects’ economics.
Energy is a strange issue. Although it is one of the key inputs into the modern industrial economy, millions of Americans engage with it as an expressive, symbolic matter — as just another battleground in the culture war. Today, Donald Trump has become the most powerful American in that category. On his first day in office, he has demonstrated that he will use energy policy to advance his extreme ideas about how the Constitution and presidential authority works. How far he gets now will depend on what the American public, business leaders, congressional Republicans, and the Supreme Court’s arch-conservative majority will accept — and whether his fragile constituency is really ready to pay the costs of “American greatness.”
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
Deep cuts to the department have left each staffer with a huge amount of money to manage.
The Department of Energy has an enviable problem: It has more money than it can spend.
DOE disbursed just 2% of its total budgetary resources in fiscal year 2025, according to a report released earlier this year from the EFI Foundation, a nonprofit that tracks innovations in energy. That figure is far lower than the 38% of funds it distributed the year prior.
While some of that is due to political whiplash in Washington, there is another, far more mundane cause: There simply aren’t that many people left to oversee the money. Thanks to the Department of Government Efficiency’s efforts, one in five DOE staff members left the agency. On top of that, Energy Secretary Chris Wright shuffled around and combined offices in a Kafkaesque restructuring. Short on workers and clear direction, the department appears unable to churn through its sizable budget.

Though Congress provides budgetary authority, agencies are left to allot spending for the programs under their ambit, and then obligate payments through contracts, grants, and loans. While departments are expected to use the money they’re allocated, federal staff have to work through the gritty details of each individual transaction.
As a result of its reduced headcount, DOE’s employees are each responsible for far more budgetary resources than ever before.
“DOE is facing its largest imbalance in its history,” Alex Kizer, executive vice president of EFI Foundation, told me. In fiscal year 2017, DOE budgeted around $4.7 million per full-time employee. In the fiscal year 2026 budget request, that figure reached $35.7 million per worker — about eight times more.
Part of that increase is the result of the unprecedented injection of funding into DOE from the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act. The pair of laws, which gave DOE access to $97 billion, comprised the United States’ largest investment to combat climate change in the nation’s history.
The epoch of federally backed renewable energy investment proved to be short-lived, however. Once President Trump retook office last year, his administration froze funds and initiated a purge of federal workers that resulted in 3,000 staffers (about one in five) leaving DOE through the Deferred Resignation Program. The administration canceled hundreds of projects, evaporating $23 billion in federal support.
While the One Big Beautiful Bill Act passed last summer depleted some of the IRA’s coffers and sunsetted many tax credits years early, it only rescinded about $1.8 billion from DOE, according to the EFI Foundation. Much of the IRA’s spending had already gone out the door or was left intact.
This leaves DOE in a strange position: Its budget is historically high, but its staffing levels have suffered an unprecedented drop.

Even before the short-lived Elon Musk-run agency took a chainsaw to the federal workforce, DOE struggled to hire enough people to keep up with the pace of funding demanded by the IRA’s funding deadlines. The Loan Programs Office, for example, was criticized for moving too slowly in shelling out its hundreds of billions in loan authority. According to a report from three ex-DOE staffers that Heatmap’s Emily Pontecorvo covered, the IRA’s implementation suffered from a lack of “highly skilled, highly talented staff” to carry out its many programs.
“The last year’s uncertainty and the staff cuts, the project cancellations, those increase an already tightening bottleneck of difficulty with implementation at the department,” Sarah Frances Smith, EFI Foundation’s deputy director, told me.
One former longtime Department of Energy staffer who asked not to be named because they may want to return one day told me that as soon as Trump’s second term started, funding disbursement slowed to a halt. Employees had to get permission from leadership just to pay invoices for projects that had already been granted funding, the ex-DOE worker said.
While the Trump administration quickly moved to hamstring renewable energy resources, staff were kept busy complying with executive orders such as removing any mention of diversity equity and inclusion from government websites and responding to automated “What did you do last week?” emails.
On top of government funding drying up, Kizer told me that the confusion surrounding DOE has had a “cooling effect on the private sector’s appetite to do business with DOE,” though the size of that effect is “hard to quantify.”
Under President Biden, DOE put a lot of effort into building trust with companies doing work critical to its renewable energy priorities. Now, states and companies alike are suing DOE to restore revoked funds. In a recent report, the Government Accountability Office warned, “Private companies, which are often funding more than 50 percent of these projects, may reconsider future partnerships with the federal government.”
Clean energy firms aren’t the only ones upset by DOE’s about-face. Even the Republican-controlled Congress balked at President Trump’s proposed deep cuts to DOE’s budget in its latest round of budget negotiations. Appropriations for fiscal year 2026 will be just slightly lower than the year before — though without additional headcount to manage it, the same difficulties getting money out the door will remain.
The widespread staff exit also appears to have slowed work supporting the administration’s new priorities, namely coal and critical minerals. LPO, which was rebranded the “Office of Energy Dominance Financing,” has announced only a few new loans since President Biden left office. Southern Company, which received the Office’s largest-ever loan, was previously backed by a loan to its subsidiary Georgia Power under the first Trump administration.
Despite Trump’s frequent invocation of the importance of coal, DOE hasn’t accomplished much for the technology besides some funding to keep open a handful of struggling coal plants and a loan to restart a coal gasification plant for fertilizer production that was already in LPO’s pipeline under Biden.
Even if DOE wanted to become an oil and gas-enabling juggernaut, it may not have the labor force it needs to carry out a carbon-heavy energy mandate.
“When you cut as many people as they did, you have to figure out who’s going to do the stuff that those people were doing,” said the ex-DOE staffer. “And now they’re going to move and going, Oh crap, we fired that guy.”
Will moving fast and breaking air permits exacerbate tensions with locals?
The Trump administration is trying to ease data centers’ power permitting burden. It’s likely to speed things up. Whether it’ll kick up more dust for the industry is literally up in the air.
On Tuesday, the EPA proposed a rule change that would let developers of all stripes start certain kinds of construction before getting a historically necessary permit under the Clean Air Act. Right now this document known as a New Source Review has long been required before you can start building anything that will release significant levels of air pollutants – from factories to natural gas plants. If EPA finalizes this rule, it will mean companies can do lots of work before the actual emitting object (say, a gas turbine) is installed, down to pouring concrete for cement pads.
The EPA’s rule change itself doesn’t mention AI data centers. However, the impetus was apparent in press materials as the agency cited President Trump’s executive order to cut red tape around the sector. Industry attorneys and environmental litigants alike told me this change will do just that, cutting months to years from project construction timelines, and put pressure on state regulators to issue air permits by allowing serious construction to start that officials are usually reluctant to disrupt.
“I think the intended result is also what will happen. Developers will be able to move more quickly, without additional delay,” said Jeff Holmstead, a D.C.-based attorney with Bracewell who served as EPA assistant administrator for air and radiation under George H.W. Bush. “It will almost certainly save some time for permitting and construction of new infrastructure.”
Air permitting is often a snag that will hold up a major construction project. Doubly so for gas-powered generation. Before this proposal, the EPA historically was wary to let companies invest in what any layperson would consider actual construction work. The race for more AI infrastructure has changed the game, supercharging what was already an active debate over energy needs and our nation’s decades-old environmental laws.
Many environmental groups condemned the proposal upon its release, stating it would make gas-powered AI data centers more popular and diminish risks currently in place for using dirtier forms of electricity. Normally, they argue, this permitting process would give state and federal officials an early opportunity to gauge whether pollution control measures make sense and if a developer’s preferred design would unduly harm the surrounding community. This could include encouraging developers to consider alternate energy sources.
“Inevitably agencies have flexibility as to how much they ask, and what this allows them to do is pre-commit in ways that’ll force agencies to take stuff off the table. What’s taken off the table, it’s hard to know, but you’re constraining options to respond to public concerns or recognize air quality impacts,” said Sanjay Narayan, Sierra Club’s chief appellate counsel.
Herein lies the dilemma: will regulatory speed for power sacrifice opportunities for input that could quell local concerns?
We’re seeing this dilemma play out in real time with Project Matador, a large data center proposal being developed in Amarillo, Texas, by the Rick Perry-backed startup Fermi Americas. Project Matador is purportedly going to be massive and Fermi claims its supposed to one day reach 11 GW, which would make it one of the biggest data centers in the world.
Fermi’s plans have focused on relying on nuclear power in the future. But the only place they’ve made real progress so far in getting permits is gas generation. In February, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality gave Fermi its air permit for building and operating up to 6 gigawatts of gas power at Project Matador. At that time, Fermi was also rooting for relaxed New Source Review standards, applauding EPA in comments to media for signaling it would take this step. The company’s former CEO Toby Neugebauer also told investors on their first earnings call that Trump officials personally intervened to help get them gas turbines from overseas. (There’s scant public evidence to date of this claim and Neugebauer was fired by Fermi’s board last month.)
But now Fermi’s permit is also being threatened in court. In April, a citizens group Panhandle Taxpayers for Transparency filed a lawsuit against TCEQ challenging the validity of the permit. The case centers around whether the commission was right to deny a request for a contested case hearing brought by members of the group who lived and worked close to Project Matador. “Once these decisions are made, they don’t get reversed,” Michael Ford, Panhandle Taxpayers for Transparency’s founder, said in a fundraising video.
This is also a financial David vs. Goliath, as Ford admits in the fundraising video they have less than $2,000 to spend on the case – a paltry sum they admit barely covers legal bills. We’re also talking about a state that culturally and legally sides often with developers and fossil fuel firms.
At the same time, this lawsuit couldn’t come at a more difficult time as Fermi is struggling with other larger problems (see: Neugebauer’s ouster). Eric Allman, one of the attorneys representing Panhandle Taxpayers for Transparency, told me they’re still waiting on a judge assignment and estimated it’ll take about one year to get a ruling. Allman told me legally Fermi can continue construction during the legal challenge but there are real risks. “Applicants on many occasions will pause activity while there is an appeal pending,” he told me, “because if the suit is successful, they won’t have an authorization.”
Aerial photos reported by independent journalist Michael Thomas purportedly show Fermi hasn’t done significant construction since obtaining its air permit. Fermi did not respond to multiple requests for comment on the lawsuit.
Industry attorneys I spoke to who wished to remain anonymous told me it was too early to say whether EPA’s rulemaking would exacerbate local conflicts by making things move faster. “A lot of times the environmental community likes to litigate things in the hope delays will kill a project, so in that regard, this strategy may be harder for them to implement now,” one lawyer told me. “But just because a plant gets a permit doesn’t mean they can build.”
Environmental lawyers, meanwhile, clearly see more potential for social friction in a faster process. Keri Powell of the Southern Environmental Law Center compared this EPA action to xAI’s rapid buildout in Tennessee and Mississippi where the Al company’s construction of gas turbines before it received its permits has only added to local controversy. This new rule would not make what xAI did permissible; this is a different matter. Yet there are thematic similarities between what the company is doing and the new permitting regime, with natural gas generation expanding faster when companies are allowed to start forms of site work before an air permit is issued.
“By the time a permit is issued, the company will be very, very far along in constructing a facility. All they’ll need to do is bring in the emitting unit, and oftentimes that doesn’t entail very much,” she said. “Imagine you’re a state or local permitting agency – your ability to choose something different than what the company already decided to do is going to be limited.”
And more of the week’s top fights around development.
1. Berkeley County, South Carolina – Forget about Richland County, Ohio. All eyes in Solar World should be on this county where officials are trying to lift a solar moratorium.
2. Hill County, Texas – We have our first Texas county trying to ban new data centers and it’s in one of the more conservative pockets of the state.
3. Sussex County, New Jersey – A town in north Jersey rapidly changed course from backing a new data center to outright banning all projects.
4. Porter County, Indiana – The Chicago ex-urb of Valparaiso is significantly restricting data centers too, after pulling the plug on a large project under development.
5. King County, Washington – It’s Snoqualmie vs. the energy sector right now, as the new poster child for battery backlash bans BESS in its borders.