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A new report from the Clean Air Task Force aims to clean up accounting methods before they’re put to wider use.

The carbon offset market is in the throes of a multi-year downturn after mounting evidence of pervasive accounting flaws depressed sales. A new report from the nonprofit Clean Air Task Force aims to prevent history from repeating itself in the more nascent market for carbon removal credits.
Researchers at CATF assessed the leading methods used to certify carbon removal credits for projects involving biomass and found that they lack a common framework. Almost all contain notable flaws.
Biomass, in this context, is essentially any organic material integrated into a carbon removal project, from trees or corn burned in a bioenergy plant to human waste set to be injected underground. Interest in biomass-based carbon removal methods has surged in recent years. Roughly 88% of all carbon removal credits sold to date are associated with a biomass project, according to the leading industry database CDR.fyi. That’s because biomass-based projects tend to generate more plentiful or affordable credits than other types on the market.
Many of these sales are pre-orders based on future projects, however, and have yet to deliver certified credits. That opens a window of opportunity to improve the certification process in time to make those credits fully count.
“We wanted to look under the hood of this approach to CDR while it’s in this early stage of development to help ensure that as it scales, there are robust standards,” Kathy Fallon, the director of the land systems program at the Clean Air Task Force, told me.
Carbon removal registries, which certify carbon credits, publish detailed “protocols” describing how companies should measure, verify, and declare the amount of carbon removed by a given project. The report analyzed 25 protocols in total, using a uniform list of 18 criteria to assess each one. Those criteria included how the protocols accounted for uncertainty as well as indirect emissions and co-products related to the project, such as when a project both produces energy and removes carbon. They also looked at rules for monitoring the stored carbon, and whether the protocols included safeguards in the case that any of the carbon ended up back in the atmosphere, among other things.
The 25 protocols were assessed on a scale from “fundamentally flawed” to “exemplary,” though none received a grade at either extreme. Seven were deemed “satisfactory,” 12 were “weak,” and six were “very weak.”
The goal was to create a roadmap for how the industry could strengthen accounting methods in the future, since many of the registries issue regular updates to their protocols. But the carbon removal industry is reluctant to admit to shortcomings, and clearly on edge about anything that could undermine public trust, as evidenced by events leading up to the release of the report. An earlier version of the supplemental materials to the report shared exclusively with Heatmap tied each protocol's score directly to the registry that developed the protocol. When I reached out to some of the registries for their views on the report, they vehemently rejected the findings. Shortly after, CATF informed me that it would edit the supplement to anonymize the scores.
“Our goal with this work is to set the bar for strong standards and encourage improvements across the board,” the group told me in an email when I asked why it made the change. “To that end, we chose to focus our study on establishing a rubric and making recommendations that apply to all protocols rather than scoring protocols against each other in a nascent industry.”
Funnily enough, despite labeling some of the methods as “flawed,” Fallon told me the authors were struck by how good they were overall.
“We were pleasantly surprised that while there is a ways to go, and an opportunity to strengthen these standards, they’re in a relatively good place compared to what we saw in the forest carbon credit market,” she said.
CATF published a similar report last year, assessing 20 protocols used to certify forest carbon offsets and finding that almost none of them was strong enough to ensure the credits delivered their promised climate benefits. It was not the first report to reach such a conclusion — the issues with forest carbon credits had been well-documented in earlier peer-reviewed studies and media reports. Broken trust contributed to a major downturn in the carbon credit market that began in 2022 and has persisted.
While earlier generations of carbon credits, including the aforementioned forest offsets, represented CO2 emissions that had supposedly been prevented, carbon removal credits are tied to efforts that remove existing CO2 in the atmosphere. In theory, it’s easier to prove you did something than to prove you prevented something from happening. Still, the accounting gets complicated. That’s because measuring carbon removal still requires the thorny and somewhat subjective exercise of lifecycle analysis — the act of tallying up all the emissions associated with an activity from start to finish to calculate the net effect on the atmosphere.
“Calculating a carbon removal credit is a lot like doing your taxes,” Fallon told me. “Good accounting is everything.” She continued the metaphor: With your taxes, you start with your total income and then subtract deductions to arrive at your net income. In the case of carbon removal, you begin with the total amount of carbon stored at the end of the process and then subtract the emissions generated along the way. “Getting those deductions right can make a really big difference in the final result,” Fallon said.
This is uniquely tricky for any project involving biomass, in part because the result will vary depending on when you consider the project to “start” — when the biomass is being cultivated, when it’s harvested, or further down the line. To see why this makes a difference, it helps to understand the four types of biomass projects the report analyzes:
Each of these methods relies on the natural process of photosynthesis to suck up carbon from the atmosphere and store it in plants. Without an intervention like one of those listed above, that carbon would naturally return to the air when the plants decompose, or are digested and turned into waste, or are burned for energy.
Or would it? That’s one of the questions CATF argues project developers must consider before they can get an accurate estimate of their net carbon removal. The report suggests that companies should document whether some portion of the carbon in their biomass might have been sequestered regardless, either by migrating underground through the soil, or by being incorporated into a wood product used for construction.
More than half of the certification schemes analyzed in the report failed to account for some or all of the carbon flows that occur prior to the project’s key intervention, including this "alternative fate of the biomass” consideration. Other such “upstream” carbon emissions include those from fertilizer use, farm equipment, land use change, and transportation of the biomass.
Some project types appeared to have more rigorous methods than others. Five out of six protocols for biomass burial scored “satisfactory,” while only one for biochar and one for BECCS earned that label. Three of the six protocols for biochar were deemed “very weak.”
The report underscores a divide between what independent scientists consider to be best practice for carbon accounting and what the registries have decided is acceptable. In general, the registries — which included Puro, Verra, Isometric, Gold Standard, and others — treat projects with co-products differently from projects that are purpose-built for carbon removal.
For example, the protocols generally agree that an ethanol plant retrofitted with carbon capture should ascribe the emissions from the production of biomass to the ethanol and leave them out of the calculation for carbon removal. Most biomass burial projects, on the other hand, where the only product being generated is the carbon credit, must take into account all the emissions associated with growing the biomass.
The report authors object to this logic, which provides an accounting advantage to the former project type and hurts the latter. The end result could be two projects that sequester nearly identical amounts of carbon, but one churns out far more credits than the other.
While the authors take issue with many different aspects of the protocols, one of the biggest problems they identify has less to do with these individual failures and more to do with the overall picture of the market. They found significant variation among the protocols on almost every criteria, which risks creating buyer confusion over whether one biochar credit, for example, is more “legit” than another.
Daniel Sanchez, a principal scientist at the advisory firm Carbon Direct who was not involved in the analysis but reviewed the report for CATF, told me his takeaway was less about the flaws in the protocols and more about how it showed the need for greater consistency.
“That’s what it’s going to take for a market to actually develop around this,” he said. “I think Microsoft would want to know that it’s getting pretty much the same thing from a Puro biochar credit that it’s getting from an Isometric biochar credit, right?”
While the fact that no protocol scored higher than “satisfactory” sounds bad, Sanchez said he has a “glass half full” view of the market. In his view, not all of the criteria the authors analyzed were crucial. For example, none of the biochar protocols except one required that projects account for the emissions embedded in the equipment used to create the biochar. The CATF report considered this “fundamentally flawed.” But those emissions are typically pretty small, Sanchez said, “so I don’t think that’s a super serious knock on credit quality.”
“Every protocol can be made better,” he added. “Is this report enough to say that the protocols that really didn’t match those crucial features, does that mean that they’re invalid? It’s a little harder to say.”
Fallon agreed that the results were more instructive than worrisome, describing the existing protocols as a “solid foundation.”
“There are areas of weakness, and there’s room for improvement,” she said. “This is the time for the registries to lean in and tighten up the protocols to ensure that there’s strong public trust in the climate outcomes.” she said.
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There are at least two more developers in a position to trade offshore leases for fossil fuel investment.
The Trump administration inked two more agreements to cancel offshore wind leases and reimburse the former leaseholders nearly $1 billion on Monday, demonstrating that its previous deals with TotalEnergies was not a one-off legal settlement but rather a new, repeatable strategy to throttle the industry.
Just like the deal with Total, the Interior Department is painting the agreement as a quid pro quo, where the companies will be reimbursed only after they invest an equivalent amount of money into U.S. oil and gas projects. There are a handful of remaining companies sitting on undeveloped offshore wind leases that could conceivably make similar deals. If they do, the cost to taxpayers could exceed $4 billion.
This latest deal will cancel leases for two projects, known as Bluepoint Wind and Golden State Wind. Bluepoint, a project off the coast of New York and New Jersey, was a joint venture between Global Infrastructure Partners, an investment firm owned by asset manager BlackRock, and Ocean Winds, which itself is a joint venture between the French energy company Engie and the developer EDP Renewables. The companies initially paid $765 million to acquire the lease.
The Interior Department announcement states that Global Infrastructure Partners has committed to investing that amount into an unspecified U.S. liquified natural gas facility. The firm is already a major investor in several U.S. LNG projects; alongside TotalEnergies, it reached a final investment decision last September for the expansion of the Rio Grande export terminal. If the lease cancellation agreement resembles the one struck with Total, as the Interior Department’s announcement suggests, Global Infrastructure Partners will be able to count this existing investment toward its total.
Golden State, one of the first leases sold off the Pacific coast, was a joint venture between Ocean Winds and the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, an investment firm. The companies purchased it for $120 million. The government’s announcement is less specific about who will invest that money into what, noting only that it will be paid back after “an investment has been made of an equal amount in the development of U.S. oil and gas assets, energy infrastructure, and/or LNG projects along the Gulf Coast.” The Canada Pension Plan Investment Board has multiple investments in oil and natural gas pipelines and productions throughout the U.S. While Engie buys LNG from the U.S., the company has generally not been involved in U.S. oil and gas projects. EDP Renewables focuses solely on renewable energy and its parent company, EDP Group, is a Portuguese utility.
The government’s leasing laws generally do not allow companies to walk away from their lease and receive a refund. The government can cancel leases if it determines development would harm the environment or threaten national security — two claims the Trump administration has made — but only after holding a hearing on the matter.
The Trump administration has engineered a different route. In the same vein as the TotalEnergies deal, it has reached legal settlements with the companies and intends to pay them out of the Judgment Fund, a reserve overseen by the Department of Justice that agencies can draw from to pay for settlements arising from litigation or imminent litigation.
“We did not take this decision lightly,” Michael Brown, the CEO of Ocean Winds North America, told me in an emailed statement. “But when the underlying conditions in a market change, we must adapt. In this case, receiving a refund for the lease payments we had invested and exiting on agreed terms was the right outcome for our shareholders and partners.”
As I’ve reported previously, some legal experts are dubious that the circumstances constitute a legitimate use of the Judgment Fund. The agreement with Total was predicated on a series of “what if” scenarios — the Trump administration says it would have paused the company’s projects, which would have led Total to sue for breach of contract. Neither party actually did those things, instead negotiating these tit-for-tat trades with Trump.
Legal experts told me the only parties with the legal standing and the financial means to challenge the agreements are the states. I contacted the attorneys general offices in New York and New Jersey, which declined to comment, and California, which did not reply to my inquiry.
There are at least two remaining offshore wind developers who would be in a position to angle for a similar payout. RWE, a German energy company, paid $1.1 billion in 2022 to purchase a lease off the coast of New York and New Jersey for a project called Community Offshore — the most any company has paid to date for U.S. offshore wind development rights.
RWE, which previously focused its U.S. business on renewable energy, announced in March that it was developing 15 natural gas peaker plants in the U.S. In addition to Community Offshore, the company also bought rights to a lease in the Pacific for $121 million, and another in the Gulf of Mexico for about $4 million. The company did not respond to a request for comment, but its CEO has publicly suggested that it would be interested in getting its money back.
Another potential seller is Invenergy, which purchased a lease off the coast of New York and New Jersey in 2022 for $645 million for its Leading Light project. It also holds the rights to a Pacific lease bought for $112 million, and two in the Gulf of Maine, for which it paid about $9 million. The company is actively expanding its natural gas power plant fleet in the U.S. Invenergy declined to comment for this story.
The remaining companies that might be eligible for such deals paid much less for their offshore wind leases — BP, for example, paid just $135 million to obtain the lease for its Beacon Wind project in the Northeast. Duke Energy paid $130 million for a lease near North Carolina. BP’s offshore wind arm, JERA Nex bp, declined to comment on whether it would be amenable to a deal. Duke did not respond to my inquiry.
A company called EDF, a U.S. subsidiary of the French state-owned utility EDF Group, is sitting on a hefty $780 million lease, but the company is a renewables developer. There are no indications that its parent company is interested in expanding its natural gas pipeline in the U.S.
While Equinor and Dominion both have fossil fuel projects in the U.S., it seems unlikely they would reach similar deals for their remaining leases, given that they have already sued the Trump administration for halting work on offshore wind projects that were already under construction — Equinor’s Empire Wind and Dominion’s Coastal Virginia Offshore project.
Notably, Ocean Winds still has one remaining lease after this week’s deal, which it purchased on its own — not as a joint venture — in 2018, under the first Trump administration. Its SouthCoast Wind project off the coast of Massachusetts has nearly all of its approvals, though Trump’s Day One moratorium on offshore wind permits delayed construction. A subsequent lawsuit in March of last year from the city and county of Nantucket challenged the project’s Construction and Operations permit, typically the final federal approval for offshore wind farms. A federal judge ordered the permit to be sent back to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management for reconsideration last fall; according to court filings, that process is ongoing.
If RWE, Invenergy, Duke, and BP each reached similar deals with the Trump administration, that would mean a total of just over $4 billion paid out of the Judgment Fund to cancel offshore wind leases, including the four existing deals. For context, the total amount the government paid to parties out of the Judgment Fund across all federal agencies in 2025 was about $4.4 billion, according to Treasury data. Annual totals over the last decade range between $1.7 billion in 2017 and $8.4 billion in 2020.
Party orthodoxy is no longer serving the energy transition, the Breakthrough Institute’s Seaver Wang and Peter Cook write.
President Trump has announced a dizzying array of executive branch led critical mineral policies since taking office again last year. While bombastically branded as new achievements, many elements from critical mineral tariffs to strategic stockpiling to Defense Production Act financing trace back to bipartisan recommendations and programs spanning the past several administrations.
Many Democrats in Congress, however, are stuck on the defensive. During a recent House Natural Resources hearing, for instance, Washington Representative Yassamin Ansari singled out the SECURE Minerals Act, a bipartisan proposal for a strategic minerals reserve, as “a framework ripe for fraud, corruption, and abuse.” Yet the draft bill actually contains strong safeguards: Senate confirmation of board members, annual independent audits, public tracking and annual reporting to Congress, conflict-of-interest prohibitions, and more.
In another House oversight hearing considering the reauthorization of the Export-Import Bank, California’s Maxine Waters expressed concern over President Trump’s mere contact with mineral producing countries in Africa, asking simply, “What is he doing?” The President of EXIM responded by reminding Waters of the bank’s charter to engage in sub-Saharan Africa.
In both cases, distrust of the administration and Republican lawmakers seems to have blinded Democrats to a larger strategic goal: building a secure critical mineral supply chain. Democrats who want to strengthen U.S. economic competitiveness and cultivate domestic clean technology sectors cannot afford to engage in partisan posturing at the expense of real policymaking. Nor can they afford to waste time — America’s vulnerabilities loom too large to wait until Trump leaves the White House.
Doing so will require Democrats to embrace certain positions that are at odds with recent party orthodoxy. First, they must accept the basic math that both the U.S. and the world will need new mine production and support incentives and regulatory reform for new critical minerals projects, not just recycling, re-mining, and substitution. And second, they must admit that mining projects in the U.S. and in democratically-governed partner countries offer a far better foundation for achieving high environmental and social standards than the currently dominant production routes for many raw materials today.
A recent hearing question from Texas Representative Christian Menefee hints at the risks of overly narrow minerals policy: “Should byproduct recovery be the first priority before we open up a single new mine?" While advocacy organizations and academic researchers have lately argued that operating mines dig up enough minerals to meet U.S. needs yet are currently neglecting to recover them, such analyses only consider the theoretical potential of extracting every element present in mined rock, not technical feasibility. Feasible recovery will be the exception, not the rule. Efforts to produce lithium as a byproduct from a copper-gold deposit might confront concentrations of under 20 parts per million, relative to concentrations at U.S. lithium mines currently under development that range from around 850 to 2,000 parts per million. Compared to cobalt concentrations of 2,400 parts per million at the Jervois Idaho Cobalt mine, Alaska’s large Red Dog zinc mine might boast 39 to 149 parts per million. For many elements, recovery would require new, first-of-a-kind extraction equipment consuming added water, energy, and chemical reagents — akin to burning a barn to fry an egg.
Recycling, too, is a meaningful category of solutions but ultimately limited. For instance, improved batteries and solar panels with longer service lives delay the point at which significant flows of materials become available for recycling. An increasing number of batteries and solar modules may also be redirected towards second-life use markets — electric vehicle batteries repurposed as electric grid storage assets, for example — diverting even more materials from recycling facilities.
To put such constraints into numbers, growing grid storage battery cell manufacturing capacity in the U.S. may surpass 96 gigawatt-hours by the end of this year, requiring over 17,000 tons of lithium content — alone equivalent to half of all worldwide lithium consumption in 2015. China’s tightening of rare earth export restrictions last year forced one of Ford’s auto plants to pause operations, and the shift to electric vehicles will only drive U.S. rare earths demand higher. The U.S. alone produced around 1 million EVs last year, relative to total auto manufacturing of 12 million to 14 million vehicles per year.
Even modest domestic manufacturing goals of 10 gigawatts of wind turbines and 2 million electric vehicles per year would require at least 100 tons of dysprosium and praseodymium, heavy rare earth elements that the U.S. is only just beginning to produce from recycling efforts and its sole operating mine. Globally, the International Energy Agency estimates that successful recycling expansion could avert around 5% to 30% of new mining activity, depending on the commodity.
The math is unforgiving. We need more minerals, and we need them soon.
For years, progressives have critiqued current U.S. mining regulations as antiquated and inadequate, insisting that standards governing existing mines expose marginalized communities to unacceptable impacts. While understandably reflecting past harms inflicted by mining prior to the enactment of stronger laws and regulations in the 1970s and 1980s, such a position exposes lawmakers to an uncomfortable contradiction: If modern mining and refining are structurally problematic industries, then not only must U.S. lawmakers advocate for improved industry standards domestically, logic dictates that they also use trade policies and international frameworks to penalize the unjust economic advantages benefiting irresponsible producers globally. The sum total of such actions might well slow the country’s transition to clean energy as opposed to speeding it.
Activist narratives that U.S. mining regulations offer the mining industry a smash-and-grab free-for-all obviously conflict with the reality that domestic mining has long been viewed as borderline uninvestible, with the U.S. seeing a 70% decrease in the number of active metal mines over the last 40 years. Insisting that more public engagement, extracting higher royalties to fund community projects, and quartering off certain areas with mineral potential for conservation will speed U.S. mining projects by neutralizing community opposition must consider how such high-cost projects can survive in a global market. China produces 10 times more graphite, rare earths, and polysilicon than the next largest producing country — and not by excelling at public engagement and community benefits-sharing. Continuing to indulge such domestic-only remonstrations will solve none of the nation’s supply challenges.
Meanwhile, efforts by both the Trump and Biden administrations are already driving progress towards improved recycling and utilization of unconventional wastes and resources. Biden’s Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act funded numerous programs to produce new critical minerals without new mining, including Department of Energy grants to equip operating facilities with byproduct recovery systems, new mapping programs from the United States Geological Survey to locate historic mines with viable levels of critical minerals in abandoned wastes, and a Rare Earth Elements Demonstration Facility program at the Department of Energy to prioritize the use of waste as a feedstock. The Trump administration has continued to issue notices for IIJA-funded, waste resource, and recycling-focused opportunities into 2026. In short, maximization of byproduct potential, recycling, and remining is already established bipartisan policy.
Above all, Democrats must capitalize on the chance to start alleviating national critical mineral constraints now, in the middle of a Trump presidency, to position the U.S. industrial base to produce impressive economic and technological results in 2028 and beyond. Trump will depart the Oval Office in less than three years, whereas U.S. critical minerals strategy must play out over the next five to 10. Passing up promising opportunities today in the name of scoring short-term political points serves neither the nation’s best interests nor those of the Democratic Party.
Over the next two years, critical minerals policy offers rare bipartisan opportunities to supercharge innovation and build projects that will not only produce strategic materials but also solutions for cleaner industrial processes. In most cases, new U.S. production will already be less carbon-intensive than the global average. Meanwhile, federal policy support will foster U.S. process engineering know-how that might ultimately drive long-term breakthroughs in transformative cleaner solutions.
All of that said, policymakers must also balance environmental and innovation ambitions against realistic expectations and resist the temptation to chase only fully clean projects. For now, truly zero-carbon metals produced using green hydrogen or other novel techniques remain dramatically more expensive than metals produced with the most cost-efficient mix of energy inputs and feedstocks. Depending on the sector, domestic industries that have first achieved scale and rebuilt domestic expertise may position America better for catalyzing such shifts.
Cost competitive industries, after all, are also key for advancing Democratic priorities. More favorable costs for U.S.-produced critical materials and increasingly secure upstream secure supply chains will help make U.S.-manufactured technologies such as electric vehicles, solar modules, and electrolyzers more competitive. Responsible production capacity that is operating at scale will increase bargaining power for pressuring irresponsible producers overseas to reform, while creating new markets for American raw materials among principled partners and corporate offtakers.
Miners and metallurgists deserve an equal place of honor in the energy transition economy alongside rooftop solar installers and electricians, and such heavy industry workers can help rebuild a stronger U.S. labor movement.
But the risk of squandering such long-term opportunities is real. During the Biden administration, progressives reflexively fielded proposals that would add regulatory burdens and make mining more difficult — proposals which largely went nowhere. Meanwhile, the bipartisan Mining Regulatory Clarity Act — one of the few specific regulatory reforms proposed for the mining sector to date — still has not passed since its introduction in 2023. The current version is stalled over the inclusion of provisions that would redirect mining administrative fees to cleaning up abandoned mines. Remediating legacy sites is an important federal government obligation, but the quid pro quo calculus of extracting concessions for simple regulatory reforms both complicates their passage while also procrastinating standalone measures to address abandoned mines.
Certainly, the current political moment could not be more charged. Another recent House Natural Resources hearing on oversight ended abruptly after Oregon Representative Maxine Dexter moved to subpoena Donald Trump, Jr. over concerns that administration financial support favored mineral companies in which he was invested. This episode highlights the challenge for Democrats — holding the federal government accountable to the U.S. public while simultaneously working to address the country’s critical mineral priorities.
This is less complicated than it sounds. Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle can agree on strong oversight provisions to ensure that programs prioritize the nation’s interests and achieve political longevity. Democrats should therefore lean in to their desired guardrails, be they mandatory public transparency, reviews of company history and project feasibility, or conflict-of-interest restrictions. Stronger congressional oversight and robust environmental and human rights safeguards are worthy Democratic goals, but advancing them requires that Congress do its job and legislate.
Current conditions: After a springy warm up, temperatures in Northeast cities such as Boston and Atlantic City are plunging back into the low 50 degrees Fahrenheit range for the rest of the week • In India, meanwhile, a northern heatwave is sending temperatures in Gujarat as high as 110 degrees today • The Pacific waters off California and Mexico are hitting record temperatures amid an historic marine heatwave.
Last month, following a string of legal defeats over his efforts to halt construction of offshore wind turbines through regulatory fiat, President Donald Trump tried something new: Paying developers to quit. The plan worked: French energy giant TotalEnergies agreed to abandon its two offshore wind farms in exchange for $1 billion from the federal government, with the promise that it would reinvest that money in U.S. oil and gas development. Reporting by Heatmap’s Emily Pontecorvo later showed that the legal reasoning behind the federal government's cash offer was shaky, and that the actual text of the agreement contained no definite assurances that the company would invest any more than it was already planning to. Last week, I told you that more deals were in the works, including with another French company, the utility Engie. Now the Trump administration has confirmed the rumors.
On Monday, the Department of the Interior announced plans to spend a little under $1 billion — a combined $885 million — to recoup the leasing costs developers already paid from a proposed wind farm off New Jersey and another off California. BlackRock-owned Global Infrastructure Partners “has committed” to reinvest up to $765 million into a U.S.-based liquified natural gas project. In exchange, the Interior Department said it will cancel the firm’s lease for the Bluepoint Wind offshore project in federal waters off New Jersey and New York “and reimburse the company’s bid payment in the amount invested in the LNG project.” As part of the deal, Bluepoint Wind “has decided not to pursue any new offshore wind developments in the United States,” the agency said. Likewise, the floating wind farm developer Golden State Wind agreed to abandon its lease located in the federally designated Morro Bay Wind Energy Area located 20 miles off San Luis Obispo County. The company had hoped to build one of the first offshore wind facilities in California where the continental shelf drops off too steeply for the kinds of wind farms sited on the nation’s Atlantic coast. Under the deal, the developer can recover “approximately $120 million in lease fees after an investment has been made of an equal amount in the development of U.S. oil and gas assets, energy infrastructure, and/or LNG projects along the Gulf Coast.” As part of the agreement, Golden State has opted out of pursuing new offshore wind projects. In a statement, Michael Brown, the chief executive of Ocean Winds North America, credited for “the clarity they have provided with this decision and deal.” The 50% owner of both Bluepoint Wind and Golden State Wind added: “Our priority remains disciplined capital allocation and delivering reliable energy solutions that create long-term value for ratepayers, partners, and shareholders.”
The Department of Energy said Monday it will soon restart talks to pay out nearly $430 million in payments to American hydroelectric projects that were promised under a Biden-era program. The Trump administration paused the negotiations as the agency reorganized its hydro-related programs under the newly named Hydropower and Hydrokinetic Office and Secretary of Energy Chris Wright reassessed droves of investments his predecessors made into clean energy projects. The funding aims to support 293 projects at 212 facilities through a program to maintain and enhance the nation’s fleet of dams. “American hydropower is a key component of this Administration’s vision for an affordable, reliable energy system,” Assistant Secretary of Energy Audrey Robertson said in a statement. “These actions will modernize our hydropower fleet, bolster our domestic workforce, and bring us closer to realizing that vision.”

Hydropower is a renewable power source conservative critics of wind and solar tend to like because it operates 24/7 and provides large-scale, long-duration energy storage through pumped-storage systems. Similarly, commercializing fusion power, the so-called holy grail of clean energy, is another technological goal the Trump administration shares with advocates of a lower-carbon future. On Tuesday morning, Commonwealth Fusion Systems became the first fusion power plant developer to apply to join a major grid operator. By submitting its paperwork to link its generators to PJM Interconnection, the largest U.S. wholesale electricity market, Commonwealth Fusion is showing it’s “on track to connect to the electricity grid in time to deliver power in the early 2030s.” The company also announced that it had named the first 400-megawatt ARC power plant it’s building in Chesterfield County, Virginia, the Fall Line Fusion Power Station. The name is a reference to the geological boundary where Virginia’s elevated Piedmont region drops to the Tidewater coastal plain, creating rapids on the James River that Virginians historically built mills on to harness the power from falling water.
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Xpansiv, the startup that manages a global exchange for trading carbon credits and renewable energy credits, has signed a deal to bring credits with precise data that allows buyers to match clean electricity consumption to generation on an hour-by-hour basis. The partnership with the software platform Granular Energy, which I can exclusively report for this newsletter, will allow buyers and sellers to access “high-integrity, time-stamped energy data with registry-issued energy attribute certificates through a single platform” for the first time. The push comes amid growing calls for tighter rules and more transparency to avoid greenwashing carbon credits as voluntary programs such as the Greenhouse Gas Protocol draw scrutiny and the European Union’s world-first carbon tariff enters its fifth month of operation. “This integrated solution makes granular renewable energy more accessible and easier to manage for independent power producers, utilities, traders, brokers, and corporate buyers,” Russell Karas, Xpansiv’s senior vice president of strategic market solutions, told me in a statement.
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Earlier this month, I told you that SunZia, the nation’s largest renewable energy project ever, had come online. The behemoth project, which included 3.5 gigawatts of wind turbines in New Mexico and 550 miles of transmission lines to funnel the electricity to Arizona’s fast-growing population centers, took just three years to build once construction began in 2023. But “the permitting process took nearly 17 years — almost six times as long,” in a sign of how “a broken permitting system has choked the infrastructure growth that underwrites American strength.” You’d be mistaken for thinking these words came from someone like Senator Martin Heinrich, the New Mexico Democrat and climate hawk who long championed SunZia and more transmission lines to bring renewables online, but told Heatmap’s Jael Holzman last December that he wouldn’t vote for anything that failed to boost renewables. But their author is actually Senator Tom Cotton, the right-wing firebrand Republican from Arkansas. In a Monday op-ed in The Washington Post, Cotton argued that the U.S. “needs more electricity to support data centers, modern manufacturing, defense infrastructure, and economic growth,” in addition to more “domestic access to critical minerals” and processing plants and “a stronger industrial base.” To make that happen, “the country first needs straightforward, enforceable permitting standards and fast, efficient construction,” he wrote. He called for overhauling landmark laws such as the National Environmental Policy Act and establishing “a single agency” to “oversee permitting reviews with firm deadlines and a clear, coordinated decision process.”
The push comes as Republican lawmakers in the House of Representatives propose restoring tax credits for wind, solar, and other clean energy technologies that were curtailed by One Big Beautiful Bill Act. The American Energy Dominance Act, introduced Thursday, would remove the accelerated deadlines that Trump’s landmark legislation last year placed on the renewable energy production tax credit, known as 45Y, and the 48E investment tax credits. It would, according to Utility Dive, also make similar changes to the 45V clean hydrogen production credit.
Last month, New York utility executives gathered at a luxury hotel in Miami and boasted about banding together to influence a new state policy that would limit when power companies can turn off customers’ electricity during heat waves because of unpaid bills. A day later, Albany unveiled the policy. Ratepayers in New York City in particular “lost meaningful safeguards,” Laurie Wheelock, the head of the watchdog Public Utility Law Project, told The New York Times. Under its previous agreement with the state, ConEdison, the utility that serves the five boroughs and Westchester, was barred from terminating service for non-payment the day before a 90-degree forecast, the day of, and two days after. The new policy prohibits shutoffs only on the day of the forecast.
Meanwhile, in Seattle, residents of King County are bracing for a double-digit rate hike on sewage service. Following years of modest increases, the Seattle Times reported, county officials proposed a 12.75% spike in sewer rates for next year as the municipality looks for ways to pay for $14 billion in infrastructure upgrades over the next decade. The problem? The famously rainy cultural and financial capital of the Pacific Northwest is facing worsening floods from atmospheric rivers.
In Pennsylvania, meanwhile, Governor Josh Shapiro is taking yet another step to deal with ballooning electricity costs in PJM Interconnection. In a Monday afternoon post on X, he said he’s appointing a new special counsel for energy affordability to be “our newest watchdog to hold utility companies accountable when they try to jack up Pennsylvanians’ energy bills.” The Democrat, widely considered a top contender for his party’s presidential nomination in 2028, said the appointment “will support our efforts to lower costs and put money back in your pockets.”