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There isn’t one EV transition. There are two.

This has not been a good week for the electric-vehicle transition. On Wednesday, General Motors scrapped a self-imposed plan of building 400,000 electric vehicles by the middle of next year. Then it jettisoned plans with Honda to build a sub-$30,000 EV. On Thursday, Mercedes Benz announced that its profits had fallen in part due to turbulence in the EV market, and Hertz ditched a plan to have EVs make up 25% of its fleet by 2024.
Nor has the past month been much better. Ford has slowed down its EV factory build-out. Elon Musk announced that Tesla was taking a wait-and-see approach to opening its next plant, in Mexico, and The Wall Street Journal has reported that EV demand is proving weaker than once expected. Higher interest rates and, perhaps, a continued lack of public chargers now seem to be impairing the EV transition.
It’s an odd time, because while the day-to-day news is bad, the overall trend remains good — surprisingly good, even. More than 1 million EVs have been sold in America this year, and the country is likely to record 50% year-over-year EV market growth for two years in a row. That is not the usual sign of an industry in trouble. The industry is faltering, yes, but only compared to the rapid scale-up that companies once aimed for — and that the Paris Agreement’s climate targets demand. And at a global level, the news is better: The economics of batteries and trends in the Chinese and European markets leave little doubt that EVs will eventually win.
So how to make sense of this moment? Automakers, it seems, are not doubting whether the EV transition will happen; they are pausing to figure out how best to proceed. Journalists often talk about the “EV transition,” but this is something of a misnomer — there are really at least two different transitions, two different bridges to the EV future.
One of those transitions must be navigated by the legacy automakers, such as Ford and GM. The other must be completed by the new electric-only upstarts, such as Tesla and Rivian. Both transitions are, today, half-complete. What is notable about this moment is that both transitions are also in flux — and the companies and executives tasked with navigating them are struggling with their next steps.
The first bridge must be built by Ford, GM, Toyota, Volkswagen, and every other legacy automaker heavily invested in the U.S. market. You can think of it as a bridge made of cross-subsidies — subsidies not from the government, but from other cars in their product line.
Right now, many automakers earn their biggest profits by selling big, gas-burning vehicles: crossovers, SUVs, and pickup trucks. They lose money, meanwhile, on each EV that they sell. So over the next few years, these companies must take the huge profits from their SUV-and-truck business and reinvest them into scaling up their EV business.
You can see how difficult this will be by looking at Ford, which conveniently reports earnings from its internal combustion business separately from its electric vehicle business. During the first half of 2023, Ford’s global gas and hybrid sales earned $4.9 billion before interest or taxes. Ford’s EV business, meanwhile, lost $1.8 billion before interest or taxes.
During this same period, Ford sold nearly half a million trucks and SUVs in the U.S. alone, and roughly 25,000 electric vehicles. By one calculation, Ford lost $60,000 for every EV that it sold during the first quarter of this year.
This is the narrow bridge that Ford and its ilk must walk: They must remain mature businesses, delivering consistent profits to shareholders, even as they overhaul their entire product line and manufacturing system. And while these legacy automakers have certain advantages — brand cachet, a network of dealerships, and an understanding of how to make car bodies — they lack the deep familiarity with software or battery chemistries that underpin the EV business. What’s more, their current business rests on uneasy foundations: Because their profits are so heavily concentrated in just a few SUVs and trucks, a sudden shift in consumer tastes, fuel prices, or regulation could undercut their whole hustle.
We’ve already seen one consequence of this concentration in the United Autoworkers strike. By focusing its strikes on just a few factories at first, and then gradually expanding them to include each company’s most profitable facilities, the UAW was able to make its strike fund go further than outside commentators initially estimated. That strategy resulted in record high pay raises for workers in the UAW’s tentative deal with Ford; strikes continue at GM and Stellantis.
But this is, of course, only the first bridge to the EV future. Other companies — including Tesla, Rivian, and the early-stage EV startups Canoo and Fisker — have to build a different path across the river. You can think of this as the bridge of scaling up, although some auto-industry analysts give it a different name: crossing the EV valley of death.
These companies have to survive long enough to build up economies of scale. You can think of it this way: At the beginning of an EV company’s lifespan, it knows very little about how to mass-produce its EVs, but it has a lot of cash to burn. As it matures, it gets better at making EVs and grows its customer base, and it makes cars more frequently and more cheaply. Eventually, it reaches a point where it can sell lots of EVs for more money than they cost to make — that is, it can be a mature, profitable business.
But in the middle, it faces a hold-your-breath moment where its high costs can overwhelm its meager production. This is the valley of death, “the challenging period between developing a product and large-scale production, when a company isn’t earning much if any revenue, but operating and capital costs are high,” as the journalist Steve Levine puts it at The Information.
Nearly every EV company faces this problem to some extent right now. Elon Musk discussed it during a recent rambling Tesla earnings call. “People do not understand what is truly hard. That’s why I say prototypes are easy. Production is hard,” he said. “Going from a prototype to volume production is like 10,000% harder… than to make the prototype in the first place.”
Now, Tesla seems to have mostly cleared the valley of death with its Model 3 and Model Y this year, allowing it to undertake a campaign of aggressive price cuts that have increased demand while retaining some profitability.
But what Musk was talking about — and what Tesla is clearly struggling with — is the Cybertruck, which will debut next month after a multi-year delay. Musk warned that the company had “dug its own grave” by trying to build the Cybertruck and that there would be “enormous challenges” in producing it profitably and at scale.
But “this is simply normal,” he added. “When you've got a product with a lot of new technology or any brand-new vehicle program, but especially one that is as different and advanced as the Cybertruck, you will have problems proportionate to how many new things you're trying to solve at scale.”
Every other EV company finds itself on the same narrow bridge. Rivian, for instance, is somewhere further behind Tesla in general but is fast making up ground. It scaled up its production of its R1T and R1S models last quarter faster than analysts thought, but was at last report still losing money on each vehicle. Rivian’s CEO, R.J. Scaringe, told me that the company is focusing on making its next line of vehicles, the R2 series, easier and simpler to manufacture to avoid this problem.
Even further behind Rivian are Fisker, which claims to have delivered 5,000 of its Ocean SUVs, and Canoo, which is struggling to stay solvent.
What’s hard about this moment, then, is that the downsides and risks of each approach have never been clearer.
If a legacy company completes its EV transition too quickly, then it risks finding itself with a fleet of electric vehicles that the public isn’t ready to buy. Companies like Ford, GM, Volkswagen, and Toyota must scale up a profitable EV product line at the same time that they sell vehicles from their legacy business.
Worldwide, no historic automaker has transitioned fully to making battery-electric vehicles, although some have come very close: BYD, the Chinese automaker that has surpassed Tesla as the world’s biggest producer of EVs, opted to quit making internal-combustion vehicles last year, but it still sells plug-in hybrids. Volvo, too, is making an attempt: It has promised to stop selling internal-combustion cars by 2030. But Volvo is owned by the Chinese automaker Geely, meaning that both of these companies can sell their cars to a much larger and more EV-interested Chinese domestic market.
Yet the second transition is tough, too. Although it may seem that EV-only companies have a lot of freedom (by lacking a network of EV-skeptical dealerships, for instance), they also have no alternative revenue to cushion themselves through a period of soft demand — they can’t ever cross-subsidize. Although it sold buses and not private vehicles, the American EV-only vehicle maker Proterra is indicative here: It went bankrupt earlier this year after getting stuck halfway through the valley of death.
America is going to have a domestic EV industry. By the mid-2030s, most automakers will be integrated EV companies, building and selling electric vehicles that include some in-house hardware, software, and battery components. Consumers will think of their new vehicles more as technology than as a simple mode of transportation, and they will power them from ubiquitous charging stations, which will be as mundane and abundant as wall outlets are today.
That future is certain. But what kinds of cars will we be driving, and what companies will count themselves among the electric elect? I couldn’t tell you. It will all depend on what happens next — on who makes it across the narrow bridge.
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On routs begetting routs, Google’s second CCS project, and Poland’s nuclear progress
Current conditions: Late-week downpours and cooler temperatures are sweeping into the American Northeast • Record floods swelled the river in McCaysville, Georgia, near the border with Tennessee, to the point that residents needed aerial rescue • The hottest place on Earth today is Tete, Mozambique, a northwestern city where temperatures are nearing 110 degrees Fahrenheit.
Democrats’ electoral rout of the GOP is giving way to a Wall Street rout on artificial intelligence stocks. The stock market wiped out $2.5 trillion from Asian chipmakers, Texas power producers, New Jersey compute providers, Silicon Valley software giants, and data center developers amid an “AI reality check” that The Wall Street Journal called an “historic rout of tech stocks.” CNBC, meanwhile, called the selloff the great “tech wreck.”
As I wrote yesterday, nearly half of proposed data centers in the country are in states set to be ruled by governors who vowed to crack down on the industry. Texas, where data centers are booming, just elected its first Democratic governor in a generation. Governor-elect Gina Hinojosa, as my colleague Matthew Zeitlin wrote yesterday, campaigned on putting a moratorium on new projects until the legislature could pass new restrictions through law.

Exxon Mobil’s offshore oil bet in Guyana is booming, and Chevron’s gamble on Venezuela reopening is paying off. Both American oil giants are eyeing new patches in South America and Africa, as I previously reported. Shell, on the other hand, is looking further north in the Western Hemisphere. The Anglo-Dutch major has bid $150 million for licenses off the coast of Canada’s Newfoundland and Labrador. Upstream described the offer as “big exploration dollars.”
The move comes as Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney looks to transform the country into an energy superpower in hopes of gaining leverage over the U.S. following President Donald Trump’s repeated threats to absorb Canada as the 51st state.
Hopes of passing the Senate’s permitting reform deal have dimmed since Democrats pulled off the party’s biggest legislative victory in half a century this week. The win emboldened progressive critics of the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act who want to put off voting to hold out for a bill with fewer benefits to fossil fuels. But the legislation’s supporters are still pushing for a vote before the next Congress arrives in January. New polling suggests the bill has purchase among voters. In a nationwide survey of 1,000 registered voters taken in the last week of October, 79% of respondents expressed support for the bill after an initial description. After hearing arguments against the legislation, including that it would “rush environmental reviews” and help “big corporations” to “override local communities,” support dropped to 66%.
The poll, commissioned by the centrist think tank Third Way and shared exclusively with me for this newsletter, shows that “Americans want more affordable, reliable energy, and they see the value in legislation that could help deliver it,” analysts Mary Sagatelova and Ryan Fitzpatrick wrote in a memo. Yet the findings come as opposition to the bill mounts. On Thursday night, a spokesperson for the likely next Speaker of the House, Hakeem Jeffries of New York, told Politico reporter Nico Portuondo that the bill “falls short in several areas,” and that the Democrat would not “rubber stamp” the Senate’s deal.
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Google is building its first data center in Wyoming, powered by a 702-megawatt fuel cell and linear generator that uses natural gas fuel paired with carbon capture technology. On Thursday, the Alphabet-owned tech giant confirmed its plans to back the facility as part of a $17 billion investment in the Cowboy State. American Electric Power, the utility it’s partnering with on the project, announced the plans last month. If successful, the project would be Google’s second foray into carbon capture and sequestration technology. As my colleague Matthew Zeitlin reported last year, the company got into the CCS game with plans to build a project at a site in Illinois.
Poland’s plan to build its first nuclear power plant with three Westinghouse AP1000s reached a key milestone Thursday as the state-owned developer behind the project inked a deal for the reactor components. Japanese engineering giant IHI Corporation confirmed to World Nuclear News that it had received a long lead-time order from Westinghouse for the first reactor at the plant. The move comes a month after Polskie Elektrownie Jądrowe, the state-backed company building the nuclear station on its Baltic coast, gave Westinghouse the go-ahead to start ordering parts, which I told you about at the time. A week later, PEJ formally started the bidding process for a second nuclear plant.
Poland’s nascent push into geothermal energy largely stalled last year. But Warsaw granted the city of Kutno in central Łódź Voivodeship about $15 million from the National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management to support construction of a geothermal heating plant. The facility would have a maximum output of about 6.4 megawatts-thermal. Once complete, the plant would provide nearly half of Kutno’s heat, according to ThinkGeoEnergy. Cash-strapped France, meanwhile, has suspended applications for a government program meant to support clean methods for producing heat.
Cybertruck, we hardly new ye. Tesla CEO Elon Musk announced during the wee hours of Friday morning that the company would wind down production of the controversial electric truck by the middle of next year. Though Musk predicted before its release that sales could reach 250,000 per year or more, customers failed to embrace the hulking, angular vehicles — Electrek estimates that Tesla sold fewer than 8,000 Cybertrucks in the third quarter of 2026. The company plans to refocus production at its Texas Gigafactory on the self-driving Cybercab, which began offering rides in Austin, Texas, at the beginning of September.
Here are four ways they can get it right.
On Tuesday, voters handed Democrats control of both the House and the Senate and flipped control of numerous governorships and state legislatures throughout the country. Its clear affordability was high among their concerns. Gas cost more than on any Election Day on record, and electricity bills keep climbing as demand grows faster than it has in decades.
Democrats now have a mandate to lower energy costs by building more homegrown clean energy, a chance to stop the administration from blocking new projects, and an opportunity to begin building a post-Trump American energy policy. Yet the president still holds veto power and control over federal agencies, diminished though they may be. The next administration will inherit a federal government that has been largely hollowed out, its agencies stripped of much of their staff, expertise, and institutional knowledge.
That puts states at the center of what comes next. A new class of governors and state lawmakers — including six new Democratic trifectas — will take office in 2027 ready to act on energy affordability. Given the limited opportunities in Washington, federal lawmakers will need to rely on state governments to advance an effective national energy agenda, both now and under the next administration. The question before them is how to design policy with that in mind from the start.
The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act offers both a model and a warning. The IRA has been transformative, catalyzing hundreds of billions of dollars in clean energy investment, supporting good jobs and domestic manufacturing, and driving economic growth nationwide. But with hindsight, one clear shortcoming emerges: Federal decision-makers too often treated states as grant recipients rather than institutional partners capable of deploying capital and shaping energy markets. This attitude hampered the law’s speed, effectiveness, and durability.
For instance, to implement the law’s Home Energy Rebates — an $8.8 billion program designed to operate through state energy offices and deliver energy efficiency and cost savings for consumers — the Department of Energy required states to navigate an unusually complex approval process. Many states had to hire outside consultants just to apply. Nearly five years after the law’s passage, only a handful have gotten their projects off the ground. The ambitions were real; the architecture made them slow.
The Environmental Protection Agency’s $20 billion Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund offers a similar lesson. The GGRF was inspired by the growth of state and local green banks, and like them was designed to provide low-cost financing to clean energy projects throughout the country. Those same state-level green banks with local market knowledge and lending experience were well-positioned to deploy capital into local projects, yet they did not receive program funding directly. In consequence, only a small number of existing green banks received a small amount of this funding — less than 10% of the total available — before the Trump administration froze the program in its entirety. DOE’s Loan Programs Office, meanwhile, had $40 billion in authority to loan to state energy financing institutions, but it executed zero such loans.
These aren’t isolated examples. They’re symptoms of a systematic failure by the federal government to treat states as partners in the process of designing and implementing policy. In recent years the federal government has generally engaged with governors and state policymakers through intergovernmental affairs offices staffed with political appointees that treat states more like stakeholders to be managed than governing partners.
State governments are the machinery through which energy policy becomes real. They regulate utilities. Their laws govern the siting and permitting of energy infrastructure, including the data centers now reshaping electricity demand. They oversee housing and land use. And they run the economic development and financing agencies that work to expand local economies. Policies built around these state institutions can move faster, deliver greater local benefits, and last longer — especially as federal policy careens in wildly different directions every few years. Had the federal-state partnership been stronger from the start, IRA funding might have been deployed more quickly and delivered impact sooner in both red and blue districts, making it much more difficult for the Trump administration to roll back these policies.
For Democrats looking to advance an agenda that can deliver more affordable, reliable and clean energy, there’s never been a better time for this partnership, given the 30 governorships their party will hold starting in 2027 — the most in over 30 years.
So, looking ahead, what should happen next time?
Invest in state capacity quickly. For all their powerful authorities, state agencies often lack budget and staff capacity. The IRA mostly routed its dollars around them through tax credits, federal loans, and competitive grants. The few programs it did run through states, such as the home energy rebates, came with detailed federal requirements. Those safeguards were well intentioned, meant to protect consumers and guarantee results. But they assumed a capacity states never had the funding to build.
Formula funding, by contrast, is a no-regrets strategy to build that capacity. These are funds designed by federal lawmakers to be dispersed to all states based on a numeric formula (e.g. population or other appropriate quantitative metric), and are generally made to be easy for states to access. For example, DOE’s State Energy Program has delivered formula grants to all state energy offices, helping to fund their operations for over 40 years. According to the National Association of State Energy Officials, each federal dollar distributed through the program has leveraged more than $10 in state and private investment. EPA’s Clean Air Act programs similarly provide flexible grants to state environmental agencies. Future legislation should multiply the amounts of formula funding available in the IRA and streamline access. It should also pair these efforts with competitive funding that rewards cutting-edge state policies and cross-state collaborations that move industries and markets toward cleaner technologies.
Capitalize state financing institutions directly. States have long managed infrastructure finance, from the 1960s birth of housing finance agencies, to clean water state revolving funds, to federal funding for surface transportation infrastructure — all of which is now intrinsic to how infrastructure is built in this country. That model should now also anchor the next generation of clean energy infrastructure finance — for states to drive locally-impactful projects and economic development. DOE’s authority to lend to state institutions also remains intact.
Leverage state authority where it’s strongest. State public utilities commissions have a longstanding role in regulating the nation’s electric utilities. Federal policymakers should use this to their advantage, providing federal grants to expand PUC staff and expert capacity to oversee utility planning and rate cases. The State Energy Oversight Act, for example, would provide formula funding to state public utility commissions for financial and technical assistance. In addition to supporting their day-to-day role in utility regulation, this could also empower commissions to ensure that new federal tax incentives and investments deliver effective ratepayer relief — a true federal-state partnership that delivers on energy affordability.
States are also closest to the siting, permitting, and interconnection barriers now constraining low-cost clean energy expansion. The next generation of federal energy legislation should build upon and help proliferate state policy innovations like Michigan’s Renewable Ready Communities program, which helps local governments buy into locating energy developments in their towns, and Texas’s connect-and-manage interconnection process, which adds new energy faster than any other U.S. grid.
At the same time, federal policymakers shouldn’t ask states to lead delivery of every program. Where incentives can clearly benefit individual consumers and companies and reorient markets toward more affordable clean technologies, direct federal incentives — especially the IRS’s existing tax filing infrastructure — can be more efficient than new state programs built from scratch. The federal government also has a critical role to play in supporting technology innovation and expediting permitting for projects that cross state lines.
Finally, future federal leaders must prioritize clarity, simplicity, and speed. The next energy legislation should streamline requirements and include real deadlines, backed by deep White House engagement with governors of both parties. That should include stronger regional federal staff support — for example the EPA maintains regional offices throughout the country, while DOE does not. This agenda must also be led by senior officials with genuine authority, not those buried in an intergovernmental affairs office.
States haven’t waited. Green banks now operate all across the country. Forty-five states have built climate plans that are ready to be acted upon. Twenty-four states are committed to achieving 100% clean energy. And this week’s elections have delivered new state leaders ready to build a more affordable energy economy. States are already building America’s energy future. Washington’s job, next time, is to trust them — and build alongside them.
The gains set up Democrats to potentially flip the utility commission in 2028.
The blue wave has officially reached the Arizona down ballot. Though two Democratic wins in the Arizona Corporation Commissioner race might not drum up the same national coverage as, say, flipping a Senate seat in South Carolina, the election of Clara Pratte and Jonathon Hill to the five-seat commission could have major energy implications in a state that already saw renewables champions take over the state’s largest utility earlier this year. (With close margins in slow-to-count Arizona, the ACC race wasn’t officially called until Thursday evening, when both Republicans conceded.)
Arizona is one of 10 states that elects its utility commissioners, with the ACC regulating private water, gas, and electric companies in the state. That includes overseeing Arizona Public Service and Tucson Electric Power, where bills have increased 52% and 10%, respectively, over the past five years, per Heatmap’s data. (The publicly owned Salt River Project, which serves much of the Phoenix area, operates largely without ACC oversight.)
The ACC has been wholly in Republican hands since 2024; during that time, the body repealed Arizona’s Electric Efficiency Standards, which had incentivized utilities to pursue energy efficiency programs, as well as the state’s Renewable Energy Standard and Tariff, which supported the build-out of solar and wind power. “They were a rubber stamp for all our utilities and refused to even consider anything in support of protecting our climate,” Arizona State Representative Brian Garcia, who was reelected on Tuesday, said during a press call with Lead Locally this week. “At one instant, one of the commissioners told someone who got sick from the heat — who turned off their power and their AC — ‘Well, that’s on them.’ And I think our state and our communities have had enough of that.”
Though the ACC remains under Republican control despite the two Democratic additions, it puts full control within a one-seat striking distance for progressives when the other three seats are up in 2028 — a much easier fight to win, and potentially a huge one, given that the party hasn’t controlled the ACC since 1997.
Of particular concern in 2026, though, was the development of data centers. Ralph Heap, a Republican in the race who made the League of Conservation Voters’ 12-person “worst of the worst” list out of all 6,342 seats up for grabs nationwide on Tuesday, previously told the Arizona Capitol Times he supports the data center build-out in the name of American AI dominance. Incumbent Republican Kevin Thompson, meanwhile, has argued that the commission “has done its job of shielding ratepayers from costs associated with servicing data centers and other large load users.”
Voters evidently disagreed, backing Hill and Pratte, who say they support a data center moratorium. “The Corporation Commission might not be able to implement a pause, but I think they can certainly be a clearinghouse for information,” Hill told Yellow Sheet Report, an Arizona political tipsheet, acknowledging the relatively limited role the ACC actually has in regulating data centers beyond demanding transparency of utilities’ energy service agreements.
There are other concerns, too. Climate organizers zeroed in on the ACC race because of its influence over the solar buildout in the nation’s sunniest state, where nevertheless six of the state’s 15 counties have a restrictive ordinance against the resource, Heatmap Pro data shows. Commissioner-elect Pratte, a member of the Navajo Nation and the first Indigenous person elected to statewide office in Arizona, is also the co-founder of Navajo Power, a clean-energy company that helps tribal nations develop solar energy and storage projects.
Arizona Public Service and Tucson Electric Power also both have pending rate increase requests under review by the ACC; a 14% rate increase for residential customers and a 45% or more increase for data centers in the case of APS, and a 10% increase for residential customers in the case of TEP. (The APS’ rate case will likely be decided in December, before Pratte and Hill take their seats.)
Additionally, State Senator Lauren Kuby has introduced a bill to change the name of the ACC to the Arizona Public Utility Commission, a move intended to highlight to voters “its significance to their daily lives,” as she told the Arizona Capitol Times earlier this year. Sure enough, John Qua, the campaign director at Lead Locally, and Caroline Spears, the executive director of Climate Cabinet, previously told my colleague Matthew Zeitlin that part of the trouble with supporting progressive candidates in the ACC race was communicating to Arizona voters that, like the race for governor, it is a partisan election.
But given how things turned out Tuesday nationwide — a referendum on cost-of-living and, perhaps, data centers — it seems they needn’t have worried. Arizonans worked out exactly who to blame.