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On the third anniversary of the signing of the Inflation Reduction Act, Heatmap contributor Advait Arun mourns what’s been lost — but more importantly, charts a path toward what comes next.
Today, the Inflation Reduction Act would have turned three years old — if it hadn’t been buried alive in a big, beautiful grave. While the IRA was a hodgepodge of programs salvaged from President Biden’s far more ambitious Build Back Better agenda, it still represented the biggest climate investment in U.S. history. It catalyzed over $360 billion in energy and manufacturing investments and was expected to drive the installation of over 155 gigawatts of new solar and wind energy by 2030. And now Republicans have taken a sledgehammer to its achievements.
The timing could not be worse — not just for the climate, but also for the energy systems that we rely on. At a moment when the energy sector requires $1.4 trillion worth of upgrades by 2030 just to keep up with rising energy demand and increasingly erratic weather, Republicans have instead delivered a one-two punch of tariffs and tax hikes, sabotaging the industrial base required to deliver those investments and raising the retirement age of our power generation fleet.
All over the country (Texas and California maybe exempted), our aging electricity system is putting in its two-weeks notice. Staring down the barrel of precipitous demand growth, the country’s regulated utilities have requested over $29 billion in rate increases, concentrated across the West and South. The Department of Energy ordered the delayed retirement of coal plants and oil generators to manage this summer’s demand peaks. Meanwhile, capacity market prices on two of the country’s largest grids, PJM and MISO, have reached record highs ― a cry for new supply that is now increasingly unlikely to materialize quickly or cheaply. Two months ago, an unplanned nuclear reactor outage on a congested part of Louisiana’s energy grid led to a blackout for 100,000 people in and around New Orleans. That meant no working AC or refrigerators across large swaths of the city during a sweltering Memorial Day weekend.
All of this amounts to an opening for Democrats to shift public opinion decisively in favor of renewed climate action. Moving forward, lawmakers cannot ignore our infirm fossil-fired energy system, which stands to thwart their ability to deliver affordability, employment, health, and resilience to their constituents. Despite our recent losses, we still need an energy policy ― a climate policy.
What should the Democrats’ second attempt at a clean investment program look like? Having delivered the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and the Inflation Reduction Act, laws that committed the state to the realization of a particular energy future, Democrats are well-positioned to build on their successes, and even to engage Republicans who remain interested in supporting innovative technologies, decarbonizing industry, and protecting public lands.
Where they cannot meet Republicans halfway, Democrats should double their ambitions. They must continue to embrace the power of federal investment to shape markets and achieve policy goals. But they must also learn from the shortcomings of their previous legislative outings and substantively change how the federal government invests in the first place. The way forward for Democrats starts with mapping out exactly how far they didn’t go, and ends with going there.
IRA and BIL were paradigm-shifting attempts at market-shaping. They laid the groundwork for the deployment of promising clean firm energy technologies such as next-generation geothermal and nuclear energy, as well as for necessary grid and supply chain upgrades, such as long-distance transmission corridors and critical minerals processing.
IRA and BIL were not, however, a comprehensive climate policy. They created cost-share programs for infrastructure resilience but neglected to buttress municipal bond markets, which states and local governments can use to make longer-term investments in climate resilience and adaptation. They penalized methane emissions but organized no comprehensive or compulsory managed phaseout of fossil fuel infrastructure. They failed to advance or adequately finance a coordinated deployment strategy for any key energy sector. And they shed the transformative vision of Biden’s Build Back Better agenda, which sought to stabilize the cost of living for Americans in the meantime — a tactical retreat that, in retrospect, looks ill-advised given voters’ current worries about affordability.
I am aware that criticizing BIL and IRA on these grounds amounts to judging them for goals they didn’t attempt to achieve. Judging them by the goals they did attempt to achieve, however, reveals that they only ever worked incompletely. Taken together, BIL and IRA expanded the energy tax credit system, created powerful programs for piloting and deploying innovative energy technologies, and seeded an ecosystem of regional financing institutions devoted to more equitably distributing the benefits of decarbonization. But the energy tax credits were never expansive enough; the programs intended to motivate investments into deeper decarbonization were not flexible enough to drive the mass uptake of emerging technologies; and efforts to decarbonize disadvantaged communities lacked a coherent strategy and ran headlong into local capacity constraints.
Speeding up the energy transition and building new infrastructure at scale requires endowing federal and state agencies with adequate appropriations, access to liquidity, and crystal-clear, wide-ranging mandates, as well as empowering them in statute with considerable flexibility as to the financial products and strategies they deploy to achieve those mandates.
Although imperfect, the IRA’s tax credits scored some significant wins that should undoubtedly inform future policy. The law took an existing system of technology-specific subsidies that had been on the books in some form since 1978 and made them technology-neutral, allowing developers of nearly any zero-emissions energy technology to access tax relief. It expanded the credits to domestic manufacturers of certain low- and zero-carbon technologies. It created a tax credit transfer market, allowing developers with limited tax liability to sell their credits for cash on an open market to any tax-liable buyer, rather than engage in expensive and complex “tax equity” transactions with a few large banks. It made certain credits directly accessible to tax-exempt entities, significantly broadening the pool of potential users. And most of these credits remained entirely uncapped ― a “bottomless mimosa” for developers that spurred over $321 billion in clean energy and manufacturing investments and supported more than 2,000 new facilities across the country.
To be sure, the IRA did not level the playing field perfectly across developers or across technologies. Developers of energy transmission, grid transformers, and electric rail were shut out of the credits. Tax-exempt public and nonprofit developers ― entities as large as the New York Power Authority and as small as local churches ― could not monetize depreciation or participate in the transfer market. And some credits remained capped, forcing developers to apply and cross their fingers. But as early as 2023, Goldman Sachs argued that even with these inadequacies ― which have easy legislative and statutory fixes ― the IRA would still have spurred over $3 trillion in investment by 2033.
The GOP has gutted much of this system, shortcomings and all, and replaced it with a tangle of red tape. The energy tax credits are once again technology-specific ― solar and wind developers have a few months left to start a project and claim the credits as written, though what it means to start a project got more complex just yesterday. But even the “clean firm” energy technologies that can still claim credits until 2032, such as nuclear and geothermal, may not be safe under new “foreign entity of concern” rules, which condition credits on developers’ ability to limit their reliance on Chinese suppliers and investment, requiring them to map out their supply chains at an unprecedented level of detail.
Democrats seeking to restore and build upon this plank of the IRA have their work cut out for them. The developers and manufacturers of any technology that contributes to zero-emissions energy production should be able to access and monetize federal support regardless of their tax status and free from the rigmarole and uncertainties imposed by competitive application procedures. Goldman Sachs’ $3 trillion estimate is now the lower bound of what’s possible — for instance, a tax credit for transmission investments suggested as part of Build Back Better but excluded from the IRA could have catalyzed over $15 billion in investment and supported the economics of all other energy projects. To the degree that the tax credits can help build industrial capacity and institutional support for decarbonization, future policymaking should maximize their remit and their distribution.
Tax credits alone, however, are hardly a skeleton key to decarbonization. Being disbursed only once a project is complete, tax credits do not substitute for the kinds of upfront financial support that project developers — especially developers of emerging technologies — require to complete their projects in the first place. Private investors have been comfortable with solar, batteries, and onshore wind because these projects can be completed, claim their tax credits, and earn revenues on the grid on a mostly predictable timetable. But new nuclear reactors, geothermal, hydrogen, green steel, and carbon capture are unfamiliar investments, have uncertain development pathways and return profiles, and thus remain un-bankable to investors.
This is why BIL and IRA created powerful programs worth tens of billions of dollars to finance the deployment of emerging clean technologies and break this vicious cycle of uncertainty. The Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, or OCED, and the Loan Programs Office, or LPO, in particular, were empowered to support, at scale, the testing and commercialization of these emerging technologies as well as conversions of whole electricity grids.
OCED, with over $27 billion in appropriations, set up hubs for hydrogen and carbon capture projects across the country, and funded a suite of advanced steel and iron decarbonization projects. Endowed by BIL and IRA with over $15 billion in total credit subsidy and well over $300 billion in total loan authority, LPO made ambitious investments across a host of innovative technology categories, including ― but certainly not limited to ― energy storage, sustainable aviation fuels, virtual power plants, EV charging, and bioenergy. At the end of 2024, the LPO had over 200 loan applicants in its queue.
By rescinding OCED’s unobligated funding, ambiguously rewriting LPO’s lending authorities (while rescinding most of its unobligated credit subsidy), and pulling the plug on billions of dollars worth of conditional commitments, the GOP has stopped years of progress in its tracks. In the meantime, LPO has shed considerable staff while the administration has prevented it from making any new commitments. The combination of the “foreign entity of concern” rules constraining tax credit eligibility and this shuttering of federal financing opportunities could seriously throttle the development and commercialization of nuclear energy in particular, the darling du jour of Republicans’ energy strategy.
If these offices were once the engines of decarbonization, they needed a stronger spark plug. The LPO, in particular, has a special authority to finance state government-backed, non-innovative clean energy projects, such as regional battery manufacturing clusters or a state power developer’s renewables portfolio, but has never used it. And while OCED and LPO can provide developers with some degree of upfront support, LPO cannot easily provide construction loans, cannot derisk project cash flows to provide security to investors, and cannot mandate offtake. These deficiencies prevent ambitious borrowers with unproven technologies from scaling up: they scare off private lenders in the infrastructure sector, many of which are skittish about construction risk, require project developers to demonstrate three to five years of stable cash flows, have a low tolerance for market price uncertainty, and have shareholders who demand a certain level of returns.
The DOE can bridge this “valley of death” by using its broader market-shaping authorities to take a more aggressive “dealership” role in these sectors, providing stable offtake for developers through upfront purchasing while becoming a reliable source of supply to downstream customers (like an actual car dealership or a grocery store). The DOE has in fact already used this approach to provide demand-side support to its now-endangered hydrogen hubs through OCED.
These kinds of public dealership arrangements are not unique or path-breaking: The Federal Reserve’s backstop of the municipal bond market in 2020, nonprofit investor Climate United’s planned EV trucking purchase-and-lease program in California, and even the Department of Defense’s recent MP Materials deal are all examples of public entities addressing a mismatch in the supply of and demand for a critical good and, in doing so, shaping markets toward public ends.
For all that BIL and IRA built avenues for developing and deploying energy technologies, they were also full of programs aimed at distributing the fruits of decarbonization equitably. Both the energy community bonus credits, a provision in the IRA that increased the value of the energy tax credits for projects in poorer, higher-unemployment, and energy facility-adjacent communities, and President Biden’s Justice40 initiative, which directed 40% of federal spending toward poorer and more rural communities, exemplified the administration’s “place-based” approach to industrial policy and economic development. The Biden administration heavily encouraged disadvantaged communities, local governments, schools, nonprofits, and tribal nations to develop their own clean energy projects — aided by the IRA’s direct pay mechanism, which allowed tax-exempt entities to access subsidies — by drawing on the various local decarbonization programs in BIL and IRA.
The Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund, perhaps the most important of these programs, exemplifies the promises and pitfalls of the administration’s approach to “place-based” industrial policy. Managed by the Environmental Protection Agency, GGRF provided $27 billion to disadvantaged communities for the financing of rooftop solar, zero-emissions transport, and net-zero housing. That pot was split into three thematic buckets ― $7 billion to the Solar for All program, specifically for rooftop solar development; $14 billion to the National Clean Investment Fund, for supporting clean energy project finance more broadly in disadvantaged communities; and $6 billion more to local and regional technical assistance providers. Each program then subdivided its appropriations further. Solar for All went to 60 recipients across the country via a competitive application. The National Clean Investment Fund’s $14 billion was split among three awardees, each a coalition of various financial institutions designed to lend to energy projects, such as green banks, impact investors, and nonprofits ― and each of those recipient coalitions planned to subdivide much of its funds still further, first among coalition partners and then to subordinate local and state partners.
That dizzying program structure was meant to endow local communities with the ability to finance their own projects. And by including so many nonprofit institutions, GGRF could make significant inroads into Republican states, whose officials might otherwise reject federal funding.
But there was not much coordination between partners and subawardees around how best to deploy those funds. And what seemed like a firehose of financing often reached local recipients as a trickle of pre-development and technical assistance grants. Demanding that local organizations build their own capacity to plan, finance, and develop projects (or hire expensive external consultants to do so) ― with limited and one-time funds, no less ― is duplicative and inefficient, and it defeats GGRF’s own stated goal of mobilizing private capital through building standardized markets for decarbonization, thereby slowing down the pace of emissions reductions. The program’s complexity also left it vulnerable to EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin’s efforts to hound the program in court and freeze its funding.
Pandemic-era proposals for a National Investment Authority, as well as legislative proposals for a national green bank ― predecessors to the GGRF ― differ sharply from this status quo, instead highlighting how public finance can benefit from economies of scale. Larger financial institutions tasked with deploying clean energy projects can more easily prepare portfolios of projects for co-investors, engage with utilities, raise debt on municipal bond markets, and build a bench of trustworthy private developers to contract for projects. If they are publicly administered, these institutions can also take more risk, undercut private lenders, support more developers, engage with local communities to meet their needs, and use revenues from higher-return projects to derisk lower-return projects that might be necessary to build to achieve their resilience and affordability goals.
Should policymakers get a second shot at building a national green bank system, they should not try to recreate GGRF’s fractal approach to energy finance. Rather, policymakers must ensure that financing sits in the hands of public agencies that already have the authorities and expert staff to be ambitious market-shapers: bond banks, state-led energy finance authorities, and public developers. The good news is that state-level green banks empowered with state funding and a political mandate are already exercising their capacities to shape markets and support disadvantaged communities directly: the New York Power Authority, the Minnesota Climate Innovation Finance Authority, the Connecticut Green Bank, and the Greater Arizona Development Authority, to name a few, are all taking it upon themselves to raise debt and contract with developers to undertake ambitious energy and infrastructure investment programs.
But Democrats should be clear-eyed about the consequences of this reorientation: It means rejecting the prevailing wisdom that local nonprofits should necessarily coordinate local project development. Local groups can be extremely effective advocates for communities’ needs ― but in contrast to public investment agencies, their capacity to finance and implement solutions is simply not great enough.
This analysis of IRA and BIL leaves out more parts of the laws than it includes ― to take just one example, the BIL’s $5 billion National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure charging station program. But the story is similar: Ambitious as it seemed, NEVI money could only flow when state governments set up implementation offices and had their spending plans approved by federal officials. Most states, which had not prepared for any of this, took years to build the requisite capacity ― just in time for the Trump administration to try and snatch away the funding (though it recently admitted defeat in that project). In fairness to state governments, the EV charging sector is incredibly new. But even this program highlights how IRA and BIL lacked the capacity to be implemented as quickly and efficiently as their supporters hoped.
Going above and beyond BIL and IRA to deliver an energy policy that stabilizes Americans’ cost of living while driving an energy transition away from fossil fuels and toward the technologies of the future ― Democrats should embrace this challenge. But they should also be aware that climate ambition runs headlong into the same institutional problems facing American democracy at large. The Senate filibuster prevents either party from comprehensively redesigning the federal government, its institutions, and its regulations to serve Americans more quickly and more efficiently. That leaves both parties reliant on budget reconciliation ― to our detriment. The head-spinning design of GGRF was itself an artifact of the reconciliation process, which prevented Congress from creating a single green bank institution or giving it a specific mandate; its awardee organizations and coalitions certainly did not ask for the program structure they got.
There’s a lot more that budget reconciliation will never solve: the century-old American utility system, the regulatory thicket of U.S. electricity markets, or the land use and permitting rules that constrain project development and grid interconnection. And things could get worse: Trump-appointed judges and Supreme Court justices who reject federal agencies’ and state governments’ attempts to regulate fossil fuel infrastructure have placed the legal system itself at odds with responsible energy system management. The courts may no longer be able to block clawbacks and recissions of legally obligated federal spending. Democrats, like clean energy developers, do not fight on a level playing field.
While Democrats are out of federal power, they should practice ambitious climate policymaking at the state level. States already have considerable ability to raise finance and build capacity for ambitious infrastructure projects ― and they might have to quickly, considering the drain of federal capacity that might support them. By developing their own public programs for transmission finance, utility-scale battery procurement, virtual power plants, and clean firm energy pilots, Democratic state governments can ensure that the ecosystem of clean energy developers created by BIL and IRA does not disappear for lack of demand — and in doing so, these states would help stabilize the cost of clean energy project development.
Finally, Democrats should not forget that climate remains a cost of living issue. In a city like New Orleans, rocked by the recent nuclear outage, residents spend, on average, over 19% of their incomes on their energy bills, over three times the DOE’s threshold to be considered an energy-burdened community. Their bills already include adders for climate adaptation and disaster preparedness ― yet, for all they spend, they still face blackouts, and their costs will only increase as their grid continues to deteriorate. Here, climate policy is not about combating Chinese supply chain dominance, or even about delivering an American industrial renaissance. It’s about keeping the lights on, keeping bills low, keeping the air clean, and keeping residents safe from disaster.
It turns out that voters all over the country still care about these goals. A majority of likely voters in the next election think climate change will have a direct impact on their or their family’s finances. This constituency is still in play — and given sharply deteriorating macroeconomic conditions, soon-to-spike electricity prices, and the ever-increasing threat of climate disaster, these cost-of-living-focused voters could be far more vocal, relevant, and hungry for change than a coalition built on vague sabre-rattling against China.
In 2022, Democrats made a valiant first attempt to transform the state itself. Perhaps it was inadequate, perhaps it was impossible to do more at the time, but that’s no reason not to think seriously about the kind of policymaking, institutional, and financial interventions that would be called for should they get a second shot at realizing that goal. The rollback of the IRA only reveals how much Democrats left on the table three years ago ― and how much farther a real climate policy could go.
Editor’s note: This story has been updated to clarify the relationship between the unplanned nuclear shutdown and the power outage in New Orleans.
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The failure of the once-promising sodium-ion manufacturer caused a chill among industry observers. But its problems may have been more its own.
When the promising and well funded sodium-ion battery company Natron Energy announced that it was shutting down operations a few weeks ago, early post-mortems pinned its failure on the challenge of finding a viable market for this alternate battery chemistry. Some went so far as to foreclose on the possibility of manufacturing batteries in the U.S. for the time being.
But that’s not the takeaway for many industry insiders — including some who are skeptical of sodium-ion’s market potential. Adrian Yao, for instance, is the founder of the lithium-ion battery company EnPower and current PhD student in materials science and engineering at Stanford. He authored a paper earlier this year outlining the many unresolved hurdles these batteries must clear to compete with lithium-iron-phosphate batteries, also known as LFP. A cheaper, more efficient variant on the standard lithium-ion chemistry, LFP has started to overtake the dominant lithium-ion chemistry in the electric vehicle sector, and is now the dominant technology for energy storage systems.
But, he told me, “Don’t let this headline conclude that battery manufacturing in the United States will never work, or that sodium-ion itself is uncompetitive. I think both those statements are naive and lack technological nuance.”
Opinions differ on the primary advantages of sodium-ion compared to lithium-ion, but one frequently cited benefit is the potential to build a U.S.-based supply chain. Sodium is cheaper and more abundant than lithium, and China hasn’t yet secured dominance in this emerging market, though it has taken an early lead. Sodium-ion batteries also perform better at lower temperatures, have the potential to be less flammable, and — under the right market conditions — could eventually become more cost-effective than lithium-ion, which is subject to more price volatility because it’s expensive to extract and concentrated in just a few places.
Yao’s paper didn’t examine Natron’s specific technology, which relied on a cathode material known as “Prussian Blue Analogue,” as the material’s chemical structure resembles that of the pigment Prussian Blue. This formula enabled the company’s batteries to discharge large bursts of power extremely quickly while maintaining a long cycle life, making it promising for a niche — but crucial — domestic market: data center backup power.
Natron’s batteries were designed to bridge the brief gap between a power outage and a generator coming online. Today, that role is often served by lead-acid batteries, which are cheap but bulky, with a lower energy density and shorter cycle life than sodium-ion. Thus, Yao saw this market — though far smaller than that of grid-scale energy storage — as a “technologically pragmatic” opportunity for the company.
“It’s almost like a supercapacitor, not a battery,” one executive in the sodium-ion battery space who wished to remain anonymous told me of Natron’s battery. Supercapacitors are energy storage devices that — like Natron’s tech — can release large amounts of power practically immediately, but store far less total energy than batteries.
“The thing that has been disappointing about the whole story is that people talk about Natron and their products and their journey as if it’s relevant at all to the sodium-ion grid scale storage space,” the executive told me. The grid-scale market, they said, is where most companies are looking to deploy sodium-ion batteries today. “What happened to Natron, I think, is very specific to Natron.”
But what exactly did happen to the once-promising startup, which raised over $363 million in private investment from big name backers such as Khosla Ventures and Prelude Ventures? What we know for sure is that it ran out of money, canceling plans to build a $1.4 billion battery manufacturing facility in North Carolina. The company was waiting on certification from an independent safety body, which would have unleashed $25 million in booked orders, but was forced to fold before that approval came through.
Perhaps seeing the writing on the wall, Natron’s founder, Colin Wessells, stepped down as CEO last December and left the company altogether in June.
“I got bored,” Wessels told The Information of his initial decision to relinquish the CEO role. “I found as I was spending all my time on fundraising and stockholder and board management that it wasn’t all that much fun.”
It’s also worth noting, however, that according to publicly available data, the investor makeup of Natron appears to have changed significantly between the company’s $35 million funding round in 2020 and its subsequent $58 million raise in 2021, which could indicate qualms among early backers about the direction of the company going back years. That said, not all information about who invested and when is publicly known. I reached out to both Wessels and Natron’s PR team for comment but did not receive a reply.
The company submitted a WARN notice — a requirement from employers prior to mass layoffs or plant closures — to the Michigan Department of Labor and Economic Opportunity on August 28. It explained that while Natron had explored various funding avenues including follow-on investment from existing shareholders, a Series B equity round, and debt financing, none of these materialized, leaving the company unable “to cover the required additional working capital and operational expenses of the business.”
Yao told me that the startup could have simply been a victim of bad timing. “While in some ways I think the AI boom was perfect timing for Natron, I also think it might have been a couple years too early — not because it’s not needed, but because of bandwidth,” he explained. “My guess is that the biggest thing on hyperscalers’ minds are currently still just getting connected to the grid, keeping up with continuous improvements to power efficiency, and how to actually operate in an energy efficient manner.” Perhaps in this environment, hyperscalers simply viewed deploying new battery tech for a niche application as too risky, Yao hypothesized, though he doesn’t have personal knowledge of the company’s partnerships or commercial activity.
The sodium-ion executive also thought timing might have been part of the problem. “He had a good team, and the circumstances were just really tough because he was so early,” they said. Wessells founded Natron in 2012, based on his PhD research at Stanford. “Maybe they were too early, and five years from now would have been a better fit,” the executive said. “But, you know, who’s to say?”
The executive also considers it telling that Natron only had $25 million in contracts, calling this “a drop in the bucket” relative to the potential they see for sodium-ion technology in the grid-scale market. While Natron wasn’t chasing the big bucks associated with this larger market opportunity, other domestic sodium-based battery companies such as Inlyte Energy and Peak Energy are looking to deploy grid-scale systems, as are Chinese battery companies such as BYD and HiNa Battery.
But it’s certainly true that manufacturing this tech in the U.S. won’t be easy. While Chinese companies benefit from state support that can prop up the emergent sodium-ion storage industry whether it’s cost-competitive or not, sodium-ion storage companies in the U.S. will need to go head-to-head with LFP batteries on price if they want to gain significant market share. And while a few years ago experts were predicting a lithium shortage, these days, the price of lithium is about 90% off its record high, making it a struggle for sodium-ion systems to match the cost of lithium-ion.
Sodium-ion chemistry still offers certain advantages that could make it a good option in particular geographies, however. It performs better in low-temperature conditions, where lithium-ion suffers notable performance degradation. And — at least in Natron’s case — it offers superior thermal stability, meaning it’s less likely to catch fire.
Some even argue that sodium-ion can still be a cost-effective option once manufacturing ramps up due to the ubiquity of sodium, plus additional savings throughout the batteries’ useful life. Peak Energy, for example, expects its battery systems to be more expensive upfront but cheaper over their entire lifetime, having designed a passive cooling system that eliminates the need for traditional temperature control components such as pumps and fans.
Ultimately, though, Yao thinks U.S. companies should be considering sodium-ion as a “low-temperature, high-power counterpart” — not a replacement — for LFP batteries. That’s how the Chinese battery giants are approaching it, he said, whereas he thinks the U.S. market remains fixated on framing the two technologies as competitors.
“I think the safe assumption is that China will come to dominate sodium-ion battery production,” Yao told me. “They already are far ahead of us.” But that doesn’t mean it’s impossible to build out a domestic supply chain — or at least that it’s not worth trying. “We need to execute with technologically pragmatic solutions and target beachhead markets capable of tolerating cost premiums before we can play in the big leagues of EVs or [battery energy storage systems],” he said.
And that, he affirmed, is exactly what Natron was trying to do. RIP.
They may not refuel as quickly as gas cars, but it’s getting faster all the time to recharge an electric car.
A family of four pulls their Hyundai Ioniq 5 into a roadside stop, plugs in, and sits down to order some food. By the time it arrives, they realize their EV has added enough charge that they can continue their journey. Instead of eating a leisurely meal, they get their grub to go and jump back in the car.
The message of this ad, which ran incessantly on some of my streaming services this summer, is a telling evolution in how EVs are marketed. The game-changing feature is not power or range, but rather charging speed, which gets the EV driver back on the road quickly rather than forcing them to find new and creative ways to kill time until the battery is ready. Marketing now frequently highlights an electric car’s ability to add a whole lot of miles in just 15 to 20 minutes of charge time.
Charging speed might be a particularly effective selling point for convincing a wary public. EVs are superior to gasoline vehicles in a host of ways, from instantaneous torque to lower fuel costs to energy efficiency. The one thing they can’t match is the pump-and-go pace of petroleum — the way combustion cars can add enough fuel in a minute or two to carry them for hundreds of miles. But as more EVs on the market can charge at faster speeds, even this distinction is beginning to disappear.
In the first years of the EV race, the focus tended to fall on battery range, and for good reason. A decade ago, many models could travel just 125 or 150 miles on a charge. Between the sparseness of early charging infrastructure and the way some EVs underperform their stated range numbers at highway speeds, those models were not useful for anything other than short hauls.
By the time I got my Tesla in 2019, things were better, but still not ideal. My Model 3’s 240 miles of max range, along with the expansion of the brand’s Supercharger network, made it possible to road-trip in the EV. Still, I pushed the battery to its limits as we crossed worryingly long gaps between charging stations in the wide open expanses of the American West. Close calls burned into my mind a hyper-awareness of range, which is why I encourage EV shoppers to pay extra for a bigger battery with additional range if they can afford it. You just had to make it there; how fast the car charged once you arrived was a secondary concern. But these days, we may be reaching a point at which how fast your EV charges is more important than how far it goes on a charge.
For one thing, the charging map is filling up. Even with an anti-EV American government, more chargers are being built all the time. This growth is beginning to eliminate charging deserts in urban areas and cut the number of very long gaps between stations out on the highway. The more of them come online, the less range anxiety EV drivers have about reaching the next plug.
Super-fast charging is a huge lifestyle convenience for people who cannot charge at home, a group that could represent the next big segment of Americans to electrify. Speed was no big deal for the prototypical early adopter who charged in their driveway or garage; the battery recharged slowly overnight to be ready to go in the morning. But for apartment-dwellers who rely on public infrastructure, speed can be the difference between getting a week’s worth of miles in 15 to 20 minutes and sitting around a charging station for the better part of an hour.
Crucially, an improvement in charging speed makes a long EV journey feel more like the driving rhythm of old. No, battery-powered vehicles still can’t get back on the road in five minutes or less. But many of the newer models can travel, say, three hours before needing to charge for a reasonable amount of time — which is about as long as most people would want to drive without a break, anyway.
An impressive burst of technological improvement is making all this possible. Early EVs like the original Chevy Bolt could accept a maximum of around 50 kilowatts of charge, and so that was how much many of the early DC fast charging stations would dispense. By comparison, Tesla in the past few years pushed Supercharger speed to 250 kilowatts, then 325. Third-party charging companies like Electrify America and EVgo have reached 350 kilowatts with some plugs. The result is that lots of current EVs can take on 10 or more miles of driving range per minute under ideal conditions.
It helps, too, that the ranges of EVs have been steadily improving. What those car commercials don’t mention is that the charging rate falls off dramatically after the battery is half full; you might add miles at lightning speed up to 50% of charge, but as it approaches capacity it begins to crawl. If you have a car with 350 miles of range, then, you probably can put on 175 miles in a heartbeat. (Efficiency counts for a lot, too. The more miles per kilowatt-hour your car can get, the farther it can go on 15 minutes of charge.)
Yet here again is an area where the West is falling behind China’s disruptive EV industry. That country has rolled out “megawatt” charging that would fill up half the battery in just four minutes, a pace that would make the difference between a gasoline pit stop and a charging stop feel negligible. This level of innovation isn’t coming to America anytime soon. But with automakers and charging companies focused on getting faster, the gap between electric and gas will continue to close.
On the need for geoengineering, Britain’s retreat, and Biden’s energy chief
Current conditions: Hurricane Gabrielle has strengthened into a Category 4 storm in the Atlantic, bringing hurricane conditions to the Azores before losing wind intensity over Europe • Heavy rains are whipping the eastern U.S. • Typhoon Ragasa downed more than 10,000 trees in Yangjiang, in southern China, before moving on toward Vietnam.
The White House Office of Management and Budget directed federal agencies to prepare to reduce personnel during a potential government shutdown, targeting employees who work for programs that are not legally required to continue, Politico reported Wednesday, citing a memo from the agency.
As Heatmap’s Jeva Lange warned in May, the Trump administration’s cuts to the federal civil service mean “it may never be the same again,” which could have serious consequences for the government’s response to an unpredictable disaster such as a tsunami. Already the administration has hollowed out entire teams, such as the one in charge of carbon removal policy, as our colleague Katie Brigham wrote in February, shortly after the president took office. And Latitude Media reported on Wednesday, the Department of Energy has issued a $50 million request for proposals from outside counsel to help with the day-to-day work of the agency.
At the Heatmap House event at New York Climate Week on Wednesday, Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer kicked things off by calling out President Donald Trump’s efforts to “kill solar, wind, batteries, EVs and all climate friendly technologies while propping up fossil fuels, Big Oil, and polluting technologies that hurt our communities and our growth.” The born and raised Brooklynite praised his home state. “New York remains the climate leader,” he said, but warned that the current administration was pushing to roll back the progress the state had made.
Yet as Heatmap’s Charu Sinha wrote in her recap of the event, “many of the panelists remained cautiously optimistic about the future of decarbonization in the U.S.” Climate tech investors Tom Steyer and Dawn Lippert charted a path forward for decarbonization technology even in an antagonistic political environment, while PG&E’s Carla Peterman made a case for how data centers could eventually lower energy costs. You can read about all these talks and more here.
Nearly 100 scientists, including President Joe Biden’s chief climate science adviser, signed onto a letter Wednesday endorsing more federal research into geoengineering, the broad category of technologies to mitigate the effects of climate change that includes the controversial proposal to inject sulfur dioxide into the atmosphere to reflect the sun’s heat back into space. In an open letter, the researchers said “it is very unlikely that current” climate goals “will keep the global mean temperature below the Paris Agreement target” of 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial averages. The world has already warmed by more than 1 degree Celsius.
Earlier this month, a paper in the peer-reviewed journal Frontiers argued against even researching technologies that could temporarily cool the planet while humanity worked to cut planet-heating emissions. But Phil Duffy, Biden’s former climate adviser, said in a statement to Heatmap that the paper “opposes research … that might help protect or restore the polar regions.” He went on via email, “As the climate crisis accelerates, we all agree that we need to rapidly scale up mitigation efforts. But the stakes are too high not to also investigate other possible solutions.”
President Trump and Prime Minister Keir Starmer. Leon Neal/Getty Images
UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer plans to skip the United Nations annual climate summit in Brazil in November, the Financial Times reported on Wednesday. He will do so despite criticizing his predecessor Rishi Sunak a few years ago for a “failure of leadership” after the conservative leader declined to attend the annual confab. One leader in the ruling Labour party said there was a “big fight inside the government” between officials pushing Starmer to attend the event those “wanting him to focus on domestic issues.”
Polls show approval for Starmer among the lowest of any leaders in the West. But he has recently pushed for more clean energy, including signing onto a series of nuclear power deals with the U.S.
The Tennessee Valley Authority has assumed the role of the nation’s testbed for new nuclear fission technologies, agreeing to build what are likely to be the nation’s first small modular reactors, including the debut fourth-generation units that use a coolant other than water. Now the federally-owned utility is getting into fusion. On Wednesday, the TVA inked a deal with fusion startup Type One Energy to develop a 350-megawatt plant “using the company’s stellarator fusion technology.” The deal, first brokered last week but reported Tuesday in World Nuclear News, promises to deploy the technology “once it is commercially ready.” It also follows the announcement just a few days ago of a major offtake agreement for fusion leader Commonwealth Fusion Systems, which will sell $1 billion of electricity to oil giant Eni.
Climate change is good news for foreign fish. A new study in Nature found that warming rivers have brought about the introduction of new invasive species. This, the researchers wrote, shows “an increase in biodiversity associated with improvement of water in many European rivers since the late twentieth century.”