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Petrostates are also big cleantech investors.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has already propagated across the global energy and climate ecosystem in countless ways. To name just a few, there’s skyrocketing gasoline prices, a coal comeback, tailwinds for U.S. liquified natural gas, and aluminum price spikes that raise costs for solar panels.
But if you continue to follow the money, you could start to see repercussions for emergent climate technologies, too — think electric mobility, clean hydrogen, alternative fuels, carbon removal, and carbon capture.
Billions of dollars from Gulf states — including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar — flow into climate tech every year via sovereign wealth funds and the investment arms of regional oil and gas giants such as Saudi Aramco and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company. With attacks on energy infrastructure causing extensive damage and millions of barrels of oil — the region’s largest export — and other petrochemical products now stranded in the Gulf due to the strait’s effective closure, fossil fuel revenues are falling across much of the region, even as commodity prices spike. The longer this status quo remains, the greater the threat could be to these countries’ ability to disburse climate tech capital.
This could have significant repercussions for decarbonization startups, Johanna Wolfson, co-founder of the early-stage climate tech investment firm Azolla Ventures, told me. Outside of the U.S. government’s current favored technologies — data centers, nuclear, geothermal, and critical minerals — “there’s increasingly scarce early-stage risk-embracing venture dollars,” she said. That’s a gap that strategic investors such as oil and gas-backed investment vehicles typically help fill, as many of them “have patient long term capital, or at least a different way of evaluating business outcomes or ROI than a typical venture investor would.”
Now, Wolfson said, she wouldn’t be surprised to see regional investors pulling back on some of these more forward-looking initiatives.
The ecosystem linking climate capital with Gulf money has grown increasingly tangled over the years, especially since COP28 in Dubai. There, the United Arab Emirates launched Altérra, a climate focused investment fund that’s since deployed $6.5 billion to anchor multi-billion dollar climate funds from Brookfield Asset Management, Blackrock and TPG Rise Climate. The specific companies and projects these institutional giants have gone on to back, however, remain largely undisclosed. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabian pension fund Hassana has also invested $1.5 billion in TPG Rise Climate.
Following the money is unsurprisingly easier for venture investing. Aramco Ventures, the oil giant’s VC arm, led the seed round for direct air capture company Spiritus, while also backing big names such as long-duration battery startup Form Energy, green steel developer Boston Metal, and thermal energy storage company Rondo Energy.
As for the region’s primary investment vehicle — sovereign wealth funds that manage surplus capital largely derived from oil and gas revenues — their capital flows are also often obfuscated. When they invest as limited partners their names are typically kept private, and they frequently funnel money through subsidiaries operating under different monikers.
Some big name deals have broken through, though. The Saudis, for example, have been enthusiastic backers of electric vehicles. The Public Investment Fund took a roughly $2 billion stake in Tesla back in 2018, and owns a majority share in luxury EV-maker Lucid Motors, which plans to start manufacturing vehicles in the kingdom by year’s end. Abu Dhabi Investment Authority funded utility-scale solar company Arevon, another Abu Dhabi-based fund, Mubadala, backs the offshore wind company Skyborn Renewables, and the Qatar Investment Authority co-led the Series D round for EV battery producer Ascend Elements.
“There’s a good reason that Saudi and other sovereign wealth funds are investing in these technologies and these startups,” Daan Walter, principal at the clean energy think tank Ember, told me. “It’s a really good hedge for their own oil business, and many U.S. banks are highly exposed to fossil fuels.”
That doesn’t mean these investments will remain attractive if Gulf states’ oil revenues continue to suffer, however. “Those looking to raise capital in the region should probably allow for some slow responses for a while,” Paul O’Brien, the former deputy chief investment officer at the sovereign wealth fund Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, told ImpactAlpha. That said, he figures that “deal flow should resume soon after the Strait of Hormuz opens.”
Restarting regional clean energy projects may prove more challenging. Wolfson told me the war is already affecting some companies in Azolla’s portfolio that are evaluating pilot opportunities in the Gulf, a region marked by both unique climate risks and a willingness to embrace early-stage tech. “We definitely are seeing a pause on those activities, understandably” she told me. “When this is going on in one’s backyard, you need to pause things that are not critical.”
What’s certain, Francis O’Sullivan, a managing director at the firm S2G Investments, told me, is that even once the strait opens back up, “this is not a switch it back on and everything is fine kind of dynamic.” Since the conflict broke out, many Gulf producers have been forced to cut oil production as their storage tanks fill up. Once hostilities subside, oil wells and refineries could still take weeks to ramp up to prior levels. Then it might be a matter of months before the backlog of fuel, food, and other materials clears the strait and shipping supply chains return to normal. The energy infrastructure that’s been damaged — such as the Ras Laffan LNG terminal in Qatar — could take years and billions of dollars to rebuild.
Restoring business as usual could draw the Gulf’s sovereign wealth funds away from their core climate-related priorities like green hydrogen, clean fuels, and carbon capture. Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund, for example, could abandon its stated target of investing over $10 billion in green projects by year’s end. The kingdom has ambitious aims to generate 50% of its electricity from renewables by 2030, and has previously declared its intention to become the planet’s largest hydrogen supplier by 2030 as well as to develop one of the world’s largest carbon capture, utilization, and storage facilities by 2035. These hydrogen and CCUS goals were absent from the country’s latest national development plan released in April of last year, however, indicating that enthusiasm was perhaps already waning.
Walter isn’t surprised. In his view, the climate tech priorities of oil-rich Gulf states tend to favor industries that preserve the existing energy order, and their commitments may not be deeply held. After all, carbon capture helps clean up fossil fuels, while hydrogen for transport and heavy industry can complement rather than replace oil. “I’ve always seen that more as a way to keep the status quo running and argue, we’ll fix this in the future,” he told me. “I’m sure those projects will be scrapped first.”
Sure enough, blue hydrogen production, which pairs fossil-fuel derived hydrogen with carbon capture and storage, is becoming increasingly uncertain amid low investor demand. Saudi Aramco has scaled back its target from 11 million to 2.5 million annual metric tons while ADNOC has indefinitely postponed one of its blue hydrogen projects. And while Saudi Arabia is also attempting to build the world’s largest green hydrogen project to help supplement its oil exports, this too has been struggling to secure international buyers.
Perhaps it goes without saying that the Iran war will do little to buoy the financial fortunes of overly ambitious mega-projects and industries already grappling with limited demand. But even if the Gulf-to-climate tech funding pipelines remain disrupted and attention shifts to urgent regional priorities like rebuilding damaged infrastructure, the reality remains: Deploying renewables and battery storage is often the most reliable — and cost-effective — way for nations to secure their energy supply and shield themselves from future fossil fuel price shocks.
Since the last major energy price spike following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, costs for solar panels and battery systems have continued to fall — with panels roughly halving in price and battery systems dropping by about 36%, according to Ember. “This is the first oil shock where there is a superior alternative.” Walter told me. And the first “that doesn’t require countries to intervene.” He expects that when left to their own devices, consumers will make economically rational choices, leading to a significant uptick in adoption of rooftop solar, home batteries, EVs, and heat pumps — particularly in emerging economies outside the U.S. and Europe, where tariffs on Chinese clean tech don’t exist.
When it comes to tech that has yet to be commercialized, such as clean fuels, long-duration energy storage, and carbon capture and removal, Walter is counting on governments to step in where hobbled Gulf investors may no longer be able to. “There’s a wishful thinking component to it, which is that surely governments realize that this is the solution,” he told me. And yet he believes they truly are beginning to see the light, as the importance of energy security becomes more apparent by the day.
“Surely they realize that you cannot now throw the startups in the space by the wayside because they really, really need the support,” he told me. “I hope that governments across the West are prescient enough to realize that someone else needs to step in to bridge the gap for the coming years.”
Editor’s note: This story has been updated to clarify the context of Johanna Wolfson’s remarks.
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The data center boom is everywhere you look in U.S. economic and emissions data.
This is an edition of Heatmap Daily, an evening review of the day’s news written by our executive editor. Sign up for it here.
It isn’t exactly a new thought, but I’ve been struck recently by how many trends in America’s economic and environmental data are fundamentally about the data center boom and the return of electricity demand:
First, the Energy Information Administration reported this week that U.S. emissions grew by more than 2% last year, driven by surging electricity demand and an increase in coal-fired generation.What caused that higher power demand? New factories and data centers — as well as record summertime cooling demand.
Second, many of the new factories driving that higher power demand are themselves producing goods that are … let’s say … data center-adjacent. There are the enormous new semiconductor fabs, of course. But Ford and General Motors have also set up new production lines (or repurposed old ones) to manufacture grid-scale batteries to meet power demand.
Third, take a look at the recent U.S. spending on private non-residential construction — in other words, everything American companies are building that is not houses, condos, or apartments.
The construction industry’s spent almost $60 billion on data centers over the past year, which is more than it spent on all other office buildings combined (and more than it spent building warehouses, too). Just a handful of categories — data centers, power plants, electricity infrastructure, and certain kinds of electronics manufacturing — now make up a third of all U.S. private non-residential construction investment. They’ve never made up such a large share of construction spending since data collection began in 2014.
As The New York Times recently noted, the American economy is unusually dependent on the American stock market right now — and the stock market is unusually dependent on artificial intelligence. This week, investors started to balk at the enormous spending hyperscalers are planning to keep building out the AI boom; Alphabet’s shares dropped 8% this week after it boosted its planned 2026 capital expenditure and signaled 2027 will be even bigger. If the data center boom started to slow down in earnest, then more than just that budget will change.
Speaking of which, my colleague Emily Pontecorvo wrote earlier this week about how many businesses are struggling to even estimate their carbon emissions from artificial intelligence. The carbon accounting startup Watershed recently unveiled a new formula to help companies get a sense of their AI-related emissions.
But even that formula is still limited by the amount of data hyperscalers publish — and they don’t publish that much. Google, for instance, is the only AI company that has (laudably) provided estimates of its emissions on a per-prompt basis. Yet no company has published its per-token emissions, or how emissions sync up with particular models or regions.
So Emily asked Google: Why aren’t you — or any other model provider — disclosing this kind of data yet?
The tech company didn’t get back to us until after we’d published Emily’s story. But its response was interesting enough that I wanted to quote some of it here.
The problem is “industry consensus,” Cooper Elsworth, a Google spokesperson, told us. “There is currently very little consensus on how to comprehensively and fairly measure the serving environmental impact of generative AI (such as text generation),” he wrote. “Without standardized, ‘apples-to-apples’ frameworks, it is difficult to compare different providers accurately.”
That’s partly because energy use — and emissions data — can vary from site to site and depend on “custom-built hardware, software compilers, and advanced inference techniques.” And he claimed Google doesn’t always have the measurement hardware in place to provide such specific estimates: “Providing precise, repeatable data requires highly advanced measurement infrastructure,” he said. “For example, software-based energy monitoring tools often suffer from sampling biases. For our study, we had to step away from top-down averages and directly measure actual energy at the physical power supply unit (PSU) level across our deployed fleet. Not all providers have the telemetry or data sets required to benchmark their operations at this level of granularity.”
Read Emily’s story to understand the other reasons why estimating — or even “guesstimating” — AI-related carbon emissions is so challenging.
A conversation with Emma Uridge of the Kansas Health Institute.
This week’s conversation is with Emma Uridge, analyst with the Kansas Health Institute. Uridge spent copious hours analyzing state and local laws on data center development to best understand how policymakers are responding to the potential environmental public health impacts of large AI infrastructure, including power and water. The report, which came out this week, also goes in depth into those health impacts. I reached out to her to discuss what she sees as must-watch territory for our readers on this emerging policy arena.
Our conversation was lightly edited for clarity.
What is actually being done on policy when it comes to data centers — beyond moratoria of course?
So first I’d like to just talk about the point of moratoria. It’s helpful to talk about how these policies emerge in the first place. One area where moratoria are helpful is when a data center is proposed but the county has no approach for how they’d like to potentially regulate them. That’s temporary, most of the time. It lets local governments conduct research on the various impacts and also negotiate community benefits, ones that can mitigate any potential negative impacts — like Lancaster Pennsylvania, which instituted a community benefit agreement that maximized the potential benefits of development while mitigating what large data centers can do. That agreement looked at capping municipal water use at 20,000 gallons per day and requiring 100% clean energy. It had financial penalties for non-compliance. The company also committed $20 million to their local economic development and clean energy fund. There are ways to negotiate with developers.
We also see amendments to existing zoning. Data center proposals are increasingly popping up in rural areas, many of which are unzoned, so there’s no way a county can negotiate unless there’s a moratorium in place.
Other policy solutions include different performance standards or requiring on-site renewable energy, like what Jefferson County, Missouri, looked at. Also setback requirements, mandatory noise buffers, ending by-right zoning.
Where are local governments getting ideas for regulating data centers?
A lot of the technical information comes from developers. That can in cases be seen as a biased source of information. I wouldn’t say there’s a dedicated group providing assistance to local governments when a project is proposed — which is a similar story to wind industry development, where we have only a handful of consultants who provide technical advice. It can be really helpful to get a multi-disciplinary approach to hearing information. It can be helpful to have the utility commission, public health folks, those in academia, as well as the developer.
As of right now, especially in rural areas, local governments have a hard task of balancing pushback while getting the most accurate, evidence-based, neutral information to make decisions. That balance can be contentious.
What is the federal government doing on data center policy? How is the Trump administration approaching it?
A few things there. In the early days, the drive was for AI expansion and to be competitive with foreign adversaries. Now due to the amount of public pushback in red and blue localities and a more cautious approach.
I’m not seeing a lot of actual policy movement at this time.
I know the EPA is looking at the chemicals used in cooling data centers because when that water is cycled through the system, some of it is discharged into the water system, so they’re looking at the Toxic Substances and Control Act for monitoring that.
How much of an impact does this minimal federal role have on industry behavior?
Y’know, this isn’t specific to data centers. This is true for all kinds of large-scale development: there’s a need to require some sort of federal monitoring and regulation.
That’s where I see an emerging role for public health. At the federal level, there could be policy movement towards requiring some sort of environmental monitoring at data centers to make sure they’re operating responsibility. Looking at specific water use relative to water availability and what happens when there’s a time of severe, persistent drought. With air quality too — we’ve seen areas where the grid isn’t as reliable so their diesel generators are kicking on more and affecting air quality for residents.
We’re just not seeing all of that right now. We need corporate disclosure.
What do you see as the most important public health impacts from data center development?
It varies by localities. The most discussed obviously is water usage. One thing I’d note about my conversations with folks enthusiastic around emerging tech is, there are still questions that need to be asked about the capacity of localities to support a data center. Like a small town in Kansas may only be using 40% of their water for their utility needs. If a data center came online, how much of that water goes to the data center?
One area underexplored within the public health discipline is energy poverty and energy security. The ability of a household to meet the needs of everything energy provides in our lives. It’s known we have an aging electric grid but we’re not talking enough about large-scale blackouts when the grid is not sufficient to support some of these new data centers.
Plus more of the week’s big development fights.
1. Laramie County, Wyoming — Meta is fighting the fine it received in the Cheyenne data center water pollution controversy, and the conflict between the tech giant and the city’s small board of public utilities is continuing to spill out into the public.
2. Niagara County, New York — This county just rejected a solar project’s highway work permits in a show of retaliation against the state’s Office of Renewable Energy Siting.
3. Barron County, Wisconsin — The anti-solar protest is the new campaign stop in deep red Wisconsin.
4. Chesapeake, Virginia — A large battery storage project on the Virginia coastline is on the rocks amidst rampant local opposition.
5. Lewis County, West Virginia — West Virginia is now a key battleground in the fight over transmission, as a line spanning all of West Virginia and Maryland — and cutting through Data Center Alley in Virginia — causes compounding consternation.