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There isn’t one EV transition. There are two.

This has not been a good week for the electric-vehicle transition. On Wednesday, General Motors scrapped a self-imposed plan of building 400,000 electric vehicles by the middle of next year. Then it jettisoned plans with Honda to build a sub-$30,000 EV. On Thursday, Mercedes Benz announced that its profits had fallen in part due to turbulence in the EV market, and Hertz ditched a plan to have EVs make up 25% of its fleet by 2024.
Nor has the past month been much better. Ford has slowed down its EV factory build-out. Elon Musk announced that Tesla was taking a wait-and-see approach to opening its next plant, in Mexico, and The Wall Street Journal has reported that EV demand is proving weaker than once expected. Higher interest rates and, perhaps, a continued lack of public chargers now seem to be impairing the EV transition.
It’s an odd time, because while the day-to-day news is bad, the overall trend remains good — surprisingly good, even. More than 1 million EVs have been sold in America this year, and the country is likely to record 50% year-over-year EV market growth for two years in a row. That is not the usual sign of an industry in trouble. The industry is faltering, yes, but only compared to the rapid scale-up that companies once aimed for — and that the Paris Agreement’s climate targets demand. And at a global level, the news is better: The economics of batteries and trends in the Chinese and European markets leave little doubt that EVs will eventually win.
So how to make sense of this moment? Automakers, it seems, are not doubting whether the EV transition will happen; they are pausing to figure out how best to proceed. Journalists often talk about the “EV transition,” but this is something of a misnomer — there are really at least two different transitions, two different bridges to the EV future.
One of those transitions must be navigated by the legacy automakers, such as Ford and GM. The other must be completed by the new electric-only upstarts, such as Tesla and Rivian. Both transitions are, today, half-complete. What is notable about this moment is that both transitions are also in flux — and the companies and executives tasked with navigating them are struggling with their next steps.
The first bridge must be built by Ford, GM, Toyota, Volkswagen, and every other legacy automaker heavily invested in the U.S. market. You can think of it as a bridge made of cross-subsidies — subsidies not from the government, but from other cars in their product line.
Right now, many automakers earn their biggest profits by selling big, gas-burning vehicles: crossovers, SUVs, and pickup trucks. They lose money, meanwhile, on each EV that they sell. So over the next few years, these companies must take the huge profits from their SUV-and-truck business and reinvest them into scaling up their EV business.
You can see how difficult this will be by looking at Ford, which conveniently reports earnings from its internal combustion business separately from its electric vehicle business. During the first half of 2023, Ford’s global gas and hybrid sales earned $4.9 billion before interest or taxes. Ford’s EV business, meanwhile, lost $1.8 billion before interest or taxes.
During this same period, Ford sold nearly half a million trucks and SUVs in the U.S. alone, and roughly 25,000 electric vehicles. By one calculation, Ford lost $60,000 for every EV that it sold during the first quarter of this year.
This is the narrow bridge that Ford and its ilk must walk: They must remain mature businesses, delivering consistent profits to shareholders, even as they overhaul their entire product line and manufacturing system. And while these legacy automakers have certain advantages — brand cachet, a network of dealerships, and an understanding of how to make car bodies — they lack the deep familiarity with software or battery chemistries that underpin the EV business. What’s more, their current business rests on uneasy foundations: Because their profits are so heavily concentrated in just a few SUVs and trucks, a sudden shift in consumer tastes, fuel prices, or regulation could undercut their whole hustle.
We’ve already seen one consequence of this concentration in the United Autoworkers strike. By focusing its strikes on just a few factories at first, and then gradually expanding them to include each company’s most profitable facilities, the UAW was able to make its strike fund go further than outside commentators initially estimated. That strategy resulted in record high pay raises for workers in the UAW’s tentative deal with Ford; strikes continue at GM and Stellantis.
But this is, of course, only the first bridge to the EV future. Other companies — including Tesla, Rivian, and the early-stage EV startups Canoo and Fisker — have to build a different path across the river. You can think of this as the bridge of scaling up, although some auto-industry analysts give it a different name: crossing the EV valley of death.
These companies have to survive long enough to build up economies of scale. You can think of it this way: At the beginning of an EV company’s lifespan, it knows very little about how to mass-produce its EVs, but it has a lot of cash to burn. As it matures, it gets better at making EVs and grows its customer base, and it makes cars more frequently and more cheaply. Eventually, it reaches a point where it can sell lots of EVs for more money than they cost to make — that is, it can be a mature, profitable business.
But in the middle, it faces a hold-your-breath moment where its high costs can overwhelm its meager production. This is the valley of death, “the challenging period between developing a product and large-scale production, when a company isn’t earning much if any revenue, but operating and capital costs are high,” as the journalist Steve Levine puts it at The Information.
Nearly every EV company faces this problem to some extent right now. Elon Musk discussed it during a recent rambling Tesla earnings call. “People do not understand what is truly hard. That’s why I say prototypes are easy. Production is hard,” he said. “Going from a prototype to volume production is like 10,000% harder… than to make the prototype in the first place.”
Now, Tesla seems to have mostly cleared the valley of death with its Model 3 and Model Y this year, allowing it to undertake a campaign of aggressive price cuts that have increased demand while retaining some profitability.
But what Musk was talking about — and what Tesla is clearly struggling with — is the Cybertruck, which will debut next month after a multi-year delay. Musk warned that the company had “dug its own grave” by trying to build the Cybertruck and that there would be “enormous challenges” in producing it profitably and at scale.
But “this is simply normal,” he added. “When you've got a product with a lot of new technology or any brand-new vehicle program, but especially one that is as different and advanced as the Cybertruck, you will have problems proportionate to how many new things you're trying to solve at scale.”
Every other EV company finds itself on the same narrow bridge. Rivian, for instance, is somewhere further behind Tesla in general but is fast making up ground. It scaled up its production of its R1T and R1S models last quarter faster than analysts thought, but was at last report still losing money on each vehicle. Rivian’s CEO, R.J. Scaringe, told me that the company is focusing on making its next line of vehicles, the R2 series, easier and simpler to manufacture to avoid this problem.
Even further behind Rivian are Fisker, which claims to have delivered 5,000 of its Ocean SUVs, and Canoo, which is struggling to stay solvent.
What’s hard about this moment, then, is that the downsides and risks of each approach have never been clearer.
If a legacy company completes its EV transition too quickly, then it risks finding itself with a fleet of electric vehicles that the public isn’t ready to buy. Companies like Ford, GM, Volkswagen, and Toyota must scale up a profitable EV product line at the same time that they sell vehicles from their legacy business.
Worldwide, no historic automaker has transitioned fully to making battery-electric vehicles, although some have come very close: BYD, the Chinese automaker that has surpassed Tesla as the world’s biggest producer of EVs, opted to quit making internal-combustion vehicles last year, but it still sells plug-in hybrids. Volvo, too, is making an attempt: It has promised to stop selling internal-combustion cars by 2030. But Volvo is owned by the Chinese automaker Geely, meaning that both of these companies can sell their cars to a much larger and more EV-interested Chinese domestic market.
Yet the second transition is tough, too. Although it may seem that EV-only companies have a lot of freedom (by lacking a network of EV-skeptical dealerships, for instance), they also have no alternative revenue to cushion themselves through a period of soft demand — they can’t ever cross-subsidize. Although it sold buses and not private vehicles, the American EV-only vehicle maker Proterra is indicative here: It went bankrupt earlier this year after getting stuck halfway through the valley of death.
America is going to have a domestic EV industry. By the mid-2030s, most automakers will be integrated EV companies, building and selling electric vehicles that include some in-house hardware, software, and battery components. Consumers will think of their new vehicles more as technology than as a simple mode of transportation, and they will power them from ubiquitous charging stations, which will be as mundane and abundant as wall outlets are today.
That future is certain. But what kinds of cars will we be driving, and what companies will count themselves among the electric elect? I couldn’t tell you. It will all depend on what happens next — on who makes it across the narrow bridge.
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California energy companies are asking for permission to take in more revenue. Consumer advocates are having none of it.
There’s a seemingly obvious solution to expensive electricity bills: Cut utility profits.
Investor-owned utilities have to deliver profits to their shareholders to be able to raise capital for grid projects. That profit comes in the form of a markup you and I pay on our electricity bills. State regulators decide how much that mark-up is. What if they made it lower?
A growing body of evidence suggests they should at least consider it. In principle, the rate of return on equity, or ROE, that regulators allow utilities to charge should reflect the risk that equity investors are taking by putting their money in those utilities, but that relationship seems to have gotten out of whack. Among the first to draw attention to the issue was a 2019 paper by Carnegie Mellon researchers which found that since the 1990s, the average “risk premium” exhibited by utility ROEs as compared to relatively risk-free U.S. Treasury bonds has grown from 3% to nearly 8%.
“An error or bias of merely one percentage point in the allowed return would imply tens of billions of dollars in additional cost for ratepayers in the form of higher retail power prices,” the authors wrote.
Subsequent research reproduced and built on those findings, showing that a generous ROE creates a perverse incentive for utilities to increase their capital investments, leading to excess costs for consumers of $3 billion to $11 billion per year. Now, the ex-chief economist of a major U.S. utility company, Mark Ellis, is putting his own analysis out there, arguing that unreasonably high ROEs are costing U.S. energy customers $50 billion per year, or over $300 per household.
Not only does this hurt consumers, it also makes the energy transition more expensive and less politically palatable.
That’s what environmental and consumer advocates are worried about in California, where the Public Utility Commission is currently considering requests by the state’s four largest energy companies to raise each of their ROE. Utilities in the state have reported record profits amid a worsening affordability crisis. On Friday, the commission signaled that it would instead lower the companies’ ROE — although not nearly as much as advocates have recommended. A final decision is expected in December.
“It’s a joke,” Ellis, the former utility executive, told me of the commission proceedings. “If you read the proposed decision, they don’t address any of the facts or evidence in the case at all.” His own analysis, which he submitted to the California commission on behalf of the Sierra Club, proposes that an average ROE of 6%, down from about 10%, would be justified and has the potential to save California energy customers more than $6 billion per year.
Utilities, of course, disagree, and have brought their own analysis and warnings about the risks of lowering their ROE. Regulators are left to sort through it all to figure out the magic number — one large enough to appeal to investors, but not so large as to throw ratepayers under the bus.
How does the ROE work its way into your bill? Let’s say your local utility, The Electric Company, has a regulated return on equity of 10%, and it plans to spend $100 million to build new substations. Utilities typically finance these kinds of capital projects with a mix of debt (loans they will have to pay interest on) and equity (shares sold to investors). Then they recover that money from ratepayers over the course of decades. If The Electric Company raises half of the capital, or $50 million, via equity, an ROE of 10% means it will be able to charge ratepayers $5 million on top of the cost of the project. That additional $5 million is factored into the per-killowatt-hour rates that customers pay. The profit can then be reinvested into future projects, issued to shareholders as dividends, paid out to executives as bonuses — the list goes on.
The energy research group RMI, which agrees that the average utility ROE is much too high, estimates the surcharge currently makes up between 15% and 20%% of the average customer’s utility bill. “Setting ROEs at the right level is necessary to bring forward a rapid, just, and equitable transition,” RMI wrote.
Utilities, however, say the “right level” is likely higher, not lower. They warn that in reality, lowering their ROE would trigger a cascade of negative effects — credit downgrades, higher borrowing costs, lower stock prices, investors taking their money elsewhere — that would push energy rates up, not down. These effects would also make it more difficult for utilities to invest in projects to clean up and expand the electric grid.
Timothy Winter, the portfolio manager of a utility-focused fund at the investment firm Gabelli, told me this “virtuous cycle” runs in both directions. Higher ROEs lead to a lower cost of capital, which leads to more investment, better reliability, and lower rates, he argued. Winter said that if California regulators reduced utility ROEs to 6%, investors would flee the state.
Between growing wildfire risk and the bankruptcy of California’s largest utility, PG&E, California energy providers are too exposed to warrant such low returns, he said. As a comparison, he noted that U.S. Treasury bonds, which are generally viewed as risk-free, yield about 4%. “If it’s a 6% return with an equity risk, they’re not going to do it,” he said of investors.
I probed Winter a bit more on this. Is that really true given that utilities are still, in many ways, the opposite of risky investments? They have captive customers, stable income, and are seeing skyrocketing growth in demand for their product.
This caused him to spiral down into an investor’s worst nightmare scenario. “Yes, there is a risk,” he said. “If a regulator is willing to give a 6% return and they used to give 11%, how do I know they’re not going to decide, okay, rates keep going up, next rate case it’s going to be 4%?” After that, he said, how can investors be sure the government won’t end up taking over the utility altogether?
Travis Miller, a senior equity analyst at Morningstar, was more measured. He hesitated to tell me whether a 6% ROE would hurt utilities’ ability to raise capital. “What usually happens” when regulators lower the ROE, he said, “is the utilities just decide not to invest very much, so then they don’t have to raise capital.” He would expect the California utilities to “invest to maintain reliability and that’s about it,” meaning that “a lot of new data center build that is planned in California would have to go elsewhere.”
Return on equity also isn’t the only thing investors look at, Miller added. They consider the overall regulatory environment. Is it predictable? Is it transparent? He said there have been cases where regulators cut a utility’s ROE but the overall regulatory environment remained strong, and other instances where the cut to ROE was “another sign of a deteriorating relationship” — a phrase that brings to mind Winter’s panic about government takeovers. (I should note, advocates for public takeovers of utilities cite this whole dynamic around the need to woo investors and the perverse incentives it creates as a key justification for their cause. Publicly-owned utilities — which serve about 1 in 7 electricity customers in the U.S., including in large cities like Sacramento, Los Angeles, and Seattle — don’t charge an ROE.)
When I spoke to Ellis about his proposal, I fired off all of the utility arguments I could think of. Won’t utilities stop building stuff and making the investments we need them to make if they can’t earn as much? “They have a legal obligation to continue to invest,” he said. But will they be able to raise equity? They don’t necessarily need to raise new equity, he responded, suggesting that utilities could reinvest more of their profits rather than distributing the money as dividends. This is not how utilities traditionally operate, he admitted, but it’s an option.
Prior to taking up the consumer cause, Ellis spent 15 years in leadership and executive roles at Sempra Energy, the parent company of San Diego Gas and Electric and SoCal Gas — two of the companies that petitioned for higher ROE. “I know how they think about this issue,” he told me, asserting that the arguments the companies make to regulators do not match how they think about ROE internally.
During our interview, Ellis described the current state of utility regulation of ROE in California as “reprehensible,” “egregious,” “heartbreaking,” and “a huge injustice.”
In the analysis he submitted to the utility commission, Ellis not only makes the case that the average U.S. utility’s ROE is much higher than is necessary to attract capital, but also that the potential impacts to consumers of lowering it — i.e. the potential to hurt a utility’s credit rating and increase its cost of debt — would be outweighed by customer savings.
He argues that to justify their requests for higher ROEs, the utilities use forecasts from biased sources, cherry-pick and manipulate data, and make economically impossible assumptions, like that earnings will grow faster than GDP.
Stephen Jarvis, an assistant professor at the London School of Economics who has conducted research on ROE rates, has reached similar conclusions about them being excessively high. Nonetheless, he told me he sympathized with the challenge regulators face. He said there was no “right” answer for how to calculate the appropriate ROE. “Depending on the assumptions that you use, you can come up with quite different numbers for what a fair rate of return should be,” he said.
The sentiment echoes the preliminary decision the California Public Utilities Commission issued last week, when it observed that all of the proposals submitted in the proceeding were “dependent on subjective inputs and assumptions.”
Ellis said the decision contained a “smoking gun,” however, proving that the commission didn’t really do its job. Changes in ROE are supposed to reflect changes to a company’s risk profile, he said. The risk profile for Southern California Edison, which is facing lawsuits related to the Eaton Fire and already paying out hundreds of millions of dollars to survivors, has certainly changed in a different way than its peers. Regardless, the commission made the exact same recommendation for each utility to reduce ROE by 0.35%. “The Commission clearly is not looking at the evidence.”
There is likely some truth to that. “It’s more art than science,” Cliff Rechtschaffen, who served for six years on the California Public Utilities Commission, told me when I asked how the people in those seats attempt to calibrate ROE. He acknowledged there was a self-reinforcing element to the process — regulators look at where investors might go if the rate of return is too low, and use that to determine what the rate should be. “But the rates of return that are set in other jurisdictions are, in turn, influenced by the national utility market, which includes your own utility market,” he said.
Similarly, regulators rely on market analysts, investment advisors, investment bankers, and so on, who have an inherent interest in building up the market and ensuring healthy rates of return, he said. “That makes it harder to discern and do true price discovery.”
Rechtschaffen said he was glad that environmental and consumer advocates were bringing greater scrutiny to ROE, adding that it was the “right time” to do so. “Particularly in this environment where utilities have forecast that they’re going to be spending tens of billions of dollars on capital upgrades, do we need the same rates of return that we’ve seen?”
On ravenous data centers, treasured aluminum trash, and the drilling slump
Current conditions: The West Coast’s parade of storms continues with downpours along the California shoreline, threatening mudslides • Up to 10 inches of rain is headed for the Ozarks • Temperatures climbed beyond 50 degrees Fahrenheit in Greenland this week before beginning a downward slide.
The Department of Energy’s Loan Programs Office just announced a $1 billion loan to finance Microsoft’s restart of the functional Unit 1 reactor at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant. The funding will go to Constellation, the station’s owner, and cover the majority of the estimated $1.6 billion restart cost. If successful, it’ll likely be the nation’s second-ever reactor restart, assuming Holtec International’s revival of the Palisades nuclear plant goes as planned in the next few months. While the Trump administration has rebranded several loans brokered under its predecessor, this marks the first completely new deal sanctioned by the Trump-era LPO, a sign of Energy Secretary Chris Wright’s recent pledge to focus funding on nuclear projects. It’s also the first-ever LPO loan to reach conditional commitment and financial close on the same day.
“Constellation’s restart of a nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania will provide affordable, reliable, and secure energy to Americans across the Mid-Atlantic region,” Wright said in a statement. “It will also help ensure America has the energy it needs to grow its domestic manufacturing base and win the AI race.” Constellation’s stock soared in after-hours trading in response to the news. Holtec’s historic first restart in Michigan got the green light from regulators to come back online in July, as I reported in this newsletter at the time. But already another company is lining up to turn its defunct reactor back on: As I reported here in August, utility giant NextEra wants to revive its Duane Arnold nuclear station in Iowa. The push to restart older reactors reflects a growing need for electricity long before new reactors can come online. Meanwhile, next-generation reactors are plowing ahead. The nuclear startup Valar Atomics claimed this week to achieve criticality long before the July 4 deadline set in an Energy Department competition.
Over the next five years, American demand for electricity is set to grow by the equivalent of 15 times the peak demand of the entirety of New York City. That’s according to the latest annual forecast from the consultancy Grid Strategies. The growth — roughly sixfold what was forecast in 2022 — comes overwhelmingly from data centers, as shown by which regions expect the largest growth:

“The fact that these facilities are city-sized is a huge deal,” John Wilson, Grid Strategies’ vice president and the report’s lead author, told Canary Media. “That has huge implications if these facilities get canceled, or they get built and don’t have long service lives.” Mounting political opposition to data centers could make deals less certain. A Heatmap Pro survey in September found just 44% of Americans would welcome a data center opening nearby. And last week I wrote about how progressives in Congress are rallying around a crackdown on data centers.
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The contrast couldn’t be starker. In Washington, President Donald Trump rolled out the red carpet for Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, offering an opulent welcome to the White House and lashing out at reporters who asked about September 11 or the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. In Belém, Brazil, meanwhile, former Vice President Al Gore tore into the team of delegates Saudi Arabia sent to the United Nations climate summit for “flexing its muscles” in negotiations about how to shift away from oil and gas. “Saudi Arabia appears to be determined to veto the effort to solve the climate crisis, only to protect their lavish income from selling the fossil fuels that are the principal cause of the climate crisis,” Gore told the Financial Times. “I hope that the rest of the world will stand up to this obscene greed and recklessness on the part of the kingdom.”
But the Trump meeting could yield some progress on clean energy. Among the top issues the White House listed in its read-out of the summit was the push to export American atomic energy technology to Saudi Arabia as the country looks to follow the United Arab Emirates in embracing nuclear power.
Facing growing needs for domestic sources of metal for the energy transition, the European Union is seeing its trash as treasure. On Tuesday, the European Commission proposed restricting exports of aluminum scrap amid what The Wall Street Journal called “concerns that rising outflows of the resource could leave Europe short of a critical input for its decarbonization efforts.” Speaking at the European Aluminum Summit, EU trade chief Maros Sefcovic referred to the exports as “leakage.” The proposal wouldn’t fully block sales of aluminum scrap overseas, but would adopt a “balanced” measure that ensures sufficient supplies and competitive prices in the single market. “Scrap is a strategic commodity given its important contribution to circularity and decarbonization, as production from secondary materials releases less emissions and is less energy intensive, as well as to our strategic autonomy,” Sefcovic said. The measure is set to be adopted by spring 2026.
In the U.S., the Biden administration made what Heatmap’s Matthew Zeitlin last year called a “big bet” on aluminum. The Trump administration slapped steep new tariffs on imported aluminum, though as our colleague Katie Brigham wrote, “aluminum producers rely on imports of these same materials to build their own plants. Tariffs on these vital construction materials — plus exorbitant levies on all goods from China — will make building new production facilities significantly costlier.”

The average number of active rigs per month that are drilling for oil and natural gas in the continental United States fell steadily over the past year. As of last month, the U.S. had 517 rigs in operation, down from a peak of 750 in the end of 2022. The number of oil-pumping rigs dropped 33% to 397 rigs, while gas-pumping rigs slid 23% to 120 rigs over the same period from December 2022 to October 2025. While the Energy Information Administration said the declining rig count “reflects operators’ responses to declining crude oil and natural gas prices,” the federal research agency said it’s also “improvement in drilling efficiencies,” meaning companies are getting more fuel out of existing wells.
It’s been a pattern in recent research on sustainability. Scientists look at methods that Indigenous groups have maintained as traditions only to find that approaches that have sustained throughout centuries or millennia are finding new value now. A study by the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa’s Hawaiʻi Institute of Marine Biology found that Native Hawaiian aquaculture systems — essentially fish ponds known as loko iʻa — effectively shielded fish populations from the negative impacts of climate change, demonstrating resilience and bolstering local food security. “Our study is one of the first in academic literature to compare the temperatures between loko iʻa and the surrounding bay and how these temperature differences may be reflected in potential fish productivity,” lead author Annie Innes-Gold, a recent PhD graduate from the university, said in a press release. “We found that although rising water temperature may lead to declines in fish populations, loko iʻa fish populations were more resilient.”
Rob and Jesse talk data center finance with the Center for Public Enterprise’s Advait Arun.
The boom in artificial intelligence has become entangled with the clean energy industry over the past 18 months. Tech companies are willing to pay a lot for electricity — especially reliable zero-carbon electricity — and utilities and energy companies have been scrambling to keep up.
But is that boom more like a bubble? And if so, what does that mean for the long-term viability of AI companies and data center developers, and for the long-term health of decarbonization?
On this week’s Shift Key, we’re talking to Advait Arun, a senior associate for capital markets at the Center for Public Enterprise, about his new report on the market dynamics at play in the data center buildout. What kind of bets are these AI companies making? How likely are they to pay off? And if they don’t, who stands to lose big? Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap, and Jesse Jenkins, a professor of energy systems engineering at Princeton University.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
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Here is an excerpt from our conversation:
Robinson Meyer: Advait, you’ve done a — we’ve done a great job of kind of dancing around maybe the biggest question of the report — and I would say you do a very good job of playing coy about it in the report, where the report’s titled “Bubble or Nothing.” You actually don’t come out and say whether you think this is a bubble or not.
And of course, it’s kind of a weird bubble, too, because there hasn’t been a moment where these leaps in equity valuations for the hyperscalers has happened where people haven’t been like, Boy, it looks kind of bubbly. And if you remember back to the 20-teens too, people were worried about a tech bubble then, too. And it turned out that it wasn’t a tech bubble, it was just a rapidly growing and healthy part of the economy. And so what I wanted to ask you, Advait, was, number one, did you walk away from this and from your conversations with investors and creditors, policymakers, thinking it was a bubble? And number two, is this unusual that we have a bubble and we can’t stop talking about how bubbly it looks? Or is this a new type of bubble where there’s a bubble happening and we all know it’s a bubble?
Advait Arun: Ooh. I will not personally say whether or not I think this is a bubble. I do think, though, that the fact that so much of our attention is centralized around it, it testifies to a new way of the real media’s relationship with the economy — and not even the media just in general, but the fact that the federal government is interested in this being the next industry of the future. The fact that I think we haven’t had too much else to talk about in economic news due to the dominance of the hyperscalers and Mag Seven in the market, the fact that they’re the collateral for improvements in the energy system, and even some people are blaming them for the affordability crisis. I think it’s very easy to get into a headspace where we’re all paying rapt attention to the day-to-day stock movements of these companies. I don’t know what it was like, necessarily, to be following the news and the dot-com bubble, but I do certainly think that the amount that we’ve all been talking about it at the same time is very striking to me.
I think it’s important, as well, to recognize that bubbles have psychological motivations, more so than just pure economic motivations. Of course, from the perspective of a policymaker and someone who’s done credit analysis for stuff, I obviously look at these firms and look at their lack of revenue and think, This is dangerous. This could be getting over their skis. But a lot of companies have gone through this point and made it out. That’s not to say that these companies will or won’t, but the fact that so much of the market moves in response to the leading tech companies, there’s a degree of asset centrality and crowding, and extremely high relative values relative to historical values. It makes me think that there’s something to watch out for, anchored by the fact that a lot of the people leading this investment boom, whether it’s the federal government seeking to promote it or whether it’s the leaders of these companies, the CEOs envisioning some kind of vastly different future for the economy. There’s a psychology to it — I think Keynes would call it ‘animal spirits’ — that’s pushing this investment boom the way that it’s going.
Mentioned:
Advait’s report: Bubble or Nothing: Data Center Project Finance
Previously on Shift Key: A Skeptic’s Take on AI and Energy Growth
Jesse’s upshift; Rob’s downshift.
This episode of Shift Key is sponsored by …
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Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.