You’re out of free articles.
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
Sign In or Create an Account.
By continuing, you agree to the Terms of Service and acknowledge our Privacy Policy
Welcome to Heatmap
Thank you for registering with Heatmap. Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our lives, a force reshaping our economy, our politics, and our culture. We hope to be your trusted, friendly, and insightful guide to that transformation. Please enjoy your free articles. You can check your profile here .
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Subscribe to get unlimited Access
Hey, you are out of free articles but you are only a few clicks away from full access. Subscribe below and take advantage of our introductory offer.
subscribe to get Unlimited access
Offer for a Heatmap News Unlimited Access subscription; please note that your subscription will renew automatically unless you cancel prior to renewal. Cancellation takes effect at the end of your current billing period. We will let you know in advance of any price changes. Taxes may apply. Offer terms are subject to change.
Create Your Account
Please Enter Your Password
Forgot your password?
Please enter the email address you use for your account so we can send you a link to reset your password:
The same technology that powers your cell phone also helps expand the reach of renewable energy.

Batteries are the silent workhorses of our technological lives, powering our phones, computers, tablets, and remotes. But their impact goes far beyond our daily screentime — they’re also transforming the electricity grid itself. Grid-scale batteries store excess renewable energy and release it as needed, compensating for the fact that solar and wind resources aren’t always available on demand.
The price of the most ubiquitous battery technology — lithium-ion — has fallen remarkably in the past 15 years. That’s allowed for an enormous buildout of battery storage systems in the U.S. and beyond, which has in turn helped to integrate more renewables onto the grid than ever before. With the assistance of batteries, California ran entirely on clean energy for the equivalent of 51 days last year, while South Australia managed the same for 99 days.
Even as deployment accelerates, startups and other innovators are working to improve on standard lithium-ion tech — or in some cases, supplant it. We’ll get into all that soon, but first, let’s start with a little Battery 101.
All electrochemical batteries — that’s everything from your standard AA to grid-scale lithium-ion systems — work by turning chemical energy into electrical energy through what’s known as an electrochemical reaction. These batteries have three primary components:
Grid batteries charge when there’s excess renewable energy on the grid or when demand for energy is low. When a lithium-ion battery is charging, lithium ions move from the cathode to the anode, where they’re stored. When the battery discharges electricity back to the grid, lithium ions move from the anode to the cathode. This movement triggers the release of electrons at the anode, which move through an external wire that carries power to the grid.
There’s variation within the realm of lithium-ion batteries. For example, some use different cathode chemistries, a solid electrolyte, or a pure lithium metal anode. Within the broader world of electrochemical batteries, there are also a variety of alternate chemistries including sodium-ion, lithium-sulfur, and iron-air (more on those below).
But if one broadens the definition of a battery to include any system that stores energy, that’s when the possibilities really open up. In this sense, a battery could be a pumped hydropower storage system, in which energy is stored by moving water uphill into a reservoir and later releasing it to generate electricity through kinetic energy. A battery could also be energy stored as heat or compressed air. Many of these mechanisms rely on converting stored energy into electricity by turning a turbine or generator.
Batteries help to stabilize the electric grid and help communities and grid operators to take full advantage of their renewable energy resources by providing a reliable power supply when, as the saying goes, the sun isn’t shining and the wind isn’t blowing. New solar or wind plants combined with battery storage can also be highly cost-effective, achieving power prices that are competitive with or lower than those of new natural gas facilities in many cases.
Homes and businesses can also install their own personal battery storage systems to bank energy from rooftop solar panels or directly from the grid. This allows individuals and companies to lower their electricity bills by charging their batteries when grid prices are low and using stored energy when prices are high.
By the end of last year, the installed capacity of utility-scale batteries in the U.S. reached about 26 gigawatts, surpassing the cumulative capacity of pumped hydro for the first time. So while pumped hydro can still store a larger amount of total energy, batteries can now deliver more instantaneous power to the grid than any other energy storage resource. And though that 26 gigawatts represents a mere 2% of the U.S.’s total 1,230 gigawatts of generation capacity, the battery sector is growing rapidly. The International Energy Agency reported in February that planned capacity additions for this year totaled 18.2 gigawatts for the U.S. alone.
Lithium-ion batteries weren’t originally designed for grid-scale energy storage. Rather, they were commercialized in the early 1990s for use in portable consumer electronics such as camcorders, cell phones, and laptops. These batteries proved to be more energy dense, lighter, and longer lasting than their predecessors, and were thus eventually adopted for a whole host of applications, including the growing electric vehicle market in the 2010s.
As electric vehicle production ramped up throughout the decade, manufacturers scaled up their production of lithium-ion batteries, quickly driving down prices — from 2010 to 2020 the cost of battery packs declined nearly 90%. Production became primarily concentrated in East Asia, where companies such as CATL, LG Energy Solution, and Panasonic emerged as dominant players.
As the cheapest and most mature battery tech on the market, lithium-ion thus became the default for grid developers looking to manage the variability of intermittent solar and wind resources. As renewables deployment surged, adding battery storage to these facilities started to become more cost-effective than building new fossil-fuel facilities in some markets and provided a reliable way to regulate the grid’s frequency. Lithium-ion batteries can begin absorbing or delivering power at a moment’s notice, which is integral to keeping the grid balanced.
While lithium-ion batteries have never been a very practical or economical option when it comes to long-duration storage — that is, the ability to dispatch energy for more than about four to eight hours at a time — they are well suited to applications such as storing excess solar produced during the day for use in the evening, or smoothing out the fluctuations in renewable resources throughout the day.
For one, China essentially has a virtual monopoly on the lithium-ion battery industry. The country made EV production a national priority beginning in the 2000s, and by the 2010s it was heavily subsidizing battery and EV manufactures alike. Thus, China came to dominate the supply chain at nearly every level, from raw materials refining to cell manufacturing, anode and cathode production, and battery pack assembly. Ideally, the U.S. would lessen its technological reliance on a nation that it’s long seen as an adversary, but building a domestic lithium-ion battery industry from scratch is an extremely complex and expensive endeavor.
In terms of technical drawbacks, most lithium-ion batteries use a flammable liquid electrolyte. That’s prone to catching fire if a battery component or surrounding equipment fails, if a cell is punctured or simply overheats, as illustrated by the Moss Landing fire in California, which broke out in January at one the world’s largest battery storage facilities. While the energy density of lithium-ion is a main selling point, the flipside is that in a fire, more energy equals more heat. And since grid-scale systems pack battery cells close together, a fire in one cell can spread quickly across an entire facility.
Finally, in terms of cost, there’s only so far lithium-ion batteries can fall due to the expense of the raw materials. The price of lithium itself has been notoriously volatile. After hitting record highs in 2022, the commodity price subsequently collapsed after a wave of new mining projects oversupplied the market. This type of volatility wreaks havoc for battery storage developers and their balance sheets, thus spurring interest in chemistries that offer lower, more stable costs, as well as technologies with potentially superior cycle life, energy density, discharge times, and safety profiles.
The most widely commercialized spin on conventional lithium-ion batteries, which are traditionally made with an NMC cathode, is a variant known as lithium iron phosphate, or LFP. The iron-phosphate bond in a LFP cathode is very strong, making it more thermally stable than those in NMC batteries. LFP materials are also more structurally durable than nickel and cobalt, meaning these batteries can be charged and discharged more times before wearing out. Finally, LFPs are also cheaper and more sustainable, as the cathode materials are plentiful and less environmentally damaging to mine. LFP’s main drawback is its lower energy density, but its many advantages have enabled it to overtake NMC as the leading chemistry for new battery energy storage systems.
All the other competitors have much lower levels of commercial maturity. But on the plus side, this means there’s an opportunity to build out domestic supply chains for them. Sodium-ion batteries, for example, replace lithium with sodium, which is far more abundant. They’re also more thermally stable. Unfortunately for U.S. manufacturers, China is already surging ahead in the race to scale up this tech. Then there’s the more nascent lithium-sulfur batteries. They have a very high theoretical energy density, which could lead to lighter and more compact energy storage systems if companies can overcome core technical challenges such as short cycle life.
Flow batteries are also an option that’s been studied for decades. These store energy in liquid electrolytes held in external tanks rather than in solid electrodes. This presents a promising option for longer-duration energy storage since the design can be scaled easily — more energy simply means bigger tanks. Because the active materials are liquid, these batteries also have a very long cycle life, and their water-based designs are non-flammable. Flow batteries are also much bulkier, however, and haven’t yet scaled enough to become cost-competitive with lithium-ion under most circumstances.
Getting into the realm of long-duration storage also opens up possibilities such as iron-air batteries, which are being commercialized by the Massachusetts-based Form Energy. In theory, these can discharge for 100-plus hours by taking in oxygen from the air and reacting it with iron to form rust, releasing electrons in the process. When the battery is charging, an electrical current converts the rust back into iron. Because iron is cheap and plentiful, this tech could also be significantly less expensive than LFP batteries. And since it uses a water-based electrolyte, these batteries aren’t flammable. The first iron-air battery plant is set to come online at the end of the year.
Beyond the electrochemical domain, there’s a wider, weirder world of energy storage technologies, many of which are being explored for their long-duration storage potential. Pumped hydro can only be built only in very specific geographies, so it’s not a main competitor in many regions today. But gravity-based storage companies such as Energy Vault often take inspiration from this approach, storing energy by using excess electricity to raise heavy objects such as concrete blocks. When energy is needed, the blocks are lowered, causing the motors that lifted them to run in reverse and act as generators to produce electricity.
Canadian company Hydrostor is pursuing another method, which involves using surplus energy to compress air and pump it into a water-filled cavern, displacing the water to the surface. To discharge, water is released back into the cavern, pushing the air to the surface, where it mixes with stored heat to turn an electricity-generating turbine.
Then there’s thermal energy storage — essentially storing energy as heat in materials such as carbon blocks. This method has the potential to decarbonize industrial processes such as steel and cement production, which demand high temperatures that are difficult to achieve with electricity. Via resistance heating — the same technology as a toaster — electricity from renewable energy is converted into heat, which is then stored in thermally conductive rocks or bricks. When that heat is needed, it can be delivered directly as hot air or steam to the facility, or in some cases converted back into electricity for use at the facility or on the grid.
Experts say that none of the aforementioned technologies is likely to fully replace lithium-ion anytime soon. That’s in large part because lithium-ion is a fully mature technology with well-established supply chains, but also because it’s simply efficient and cost effective for what it can do.
Many of the technologies mentioned could, however, become effective complements to lithium-ion on the grid. For example, it’s possible that some combination of iron-air batteries, gravity energy storage, and compressed air energy storage could meet longer-duration needs — in some cases discharging continuously for days at a time. Thermal energy storage could also play a role here, as well as in decarbonizing high-heat heavy industries, which don’t make economic sense to electrify with lithium-ion batteries.
Sodium-ion batteries could eventually become cheaper than LFP, but because the tech has yet to scale and reach that price point, it’s still primarily viewed as a complementary solution. Having other viable battery chemistries such as sodium-ion would help reduce the overall demand for lithium, thus working to stabilize prices and risk in the battery supply chain as a whole. But because sodium-ion is less energy dense, it probably won’t make sense in space-constrained regions.
As for lithium-sulfur, the tech is just beginning to hit the market as companies such as Lyten focus on early applications in drones, satellites, and two- and three-wheelers. But it doesn’t yet have the cycle life to make sense for any grid-scale applications, and whether it will ever get there has yet to be discovered.
Yes, but battery recycling — especially for battery energy storage systems — is still a nascent industry. And it remains uncertain whether recycling and reusing battery materials is financially viable in an environment where lithium prices have plummeted and other key battery minerals such as nickel, cobalt, and graphite have become significantly cheaper. LFP’s cost efficiency improvements have further depressed interest in recycling their materials. But there’s still interest in this sector as it could help establish a domestic mineral supply chain, greatly reduce the need for environmentally disruptive mining projects, and ameliorate problems such as toxic chemical leaching and fire risk, which can occur when batteries are improperly disposed of.
Because grid-scale battery deployments didn’t begin to ramp in earnest until 2019, most systems have yet to reach the end of their useful life, which can last on the order of 10 to 20 years. As such, most leading battery recyclers — such as the well-funded startup Redwood Materials — are primarily focused on old EV batteries for now. Redwood says it can recover, on average, over 95% of battery materials such as lithium, nickel, cobalt, copper, aluminum, and graphite. Recently, the company has also been working to repurpose old EV batteries with some life left in them to make grid-scale battery storage systems, and it’s made forays into recycling grid batteries as well.
One of the industry’s former leaders, Li-Cycle, filed for bankruptcy in May, while another player, Ascend Elements, has paused construction on its recycling facility in Kentucky due to “changing market conditions.” As the U.S. seeks to develop a more localized battery supply chain, however, recycling will only become more critical.
It’s a mixed bag. On the one hand, President Trump’s steep tariffs on Chinese goods are set to substantially increase prices for domestic battery energy storage systems, given that the U.S. imports nearly all of its battery cells from China. This will threaten developers’ margins, potentially leading to project cancellations or delays.
Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill maintained tax credits for battery energy storage projects through 2032, however stringent foreign sourcing rules now apply, withholding tax credits from projects that source a certain percentage of their components from Russia, Iran, North Korea, and most importantly, China. Given how China-centric the battery supply chain is, achieving the required sourcing levels could prove difficult, though exactly how difficult ultimately depends on forthcoming guidance from the Treasury department.
On the bright side, the administration is also bullish on bolstering the U.S. supply chain for critical minerals and rare earths. In a recent meeting, White House officials told a group of critical minerals firms that they would guarantee a price floor for their products. Such a policy could, of course, bolster the domestic battery supply chain, though at the risk of making this tech more expensive.
Assuming the U.S. navigates the current political headwinds and maintains a degree of momentum in its transition to clean energy, battery energy storage will play an increasingly critical role on the future grid, both domestically and globally. As electricity demand grows and renewables make up a progressively larger proportion of the mix, batteries will help ensure grid flexibility and resiliency. That will be increasingly important as extreme weather events become more common and severe.
In some markets, solar plus storage facilities have been more economical than so-called fossil fuel “peaker plants” for years. Peakers fire up during times of maximum electricity demand, and as batteries continue to fall in price, stored renewable power becomes an ever-cheaper way to supplement supply. As long-duration storage tech advances and comes down the cost curve, renewables will be able to provide firm baseload power over a period of days or even weeks, making fossil fuel infrastructure increasingly obsolete.
The International Energy Agency reports that in order to reach net zero emissions by 2050, global grid-scale battery storage needs to expand to nearly 970 gigawatts of capacity by 2030. That means annual grid-scale deployments must average about 120 gigawatts per year from 2023 to 2030. So while last year saw a record-setting 55 gigawatts of newly installed grid-scale capacity, that type of hockey-stick growth will need to accelerate even further if batteries are to pull their weight in the IEA’s net zero scenario.
Log in
To continue reading, log in to your account.
Create a Free Account
To unlock more free articles, please create a free account.
Microsoft dominated this year.
It’s been a quiet year for carbon dioxide removal, the nascent industry trying to lower the concentration of carbon already trapped in the atmosphere.
After a stretch as the hottest thing in climate tech, the CDR hype cycle has died down. 2025 saw fewer investments and fewer big projects or new companies announced.
This story isn’t immediately apparent if you look at the sales data for carbon removal credits, which paints 2025 as a year of breakout growth. CDR companies sold nearly 30 million tons of carbon removal, according to the leading industry database, CDR.fyi — more than three times the amount sold in 2024. But that topline number hides a more troubling reality — about 90% of those credits were bought by a single company: Microsoft.
If you exclude Microsoft, the total volume of carbon removal purchased this year actually declined by about 100,000 tons. This buyer concentration is the continuation of a trend CDR.fyi observed in its 2024 Year In Review report, although non-Microsoft sales had grown a bit that year compared to 2023.
Trump’s crusade against climate action has likely played a role in the market stasis of this year. Under the Biden administration, federal investment in carbon removal research, development, and deployment grew to new heights. Biden’s Securities and Exchange Commission was also getting ready to require large companies to disclose their greenhouse gas emissions and climate targets, a move that many expected to increase demand for carbon credits. But Trump’s SEC scrapped the rule, and his agency heads have canceled most of the planned investments. (At the time of publication, the two direct air capture projects that Biden’s Department of Energy selected to receive up to $1.2 billion have not yet had their contracts officially terminated, despite both showing up on a leaked list of DOE grant cancellations in October.)
Trump’s overall posture on climate change reduced pressure on companies to act, which probably contributed to there being fewer new buyers entering the carbon removal market, Robert Hoglund, a carbon removal advisor who co-founded CDR.fyi, told me. “I heard several companies say that, yeah, we wouldn't have been able to do this commitment this year. We're glad that we made it several years ago,” he told me.
Kyle Harrison, a carbon markets analyst at BloombergNEF, told me he didn’t view Microsoft’s dominance in the market as a bad sign. In the early days of corporate wind and solar energy contracts, he said, Microsoft, Google, and Amazon were the only ones signing deals, which raised similar questions about the sustainability of the market. “But what it did is it created a blueprint for how you sign these deals and make these nascent technologies more financeable, and then it brings down the cost, and then all of a sudden, you start to get a second generation of companies that start to sign these deals.”
Harrison expects the market to see slower growth in the coming years until either carbon removal companies are able to bring down costs or a more reliable regulatory signal puts pressure on buyers.
Governments in Europe and the United Kingdom introduced a few weak-ish signals this year. The European Union continued to advance a government certification program for carbon removal and expects to finalize methodologies for several CDR methods in 2026. That government stamp of approval may give potential buyers more confidence in the market.
The EU also announced plans to set up a carbon removal “buyers’ club” next year to spur more demand for CDR by pooling and coordinating procurement, although the proposal is light on detail. There were similar developments in the United Kingdom, which announced a new “contract for differences” policy through which the government would finance early-stage direct air capture and bioenergy with carbon capture projects.
A stronger signal, though, could eventually come from places with mandatory emissions cap and trade policies, such as California, Japan, China, the European Union, or the United Kingdom. California already allows companies to use carbon removal credits for compliance with its cap and invest program. The U.K. plans to begin integrating CDR into its scheme in 2029, and the EU and Japan are considering when and how to do the same.
Giana Amador, the executive director of the U.S.-based Carbon Removal Alliance, told me these demand pulls were extremely important. “It tells investors, if you invest in this today, in 10 years, companies will be able to access those markets,” she said.
At the same time, carbon removal companies are not going to be competitive in any of these markets until carbon trades at a substantially higher price, or until companies can make carbon removal less expensive. “We need to both figure out how we can drive down the cost of carbon removal and how to make these carbon removal solutions more effective, and really kind of hone the technology. Those are what is going to unlock demand in the future,” she said.
There’s certainly some progress being made on that front. This year saw more real-world deployments and field tests. Whereas a few years ago, the state of knowledge about various carbon removal methods was based on academic studies of modeling exercises or lab experiments, now there’s starting to be a lot more real-world data. “For me, that is the most important thing that we have seen — continued learning,” Hoglund said.
There’s also been a lot more international interest in the sector. “It feels like there’s this global competition building about what country will be the leader in the industry,” Ben Rubin, the executive director of the Carbon Business Council, told me.
There’s another somewhat deceptive trend in the year’s carbon removal data: The market also appeared to be highly concentrated within one carbon removal method — 75% of Microsoft’s purchases, and 70% of the total sales tracked by CDR.fyi, were credits for bioenergy with carbon capture, where biomass is burned for energy and the resulting emissions are captured and stored. Despite making up the largest volume of credits, however, these were actually just a rare few deals. “It’s the least common method,” Hoglund said.
Companies reported delivering about 450,000 tons of carbon removal this year, according to CDR.fyi’s data, bringing the cumulative total to over 1 million tons to date. Some 80% of the total came from biochar projects, but the remaining deliveries run the gamut of carbon removal methods, including ocean-based techniques and enhanced rock weathering.
Amador predicted that in the near-term, we may see increased buying from the tech sector, as the growth of artificial intelligence and power-hungry data centers sets those companies’ further back on their climate commitments. She’s also optimistic about a growing trend of exploring “industrial integrations” — basically incorporating carbon removal into existing industrial processes such as municipal waste management, agricultural operations, wastewater treatment, mining, and pulp and paper factories. “I think that's something that we'll see a spotlight on next year,” she said.
Another place that may help unlock demand is the Science Based Targets initiative, a nonprofit that develops voluntary standards for corporate climate action. The group has been in the process of revising its Net-Zero Standard, which will give companies more direction about what role carbon removal should play in their sustainability strategies.
The question is whether any of these policy developments will come soon enough or be significant enough to sustain this capital-intensive, immature industry long enough for it to prove its utility. Investment in the industry has been predicated on the idea that demand for carbon removal will grow, Hoglund told me. If growth continues at the pace we saw this year, it’s going to get a lot harder for startups to raise their series B or C.
“When you can't raise that, and you haven't sold enough to keep yourself afloat, then you go out of business,” he said. “I would expect quite a few companies to go out of business in 2026.”
Hoglund was quick to qualify his dire prediction, however, adding that these were normal growing pains for any industry and shouldn’t be viewed as a sign of failure. “It could be interpreted that way, and the vibe may shift, especially if you see a lot of the prolific companies come down,” he said. “But it’s natural. I think that’s something we should be prepared for and not panic about.”
America runs on natural gas.
That’s not an exaggeration. Almost half of home heating is done with natural gas, and around 40% — the plurality — of our electricity is generated with natural gas. Data center developers are pouring billions into natural gas power plants built on-site to feed their need for computational power. In its -260 degree Fahrenheit liquid form, the gas has attracted tens of billions of dollars in investments to export it abroad.
The energy and climate landscape in the United States going into 2026 — and for a long time afterward — will be largely determined by the forces pushing and pulling on natural gas. Those could lead to higher or more volatile prices for electricity and home heating, and even possibly to structural changes in the electricity market.
But first, the weather.
“Heating demand is still the main way gas is used in the U.S.,” longtime natural gas analyst Amber McCullagh explained to me. That makes cold weather — experienced and expected — the main driver of natural gas prices, even with new price pressures from electricity demand.
New sources of demand don’t help, however. While estimates for data center construction are highly speculative, East Daily Analytics figures cited by trade publication Natural Gas Intel puts a ballpark figure of new data center gas demand at 2.5 billion cubic feet per day by the end of next year, compared to 0.8 billion cubic feet per day for the end of this year. By 2030, new demand from data centers could add up to over 6 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas demand, East Daley Analytics projects. That’s roughly in line with the total annual gas production of the Eagle Ford Shale in southwest Texas.
Then there are exports. The U.S. Energy Information Administration expects outbound liquified natural gas shipments to rise to 14.9 billion cubic feet per day this year, and to 16.3 billion cubic feet in 2026. In 2024, by contrast, exports were just under 12 billion cubic feet per day.
“Even as we’ve added demand for data centers, we’re getting close to 20 billion per day of LNG exports,” McCullagh said, putting more pressure on natural gas prices.
That’s had a predictable effect on domestic gas prices. Already, the Henry Hub natural gas benchmark price has risen to above $5 per million British thermal units earlier this month before falling to $3.90, compared to under $3.50 at the end of last year. By contrast, LNG export prices, according to the most recent EIA data, are at around $7 per million BTUs.
This yawning gap between benchmark domestic prices and export prices is precisely why so many billions of dollars are being poured into LNG export capacity — and why some have long been wary of it, including Democratic politicians in the Northeast, which is chronically short of natural gas due to insufficient pipeline infrastructure. A group of progressive Democrats in Congress wrote a letter to Secretary of Energy Chris Wright earlier this year opposing additional licenses for LNG exports, arguing that “LNG exports lead to higher energy prices for both American families and businesses.”
Industry observers agree — or at least agree that LNG exports are likely to pull up domestic prices. “Henry Hub is clearly bullish right now until U.S. gas production catches up,” Ira Joseph, a senior research associate at the Center for Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, told me. “We’re definitely heading towards convergence” between domestic and global natural gas prices.
But while higher natural gas prices may seem like an obvious boon to renewables, the actual effect may be more ambiguous. The EIA expects the Henry Hub benchmark to average $4 per million BTUs for 2026. That’s nothing like the $9 the benchmark hit in August 2022, the result of post-COVID economic restart, supply tightness, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Still, a tighter natural gas market could mean a more volatile electricity and energy sector in 2026. The United States is basically unique globally in having both large-scale domestic production of coal and natural gas that allows its electricity generation to switch between them. When natural gas prices go up, coal burning becomes more economically attractive.
Add to that, the EIA forecasts that electricity generation will have grown 2.4% by the end of 2025, and will grow another 1.7% in 2026, “in contrast to relatively flat generation from 2010 to 2020. That is “primarily driven by increasing demand from large customers, including data centers,” the agency says.
This is the load growth story. With the help of the Trump administration, it’s turning into a coal growth story, too.
Already several coal plants have extended out their retirement dates, either to maintain reliability on local grids or because the Trump administration ordered them to. In America’s largest electricity market, PJM Interconnection, where about a fifth of the installed capacity is coal, diversified energy company Alliance Resource Partners expects 4% to 6% demand growth, meaning it might even be able to increase coal production. Coal consumption has jumped 16% in PJM in the first nine months of 2025, the company’s Chairman Joseph Kraft told analysts.
“The domestic thermal coal market is continuing to experience strong fundamentals, supported by an unprecedented combination of federal energy and environmental policy support plus rapid demand growth,” Kraft said in a statement accompanying the company’s October third quarter earnings report. He pointed specifically to “natural gas pricing dynamics” and “the dramatic load growth required by artificial intelligence.”
Observers are also taking notice. “The key driver for coal prices remains strong natural gas prices,” industry newsletter The Coal Trader wrote.
In its December short term outlook, the EIA said that it expects “coal consumption to increase by 9% in 2025, driven by an 11% increase in coal consumption in the electric power sector this year as both natural gas costs and electricity demand increased,” while falling slightly in 2026 (compared to 2025), leaving coal consumption sill above 2024 levels.
“2025 coal generation will have increased for the first time since the last time gas prices spiked,” McCullagh told me.
Assuming all this comes to pass, the U.S.’s total carbon dioxide emissions will have essentially flattened out at around 4.8 million metric tons. The ultimate cost of higher natural gas prices will likely be felt far beyond the borders of the United States and far past 2026.
Lawmakers today should study the Energy Security Act of 1980.
The past few years have seen wild, rapid swings in energy policy in the United States, from President Biden’s enthusiastic embrace of clean energy to President Trump’s equally enthusiastic re-embrace of fossil fuels.
Where energy industrial policy goes next is less certain than any other moment in recent memory. Regardless of the direction, however, we will need creative and effective policy tools to secure our energy future — especially for those of us who wish to see a cleaner, greener energy system. To meet the moment, we can draw inspiration from a largely forgotten piece of energy industrial policy history: the Energy Security Act of 1980.
After a decade of oil shocks and energy crises spanning three presidencies, President Carter called for — and Congress passed — a new law that would “mobilize American determination and ability to win the energy war.” To meet that challenge, lawmakers declared their intent “to utilize to the fullest extent the constitutional powers of the Congress” to reduce the nation’s dependence on imported oil and shield the economy from future supply shocks. Forty-five years later, that brief moment of determined national mobilization may hold valuable lessons for the next stage of our energy industrial policy.
The 1970s were a decade of energy volatility for Americans, with spiking prices and gasoline shortages, as Middle Eastern fossil fuel-producing countries wielded the “oil weapon” to throttle supply. In his 1979 “Crisis of Confidence” address to the nation, Carter warned that America faced a “clear and present danger” from its reliance on foreign oil and urged domestic producers to mobilize new energy sources, akin to the way industry responded to World War II by building up a domestic synthetic rubber industry.
To develop energy alternatives, Congress passed the Energy Security Act, which created a new government-run corporation dedicated to investing in alternative fuels projects, a solar bank, and programs to promote geothermal, biomass, and renewable energy sources. The law also authorized the president to create a system of five-year national energy targets and ordered one of the federal government’s first studies on the impacts of greenhouse gases from fossil fuels.
Carter saw the ESA as the beginning of an historic national mission. “[T]he Energy Security Act will launch this decade with the greatest outpouring of capital investment, technology, manpower, and resources since the space program,” he said at the signing. “Its scope, in fact, is so great that it will dwarf the combined efforts expended to put Americans on the Moon and to build the entire Interstate Highway System of our country.” The ESA was a recognition that, in a moment of crisis, the federal government could revive the tools it once used in wartime to meet an urgent civilian challenge.
In its pursuit of energy security, the Act deployed several remarkable industrial policy tools, with the Synthetic Fuels Corporation as the centerpiece. The corporation was a government-run investment bank chartered to finance — and in some cases, directly undertake — alternative fuels projects, including those derived from coal, shale, and oil.. Regardless of the desirability or feasibility of synthetic fuels, the SFC as an institution illustrates the type of extraordinary authority Congress was once willing to deploy to address energy security and stand up an entirely new industry. It operated outside of federal agencies, unencumbered by the normal bureaucracy and restrictions that apply to government.
Along with everything else created by the ESA, the Sustainable Fuels Corporation was also financed by a windfall profits tax assessed on oil companies, essentially redistributing income from big oil toward its nascent competition. Both the law and the corporation had huge bipartisan support, to the tune of 317 votes for the ESA in the House compared to 93 against, and 78 to 12 in the Senate.
The Synthetic Fuels Corporation was meant to be a public catalyst where private investment was unlikely to materialize on its own. Investors feared that oil prices could fall, or that OPEC might deliberately flood the market to undercut synthetic fuels before they ever reached scale. Synthetic fuel projects were also technically complex, capital-intensive undertakings, with each plant costing several billion dollars, requiring up to a decade to plan and build.
To address this, Congress equipped the corporation with an unusually broad set of tools. The corporation could offer loans, loan guarantees, price guarantees, purchase agreements, and even enter joint ventures — forms of support meant to make first-of-a-kind projects bankable. It could assemble financing packages that traditional lenders viewed as too risky. And while the corporation was being stood up, the president was temporarily authorized to use Defense Production Act powers to initiate early synthetic fuel projects. Taken together, these authorities amounted to a federal attempt to build an entirely new energy industry.
While the ESA gave the private sector the first shot at creating a synthetic fuels industry, it also created opportunities for the federal government to invest. The law authorized the Synthetic Fuels Corporation to undertake and retain ownership over synthetic fuels construction projects if private investment was insufficient to meet production targets. The SFC was also allowed to impose conditions on loans and financial assistance to private developers that gave it a share of project profits and intellectual property rights arising out of federally-funded projects. Congress was not willing to let the national imperative of energy security rise or fall on the whims of the market, nor to let the private sector reap publicly-funded windfalls.
Employing logic that will be familiar to many today, Carter was particularly concerned that alternative fuel sources would be unduly delayed by permitting rules and proposed an Energy Mobilization Board to streamline the review process for energy projects. Congress ultimately refused to create it, worried it would trample state authority and environmental protections. But the impulse survived elsewhere. At a time when the National Environmental Policy Act was barely 10 years old and had become the central mechanism for scrutinizing major federal actions, Congress provided an exemption for all projects financed by the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, although other technologies supported in the law — like geothermal energy — were still required to go through NEPA review. The contrast is revealing — a reminder that when lawmakers see an energy technology as strategically essential, they have been willing not only to fund it but also to redesign the permitting system around it.
Another forgotten feature of the corporation is how far Congress went to ensure it could actually hire top tier talent. Lawmakers concluded that the federal government’s standard pay scales were too low and too rigid for the kind of financial, engineering, and project development expertise the Synthetic Fuels Corporation needed. So it gave the corporation unusual salary flexibility, allowing it to pay above normal civil service rates to attract people with the skills to evaluate multibillion dollar industrial projects. In today’s debates about whether federal agencies have the capacity to manage complex clean energy investments, this detail is striking. Congress once knew that ambitious industrial policy requires not just money, but people who understand how deals get done.
But the Energy Security Act never had the chance to mature. The corporation was still getting off the ground when Carter lost the 1980 election to Ronald Reagan. Reagan’s advisers viewed the project as a distortion of free enterprise — precisely the kind of government intervention they believed had fueled the broader malaise of the 1970s. While Reagan had campaigned on abolishing the Department of Energy, the corporation proved an easier and more symbolic target. His administration hollowed it out, leaving it an empty shell until Congress defunded it entirely in 1986.
At the same time, the crisis atmosphere that had justified the Energy Security Act began to wane. Oil prices fell nearly 60% during Reagan’s first five years, and with them the political urgency behind alternative fuels. Drained of its economic rationale, the synthetic fuels industry collapsed before it ever had a chance to prove whether it could succeed under more favorable conditions. What had looked like a wartime mobilization suddenly appeared to many lawmakers to be an expensive overreaction to a crisis that had passed.
Yet the ESA’s legacy is more than an artifact of a bygone moment. It offers at least three lessons that remain strikingly relevant today:
As we now scramble to make up for lost time, today’s clean energy push requires institutions that can survive electoral swings. Nearly half a century after the ESA, we must find our way back to that type of institutional imagination to meet the energy challenges we still face.