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The Republican Party isn’t pro-pollution, it’s just anti-anti-climate change.
At 9 p.m. ET on June 27, Americans who haven’t already set their out-of-office responders or hit the road to beat summer weekend traffic or otherwise made plans more exciting than watching two old men insult each other might find themselves tuning into the first presidential debate.
It does not promise to be a particularly productive evening of television, however. Weekly Economist/YouGov polls conducted online since last April show that of the 49,000 voters who responded, just 3% of respondents voted for one candidate in 2020 and plan to vote for the other in 2024. (Of those swing voters, two-thirds have flipped to Trump.) The 2024 election is already so politically calcified that a night of persuasive television is unlikely to change additional minds, to say nothing of two hours of petty sniping. Although, the only thing more difficult than changing someone’s mind about Biden or Trump might be changing their mind about climate change — a similarly key facet of political identity, regardless of the facts.
Nothing has the potential to highlight both the spectacle and the farce of this whole election quite like a back-and-forth on the debate stage over Biden’s climate legacy. Trump has spent the past several months on the campaign trail hammering his opponent on everything from offshore wind to electric vehicles, dishwashers, and gas stoves. The bashing has little to do with the actual policies, but rather with the idea of climate policy itself.
The modern Republican Party has “managed to define almost all aspects of environmentalism — even just future concern for other people’s welfare — as not a virtue anymore but a sign of weakness,” Riley Dunlap, a professor emeritus of environmental sociology at Oklahoma State University, put it to me. Heatmap columnist Paul Waldman recently dubbed this kind of political positioning “anti-anti-climate change” — not in favor environmental degradation per se, but certainly against anyone trying to stop it. Trump is merely an exemplar of a greater shift on the right — traceable also to Wyoming Senator John Barrasso, Wisconsin Senator Ron Johnson, and on down to dozens of state attorneys general suing to roll back the Biden administration’s climate policies — moving “the conversation from the real problem onto the supposedly oppressive efforts to solve it.”
It’s a phenomenon I’ve observed, too, in my writing about how Republicans have evolved from the denial and skepticism strategies of the 1990s and early 2000s to today’s more underhanded tactics. Why bother getting hung up on the specifics of what is causing global warming or if it’s happening (especially when popular belief in the scientific consensus is at an all-time high) when you can focus on how the elites in Washington want to control how you drive, eat, invest, and cook, instead?
Jay Turner, a professor of environmental studies at Wellesley College and the author of The Republican Reversal: Conservatives and the Environment from Nixon to Trump, told me the politicization of climate change has been building for more than a decade. He traced the strategy back to around the 2010 midterms, when the populist, anti-government Tea Party movement — today mostly remembered for opposition to Obama-era federal healthcare reforms — also took aim at climate change. With the backing of the libertarian advocacy group Americans for Prosperity (funded by petrochemical billionaires Charles and David Koch), the movement helped kill the bipartisan cap-and-trade Waxman-Markey Bill, which up to that point had been the biggest climate bill ever to pass a chamber of Congress.
“A culture of freedom and abundance is something that is very American,” Turner told me. “The idea that we’re going to curb fossil fuels or are transitioning our economy because of an abstract environmental threat” runs counter to what many feel the flag stands for.
Republicans, especially those angling for a national audience, have found traction with voters exploiting this perceived threat. The general public isn’t terribly energy literate, so politicians “can kind of make up stuff like, ‘They’re going to make you use these terrible toilets, they’re gonna force you to get an electric car, they’re going to force you just start eating fake meat,’” Dunlap, the Oklahoma State professor, said. “The message is, ‘These people are out to get you, and we’re fighting for you.’”
This dialog presents a problem for Biden, who has not only enacted numerous climate policies, but who also now faces the daunting task of explaining to voters what all of them are. But by opening a second, substantively unrelated front in the climate conversation, Trump and other Republicans have wrenched the message away from liberal-coded ideas that are, in fact, popular across a broad spectrum of voters and toward more solid conservative ground.
“Most Republican voters still want clean air and clean water and a healthy climate,” is how David Pomerantz, the executive director of the Energy and Policy Institute, a utilities watchdog, put it to me. “But if they’re able to cast this messaging in ways that are anti-government, anti-elitist, and anti-somebody-telling-you-what-you-have-to-do, then they think that can be an effective strategy.”
It’s working. As Biden has paused approving construction permits for new liquefied natural gas export terminals (which is also a clean-air issue) and argued for diversifying American energy (an economic one), Republicans have doubled down on their anti-anti-climate bona fides. “I don’t know if this is an actual term anyone uses, but it might be more accurate to say they are ‘vice signaling’ because it’s like, ‘Yeah, we’re for the bad thing because it’s a way to own the libs,’” Pomerantz said. There is often a healthy amount of irony in these sorts of controversies, such as Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis’ crusade against gas stoves that are used by less than 10% of Floridians, or a ban on lab-grown meat, which isn’t even available in the U.S.
The “obvious and boring” thing for Biden, his team, and others to do in the face of such bluster is “to just say the true thing over and over,” Pomerantz went on. But he also noted that climate advocates like EPI must make clear “not only when people are lying or purveying disinformation, but why.” If Trump hits Biden over energy or drilling, for example, the president could counter by raising Trump’s recent closed-door dealings with oil executives, in which he used fossil-fuel regulations intended to keep Americans healthy as a bargaining chip for soliciting campaign donations. But that kind of move is only possible after your opponent has set the pieces on the board — and if your opponent is disingenuous, as likely as not, you’ll have lost by the time you get started.
If there is any good news, it’s that the presidential debate itself won’t matter. Whatever Trump and Biden say about climate next month won’t change the minds of any of the few dozen people (OK fine, actually more like 63 million, based on the audience of their last matchup, in 2020) likely to tune in.
The bad news is that Biden has already lost the climate debate, even if Trump renews his distinction of setting “the tone for the worst presidential debate in living memory,” as he did the last time around. Because by arguing foolish premises, Biden legitimizes them. And he may have no other choice.
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Current conditions: States left flooded from recent severe storms are now facing freezing temperatures • Firefighters are battling blazes in Scotland due to unusually warm and dry weather • Hospitals in India are reporting a 25% rise in heat-related illnesses compared to last year. Yesterday the country’s northern state of Rajasthan reached 115 degrees Fahrenheit, about 13 degrees higher than seasonal norms.
President Trump’s sweeping new tariffs came into effect at 12:01 a.m. on Wednesday, rattling the world’s markets and raising the risk of a global trade war. The levies, which include a 104% tariff on Chinese imports, triggered a mass sell-off in U.S. Treasury bonds, hiking yields as investors worry about a potential recession and flock to alternative safe-haven investments. The price of oil fell for the fifth day in a row to its lowest since 2021, with Brent futures at about $61 per barrel, well below the $65 level that oil producers need in order to turn a profit drilling new wells nationwide. As Heatmap’s Robinson Meyer explained recently, the tariffs are an outright catastrophe for the oil industry because they threaten a global downturn that would hurt oil demand at a time when oil cartel OPEC+ is increasing its output. Trump’s slate of tariffs will impact the cost of just about everything, from gasoline to e-bikes to LNG to cars. China imposed retaliatory tariffs, increasing them from 34% to 84% in response to the U.S. escalation. Meanwhile, the European Union will vote today on whether to impose its own retaliatory fees. European shares plummeted, as did Asian and Australian stocks.
As Heatmap’s Emily Pontecorvo reported today, a new study published in the journal Nature Climate Change finds that the transition to clean energy could create a world that is less exposed to energy price shocks and other energy-related trade risks than the world we have today. “We have such a concentration of fossil resources in a few countries,” Steven Davis, a professor of Earth system science at Stanford and the lead author of the study, told Pontecorvo. Transition minerals, by contrast, are less geographically concentrated, so “you have this ability to hedge a little bit across the system.”
The White House issued several executive orders on Tuesday aimed at boosting U.S. coal production and use, pointing to rising electricity demand from artificial intelligence. The series of orders direct federal agencies to:
Trump also said he plans to invoke the Defense Production Act to spur mining operations, “a move that could put the federal purse behind reviving the fading industry,” Reutersreported. Coal is the dirtiest fossil fuel, and its use has been in decline since 2007. As of last year, wind and solar combined surpassed coal for U.S. electricity generation.
President Trump signed a separate executive order on Tuesday that targets climate laws at the state level and seeks to remove threats to U.S. “energy dominance,” including “illegitimate impediments to the identification, development, siting, production, investment in, or use of domestic energy resources — particularly oil, natural gas, coal, hydropower, geothermal, biofuel, critical mineral, and nuclear energy resources.” The order references “state overreach” and suggests that some state and local governments are overstepping their constitutional authority in regulating energy through interstate trade barriers or fines on energy producers. It calls out New York and Vermont for their climate change superfund laws that require fossil fuel companies to pay for their planet-warming greenhouse gas emissions. And it mentions California’s carbon cap-and-trade system.
The executive order directs the U.S. attorney general to compile a list of all state and local laws “purporting to address ‘climate change,’” along with ESG, environmental justice, carbon taxes, and anything involving “carbon or ‘greenhouse gas’ emissions,” and put a stop to their enforcement. “The federal government cannot unilaterally strip states’ independent constitutional authority,” New York Governor Kathy Hochul and New Mexico Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham said in a statement. “We are a nation of states — and laws — and we will not be deterred. We will keep advancing solutions to the climate crisis that safeguard Americans’ fundamental right to clean air and water, create good-paying jobs, grow the clean energy economy, and make our future healthier and safer.”
Wood Mackenzie issued its annual U.S. wind energy report this week. It finds that 2024 marked the worst year for new onshore wind capacity in the past decade, with just 3.9 gigawatts installed. Through 2029, the firm expects developers to install another 33 gigawatts of onshore capacity, 6.6 gigawatts of offshore capacity, and carry out 5.5 gigawatts of upgrades and refurbishings. The five-year outlook marks “a 40% decrease quarter-on-quarter from a previous total of 75.8 gigawatts.” The report warns of enduring “uncertainty” thanks to the Trump administration’s attacks on the wind industry. “Growth will happen, but it’s going to be slower,” wrote Michelle Lewis at Electrek. “[Trump] has managed to get some projects canceled, and he’ll make things more of a slog over the next few years.”
President Trump has pulled the U.S. out of international talks to decarbonize the shipping industry and vowed to reciprocate against any fees on U.S. ships, Politicoreported. The International Maritime Organization's Maritime Environmental Protection Conference is unfolding this week in London, where negotiators are trying to agree on a policy to curb shipping pollution through carbon taxation. Shipping accounts for about 3% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Trump reportedly sent a letter to the conference saying “the U.S. rejects any and all efforts to impose economic measures against its ships based on GHG emissions or fuel choice. Should such a blatantly unfair measure go forward, our government will consider reciprocal measures so as to offset any fees charged to U.S. ships and compensate the American people for any other economic harm from any adopted GHG emissions measures.”
“What’s next, a mandate that Americans must commute by horse and buggy?”
–Kit Kennedy, a managing director at the Natural Resources Defense Council, in response to Trump’s executive orders aimed at revitalizing the U.S. coal industry.
Rob and Jesse get into the nitty gritty on China’s energy policy with Joanna Lewis and John Paul Helveston.
China’s industrial policy for clean energy has turned the country into a powerhouse of solar, wind, battery, and electric vehicle manufacturing.
But long before the country’s factories moved global markets — and invited Trump’s self-destructive tariffs — the country implemented energy and technology policy to level up its domestic industry. How did those policies work? Which tools worked best? And if the United States needs to rebuild in the wake of Trump’s tariffs, what should this country learn?
On this week’s episode of Shift Key, Rob and Jesse talk with two scholars who have been studying Chinese industrial policy since the Great Recession. Joanna Lewis is the Provost’s Distinguished Associate Professor of Energy and Environment and Director of the Science, Technology and International Affairs Program at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. She’s also the author of Green Innovation in China. John Paul Helveston is an assistant professor in engineering management and systems engineering at George Washington University. He studies consumer preferences and market demand for new technologies, as well as China’s longstanding gasoline car and EV industrial policy. Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap, and Jesse Jenkins, a professor of energy systems engineering at Princeton University.
Subscribe to “Shift Key” and find this episode on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Amazon, or wherever you get your podcasts.
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Here is an excerpt from our conversation:
Robinson Meyer: One kind of classical hard problem about industrial policy is selecting the technology that is going to eventually be a winner. And there’s a few ways to get around this problem. One is to just make lots of bets.
One thing that’s been a little unclear to me about the set of technology bets that China has made is that it has seemed to pick a set of technologies that are now extremely competitive globally, and it did seem to pick up on those technologies before Western governments or firms really got to them. Is that entirely because China just made a bunch of technology bets and it happened that these are the ones that worked out? Is it because China could look ahead to the environmental needs of the world and the clean development needs of the world and say, well, there’s probably going to be a need for solar? There’s probably going to be a need for wind? There’s probably going to be a need for EVs? Or is it a third thing, which is that China’s domestic needs, its domestic energy security needs, just happen to align really well with the direction of development that the world is kind of interested in moving in anyway.
John Paul Helveston: All of the above. I don’t know — like, that’s the answer here. I’ll add one thing that’s a little bit nuanced: There’s been tremendous waste. I’ll just put that out there. There’s been all kinds of investments that did not pan out at all, like semiconductors for a long, long time. Just things that didn’t work.
I think where China has had a lot of success is in areas where … It’s like the inverse of what the United States innovation ecosystem does well. China’s ecosystem is really driven around production, and a lot of that is part of the way the government’s set up, that local provinces have a ton of power over how money gets spent, and often repurpose funds for export-oriented production. So that’s been a piece of the engine of China’s economic miracle, is mass producing everything.
But there’s a lot of knowledge that goes along with that. When you look at things like solar, that technology goes back many, many decades for, you know, satellites. But making it a mass produced product for energy applications requires production innovations. You need to get costs down. You need to figure out how to make the machine that makes the machine. And that is something that the Chinese ecosystem does very well.
So that’s one throughline across all of these things, is that the technology got to a certain level of maturity where production improvements and cost decreases were the bigger things that made them globally competitive. I don’t think anyone would be considering an EV if we were still looking at $1,000 a kilowatt hour — and we were there just 15 years ago. And so that’s the big thing. It’s just production. I don’t know if they’ve been exceptionally good at just picking winners, but they’re good at picking things that can be mass produced.
Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow.
That’s according to new research published today analyzing flows of minerals and metals vs. fossil fuels.
Among fossil fuel companies and clean energy developers, almost no one has been spared from the effects of Trump’s sweeping tariffs. But the good news is that in general, the transition to clean energy could create a world that is less exposed to energy price shocks and other energy-related trade risks than the world we have today.
That’s according to a timely study published in Nature Climate Change on Wednesday. The authors compared countries’ trade risks under a fossil fuel-based energy economy to a net-zero emissions economy, focusing on the electricity and transportation sectors. The question was whether relying on oil, gas, and coal for energy left countries more or less exposed than relying on the minerals and metals that go into clean energy technologies, including lithium, cobalt, nickel, and uranium.
First the researchers identified which countries have known reserves of which resources as well as those countries’ established trading partners. Then they evaluated more than a thousand pathways for how the world could achieve net-zero emissions, each with different amounts or configurations of wind, solar, batteries, nuclear, and electric vehicles, and measured how exposed to trade risks each country would be under each scenario.
Ultimately, they found that most countries’ overall trade risks decreased under net-zero emissions scenarios relative to today. “We have such a concentration of fossil resources in a few countries,” Steven Davis, a professor of Earth system science at Stanford and the lead author of the study, told me. Transition minerals, by contrast, are less geographically concentrated, so “you have this ability to hedge a little bit across the system.”
The authors’ metric for trade risk is a combination of how dependent a given country is on imports and how many trading partners it has for a given resource, i.e. how diverse its sourcing is. “If you have a large domestic supply of a resource, or you have a large trade network, and you can get that resource from lots of different trading partners, you're in a relatively better spot,” Davis said.
Of course, this is a weird time to conclude that clean energy is better equipped to withstand trade shocks. As my colleagues at Heatmap have reported, Trump’s tariffs are hurting the economics of batteries, renewables, and minerals production, whether domestic or not. The paper considers risks from “random and isolated trade shocks,” Davis told me, like losing access to Bolivian lithium due to military conflict or a natural disaster. Trump’s tariffs, by contrast, are impacting everything, everywhere, all at once.
Davis embarked on the study almost two years ago after working as a lead author of the mitigation section of the Fifth National Climate Assessment, a report delivered to Congress every four years. A lot of the chapter focused on the economics of switching to solar and wind and trying to electrify as many end uses of energy as possible, but it also touched on considerations such as environmental justice, water, land, and trade. “There's this concern of having access to some of these more exotic materials, and whether that could be a vulnerability,” he told me. “So we said, okay, but we also know we're going to be trading a lot less fossil fuels, and that is probably going to be a huge benefit. So let's try to figure out what the net effect is.”
The study found that some more affluent countries, including the United States, could see their energy security decline in net-zero scenarios unless their trade networks expand. The U.S. owns 23% of the fossil reserves used for electricity generation, but only 4% of the critical materials needed for solar panels and wind turbines.
One conclusion for Davis was that the U.S. should be much more strategic about its trade partnerships with countries in South America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Companies are already starting to invest in developing mineral resources in those regions, but policymakers should make a concerted effort to develop those trade relationships, as well. The study also discusses how governments can reduce trade risks by investing in recycling infrastructure and in research to reduce the material intensity of clean energy technologies.
Davis also acknowledged that focusing on the raw materials alone oversimplifies the security question. It also matters where the minerals are processed, and today, a lot of that processing happens in China, even for minerals that don’t originate there. That means it will also be important to build up processing capacity elsewhere.
One caveat to the paper is that comparing the trade risks of fossil fuels and clean energy is sort of apples and oranges. A fossil fuel-based energy system requires the raw resource — fuel — to operate. But a clean energy system mostly requires the raw materials in the manufacturing and construction phase. Once you have solar panels and wind turbines, you don’t need continuous commodity inputs to get energy out of them. Ultimately, Davis said, the study’s conclusions about the comparative trade risks are probably conservative.
“Interrupting the flow of some of these transition materials could slow our progress in getting to the net zero future, but it would have much less of an impact on the actual cost of energy to Americans,” he said. “If we can successfully get a lot of these things built, then I think that's going to be a very secure situation.”