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A new report from the Clean Air Task Force aims to clean up accounting methods before they’re put to wider use.

The carbon offset market is in the throes of a multi-year downturn after mounting evidence of pervasive accounting flaws depressed sales. A new report from the nonprofit Clean Air Task Force aims to prevent history from repeating itself in the more nascent market for carbon removal credits.
Researchers at CATF assessed the leading methods used to certify carbon removal credits for projects involving biomass and found that they lack a common framework. Almost all contain notable flaws.
Biomass, in this context, is essentially any organic material integrated into a carbon removal project, from trees or corn burned in a bioenergy plant to human waste set to be injected underground. Interest in biomass-based carbon removal methods has surged in recent years. Roughly 88% of all carbon removal credits sold to date are associated with a biomass project, according to the leading industry database CDR.fyi. That’s because biomass-based projects tend to generate more plentiful or affordable credits than other types on the market.
Many of these sales are pre-orders based on future projects, however, and have yet to deliver certified credits. That opens a window of opportunity to improve the certification process in time to make those credits fully count.
“We wanted to look under the hood of this approach to CDR while it’s in this early stage of development to help ensure that as it scales, there are robust standards,” Kathy Fallon, the director of the land systems program at the Clean Air Task Force, told me.
Carbon removal registries, which certify carbon credits, publish detailed “protocols” describing how companies should measure, verify, and declare the amount of carbon removed by a given project. The report analyzed 25 protocols in total, using a uniform list of 18 criteria to assess each one. Those criteria included how the protocols accounted for uncertainty as well as indirect emissions and co-products related to the project, such as when a project both produces energy and removes carbon. They also looked at rules for monitoring the stored carbon, and whether the protocols included safeguards in the case that any of the carbon ended up back in the atmosphere, among other things.
The 25 protocols were assessed on a scale from “fundamentally flawed” to “exemplary,” though none received a grade at either extreme. Seven were deemed “satisfactory,” 12 were “weak,” and six were “very weak.”
The goal was to create a roadmap for how the industry could strengthen accounting methods in the future, since many of the registries issue regular updates to their protocols. But the carbon removal industry is reluctant to admit to shortcomings, and clearly on edge about anything that could undermine public trust, as evidenced by events leading up to the release of the report. An earlier version of the supplemental materials to the report shared exclusively with Heatmap tied each protocol's score directly to the registry that developed the protocol. When I reached out to some of the registries for their views on the report, they vehemently rejected the findings. Shortly after, CATF informed me that it would edit the supplement to anonymize the scores.
“Our goal with this work is to set the bar for strong standards and encourage improvements across the board,” the group told me in an email when I asked why it made the change. “To that end, we chose to focus our study on establishing a rubric and making recommendations that apply to all protocols rather than scoring protocols against each other in a nascent industry.”
Funnily enough, despite labeling some of the methods as “flawed,” Fallon told me the authors were struck by how good they were overall.
“We were pleasantly surprised that while there is a ways to go, and an opportunity to strengthen these standards, they’re in a relatively good place compared to what we saw in the forest carbon credit market,” she said.
CATF published a similar report last year, assessing 20 protocols used to certify forest carbon offsets and finding that almost none of them was strong enough to ensure the credits delivered their promised climate benefits. It was not the first report to reach such a conclusion — the issues with forest carbon credits had been well-documented in earlier peer-reviewed studies and media reports. Broken trust contributed to a major downturn in the carbon credit market that began in 2022 and has persisted.
While earlier generations of carbon credits, including the aforementioned forest offsets, represented CO2 emissions that had supposedly been prevented, carbon removal credits are tied to efforts that remove existing CO2 in the atmosphere. In theory, it’s easier to prove you did something than to prove you prevented something from happening. Still, the accounting gets complicated. That’s because measuring carbon removal still requires the thorny and somewhat subjective exercise of lifecycle analysis — the act of tallying up all the emissions associated with an activity from start to finish to calculate the net effect on the atmosphere.
“Calculating a carbon removal credit is a lot like doing your taxes,” Fallon told me. “Good accounting is everything.” She continued the metaphor: With your taxes, you start with your total income and then subtract deductions to arrive at your net income. In the case of carbon removal, you begin with the total amount of carbon stored at the end of the process and then subtract the emissions generated along the way. “Getting those deductions right can make a really big difference in the final result,” Fallon said.
This is uniquely tricky for any project involving biomass, in part because the result will vary depending on when you consider the project to “start” — when the biomass is being cultivated, when it’s harvested, or further down the line. To see why this makes a difference, it helps to understand the four types of biomass projects the report analyzes:
Each of these methods relies on the natural process of photosynthesis to suck up carbon from the atmosphere and store it in plants. Without an intervention like one of those listed above, that carbon would naturally return to the air when the plants decompose, or are digested and turned into waste, or are burned for energy.
Or would it? That’s one of the questions CATF argues project developers must consider before they can get an accurate estimate of their net carbon removal. The report suggests that companies should document whether some portion of the carbon in their biomass might have been sequestered regardless, either by migrating underground through the soil, or by being incorporated into a wood product used for construction.
More than half of the certification schemes analyzed in the report failed to account for some or all of the carbon flows that occur prior to the project’s key intervention, including this "alternative fate of the biomass” consideration. Other such “upstream” carbon emissions include those from fertilizer use, farm equipment, land use change, and transportation of the biomass.
Some project types appeared to have more rigorous methods than others. Five out of six protocols for biomass burial scored “satisfactory,” while only one for biochar and one for BECCS earned that label. Three of the six protocols for biochar were deemed “very weak.”
The report underscores a divide between what independent scientists consider to be best practice for carbon accounting and what the registries have decided is acceptable. In general, the registries — which included Puro, Verra, Isometric, Gold Standard, and others — treat projects with co-products differently from projects that are purpose-built for carbon removal.
For example, the protocols generally agree that an ethanol plant retrofitted with carbon capture should ascribe the emissions from the production of biomass to the ethanol and leave them out of the calculation for carbon removal. Most biomass burial projects, on the other hand, where the only product being generated is the carbon credit, must take into account all the emissions associated with growing the biomass.
The report authors object to this logic, which provides an accounting advantage to the former project type and hurts the latter. The end result could be two projects that sequester nearly identical amounts of carbon, but one churns out far more credits than the other.
While the authors take issue with many different aspects of the protocols, one of the biggest problems they identify has less to do with these individual failures and more to do with the overall picture of the market. They found significant variation among the protocols on almost every criteria, which risks creating buyer confusion over whether one biochar credit, for example, is more “legit” than another.
Daniel Sanchez, a principal scientist at the advisory firm Carbon Direct who was not involved in the analysis but reviewed the report for CATF, told me his takeaway was less about the flaws in the protocols and more about how it showed the need for greater consistency.
“That’s what it’s going to take for a market to actually develop around this,” he said. “I think Microsoft would want to know that it’s getting pretty much the same thing from a Puro biochar credit that it’s getting from an Isometric biochar credit, right?”
While the fact that no protocol scored higher than “satisfactory” sounds bad, Sanchez said he has a “glass half full” view of the market. In his view, not all of the criteria the authors analyzed were crucial. For example, none of the biochar protocols except one required that projects account for the emissions embedded in the equipment used to create the biochar. The CATF report considered this “fundamentally flawed.” But those emissions are typically pretty small, Sanchez said, “so I don’t think that’s a super serious knock on credit quality.”
“Every protocol can be made better,” he added. “Is this report enough to say that the protocols that really didn’t match those crucial features, does that mean that they’re invalid? It’s a little harder to say.”
Fallon agreed that the results were more instructive than worrisome, describing the existing protocols as a “solid foundation.”
“There are areas of weakness, and there’s room for improvement,” she said. “This is the time for the registries to lean in and tighten up the protocols to ensure that there’s strong public trust in the climate outcomes.” she said.
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Proposed reforms to Europe’s Emissions Trading System could see the EU itself become a carbon credit customer.
The European Union is on the verge of making major changes to its carbon market, including integrating carbon removals into the scheme for the first time.
The bloc’s highest governing body, the European Commission, is expected to publish a proposal on Friday to reform the EU Emissions Trading System, or ETS, to align it with the EU’s 2040 emissions target. Under the current rules, companies cannot use carbon credits of any kind to comply with the regulations. But as 2040 grows closer, the EU plans to rely on carbon removal to offset some of the residual emissions from industries that are the most difficult to decarbonize.
Friday’s proposal will cover which types of carbon removal will be accepted, how many carbon removal credits can enter the market and when, and who will be allowed to buy them. One leading approach would have the EU government buy carbon removal directly, which would give the industry unprecedented market certainty.
“The ETS could be the single biggest driver of demand for carbon removal for the next decade,” Felix Grey, a policy manager for the carbon registry Isometric, told me.
The ETS enforces a cap on emissions that declines over time. Large emitters located in the EU must buy “allowances” for each ton of carbon they release, while the pool of available allowances shrinks apace with the emissions cap. Last year, the EU set a new target to reduce emissions 90% below 1990 levels by 2040, building off its earlier target of a 55% reduction by 2030. The upcoming proposal will address how the market should operate between 2030 and 2040 to achieve that goal.
There are many contentious questions surrounding this next phase, including how quickly the cap should decline over the decade. Another question is how many free allowances the EU should give to energy-intensive facilities such as steelmakers and fertilizer producers, which it does to prevent them from leaving Europe due to higher operating costs. Now that the EU has launched its carbon border adjustment mechanism, which taxes higher-carbon imports of these goods, free allowances may not be as necessary.
The integration of carbon removal is also controversial. At best, it could be an opportunity to improve and scale up nascent technologies that take carbon out of the atmosphere. At worst, it could enable polluters to avoid cutting their own emissions by purchasing carbon credits that don’t represent real climate benefits. Then there’s the possibility that removals will be so expensive that their integration into the ETS will have no effect at all — that is, it will be less expensive for companies to pursue emissions reductions than to buy their way out. The outcome will depend on the rules the EU Commission proposes and what its member states ultimately agree to.
Today, most carbon removal efforts are supported by research grants and voluntary carbon credit purchases from companies like Microsoft. A common mantra in the industry is that it will never reach a meaningful scale without government backing. Carbon removal startups aren’t selling a product with inherent value, they are selling a waste management solution. Unless governments require polluters to clean up their carbon waste, or else handle the job themselves as a public good, carbon removal will never take off.
Some governments have already dabbled in state-sponsored removals. Under the Biden administration, the U.S. launched a carbon removal purchase pilot prize, dedicating $35 million to buy carbon removal from a handful of promising companies. It never got past the initial award phase, however, and the Trump administration has not continued the program. A number of cities and counties across the U.S. have set up their own, much smaller purchasing programs in an effort to support the industry. Making carbon removal part of a regulatory program like the EU’s ETS could open the industry to a much bigger market.
As of today, there are a few knowns and a few unknowns about what the Commission plans to propose. For example, it’s relatively clear what methods of carbon removal the European Commission will allow into the market. Earlier this year, the EU finalized regulations for certifying three kinds of carbon removal under its official Carbon Removal and Carbon Farming scheme — direct air capture, biomass with carbon capture, and biochar projects — laying out criteria for quality as well as monitoring and reporting rules. For now, only these three project types can be considered.
Here’s the problem: Direct air capture and biomass with carbon capture are two of the most expensive project types. The average carbon removal credit from these methods costs hundreds of dollars. The average price of an allowance in the ETS, by contrast, has hovered between $70 and $90 over the past few years. Depending on how the Commission chooses to incorporate the credits into the market, it’s possible that no one will buy them.
The European Commission has said it is considering three options. The leading proposal is for the EU to create a central purchasing authority that buys removals using revenues from the ETS. For each removal credit the government acquires, it would issue an additional allowance into the market on top of the established cap. This would enable regulated facilities to emit a bit more than they could otherwise — a tradeoff that Grey argued would help them stay competitive. At the same time, it would also ensure that there’s demand for carbon removal regardless of the price.
The second option is to leave it to the market, giving emitters the option to purchase carbon removal credits as an alternative to purchasing allowances. In this version, similar to the first, the carbon removal credits would enter the market as an addition to the established amount of allowances. Whether or not anyone actually buys carbon removal will depend on how tight the allowance market is.
In the third option, emitters would be able to use carbon removal credits in lieu of allowances, but those credits would operate “below the cap,” so to speak. For every credit counted toward the ETS, regulators would reduce the number of allowances available to purchase by the same amount. It is hard to see why any company would purchase carbon removal in this version unless and until the price of a credit drops below the price of an allowance, however.
Carbon Market Watch, a nonprofit watchdog group, isn’t excited about any of these options. In a recent white paper on ETS reforms, it argued that Europe should support carbon removal separate from the ETS. “Direct integration of CDR in the ETS is either a dead end, or the start of a slippery slope,” the group warned. Carbon Market Watch also has concerns about the integrity of the EU’s carbon removal certification scheme. The group has formally challenged the methodologies for certifying biochar and biomass with carbon capture projects, arguing that they do not account for all the emissions associated with these processes, lack sustainable biomass sourcing safeguards, and in the case of biochar, are missing monitoring requirements. If ETS credits are built on faulty science, the EU could end up spending billions of dollars to little climate benefit.
The other big question about the integration is the amount of carbon removal the EU will allow into the market. Even if the bloc decides to create a central purchasing authority, its potential to help the industry scale will depend on how much it commits to buying. Grey, of Isometric, argued that staying on course for net zero by 2050 would require the EU to remove about 100 million metric tons of carbon per year by 2040.
“A strong proposal on Friday will confirm carbon removal’s integration from 2031, commit to buying removal at the scale required to meet net zero, and treat every credible method equally rather than picking winners,” he said.
New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania advance a flurry of new ideas to manage the boom.
We know a little bit more about New York’s AI data center moratorium than we did yesterday. Here’s what stands out to me:
Governor Kathy Hochul says this won’t become a ban. “I’m not expecting the need for a ban. I want [the AI companies] to work with us,” she told Bloomberg’s “Odd Lots” podcast. “I understand how important AI is.”
The moratorium isn’t enough for some left-wing groups. As I wrote on Tuesday, Hochul’s order allowed her to avoid signing a more stringent moratorium that included wage requirements and renewable energy mandates for a much wider scope of projects. Kristen Gonzalez, a democratic socialist and a cosponsor of that bill, hailed Hochul anyway for “protecting everyday New Yorkers with a first in the nation moratorium on new large data centers.”
Some New York City progressive groups, while endorsing that more restrictive bill, suggested that she should have gone much further. The New York City chapter of the Sunrise Movement and other left-wing organizations, for instance, posted an Instagram carousel that said: “The dream isn’t better data centers. The dream is no data centers at all.”
New York is also exploring a grid acceleration fund. The governor’s order hints that a few policies should be in place by the time the moratorium ends. These include a new rule that data centers either bring their own power or “pay their fair share” for electricity, and a new state program to help local governments negotiate for community benefits with developers.
But it also opens the door for requiring projects to pay into a grid modernization fund. Such a fund could finance upgrades, set up new virtual power plants, or pay for new sources of zero-carbon energy, the order says. That idea — which resembles proposals from the Searchlight Institute and Groundwork Collaborative — suggests that the state is exploring ways to harness the AI boom for the public. “We want to make sure [data center developers] are investing in the grid,” Hochul said on Tuesday, “but they’re not being asked.”
Which brings me to my larger point. We’re seeing an efflorescence of interesting policymaking on data centers from Democratic governors and state legislators. New York has now enacted this moratorium, of course. Pennsylvania, a true national epicenter of data center construction, has passed new disclosure requirements, and Governor Josh Shapiro has pushed for serious reforms in the country’s largest electricity market.
In New Jersey — where surging power prices were central to last year’s gubernatorial election — the data center buildout has already produced a flurry of new laws. In its most recent session, the state legislature pared back tax incentives for data centers, required utilities to offer a rate for large electricity users, and required data center operators to publish water and energy data. It also set up a novel program that will let data centers pay to reduce electricity demand elsewhere on the grid, such as by setting up virtual power plants (or paying those who participate in them).
It’s been exciting to see different states — and, to be blunt, to see Democratic-governed states, particularly those in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic — try to take on the data center boom. It’s good to see them test out ideas, solve problems through legislation, and harness this moment for the public good without strangling the buildout entirely. For too long, blue states have leaned into a particular economic model, one in which states want to attract varying forms of development but in fact succeed only in creating new suburbs, office buildings, and warehouses.
Soon after Democrats passed the Inflation Reduction Act, observers noticed that the law’s fruits — and notably its manufacturing investments — were sprouting in red or purple states, particularly in the Southeast and Sun Belt. The so-called Battery Belt bloomed in the Mid-South, for instance, not the Rust Belt. As I discussed with the political scientist Alexander Gazmararian on Heatmap’s podcast Shift Key, that was often due (counterintuitively, I think, for liberals) to a failure of governance: It is GOP-governed states that have the local expertise, institutional capacity, and political muscle memory to attract big new economic development projects.
If Democrats want to see their states do big things — build new housing and transit, decarbonize their power grids, or give birth to new industries — then they will need to develop the same kind of capability. That’s why I’ve so relished seeing blue states reckon with the data center boom. It should be encouraging that New Jersey policymakers, for instance, have to figure out how to manage a new and fast-growing industry on the technological frontier. Even questions that may seem troublesome right now — around land use, for instance, or how to relieve a congested power grid — will likely lead to policies that improve the state.
This kind of policymaking helps the Democratic Party, too. After all, the party’s future national leaders — its members of Congress, cabinet secretaries, and even presidents — are currently serving at the state and local level. The data center boom’s lessons — for good and ill — will resound among the party’s leadership for a long time.
Can she appease AI skeptics, economic development advocates, and renewables boosters?
New York Governor Kathy Hochul tried to pick out a middle way with her data center moratorium, carefully charting a course between the demands of industry, advocacy groups, and voters who are increasingly suspicious of the data center and artificial intelligence industries. Did she succeed? Only time will tell.
Hochul’s first-in-the-nation permitting pause has been hailed by data center opponents who want to re-orient American politics around the artificial intelligence backlash and lamented by the technology sector and its allies, including several in the Trump administration. President Donald Trump himself wrote on Truth Social, “New York State has made a terrible decision.” adding that the “Radical Left Dumocrats must not be allowed to cause us to lose Data Centers, AI, and all of this incredible new Technology, to China.”
Before we discuss what Hochul did, we must first discuss what she didn’t do.
What Hochul’s moratorium is not is her signature on the Responsible Data Center Development Act, a data center moratorium that passed both houses of the state legislature in June. That moratorium had a lower energy use threshold for the moratorium: 20 megawatts, compared to Hochul’s 50 megawatts.
One of that bill’s sponsors, democratic socialist Kristen Gonzalez, appeared alongside Hochul when she signed the executive order Tuesday and hailed the governor for “protecting everyday New Yorkers with a first in the nation moratorium on new large data centers.” When asked about this discrepancy by reporters, Hochul said that “we want to make sure we didn’t touch the data centers that are powering hospitals and schools and research centers,” and specifically mentioned data centers used by “bank back-office operations.”
Protecting bank back-office operations is not typically top of mind for democratic socialists. Gonzalez’s office did not respond to a request for comment.
The goal of the moratorium, Hochul said, is to develop a process for data centers to pay their way in terms of grid costs and electricity rates.
“We expect this process, which we already launched, to be completed within the year,” she said. “Once this policy’s in place, the moratorium will be reviewed and lifted.”
What is still unclear is how this moratorium interacts with renewables development, especially upstate where there is enough open space for both wind and solar power as well as large data centers.
While the New York governor has pulled back on the state’s climate goals as renewable energy and transmission has come under the dual assault of the Trump administration and rising costs, Hochul has made a point of promoting clean power development across the state, especially nuclear and hydropower, which can be built and maintained close to her western New York home base.
A New York data center industry could — emphasis on could — be a major customer for renewable power in the state, especially as there’s little prospect of large-scale new natural gas development.
During her speech announcing the moratorium, Hochul emphasized that “we’ve invested so much in other forms of power to meet the current needs of New Yorkers and our businesses,” and that “New York will require data centers to either produce their own energy or pay a premium to tap into our grid.”
The executive order itself lays out a process whereby, once the moratorium is lifted, new data centers may be required “to fund new clean electric generation and/or battery storage dedicated to their operations, consistent with the State’s clean energy goals, including customer-sited distributed energy resources, to the greatest extent feasible.”
When discussing her energy and economic policies on Bloomberg’s “Odd Lots” podcast this week, Hochul connected her data center moratorium with economic development efforts, especially upstate, where large data centers are more likely to be sited.
Referring to Micron’s $100 billion Syracuse-area semiconductor manufacturing project, Hochul told hosts Joe Weisenthal and Tracy Alloway, “I’ll work with you to get the power you need.” (The state approved a transmission line for the project last year.)
“If I have to choose between powering a largely vacant data center with the same amount of power I can have with a Micron with 1,000 jobs, I can tell you right now where I’m going,” Hochul said. “They can come under the conditions we lay out.”
But it may be just as likely data center developers take the hint and avoid a state with expensive power and high costs of doing business in the best of times.
“I don’t think we know yet how this will impact what’s known as behind-the-meter or off-the-grid power solutions: natural gas, cogeneration, solar, wind, battery storage,” Jeffrey Moerdler, a partner at the law firm Haynes Boone who chairs the data center practice, told me. “I assume it will hold up data centers powered by alternative energy sources.”
As for whether Hochul can successfully keep the one-year moratorium a year (temporary policies have a tendency to become permanent), develop new rules to address her concerns about grid costs and local opposition, and then have data centers line up to get back into New York, Moerdler was skeptical.
“It’s going to take years to make up for that shift” against data center development, he told me, predicting that the moratorium could lead to “many years of new data centers not locating here because they already started during that one-year period somewhere else.”
Something else that must be noted in all of this: “New York is not a high priority location for data centers.” Whether the state’s governor wants it to be remains to be seen.